Optimal income taxation with endogenous participation and search unemployment.*

Numerical Results are Preliminary

Etienne LEHMANN† Alexis PARMENTIER‡
CREST, IZA, IDEP and EPEE-TEPP - Université d’Evry and
Université Catholique de Louvain Université Catholique de Louvain
Bruno VAN DER LINDEN§
IRES - Department of Economics - Université Catholique de Louvain,
FNRS, ERMES - Université Paris 2 and IZA

September 1, 2008

Abstract

This paper characterizes the optimal redistributive taxation when individuals are heterogeneous in two exogenous dimensions: their skills and their values of non-market activities. Search-matching frictions on the labor markets create unemployment. Wages, labor demand and participation are endogenous. The government only observes wage levels. Under a Maximin objective, if the elasticity of participation decreases along the distribution of skills, at the optimum, the average tax rate is increasing, marginal tax rates are positive everywhere, while wages, unemployment rates and participation rates are distorted downwards compared to their laissez-faire values. A simulation exercise confirms some of these properties under a general utilitarian objective. Taking account of the wage-cum-labor demand margin deeply changes the equity-efficiency trade off.

Keywords: Non-linear taxation; redistribution; adverse selection; random participation; unemployment; labor market frictions.

JEL codes: D82; H21; J64

*We thank for their comments Pierre Cahuc, Mathias Hungerbühler, Laurence Jacquet, Guy Laroque, Cecilia Garcia-Penlosa, Fabien Postel-Vinay and participants at seminars at the Université Catholique de Louvain, CREST, Málaga, EPEE-Evry, Gains-Le Mans, CES-Paris 1, ERMES-Paris 2, the IZA-SOLE 2008 Transatlantic meeting, the 7th Journées Louis-André Gérard-Varet and the University of Konstanz. Any errors are ours. This research has been funded by the Belgian Program on Interuniversity Poles of Attraction (P6/07 Economic Policy and Finance in the Global Economy: Equilibrium Analysis and Social Evaluation) initiated by the Belgian State, Prime Minister’s Office, Science Policy Programming.

†Address: CREST-INSEE, Timbre J360, 15 boulevard Gabriel Péri, 92245, Malakoff Cedex, France. Email: etienne.lehmann@ensae.fr
‡Address: EPEE - Université d’Evry Val d’Essone, 4 boulevard François Mitterand, 91025, Evry Cedex, France. Email: alexis.parmentier@univ-evry.fr
§Address: IRES - Département d’économie, Université Catholique de Louvain, Place Montesquieu 3, B1348, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium. Email: bruno.vanderlinden@uclouvain.be
I Introduction

In the literature on optimal redistributive taxation initiated by Mirrlees (1971), non-employment, if any, is synonymous with non-participation. The importance of participation decisions is not debatable. However, according to Mirrlees (1999), “another desire is to have a model in which unemployment [in our words, “non-employment”] can arise and persist for reasons other than a preference for leisure”. Along this view, it is important to recognize that some people remain jobless despite they do search for a job at the market wage. To account for this fact, one should depart from the assumption of walrasian labor markets. If wage formation is not competitive, more progressive taxes on earnings moderate wages (see e.g. Lockwood and Manning, 1993). This in turn stimulates labor demand, reduces unemployment, and hence deeply changes the equity-efficiency trade-off. Our paper characterizes the optimal redistribution when taxation affects both participation decisions and wages.

Our economy is made of a continuum of skill-specific labor markets. On each of them, we introduce matching frictions à la Mortensen and Pissarides (1999). In this setting, both labor supply and demand matter to determine the equilibrium level of unemployment. In a variety of wage formation mechanisms, from the viewpoint of an employee, a more progressive tax schedule reduces the marginal benefit of a unit increase in her pre-tax (or ‘gross’) wage without changing the marginal loss of chances to be employed. Through this channel, tax progressivity reduces the equilibrium wage, stimulates labor demand and reduces unemployment. Concerning participation, we assume that whatever their skill, individuals differ in their value of remaining out of the labor force. A higher level of taxes reduces the participation rate. In sum, taxes are distorsive via the participation margin and the wage-cum-labor demand margin.

As the government cannot observe an agent’s skill, taxation of workers can only be conditioned on their wage (generating an adverse selection problem with random participation à la Rochet and Stole, 2002). In the literature following Mirrlees (1971), optimal tax schedules have few general properties. In our case, when the government has a Maximin (Rawlsian) objective, the optimal tax schedule has on the contrary clear properties if the elasticities of participation verify a monotonicity assumption. In the most plausible case where these elasticities are decreasing along the skill distribution, we prove that optimal marginal tax rates are positive everywhere and optimal average tax rates are increasing. The reason is that a more progressive tax schedule increases the level of tax at the top of the skill distribution where participation decisions are less elastic and decreases the level of tax where participation reacts more strongly to the tax pressure. In addition, a more progressive tax schedule distorts wages and unemployment rates downwards. At the optimum, the marginal loss generated by the latter distortion equalizes the net gain due to the former adjustment in participation decisions.

We also derive the optimal tax formula under a general utilitarian criterion. As in the
Maximin case, we provide an intuitive interpretation of the optimality condition by considering the consequences of a marginal tax reform and by emphasizing the role of behavioral elasticities. Unemployment has two effects on social welfare that cannot be recognized if the wage-cum-labor demand margin is ignored. First, since income net of taxes and transfers has to be higher in employment than in non-employment (to induce participation), unemployment per se causes a loss in social welfare. Second, because some participants to the labor market are eventually unemployed, enhancing participation has a detrimental effect on social welfare. These channels influence the optimal tax profile because the latter has an impact on wages and on participation decisions.

To illustrate the properties found in the Maximin case and to cast light on the more complex mechanisms at work in the general utilitarian case, this paper also provides numerical simulations for the US. In the Maximin case, it turns out that the optimal tax profile is well approximated by an assistance benefit tapered away at a high and nearly constant rate. If the government maximizes a Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function, the tax profile is different with marginal tax rates that are roughly increasing, inducing lower unemployment rates to be lowered.

In the optimal taxation literature that follows Mirrlees (1971), marginal tax rates have to be positive everywhere, except at the top of the skill distribution when this distribution is bounded.\footnote{See Choné and Laroque (2007) for a counterexample with negative marginal tax rates under a specific objective function. See Diamond (1998) for positive marginal tax rates everywhere under an unbounded Pareto skill distribution.} The average tax rate cannot be increasing everywhere, except if the skill distribution is unbounded (Hindriks \textit{et al}, 2006). In these models where the intensive margin (i.e. work effort) is the only source of deadweight loss, positive marginal tax rates distorts gross income downwards. Our results contrast with those of the literature initiated by Mirrlees (1971) since we do not need unbounded distribution of skills to find positive marginal tax rates everywhere and increasing average tax rates.

The comprehensive surveys of Blundell and MacCurdy (1999) and Meghir and Phillips (2008) conclude that labor supply responses along the intensive margin are empirically very small. There is now growing evidences that the extensive margin (i.e. participation decisions) matters more. Diamond (1980) and Choné and Laroque (2005) have studied optimal income taxation when individuals’ decisions are limited to a dichotomic choice about whether to work or not. At the optimum, the level of taxes trades off the equity gain of a higher level of tax against the efficiency loss of a lower level of participation. However, wages are not distorted in these models because of a competitive labor market and exogenous productivity levels. Saez (2002) has proposed a model of optimal taxation where both extensive and intensive margins of the labor supply are present. Cahuc and Laroque (2007) have recently introduced monopsonistic labor markets in the model of Diamond (1980). They explain how optimal taxation can undo...
the distortions induced by the monopsony.

Some papers have made a distinction between unemployment and non-participation. Boardway et al (2003) study redistribution when unemployment is endogenous and generated by matching frictions or efficiency wages. The focus is on the role of employment policies and tax-transfer when the government is well informed (it observes productivities and can distinguish among the various types of unemployed). We focus on redistributive taxation when the government observes only wages. Boone and Bovenberg (2004) add a participation constraint to the standard model of nonlinear income taxation à la Mirrlees (1971). Job-search is nonverifiable and is the single determinant of the unemployment risk. The cost of search is linear and homogeneous in the population. Conditional on an exogenous level of assistance benefit and a tax schedule, there is a unique threshold of productivity above which search effort reaches an upper-bound and below which people do not search at all. The unemployment risk is therefore exogenous. Optimal taxation trades off the distortions on the search margin and those on effort in work. In Boone and Bovenberg (2006), the framework is similar but the government observes worker’s skill. So, taxation is skill-specific and the participation constraint binds all along the skill distribution. The focus is on the respective roles of the assistance benefit and of in-work benefits in redistributing income.

Hungerbühler et al (2006), henceforth HLPV, have proposed an optimal income tax model where unemployment is endogenous and due to matching frictions. With a utilitarian criterion, HLPV find that wages have to be distorted downwards, marginal tax rates have to be positive everywhere and the average tax rate is increasing. The present paper differs from HLPV in three important respects. First, the cost of participation takes a unique value in HLPV. Hence, every agent above (below) an endogenous threshold of skill participates (does not participate). In the present paper, we allow the opportunity cost of participation to vary within and between skill levels. This leads to a more general and to us more realistic treatment of participation decisions. In this sense, HLPV is a particular case of the present paper where the elasticity of participation is infinite at the threshold, and zero above. Second, following Saez (2001) and contrary to HLPV, the present paper expresses our optimality conditions in terms of behavioral elasticities. This renders these conditions more intuitive and reveals in particular the critical role played by the elasticity of participation in the Maximin case. Third, HLPV assume Nash bargaining over wages under the so-called Hosios (1990) condition. In the present paper, wages are selected in a more general way which is compatible with a wider class of matching functions. Wage-setting still implies that the laissez-faire allocation is efficient (in the Benthamite sense). This assumption offers a good benchmark to discuss redistribution issues.

The paper is organized as follows. The model is presented in the next section. Fiscal incidence is also discussed in this section. Throughout the paper, we stick to the welfarist view
(i.e. the government’s objective depends on utility levels). Section III characterizes the Maximin optimum. Section IV presents the optimality conditions under the general utilitarian criterion. Section V explains how we calibrate the model and presents numerical simulations of optimal tax schedules. Finally, Section VI concludes.

II  The model

As usual in the optimal non linear tax literature that follows Mirrlees (1971), we consider a static framework where the government is averse to inequality. For simplicity we assume risk-neutral agents. In our model, the sources of differences in earnings are threefold. First, individuals are endowed with different levels of productivity (or skill) denoted by $a$. The distribution of skills admits a continuous density function $f(.)$ on a support $[a_0, a_1]$, with $0 \leq a_0 < a_1 \leq +\infty$. The size of the population is normalized to 1. Second, whatever their skill, some people choose to stay out of the labor force while some others do participate to the labor market. To account for this fact, we assume that individuals of a given skill differ in their individual-specific gain $\chi$ of remaining out of the labor force. We call $\chi$ the value of non-market activities. Third, among those who participate to the labor market, some fail to be recruited and become unemployed. This “involuntary” unemployment is due to matching frictions à la Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) and Pissarides (2000). Labor markets are perfectly segmented by skill. This assumption is made for tractability and is more realist than the polar one of a unique labor market for all skill levels. The timing of events is the following:

1. The government commits to an untaxed assistance benefit $b$ and a tax function $T(.)$ that only depends on the (gross) wage $w$.\(^2\)

2. For each skill level $a$, firms decide how many vacancies to create. Creating a vacancy of type $a$ costs $\kappa(a)$. Individuals of type $(a, \chi)$ decide whether they participate to the labor market of type $a$.

3. On each labor market, the matching process determines the number of filled jobs. Since an individual of type $(a, \chi)$ who chooses to participate renounces $\chi$, all participants of skill $a$ are alike. We henceforth call these individuals participants of type $a$ for short. Each participant supplies an exogenous amount of labor normalized to 1. So, earnings and (gross) wages are equal.

4. Each worker of skill $a$ produces $a$ units of goods, receives a wage $w = w_a$ and pays taxes. Taxes finance the assistance benefit and an exogenous amount of public expenditures $E \geq 0$. Agents consume.

\(^2\)If the income tax and the assistance schemes were administered by different authorities, new issues would arise that we do not consider here.
We assume that the government does neither observe individuals’ types \((a, \chi)\) nor the job-search and matching processes.\(^3\) It only observes workers’ gross wages \(w_a\) and is unable to distinguish among the non-employed individuals those who have searched for a job but failed to find one (the unemployed) from the non participants.\(^4\) Moreover, as our model is static, the government is unable to infer the type of a jobless individual from her past earnings. Therefore, the government is constrained to give the same level of assistance benefit \(b\) to all non-employed individuals, whatever their type \((a, \chi)\) or their participation decisions.\(^5\) An individual of type \((a, \chi)\) can decide to remain out of the labor force, in which case her utility equals \(b + \chi\). Otherwise, she finds a job with an endogenous probability \(\ell_a\) and gets a net-of-tax wage \(w_a - T(w_a)\) or she becomes unemployed with probability \(1 - \ell_a\) and gets the assistance benefit \(b\).\(^6\)

II.1 Participation decisions

An individual of type \((a, \chi)\) chooses to participate only if she expects a gain in participation, \(\ell_a (w_a - T(w_a)) + (1 - \ell_a) b\), higher than if she stays out of the labor force, \(b + \chi\). Let

\[
\Sigma_a \equiv \ell_a (w_a - T(w_a) - b)
\]

denote the expected surplus of a participant of type \(a\). Let \(G(a, \cdot)\) be the cumulative distribution of the value of non-market activities, conditional on the skill level, that is

\[
G(a, \Sigma) \equiv \Pr[\chi \leq \Sigma | a]
\]

Then, the participation rate among individuals of skill \(a\) equals \(G(a, \Sigma_a)\) and hence the number of participants of type \(a\) equals \(U_a = G(a, \Sigma_a) f(a)\). We denote the continuous conditional density of the value of non-market activities by \(g(a, \Sigma)\). The support of \(g(a, \cdot)\) is an interval whose lower bound is 0. Note that the characteristics \(a\) and \(\chi\) can be independent or not. We define

\[
\pi_a \equiv \frac{\Sigma_a \cdot g(a, \Sigma_a)}{G(a, \Sigma_a)}
\]

the elasticity of the participation rate with respect to \(\Sigma\), at \(\Sigma = \Sigma_a\). This elasticity is in general both endogenous and skill-dependent. Note that \(\pi_a\) also equals the elasticity of the participation rate of agents of skill \(a\) with respect to \(w_a - T(w_a) - b\) when \(\ell_a\) is fixed. The empirical literature typically estimates the latter elasticity.

\(^3\)Since the government cannot infer the skill of workers from the screening of job applicants made by firms, the tax schedule cannot be skill-specific. We do not consider the possibility that redistribution could be also based on observable characteristics related to skills (see Akerlof, 1978).

\(^4\)However, the government is able to compute the probabilities of participation and of employment. It also knows the density \(f(\cdot)\) and the boundaries of the support of \(a\).

\(^5\)Similarly, in Boone and Bovenberg (2004, 2006), the welfare benefit does not depend on the ability of the jobless individual.

\(^6\)Our model can easily be extended to include a skill-specific fixed cost of working.
II.2 Labor demand

On the labor market of skill \(a\), creating a vacancy costs \(\kappa(a) > 0\). This cost includes the investment in equipment and the screening of applicants. Only a fraction of vacancies finds a suitable worker to recruit. Following the matching literature (Mortensen and Pissarides 1999, Pissarides 2000 and Rogerson et al 2005), we assume that the number of filled positions is a function \(H(a, V_a, U_a)\) of the numbers \(V_a\) of vacancies and \(U_a\) of job-seekers. The matching function \(H(a, \ldots)\) on the labor market of skill \(a\) has the following properties.\(^7\) It is twice-continuously differentiable on \(\mathbb{R}_+^2\) and increasing in both arguments. It exhibits constant returns to scale. Moreover, \(H(a, V_a, 0) = H(a, 0, U_a) = 0\), and for all \(V_a\) and \(U_a\), one has \(H(a, V_a, U_a) < \min(V_a, U_a)\). Define tightness \(\theta_a\) as the ratio \(V_a/U_a\). The probability that a vacancy is filled equals \(q(a, \theta_a) \equiv H(a, 1, 1/\theta_a) = H(a, V_a, U_a)/V_a\). Due to search-matching externalities, the job-filling probability decreases with the number of vacancies and increases with the number of job-seekers. Because of constant returns to scale, only tightness matters and \(q(a, \theta_a)\) is a decreasing function of \(\theta_a\). Symmetrically, the probability that a job-seeker finds a job is an increasing function of tightness \(p(a, \theta_a) \equiv H(a, \theta_a, 1) = H(a, V_a, U_a)/U_a\). Firms and individuals being atomistic, they take tightness \(\theta_a\) as given.

When a firm creates a vacancy of type \(a\), she fills it with probability \(q(a, \theta_a)\). Then, her profit at stage 2 equals \(a - w_a\). Therefore, her expected profit at stage 2 equals \(q(a, \theta_a)(a - w_a) - \kappa(a)\). Firms create vacancies until the free-entry condition \(q(\theta_a)(a - w_a) = \kappa(a)\) is met. This pins down the value of tightness \(\theta_a\) and in turn the probability of finding a job through\(^8\)

\[
L(a, w_a) \equiv p\left(a, q^{-1}\left(a, \frac{\kappa(a)}{a - w_a}\right)\right) \quad (2)
\]

At the equilibrium, one has \(\ell_a = L(a, w_a)\) and

\[
\Sigma_a = L(a, w_a)(w_a - T(w_a) - b) \quad (3)
\]

The \(L(\ldots)\) function is a reduced form that captures everything we need on the labor demand side. From the assumptions made on the matching function, \(L(\ldots)\) is continuously differentiable and admits values within \((0, 1)\). As the wage increases, firms get lower profit on each filled vacancy, fewer vacancies are created and tightness decreases. This explains why \(\partial L/\partial w_a < 0\). Moreover, due to the constant-returns-to-scale assumption, the probability of being employed depends only on skill and wage levels and not on the number of participants. If for a given wage, there are twice more participants, the free-entry condition leads to twice more vacancies, so the level of employment is twice higher and the employment probability is unaffected. This property

\(\text{7See Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) for microfoundations and empirical evidence about the matching function.}\)

\(\text{8Where } q^{-1}(a, \ldots) \text{ denotes the inverse function of } \theta \mapsto q(a, \theta), \text{ holding } a \text{ a constant.}\)
is in accordance with the empirical evidence that the size of the labor force has no lasting effect on group-specific unemployment rates. Finally, because labor markets are perfectly segmented by skill, the probability that a participant of type $a$ finds a job depends only on the wage level $w_a$ and not on wages on other segments of the labor market.

II.3 The wage setting

As the literature dealing with optimal redistribution in a competitive framework (Mirrlees 1971 and followers), we focus on the redistribution issue and abstract from the standard inefficiency arising from matching frictions. In other words, we consider a setting such that the role of taxation is only to redistribute income (as in Mirrlees) and not restore efficiency (as in e.g. Boone and Bovenberg 2002). For this purpose, we consider a wage-setting mechanism that maximizes the sum of utility levels in the absence of taxes and benefits. To obtain this property, the matching literature typically assumes that wages are the outcome of a Nash bargaining and that the workers’ bargaining power equals the elasticity of the matching function with respect to unemployment (see Hosios 1990). This assumption is only meaningful if the elasticity of the matching function is constant and exogenous. When the matching function is of the Cobb-Douglas form $H(a,U_a,V_a) = A(U_a)^\gamma(V_a)^{1-\gamma}$, Equation (2) implies that $L(a,w) = A^{1/\gamma}((a-w)/\kappa(a))^{((1-\gamma)/\gamma)}$. Then, Nash bargaining under the Hosios condition leads to a wage level that solves (see HLPV):9

$$w_a = \arg \max_w L(a,w) \cdot (w - T(w) - b) \quad (4)$$

When the matching function is not of the Cobb-Douglas form, we assume that (4) still holds. So, $\Sigma_a = \max_w L(a,w) \cdot (w - T(w) - b)$ and the equilibrium wage maximizes the participation rate given the tax/benefit system.

Different wage-setting mechanisms can provide microfoundations for (4). The Competitive Search Equilibrium introduced by Moen (1997) and Shimer (1996) leads to this property.10 Another possibility is to assume that a skill-specific utilitarian monopoly union selects the wage $w_a$ after individuals’ participation decisions but before firms’ decisions about vacancy creation (see Mortensen and Pissarides 1999).

II.4 The laissez faire

The laissez faire is defined as the economy without tax and benefit. According to (4), the equilibrium level of wage in this economy amounts to maximize $L(a,w) \cdot w$. A wage increase has

9 If different wage levels solve (4), then we make the tie-breaking assumption that the wage level preferred by the government will be selected. See also the discussion in Mirrlees (1971, footnotes 2 and 3 pages 177).
10 We have verified this claim in a previous version of this article available upon request.
a direct positive effect on \( L(a, w) \cdot w \) and a negative effect through the employment probability. To ensure that program (4) is well-behaved at the \textit{laissez faire}, we assume that for any \((a, w)\),

\[
\frac{\partial^2 \log L(a, w_a)}{\partial w \cdot \partial \log w}(a, w) < 0
\]

We henceforth denote \( w_{a}^\text{LF} \) the wage at the \textit{laissez faire}. To guarantee that \( w_{a}^\text{LF} \) increases with the level of skill, we further assume that for any \((a, w)\):

\[
\frac{\partial^2 \log L}{\partial a \partial w}(a, w) > 0
\]

Appendix A verifies that, when the exogenous amount of public expenditures \( E \) is nil, the \textit{laissez-faire} economy maximizes the Benthamite objective, which equals the sum of utility levels. Because of our wage-setting mechanism (4), wages at the \textit{laissez faire} maximize “efficiency” (i.e. maximize the Benthamite criterion). Note that participation decisions are then also efficient.

II.5 Fiscal incidence

We now reintroduce the tax/benefit system and explain how tax reforms affect the equilibrium. Starting with the wage, notice that the objective in (4) multiplies the employment probability by the difference between the net incomes in employment and in unemployment. We call this difference the \textit{ex-post surplus} and denote it \( x \equiv w - T(w) - b \). It subtracts an “employment tax”, \( T(w) + b \), from the earnings \( w \). In our setting, the influence of the tax and benefit system comes through the profile of the relationship between the ex-post surplus \( x \) and earnings \( w \).

Because of the multiplicative form of (4), what actually matters is how \( \log x \) varies with \( \log w \).

When \( T(.) \) is differentiable, the first-order condition\(^{11}\) of Program (4) writes:

\[
- \frac{\partial \log L}{\partial \log w}(a, w_a) = \eta(w_a)
\]

where\(^{12}\)

\[
\eta(w) \equiv \frac{1 - T'(w)}{1 - T'(w) + b} = \frac{\partial \log (w - T(w) - b)}{\partial \log w}
\]

When the wage increases by one percent, the term \( \partial \log L / \partial \log w (a, w) \) measures the relative decrease in the employment probability, while \( \eta(w) \) measures the relative increase in the ex-post surplus. At equilibrium, Equation (7) requires that these two relative changes sum to

\(^{11}\)The solution to (4), if any, necessarily lies in \((-\infty, a - \kappa(a))\). Since \( L(a, a - \kappa(a)) = 0 \), \( \omega = a - \kappa(a) \) does not solve (4). From a theoretical viewpoint, the wage can be negative whenever \( T(.) \) is negative enough to keep some agents of type \( a \) participating to the labor market (i.e. \( \omega - T(.) > b \)). Hence the solution to (4) is necessarily interior. In the rest of the paper, we focus on positive wage levels.

\(^{12}\)\( \eta(w) \) is reminiscent of the Coefficient of Residual Income Progression which measures the wage elasticity of net earnings (Musgrave and Musgrave 1976). \( \eta(w) \) is actually the Coefficient of Residual Income Progression divided by one minus the net replacement ratio \( b/(w - T(w)) \).
zero. Notice that in our setting the profile of $\eta(w)$ gathers all the information about the profile of the tax/benefit system needed to fix the equilibrium wage. Figure 1 displays indifference expected surplus curves. The equation of these indifference curves can be written as $\log x = \text{constant} - \log L(a, w)$. From (2) and (5), these curves are increasing and convex. The solution to Program (4) then consists in choosing the highest indifference curve taking the relationship between $\log x$ and $\log w$ into account. In case of differentiability, this amounts to choosing the highest indifference curve tangent to the $\log w \mapsto \log x = \log (w - T(w) - b)$ schedule. The first-order condition (7) combined with (8) expresses this tangency condition.

![Figure 1: The choice of the wage for a type $a$ match.](image)

For comparative static purposes, consider for a while the average tax rate $T(w_a)/w_a$, the assistance benefit ratio $b/w_a$ and the marginal tax rate $T'(w_a)$ as parameters. So, $\eta(w_a)$ is provisionally a parameter, too. Under Condition (5), Equations (7) and (8) imply that the equilibrium wage $w_a$ (thereby the unemployment rate $1 - L(a, w_a)$) increases with the average tax rate and the assistance benefit ratio and decreases with the marginal tax rate. These properties are standard in the equilibrium unemployment literature. They hold under monopoly unions (Hersoug 1984), right-to-manage bargaining (Lockwood and Manning 1993), efficiency wages with continuous effort (Pisauro 1991) or matching models with Nash bargaining (Pissarides 1998). Sørensen (1997) and Røed and Strøm (2002) provide some empirical evidence in favor of the wage-moderating effect of higher marginal tax rates. In addition, Manning (1993) finds that higher marginal tax rates lower unemployment in the UK.

Imagine a tax reform such that participants of type $a$ face a rise in the slope $\eta$ of the $\log w \mapsto \log x$ function. A relative rise in the wage induces now a higher relative gain in the ex-post surplus $x$. Still, the relative loss in the employment probability is unchanged.
Consequently, the rise in $\eta$ induces an increase in the equilibrium wage $w_a$ that substitutes ex-post surplus for employment probability. This is reminiscent of the substitution effect in a competitive framework with adjustments along the intensive margin. There, a lower marginal tax rate raises the net hourly wage and leads to a substitution toward consumption and away from leisure time. Returning to our setting, Equation (7) indicates that for a given slope of the $\log w \mapsto \log x$ function, the level of this function does not affect the equilibrium wage. In this specific sense, there is no income effect of the tax schedule on wages.

In the general case where $\eta$ is a function of the wage, a change in this slope produces a direct change in wage levels. This in turn creates a second change in $\eta$ which produces a further change in the wage. To clarify this circular process and to prepare the analysis developed in Sections III and IV in terms of a small tax reform, imagine that the slope $\eta(w)$ of the $\log w \mapsto \log x$ relationship increases by a small exogenous amount $\tilde{\eta}$. Let us rewrite the first-order condition (7) as $W(w_a, a, 0) = 0$, where:

$$ W(w, a, \tilde{\eta}) \equiv \frac{\partial \log L}{\partial \log w}(a, w) + \eta(w) + \tilde{\eta} \quad (9) $$

The second-order condition of (4) writes $W'_w(w_a, a, 0) \leq 0$ where

$$ W'_w(w_a, a, \tilde{\eta}) = \frac{\partial^2 \log L(a, w_a)}{\partial w \cdot \partial \log w} + \eta'(w_a) $$

This second-order condition states that at the equilibrium wage $w_a$, the $\log w \mapsto \log x$ relationship depicted in Figure 1 has to be either concave or less convex than the indifference expected surplus curves. Put differently, the slope of the $\log w \mapsto \log x$ schedule cannot increase too rapidly.

Consider now how the equilibrium wage $w_a$ is influenced by small changes in the parameter $\tilde{\eta}$ and in the type $a$. Whenever the second-order condition of (4) is a strict inequality, we can apply the implicit function theorem on $W(w_a, a, \tilde{\eta}) = 0$. We then obtain the elasticity $\varepsilon_a$ of the equilibrium wage $w_a$ with respect to a small local change in $\tilde{\eta}$ around a given $\log w \mapsto \log x$ function:

$$ \varepsilon_a \equiv \frac{\eta(w_a)}{w_a} \cdot \frac{\partial w_a}{\partial \tilde{\eta}} = -\frac{1}{W'_w(w_a, a, 0)} \cdot \frac{\eta(w_a)}{w_a} > 0 \quad (10a) $$

$$ \alpha_a \equiv \frac{a}{w_a} \cdot \frac{\partial w_a}{\partial a} = -\frac{a}{w_a} \cdot \frac{\partial^2 \log L(a, w_a)}{\partial a \partial w} > 0 \quad (10b) $$

These elasticities are in general endogenous and in particular they depend on the curvature term $\eta'(w_a)$ in $W'_w$. This is because a change in wage $\Delta w_a$, that is either caused by a change in $\tilde{\eta}$ or

---

\[13\] Which is also present in the optimal non-linear taxation literature with competitive labor markets and labor supply decisions (see Saez 2001).

\[14\] When this condition is not verified, the earnings function $a \mapsto w_a$ is discontinuous.
in a, induces a change in \( \eta(w_a) \) that equals \( \eta'(w_a) \Delta w_a \) and a further change in the wage. This is at the origin of a circular process captured by the term \( \eta'(w_a) \) in \( W'_w \). However, as will be clear in Sections III and IV, only the ratio \( \varepsilon_a/\alpha_a \) enters the optimality conditions and this ratio does not depend on \( \eta'(w_a) \) but only on \( a \) and \( w_a \). The positive signs of \( \varepsilon_a \) and \( \alpha_a \) follow from the strict second-order condition \( W'_w < 0 \) and (6).

In addition to its effect on wage and unemployment through \( \eta(\cdot) \), taxation also influences participation decisions. To isolate this effect, consider a tax reform that rises \( \log(w - T(w) - b) \) by a constant amount for all \( w \) so that \( \eta(w) \) is kept unchanged. Such a tax reform does neither change the wage level, nor the employment probability. However, the employment tax \( T(w_a) + b \) is reduced and hence the surplus \( \Sigma_a \) an agent of type \( a \) can expect from participation increases. Therefore, such a reform increases the participation rate \( G(a, \Sigma_a) \), thereby the employment rate \( L(a, w_a) \cdot G(a, \Sigma_a) \). The magnitude of this behavioral response is captured by the elasticity \( \pi_a \) defined in (1). In sum, the income effect affects the participation margin and not the wage-cum-labor demand margin.

II.6 The equilibrium

For a given function \( \log w \rightarrow \log x \), the equilibrium allocation can be found recursively. The wage-setting equations (4) determine wages \( w_a \) and in turn \( x_a = w_a - T(w_a) - b \). The labor demand functions (2) determine the skill-specific unemployment rates \( 1 - L(a, w_a) \). Then, from (3), the participation rates are given by \( G(a, \Sigma_a) \) and the employment rates equal \( L(a, w_a) \cdot G(a, \Sigma_a) \).

For each additional worker of type \( a \), the government collects taxes \( T(w_a) + b \) and saves the assistance benefit \( b \). Since \( E \geq 0 \) is the exogenous amount of public expenditures, the government’s budget constraint defines the level of \( b \):

\[
b = \int_{a_0}^{a_1} (T(w_a) + b) \cdot L(a, w_a) \cdot G(a, \Sigma_a) \cdot f(a) da - E \tag{11}
\]

III The Maximin case

Under the Maximin (Rawlsian) objective, the government only values the utility of the least well-off. Unemployed individuals get \( b \), which is always lower than the workers’ and non participants’ utility levels, respectively \( w - T(w) \) and \( b + \chi \). Therefore, a Maximin government aims at maximizing \( b \) subject to the budget constraint (11) and incentive compatibility constraints. The latter state that, for each skill level, the selected wage \( w_a \) maximizes the expected surplus \( L(a, w)(w - T(w) - b) \). According to the taxation principle (Hammond 1979, Rochet 1985 and Guesnerie 1995), the set of allocations generated by the assistance benefit \( b \) and the non-linear tax schedule \( T(w) \) under the wage-setting equations (4) and the definitions of \( x_a \) and \( \Sigma_a \).
corresponds to the set of incentive-compatible allocations \((b, \{w_a, x_a, \Sigma_a\}_{a \in [a_0, a_1]}\) such that:

\[
\forall (a, a') \in [a_0, a_1]^2 \quad \Sigma_a \equiv L(a, w_a) \cdot x_a \geq L(a, w_{a'}) \cdot x_{a'}
\]  

(12)

From (6), the strict single-crossing condition holds. Hence (12) is equivalent to the differential equation \(\dot{\Sigma}_a = \Sigma_a \cdot \partial \log L/\partial a (a, w_a)\) and the monotonicity requirement that the wage \(w_a\) is a nondecreasing function of the skill level \(a\) (see Appendix B).

Following Mirrlees (1971), it is much more convenient to solve the government’s problem in terms of allocations.\textsuperscript{15} In Appendix C, we follow this approach to derive our optimal tax formula. Let \(h_a = L(a, w_a) G(a, \Sigma_a) f(a)\) denote the (endogenous) mass of workers of skill \(a\). We obtain:

**Proposition 1** For any skill level \(a \in [a_0, a_1]\), the maximin-optimal tax schedule verifies:

\[
\frac{1 - \eta(w_a)}{\eta(w_a)} \cdot \bar{\varepsilon}_a \cdot w_a \cdot a \cdot h_a = Z_a \quad \text{and} \quad Z_{a_0} = 0
\]

(13a)

\[
Z_a = \int_a^{a_1} [x_t - \pi_t (T(w_t) + b)] h_t \cdot dt,
\]

(13b)

where \(T(w_t) + b = w_t - x_t\) and since \(\eta(w) = \partial \log (w - T(w) - b) / \partial \log w\), \(x_t\) verifies:

\[
\forall t, u \quad \log x_t = \log x_u + \int_{w_t}^{w_u} \eta(w) \, d \log w
\]

In Proposition 1, the elasticities \(\pi_a\) of the participation rate, \(\bar{\varepsilon}_a\) of the wage with respect to \(\eta\) and \(\alpha_a\) of the wage with respect to the skill level \(a\) are respectively given by (1), (10a) and (10b). Moreover, \(w_a\) is determined by the wage-setting condition (7).

**III.1 Intuitive proof of Proposition 1**

The resolution in terms of incentive-compatible allocations enables a rigorous derivation. However, this method does not provide much economic intuition. So, we propose here an intuitive or “direct” proof in the spirit of Saez (2001). Recall that in our model, it is much more convenient to think of the tax schedule as a function that associates the log of the ex-post surplus to the log of the wage. This amounts to pinning down an employment tax level. We consider the effect of the following small tax reform around the optimum depicted in Figure 2. The slope \(\eta(w)\) of \(\log w \mapsto \log x\) is marginally increased by \(\tilde{\eta} = \Delta \eta\) for wages in the small interval \([w_a - \delta w, w_a]\).\textsuperscript{16}

\textsuperscript{15}We assume the existence of an optimal allocation \(a \mapsto (w_a, x_a)\) that is continuous, differentiable and increasing. Existence and continuity are usual regularity assumptions (see e.g. Mirrlees 1971, 1976 or Guesnerie and Laffont 1984). The monotonicity assumption means that we rule out bunching. We verify in the simulations that the monotonicity requirement is verified along the optimum. The differentiability assumption is made only for convenience. It implies that the tax schedule \(T(\cdot)\) is almost everywhere differentiable in the wage.

\textsuperscript{16}The reasoning below will be entirely developed in terms of this local change in \(\eta\). For the reader interested by the implementation of such a reform, the small local increase \(\Delta \eta\) would be the result of a small decline in the marginal tax rate, the level of the average employment tax being kept locally constant. Above \(w_a\), the induced reduction in the employment tax should be compensated for by an appropriate reduction of the marginal tax rate to keep \(\eta\) unchanged.
We take $\Delta \eta$ sufficiently small compared to $\delta w$, so that bunching or gaps in the wage distribution around $w_a - \delta w$ or $w_a$ induced by the tax reform can be neglected. This reform has two effects on the government’s objective (11). There is first a tax level effect that concerns individuals of skill $t$ above $a$. Those of them who are employed thus receive a wage $w_t$ above $w_a$. Second, there is a wage response effect. It takes place for those whose wages lie in the $[w_a - \delta w, w_a]$ interval.

The tax level effect

Consider skill levels $t$ above $a$. Since $\eta(.)$ is unchanged around $w_t$, the equilibrium wage $w_t$ is unaffected by the tax reform, and so is the employment probability $L(t, w_t)$. From (8), the tax reform increases the ex-post surplus $x_t = w_t - T(w_t) - b$ by

$$\frac{\Delta x_t}{x_t} = \Delta \eta \cdot \frac{\delta w}{w}$$

(see Figure 2). The consequence of this rise of (the log of) the ex-post surplus can be decomposed into a mechanical component and a behavioral component through a change in the participation decisions.

The rise in $x_t$ corresponds to a reduction in the employment tax level $T(w_t) + b$ such that $\Delta (T(w_t) + b) = -x_t \cdot \Delta \eta \cdot (\delta w/w)$. Since there are $h_t$ workers of type $t$, the mechanical component of the tax level effect at skill level $t$ equals:

$$-x_t \cdot h_t \cdot \Delta \eta \cdot \frac{\delta w}{w}$$

(14)

Consider now the participation decisions of individuals of skill $t$ above $a$. From (3), since their employment probability is unchanged, their expected surplus increases by the same relative amount $\Delta \Sigma_t/\Sigma_t = \Delta \eta \cdot (\delta w/w)$ as their ex-post surplus $x_t$. According to (1) the number of
employed individuals of type $t$ thus increases by $\pi_t \cdot h_t \cdot \Delta \eta \cdot (\delta w/w)$. For each of these additional employed individuals, the government receives $T(w_t) + b$ additional employment taxes. Hence, the behavioral component of the tax level effect at skill level $t$ equals:

$$\pi_t \cdot (T(w_t) + b) \cdot h_t \cdot \Delta \eta \cdot \frac{\delta w}{w}$$  \hspace{1cm} (15)$$

From (13b), the sum of the mechanical and behavioral components over all skill levels $t$ above $a$ gives the tax level effect. It equals $-Z_a \cdot \Delta \eta \cdot (\delta w/w)$.

The wage response effect

This effect concerns individuals whose skill level is such that their wage in case of employment lies in the interval $[w_a - \delta w, w_a]$. Let $[a - \delta a, a]$ be the corresponding interval of the skill distribution. From (10b), one has

$$\delta a = \frac{a}{\alpha_a} \cdot \frac{\delta w}{w}$$  \hspace{1cm} (16)$$

Therefore, the number of agents concerned by this effect is $\frac{a}{\alpha_a} f(a) (\delta w/w)$.

Due to the small tax reform, those employed face a more increasing $\log w \rightarrow \log x$ tax schedule. The tax reform thus induces a wage increase $\Delta w_a$ that substitutes ex-post surplus for employment probability. From (10a), one has

$$\frac{\Delta w_a}{w_a} = \frac{\varepsilon_a}{\eta(w_a)} \cdot \Delta \eta$$  \hspace{1cm} (17)$$

Since the equilibrium wage maximizes participants’ ex-post surplus $\Sigma_a$, the tax reform has only a second-order effect on $\Sigma_a$ and thereby on the participation rate of these individuals. The wage response effect can be decomposed into a mechanical component and a behavioral component through a change in the labor demand decisions.

The wage increase $\Delta w_a$ changes the employment tax paid by $T'(w_a) \cdot \Delta w_a$. From (8), one gets $1 - T'(w_a) = x_a \cdot \eta(w_a)/w_a$, so

$$\Delta(T(w_a) + b) = T'(w_a) \cdot \Delta w_a = [(1 - \eta(w_a)) w_a + \eta(w_a) (T(w_a) + b)] \frac{\Delta w_a}{w_a}$$  \hspace{1cm} (18)$$

Multiplying the last term by the number of employed individuals $h_a$ gives the mechanical component of the wage response effect.

The wage increase $\Delta w_a$ also induces a reduction in the employment probability $L(a, w_a)$. Given (7), the fraction of employed among participants is decreased by:

$$\Delta L(a, w_a) = -\eta(w_a) \frac{\Delta w_a}{w_a} L(a, w_a)$$  \hspace{1cm} (19)$$

When an additional participant of type $a$ finds a job, the government levies additional taxes $T(w_a)$ and saves $b$. Multiplying the employment tax $T(w_a) + b$ by $\Delta \ell_a$ times the number of
participants $G(a, \Sigma_a) f(a) \delta a$ gives the behavioral component of the wage response effect. The sum of these two components equals

$$\Delta \left[ (T(w_a) + b) \cdot L(a, w_a) \right] \cdot G(a, \Sigma_a) \cdot f(a) \cdot \delta a = (1 - \eta(w_a)) w_a \cdot h_a \cdot \frac{\Delta w_a}{w_a} \cdot \delta a$$

Given (16) and (17) and the last expression, the total wage response effect on the interval $[w_a - \delta w, w_a]$ equals

$$\frac{1 - \eta(w_a)}{\eta(w_a)} \cdot \frac{\varepsilon_a}{\alpha_a} \cdot w_a \cdot h_a \cdot \Delta \eta \cdot \frac{\delta w}{w}$$

The wage response effect can be either positive or negative. From Subsection II.4, recall that the laissez-faire value of the wage is efficient. If $\eta(w_a) < 1$, (resp. $\eta(w_a) > 1$) the wage is below (above) its laissez-faire value, hence it is inefficiently low (high). Adding the wage response and the tax level effects gives (13a) in Proposition 1.

To obtain $Z_{a0} = 0$ in (13a), consider a tax reform that rises $\log(w - T(w) - b)$ by a constant amount for all $w$, so that $\eta(w)$ is kept unchanged. Such a tax reform induces a tax level effect that is proportional to $Z_{a0}$ and no wage response effect. Hence, at the optimum, one must obtain $Z_{a0} = 0$.

### III.2 Instructive cases

To better understand the implications of our optimal tax formula, we now consider its implications when additional restrictions are imposed. Given the literature, a natural starting point is the case where wages are exogenously fixed ($\varepsilon_a = 0$). Then, we return to the case where wages are endogenous but impose some constraints on the elasticities of participation.

### No wage response effect

Marginal tax reforms do not change the employment probabilities $\ell_a$. However, wages still increase exogenously with the skill (i.e. $\alpha_a$ remains positive). This case corresponds to the model with only extensive margin responses of labor supply considered by Diamond (1980), Saez (2002) and Choné and Laroque (2005).\footnote{However here, as in Boone and Bovenberg (2004, 2006), participants face a positive but exogenous probability to be “involuntarily” unemployed.} Intuitively, as wages do not react to changes in taxes, the solution is given by putting to zero the sum of the mechanical (14) and behavioral (15) components of the tax level effect. This has to be true for all levels of skill. Consequently, $x_a - \pi_a (T(w_a) + b) = 0$ whatever the skill $a$.\footnote{Formally, from (13a) as $\varepsilon_a = 0$ for all $a$, $Z_a = 0$ everywhere. So, from (13b), $x_a - \pi_a (T(w_a) + b) = 0$ everywhere, too.}

Therefore, at the optimum, the employment tax (respectively, the employment surplus) verify:

$$\frac{T(w_a) + b}{w_a} = \frac{1}{1 + \pi_a} \quad \iff \quad \frac{x_a}{w_a} = \frac{\pi_a}{1 + \pi_a}$$

(21)
These relationships are implicit ones when $\pi_a$ depends on the expected surplus. The optimal employment tax rate only depends on the behavioral response (through $\pi_a$) and not on the distribution of skills. In Figure 1, the optimal allocation $\log x_a$ is necessarily below the 45 degree line at a distance given by $| \log (\pi_a/(1 + \pi_a)) |$. In accordance with Saez (2002) in the Maximin case, the employment tax is positive i.e. there is no EITC. Where the participation rate is more elastic, the behavioral component matters more. Therefore, the optimal ex-post surplus has to be higher to induce participation (a necessary condition to collect taxes to finance $b$).

**Constant elasticity of participation**

We now investigate under which condition the tax schedule described by Equation (21) is optimal when wages are responsive to taxation ($\varepsilon_a > 0$). This tax schedule induces that the aggregate tax level effect $Z_a$ equals 0 everywhere along the skill distribution (See Equation 13b). Therefore, the wage response effect has to be nil everywhere. So, according to (13a), the slope $\eta$ of the $\log w \mapsto \log x$ function has to equal 1 everywhere. Therefore, from (8), the ratio $x_a/w_a$ has to be constant. This is consistent with (21) only when the elasticity of participation $\pi_a$ is the same for all skill levels at the optimum.

Reciprocally, assume that the elasticity of participation is constant and consider the tax policy defined by an employment tax $T(w) + b$ that equals $w/(1 + \pi)$ for all wage levels $w$. In this case, the mechanical (14) and behavioral (15) components of the tax level effect sum to 0 at each skill level. Moreover, from (8), this policy induces $\eta(w)$ to be constant and equal to 1, so wages are not distorted and the wage response effect is nil everywhere. Therefore, this policy satisfies the conditions in Proposition 1.

**Decreasing elasticity of participation**

The assumption of a constant elasticity of participation is convenient but not plausible. Empirical studies suggest that participation decisions are more elastic at the bottom of the skill distribution (see the empirical evidence surveyed by Immervoll et al, 2007, and Meghir and Phillips, 2008). This elasticity is in general a function of the expected surplus (see (1)), hence it is endogenous. Therefore, the profile of $\pi_a$ at the optimum may be different from the corresponding profile in the current economy. It seems nevertheless reasonable to assume that the elasticity of participation is decreasing in skill levels along the optimum.19 In this case, we get:

**Proposition 2** If everywhere along the Maximin optimum one has $\dot{\pi}_a < 0$, then

19The polar assumption where $\pi_a$ is increasing in $a$ leads to symmetric analytical results. We do not present them here since this case very implausible.
1) \( w_a < w_{a}^{LF} \) and \( L(a, w_a) > L(a, w_{a}^{LF}) \) for all \( a \) in \((a_0, a_1)\), while \( w_{a_0} = w_{a_0}^{LF} \), \( L(a_0, w_{a_0}) = L(a_0, w_{a_0}^{LF}) \), \( w_{a_1} = w_{a_1}^{LF} \) and \( L(a_1, w_{a_1}) = L(a, w_{a_1}^{LF}) \).

ii) Compared to the laissez faire, the participation rates are distorted downwards.

iii) The average tax rate \( T(w)/w \) is an increasing function of the wage and the marginal tax rates \( T'(w) \) are positive everywhere. The in-work benefit (if any) at the bottom-end of the distribution is lower than the assistance benefit \(-T(w_{a_0}) < b\).

This Proposition is proved in Appendix D. Its intuition is illustrated in Figure 3. This Figure depicts the ratio of the ex-post surplus over the wage, \( x_a/w_a \), as a function of the level of skill. In the absence of wage responses, as we have seen above, the optimum implements a policy such that \( x_a/w_a \) is identical to \( \pi_a/(1 + \pi_a) \) and hence the tax level effect is nil. The dashed decreasing curve \( \pi_a/(1 + \pi_a) \) in Figure 3 illustrates this profile in the current context where \( \dot{\pi}_a < 0 \). However, when wages are responsive to taxation (i.e. when \( \epsilon_a > 0 \)), implementing this policy means that \( x_a = w_a - T(w_a) - b \) increases less than proportionally in the wage \( w_a \). Put differently, one has \( \eta(w_a) < 1 \), so wages are distorted downwards. In other words, equalizing \( x_a/w_a \) to the declining \( \pi_a/(1 + \pi_a) \) profile induces a detrimental wage response effect while the tax level effect is zero. To verify Proposition 1, the optimum therefore implements a policy like the one illustrated by the solid curve in Figure 3. Since the solid curve is flatter than the dashed curve, such a policy induces less distortions along the wage response effect. Moreover, the solid curve remains close enough to the dashed curve so as to limit distortions due to the tax level effects. In particular, the solid curve remains decreasing, inducing that wages and unemployment are distorted downwards for almost every skill levels (point i) of the Proposition). The highest level of the \( x_a/w_a \) ratio is obtained for the lowest skill level. As wages are distorted downwards, the tax level effect has to be non negative \( (Z_a \geq 0) \). So, since \( Z_{a_0} = 0 \) by the transversality condition, one has \( \dot{Z}_{a_0} \geq 0 \). From this property and (13b), it can be checked that \( x_{a_0}/w_{a_0} \) is lower than or equal to \( \pi_{a_0}/(1 + \pi_{a_0}) \) when wages are responsive to taxation (the solid curve is below the dashed curve at \( a_0 \)). Hence, the ex-post surplus \( x_a \) is everywhere lower than wages \( w_a \). Compared to the laissez faire, participation rates are thus lower at the Maximin optimum (point ii) of the proposition). Moreover, as \( T(w) + b > 0 \), transfers for (low income) workers are never higher than for the jobless. There is no EITC in the words of Saez (2002, p. 1055). Furthermore, since \( x/w \) is decreasing, \( (T(w) + b)/w \) is increasing in wages, hence average tax rates are increasing in wages, too. Finally, since \( (T(w) + b)/w \) is positive everywhere and marginal tax rates are higher than this ratio (because \( \eta < 1 \)), marginal tax rates are positive everywhere, including at the boundaries of the skill distribution (Point iii) of the Proposition.

Point i) of the Proposition 2 is in contrast to the literature initiated by Mirrlees (1971). There, optimal marginal tax rates are positive whenever the government values redistribution
Figure 3: Intuition of Proposition 2

(see e.g. the discussion in Choné and Laroque 2007). Therefore, employment is lower at the optimum compared to the laissez faire while in our case the employment probability is distorted upwards. However, Point ii) reduces this contrast. In our model, participation is distorted downwards. Consequently, the net effect on aggregate employment is ambiguous. Proposition 2 generalizes HLPV. There, the value \( \chi \) of non market activities is identical for all types. Therefore, a unique threshold level of skill separates nonparticipants from participants. The elasticity of participation is thus infinite at the threshold and then nil, which is a very specific decreasing \( a \rightarrow \pi_a \) relationship. Finally, the property according to which employment tax rates are always positive is also obtained in the models of Saez (2002) and Choné and Laroque (2005) where participation margins are central. Saez (2002) however emphasizes that this result only holds under a Maximin criterion. With a more general objective, he finds that the optimal income tax schedule is characterized by a negative employment tax at the bottom provided that labor supply responses along the extensive margin are high enough compared to responses along the intensive margin.

IV The general utilitarian case

In this section, we derive the optimal tax formula when the government has the following Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function:

\[
\Omega = \int_{a_0}^{a_1} \{ L(a, w_a) G(a, \Sigma_a) \Phi(w_a - T(w_a)) + (1 - L(a, w_a)) G(a, \Sigma_a) \Phi(b) \} f(a) da
\]

\[+ \int_{\Sigma_a}^{+\infty} \Phi(b + \chi) g(a, \chi) d\chi \} f(a) da\]
where $\Phi'(.) > 0 > \Phi''(.)$. The “pure” (Benthamite) utilitarian case sums the utility levels of all individuals and corresponds to the case where $\Phi(.)$ is linear. The stronger the concavity of $\Phi(.)$, the more averse to inequality is the government. Under this objective, Appendix E shows that the optimum verifies (recall that $\ell_a = L(a, w_a)$):

**Proposition 3** The first-order condition for the optimal tax problem at skill level $a$ is

$$
\left(1 - \eta(w_a)\right) \cdot w_a - \frac{\Phi(w_a - T(w_a)) - \Phi(b) - x_a \cdot \Phi'(w_a - T(w_a))}{\lambda} \cdot \frac{\varepsilon_a}{\alpha_a} \cdot a \cdot h_a = Z_a
$$

(23a)

$$
Z_{a0} = 0
$$

(23b)

where

$$
Z_a = \int_a^{a_1} \left\{(1 - \frac{\Phi'(w_t - T(w_t))}{\lambda}) x_t - \pi_t [T(w_t) + b + \Xi_t]\right\} h_t \cdot dt
$$

(23c)

and

$$
\Xi_t = \frac{\ell_t \cdot \Phi(w_t - T(w_t)) + (1 - \ell_t) \Phi(b) - \Phi(b + \Sigma_t)}{\lambda \cdot \ell_t},
$$

(23d)

in which the positive Lagrange multiplier associated to the budget constraint (11), $\lambda$, verifies

$$
\lambda = \int_{a_0}^{a_1} \left\{\ell_a G(\cdot) \Phi'(w_a - T(w_a)) + (1 - \ell_a) G(\cdot) \Phi'(b) + \int_{\Sigma_a}^{+\infty} \Phi'(b + \chi) g(a, \chi) d\chi\right\} f(a) \cdot da
$$

(24)

We now explain how to extend the intuitive proof of Section III. Equation (24) defines the marginal social value of public funds, $\lambda$. It is obtained by a unit increase in $E$ financed by a unit decrease in $b$ holding $w \mapsto w - T(w) - b$ constant. Next, we consider again the small tax reform depicted in Figure 2. This tax reform has a Tax level effect and a wage response effect, each of them being decomposed into mechanical and behavioral components. In the Maximin case, these components only capture the impact on the least well-off (i.e. on additional tax receipts to finance the assistance benefit $b$). Now, the government also values how the utility levels of all other economic agents are affected by the tax reform. To make the formula comparable, we divide these additional impacts by $\lambda$. For each component, we now examine how the various components are changed.

**Tax level effect**

The rise in the ex-post surplus $x_t$ increases the social welfare of the corresponding workers by $\Phi'(w_t - T(w_t)) / \lambda$. Adding this welfare gain to the loss in tax receipts, the mechanical component of the tax level effect at skill level $t$ equals

$$
- \left(1 - \frac{\Phi'(w_t - T(w_t))}{\lambda}\right) \cdot x_t \cdot h_t \cdot \Delta \eta \cdot \frac{\delta w}{w}
$$

(25)

instead of (14). Since $\lambda$ averages marginal social welfare over the whole population and $\Phi$ is concave, the term in parentheses is positive for most workers. This might however not be true for workers with sufficiently low earnings.
As far as the behavioral component is concerned, consider individuals of type $t$ who are induced to participate by the tax reform. Their expected utility levels only change by a second-order amount. However, this change in participation decisions increases inequalities because participants’ income is different whether they get a job or not. The inequality-averse government values this by \( \ell_t \cdot \Phi (w_t - T(w_t)) + (1 - \ell_t) \Phi (b) - \Phi (b + \Sigma_t) / \lambda \), which equals $\ell_t \cdot \Xi_t$ (by Definition (23d)) and is negative. So, the behavioral component of the tax level effect at skill level $t$ equals

\[
\pi_t \{ T(w_t) + b + \Xi_t \} \cdot h_t \cdot \Delta \eta \cdot \delta w_w
\]

instead of (15). From (23c), the sum of the mechanical and behavioral components over all skill levels $t$ above $a$ equals $-\Delta \eta \cdot (\delta w/w) \cdot Z_a$. It is hard to draw clear conclusions about the value of $Z_a$. Still, two opposite effects are specific to the general utilitarian case. Compared to the Maximin, raising the ex-post surplus for skills above $a$ is now less detrimental in terms of the mechanical component but the welfare gain of additional participants is less important because of the induced impact on social welfare (the negative $\Xi_t$ terms).

**Wage response effect**

In addition to its impact on $b$ through the tax receipts (described in (18) and (19)), the wage response effect has also a direct influence on social welfare through a change in the expected social welfare of participants of type $a$, $\ell_a \Phi (w_a - T(w_a)) + (1 - \ell_a) \Phi (b)$. Holding $b$ constant, a mechanical and a behavioral component should again be distinguished.

The wage increase $\Delta w_a$ rises $\Phi (w_a - T(w_a))$ by the marginal social welfare $\Phi' (w_a - T(w_a))$ times the small increase in the post-tax wage $(1 - T'(w_a)) \Delta w_a$. Using (8), the additional mechanical component equals:

\[
x_a \cdot \Phi' (w_a - T(w_a)) / \lambda \cdot \eta (w_a) \cdot h_a \cdot \Delta w_a / w_a \cdot \delta a
\]

The wage increase also lowers the employment probability $\ell_a$ by $\Delta \ell_a = -\eta (w_a) \cdot (\Delta w_a / w_a) \cdot \ell_a$. Each additional unemployed individual decreases social welfare by $\Phi (w_a - T(w_a)) - \Phi (b)$. Hence, using (7), the additional behavioral component equals

\[
- \Phi (w_a - T(w_a)) - \Phi (b) / \lambda \cdot \eta (w_a) \cdot h_a \cdot \Delta w_a / w_a \cdot \delta a
\]

Adding these two components, then using (16) and (17), we get the welfare consequence of the wage response effect

\[
- \Phi (w_a - T(w_a)) - \Phi (b - x_a \cdot \Phi' (w_a - T(w_a))) / \lambda \cdot \varepsilon_a \cdot a \cdot h_a \cdot \delta a
\]

Due to the concavity of $\Phi (.)$, this welfare consequence is negative. It pushes optimal wages downwards to reduce inequalities among participants by lowering unemployment.
By adding (27) to the impact (20) of the wage response effect on the level of the assistance benefit $b$, one obtains the left-hand side of (23a) times $\Delta \eta \cdot (\delta w/w)$.

This intuitive proof of Proposition 3 has highlighted that (search) unemployment has two effects on social welfare that cannot be recognized if the wage-cum-labor demand margin is ignored. First, unemployment *per se* is a source of loss in social welfare which calls for downwards wage distortions. This is captured by the negative sign of (27). Second, because the fate of participants is not employment for sure, policies that enhance participation have a detrimental induced effect on inequality. To see the implication of this second effect, consider the particular case where wages are not responsive to taxation ($\wp_a = 0$ everywhere). Then, the tax level effect has to be nil everywhere at the optimum. From (23c), whatever the skill $t$, the employment tax should verify:

$$
\frac{T(w_t) + b}{w_t - T(w_t) - b} = \frac{1}{\pi_t} \left( 1 - \frac{\Phi'(w_t - T(w_t))}{\lambda} \right) - \frac{\Xi_t}{w_t - T(w_t) - b}
$$

(28)

If $\Xi_t$ was zero, Formula (28) would be identical to Expression (4) in Saez (2002). Then, for sufficiently low skill levels such that $\Phi'(w_t - T(w_t))/\lambda > 1$, the employment tax $T(w_t) + b$ should be negative, meaning that transfers for low income workers, $-T(w_t)$, are higher than for the jobless. Now because of unemployment, $\Xi_t$ is negative. Consequently, the higher the unemployment rate $1 - \ell_t$, the less plausibly optimal is an EITC.

When wages are responsive to taxation, the only analytical result in the general utilitarian case concerns wage distortions at both extremes of the skill distribution. There, as in the Maximin case, the tax level effect is nil. Nevertheless, there is a reason to choose an inefficient wage level. This is because unemployment reduces social welfare. To mitigate this effect, it is worth distorting wages downwards at both extremes of the skill distribution.

Concerning the robustness of Proposition 2 obtained under a Maximin objective, we cannot say whether nor when the two new terms in (25) and (26) change the sign of the tax level effect. We can nevertheless make the following conjectures in line with this proposition. As far as point $i)$ is concerned, the government has now an additional incentive to reduce wages and stimulate labor demand since the welfare impact of the wage response effect (27) is negative. However, pushing wages downwards obviously reduces social welfare, and the more so as one moves towards the low-end of the wage distribution. Therefore, compensating transfers for low-skilled workers are expected. Numerical simulations are needed to throw some light on these conjectures.

V  Simulations

This section presents computed optimal income tax schedules that provide some numerical feel of the policy implications of our analysis. As the underlying model remains stylized in several
dimensions and our calibration is somewhat rough, the following simulation results should only be considered as illustrative.

V.1 Calibration

To avoid the complexity of interrelated participation decisions within families, we only consider single adults. We need to specify the labor demand function \( L(a, \cdot) \) and the distribution of types \((a, \chi)\) through functions \( G(\cdot, \cdot) \) and \( f(\cdot) \). In choosing functional specifications of \( L(a, \cdot) \) and \( G(\cdot, \cdot) \), we want to control the behavioral responses \( \varepsilon_a, \alpha_a \) and \( \pi_a \) defined respectively by Equations (10a), (10b) and (1). We take

\[
\log L(a, w) = B(a) - \varepsilon \left( \frac{w}{c} \right)^{\frac{1}{\varepsilon}}
\]

Hence, along a tax profile where \((w - T(w) - b)/w\) is constant\(^{21}\), one has \( \varepsilon_a = \varepsilon \), and \( \alpha_a = 1 \). The elasticity \( \varepsilon \) is not precisely known. Following Gruber and Saez (2002), the elasticity of gross earnings with respect to one minus the marginal tax rate would lie between 0.2 and 0.4. We take a conservative value \( \varepsilon = 0.1 \) in the benchmark calibration and conduct a sensitivity analysis with \( \varepsilon = 0.2 \). In a perfectly competitive economy, one would have \( \alpha_a = 1 \). We set \( c \) to 2/3, so in an efficient economy, total wage income would represent two third of the total production.\(^{22}\)

We assume that the elasticity of participation varies exogenously with the level of skill. More specifically, we assume the following cumulative distribution of non-market activities \( \Pr[\chi \leq \Sigma | a] \):\(^{23}\)

\[
G(a, \Sigma) = A(a) \cdot \Sigma^{\pi_a} \quad \text{where } A(a) > 0 \text{ and } \pi_a > 0
\]

Because, to our knowledge, the empirical literature does not provide any information about the concavity of the function \( a \mapsto \pi_a \), we assume the following simple declining profile \( \pi_a = (\pi_{a_0} - \pi_{a_1}) \left( \frac{a-a_1}{a_1-a_0} \right)^3 + \pi_{a_1} \). We set the elasticity at the bottom, \( \pi_{a_0} \), to 0.4 and the elasticity at the top, \( \pi_{a_1} \), to 0.2 in the benchmark calibration and conduct sensitivity analysis. These elasticities are rather consistent with the evidence summarized by Immervoll et al. 2007 and Meghir and Phillips (2008). However, the latter stress that this evidence typically neglects longer-term adjustments via investment in human capital.

We calibrate the density of skill \( f(\cdot) \) by using the distribution of weakly earnings of the Current Population Survey of May 2007 that we reexpress on an annual basis. We roughly approximate the actual tax system by a linear function \( T(w) = \tau \cdot w + \tau_0 \) with \( \tau = 25\% \) and

\(^{20}\)These are “primary individuals”, i.e. persons without children living alone or in households with adults who are not their relatives. They are older than 16 and younger than 66.

\(^{21}\)Under this assumption, \( d\eta = \frac{d(1-T')}{1-(\tau+\delta)/\omega} = \frac{d(1-T')}{1-\tau} \).

\(^{22}\)In the equilibrium matching approach, workers receive less than their marginal product because firms have to recoup their initial investment \( \kappa(a) \) in the theory developed above.

\(^{23}\)When we adopt this specification, we implicitly assume that \( A(a) \) is such that one always has \( \Sigma_a \leq [A(a)]^{-1/\pi_a} \). Otherwise, the participation rate equals one and becomes inelastic.
\( \tau_0 = -3000 = -b \). Assuming \( b = -\tau_0 \) implies that \( \eta = 1 \) in the current economy, so wages and unemployment rates in the current economy are efficient. In particular, we get \( w_a = c \ a \) from Equation (7). The range of skill considered below is \([3,900; 218,400]\).24 Using a quadratic Kernel with a bandwidth of \(63,800\) we get an approximation of \( L(a)G(a, \Sigma_a)f(a) \) in the current economy. Then, the profile of unemployment (participation) rates is approximated by functions of \( a \) that are respectively decreasing (increasing) and convex (concave) with the skill:

\[
1 - \ell_a = 0.035 + \left( \frac{a_1 - a}{a_1 - a_0} \right)^4 \quad 0.045 \quad \text{and} \quad G_a = 0.31 \left( 1 - \left( \frac{a_1 - a}{a_1 - a_0} \right)^6 \right) + 0.58
\]

We adjust scales parameters \( B(a) \) and \( A(a) \) to reproduce these rates in the current economy. The mean unemployment rate is then 5.06%, the mean participation rate equals 80.3% and the mean elasticity of the participation rate equals 0.29 in our approximation of the current economy.

Figure 4 depicts the calibrated skill distribution \( f(a) \), the distribution of skill among participants in the current economy \( G(a, \Sigma_a)f(a) \) and the distribution of skills among employed individuals \( L(a, w_a)G(a, \Sigma_a)f(a) \), the two latter densities being evaluated along our approximation of the current economy. We compute the level of exogenous public expenditures \( E \) from the government’s budget constraint (11). This leads to an amount \( E = 5,636 \) per capita. In the Bergson-Samuelson utilitarian case, we take \( \Phi(y) = (y + E)^{1 - \sigma}/(1 - \sigma) \), with \( \sigma = 0.2 \) in the benchmark. The exogenous public expenditures finances a public good that generates social

\footnote{The data are collected for wage and salary workers. We ignore weekly earnings below 508, which corresponds to the lowest 1.2% of the earnings distribution.}
utility that is considered as a perfect substitute to private consumption under this specification.

V.2 Results

Figure 5: Unemployment under the benchmark calibration

To illustrate Part i) of Proposition 1, let us compare the actual profile of unemployment rates and the optimal ones under the Maximin and Bergson-Samuelson criteria (Figure 5). The actual unemployment rate turns out to be too high from a Maximin perspective (except at the extremes of the skill distribution). From the general utilitarian viewpoint, it should even decrease further, confirming the importance of the welfare impact of the wage response effect (27). As an illustration of Part ii) of Proposition 1, Figure 6 shows that the a Maximin government would accept a sharp decline in participation rates. Under the more general utilitarian objective, optimal participation rates are higher for low skilled workers and higher for low skilled workers. Since unemployment rates are lower and participation rates are higher at the bottom of the skill distribution, the tax-schedule is designed to boost low-skill employment.

Marginal tax rates are drawn in Figure 7. Under the Maximin, redistribution takes the form of a Negative Income Tax (NIT) in the following sense: An assistance benefit close to $14,198 is taxed away at a high, and in this case nearly constant, marginal tax rate close to 80%. With the more general utilitarian criterion, the well-being of workers, in particular the low-paid ones, enters the scene. At the bottom of the skill distribution, the marginal tax rate is negative and then sharply increases to about 40%. The tax schedule has now the basic features of an EITC-type taxation. In particular, the level of $b$ equals $1,015 per year, while the level of taxes at the bottom is substantially lower in absolute value: $T(w_{a0}) = −$3, 167.
In Figure 7, we have also introduced the optimal relationships if the reaction of wages to taxation is ignored ($\varepsilon = 0$). Compared to our benchmark where $\varepsilon = 0.1$, the optimal profiles are notably different. In particular, the marginal tax rates are lower at the low-end of the wage distribution since, by assumption, there is no adjustment in wages and hence in unemployment. The assistance benefit and the tax reimbursement at the bottom are close to those just mentioned (so that the property $T(w_{a0}) + b < 0$ still holds).

If the sensitivity of wages to taxation is raised from $\varepsilon = 0.1$ towards $\varepsilon = 0.2$, the wage response effects are reinforced. The Maximin optimum therefore implements a tax schedule where the function $w \mapsto x(w)/w$ vary less (i.e. the solid curve of Figure 3 becomes flatter) so as to prevent too important distortions along the wage-cum-labor demand margin. The tax schedule becomes closer to a linear one, marginal tax rates vary less. The simulations displayed in Figure 8 show that this also happens along the Bergson-Samuelson optimum.

The other sensitivity analyses we conduct concern the calibration of the elasticity of participation $\pi_a$. First we decrease by a constant amount of 0.05 all the shape of $a \mapsto \pi_a$. In the Maximin case without wage response, Equation (21) implies that the government would choose higher tax levels as participation responds less, so the dashed curve in Figure 3 is shifted downwards. Consequently, in the presence of wage response, the solid curve shifts downwards too. Hence the Maximin optimum implements higher level of $(T(w) + b)/w$ and therefore higher marginal tax rates. Figure 9 quantifies this mechanism. Once again, The Bergson-Samuelson optimum is affected in a similar way compared to the Maximin optimum.

Last, we change the elasticities of participation so as to make more decreasing the shape of
Figure 7: Marginal Tax Rates under the benchmark calibration

\( a \rightarrow \pi_a \) although keeping the average elasticity in the current economy almost constant. For that purpose, we take \((\pi_{a0}, \pi_{a1}) = (0.48; 0.13)\) instead of \((0.4; 0.2)\). To understand the rise in Marginal tax rates displayed by Figure 10, it is again convenient to come back to Figure 3. In the Maximin optimum without wage response, the government wishes to implement a tax schedule with a more decreasing \( a \rightarrow x_a/w_a \) function, so the dashed curve of Figure 3 becomes stepper. Hence, in the presence of wage responses, the distortions along the wage cum labor demand are reinforced and the solid curve of Figure 3 becomes stepper too. As a consequence, \( \eta(w_a) \) are decreased and marginal tax rates are raised (see 8).

In all the simulation exercises, unemployment rates are even lower at the Bergson-Samuelson optimum than in the Maximin one. This confirms the importance of the welfare impact of the wage response effect (27). Participation rates are always higher at the Bergson-Samuelson optimum compared to the Maximin one. They remain lower than the current ones for high skill workers and higher for lower skill workers. Average tax rates are always increasing at the Bergson-Samuelson optimum. Moreover, the shape of marginal tax rates is hump-shaped in all cases, which is in contrast with the U-shaped profiles found by Saez (2001) among others.

VI Conclusions

It is widely believed that optimal income taxation can be studied in a competitive framework. What essentially matters then is the relative importance of the two labor supply margins (effort in work and participation). In this context, as the empirical evidence points overwhelmingly
to elasticities of participation much larger than in-work, recent papers have concluded that transfers for low-paid workers should be higher than for the jobless.

According to authors such as Immervoll et al (2007), the introduction of imperfections would not deeply modify the equity-efficiency trade-off. By modelling jointly participation decisions, wage formation and labor demand in a frictional economy, we show on the contrary that this trade off is deeply modified. Despite the complexity of the model, the tax-transfer system can be summarized by one key function that relates the pre-tax wage to the ex-post worker’s surplus. Through this function, taxes and transfers influence wage formation and eventually the level of unemployment. In the Maximin case, the wage and participation distortions induced by redistributive taxation only matter in so far as they affect the tax basis and hence the public resources available to finance the income of the least well-off (namely, jobless participants). A set of clear-cut analytical properties are then shown if the elasticity of participation decreases with the level of skill. Then at the optimum, the average tax rate is increasing, marginal tax rates are positive everywhere, while wages, unemployment rates and participation rates are distorted downwards compared to their *laissez-faire* values. These precise recommendations contrast with the small number of properties derived in the literature following Mirrlees (1971).

When the government has a general utilitarian social welfare function, the equity-efficiency trade-off is more deeply affected by the wage-cum-labor demand margin. To induce participation, the net income of workers should be higher than the one of the non-employed. This creates an inequality that matters from a utilitarian perspective. Taxation should then promote wage moderation to reduce the detrimental effect of unemployment on social welfare. Moreover, the

![Marginal Tax rates](image)

Figure 8: Dotted curves: $\varepsilon$ equals 0.2 instead of 0.1 (solid curves).
role of taxation on participation is more complex because some participants will not find a job. Therefore, stimulating participation through lower tax levels raises inequalities. Our numerical exercise shows that optimal unemployment rates are substantially distorted downwards.

The present model could be extended in different directions. First, a dynamic model would enable to introduce earning-related unemployment insurance. Hence, one can expect that a “dynamical optimal taxation” version (à la Golosov et al (2003)) of our model would deliver interesting insights about the optimal combination of unemployment insurance and taxation to redistribute income. Second, we abstract from any response of the labor supply along the intensive margin. Although we are confident that responses along the extensive margin are much more important, enriching our framework to include hours of work, in-work effort or educational effort belongs to our research agenda. Finally, in the real world, labor supply decisions are typically taken at the household level, not at the individual one. All these extensions are left for future research.

Appendices

A Benthamic efficiency of the laissez-faire allocation

Let $U$ be the Benthamic objective. Consider an equilibrium allocation. There are $G(a, \Sigma_a) f(a)$ participants of type $a$ whose net income is $w_a - T(w_a)$ if they are employed and $b$ otherwise,
Figure 10: Dashed curves: \((\pi_{a0}, \pi_{a1})\) equals \((0.48; 0.13)\) instead of \((0.4; 0.2)\) (solid curves)

while non participants obtain \(b + \chi\). So, the Benthamite objective writes:

\[
\mathcal{U} = \int_{a_0}^{a_1} \left\{ (L(a, w_a)(w_a - T(.)) + (1 - L(a, w_a))b) \cdot G(a, \Sigma_a) + \int_{\Sigma_a}^{+\infty} (b + \chi) \cdot g(a, \chi) \cdot d\chi \right\} f(a) \cdot da
\]

\[
= \int_{a_0}^{a_1} \left\{ (\Sigma_a + b) \cdot G(a, \Sigma_a) + \int_{\Sigma_a}^{+\infty} (b + \chi) \cdot g(a, \chi) \cdot d\chi \right\} f(a) \cdot da
\]

where the second equality uses (3). Given the government’s budget constraint (11), this objective can be rewritten when \(E = 0\) as:

\[
\mathcal{U} = \int_{a_0}^{a_1} \left\{ L(a, w_a) \cdot w_a \cdot G(a, \Sigma_a) + \int_{\Sigma_a}^{+\infty} \chi \cdot g(a, \chi) \cdot d\chi \right\} f(a) \cdot da
\]

The Benthamite objective aggregates average earnings plus the value of non-market activities over the whole population, no matter how they are distributed. In this sense, the Benthamite criterion is an extreme case.

For each \(a\) and \(Y\), the function \(\Sigma \mapsto L \cdot w \cdot G(a, \Sigma) + \int_{\Sigma}^{+\infty} \delta \cdot g(a, \delta) \cdot d\delta\) reaches a unique maximum for \(\Sigma = L \cdot w\). Therefore, when we compare any allocation \(a \mapsto (w_a, \Sigma_a)\) to the laissez-faire one, we get:

\[
\mathcal{U}^{LF} = \int_{a_0}^{a_1} \left\{ L(a, w_a^{LF}) \cdot w_a^{LF} \cdot G(a, \Sigma_a^{LF}) + \int_{\Sigma_a^{LF}}^{+\infty} \delta \cdot g(a, \delta) \cdot d\delta \right\} f(a) \cdot da
\]

\[
\geq \int_{a_0}^{a_1} \left\{ L(a, w_a^{LF}) \cdot w_a^{LF} \cdot G(a, \Sigma_a) + \int_{\Sigma_a}^{+\infty} \delta \cdot g(a, \delta) \cdot d\delta \right\} f(a) \cdot da
\]

\[
\geq \int_{a_0}^{a_1} \left\{ L(a, w_a) \cdot w_a \cdot G(a, \Sigma_a) + \int_{\Sigma_a}^{+\infty} \delta \cdot g(a, \delta) \cdot d\delta \right\} f(a) \cdot da = \mathcal{U}
\]

The first inequality holds because \(\Sigma_a^{LF} = L(a, w_a^{LF}) \cdot w_a^{LF}\) at the laissez faire, according to (3). The second inequality holds because \(w_a^{LF}\) maximizes \(w \mapsto L(a, w) \cdot w\)
B Incentive Compatible allocations

Let \( \mathcal{K} \) be the set of types \((a, \chi)\), \( \mathcal{K}_P \) being the subset of participating types and \( \mathcal{K}_0 = \mathcal{K} - \mathcal{K}_P \).

An incentive-compatible allocation is given by a real number \( b \) and a mapping that associates to any element \((a, \chi)\) of \( \mathcal{K}_P \) a bundle of wage \( w_{ax} \) and ex-post surplus \( x_{ax} = w_{ax} - T(a_{ax}) - b \), such that

For any \( ((a, \chi), (a', \chi')) \in (\mathcal{K}_P)^2 \) : \( L(a, w_{ax}) \cdot x_{ax} \geq L(a, w_{a'x'}) \cdot x_{a'x'} \) \hspace{1cm} (31a)

For any \((a, \chi) \in \mathcal{K}_P : b + L(a, w_{ax}) x_{ax} \geq b + \delta \) \hspace{1cm} (31b)

For any \((a, \chi) \in \mathcal{K}_0 \) and any \((a', \chi') \in \mathcal{K}_P : b + \delta \geq b + L(a, w_{a'x'}) x_{a'x'} \) \hspace{1cm} (31c)

and \( b \) clears the budget constraint

\[
 b + E = \int_{\mathcal{K}_P} L(a, w_{ax}) (w_{ax} - x_{ax}) dG(a, \chi) f(a) da
\]

(31a) ensures that the wage-setting process described by equation (4) induces for an employed worker of type \((a, \chi)\) the wage \( w_{ax} \) and the associated ex-post surplus \( x_{ax} \) designed for her type instead of the wage \( w_{a'x'} \) and ex-post surplus \( x_{a'x'} \) designed for any other participating type \((a', \chi')\). (31b) ensures that participating types get a higher expected utility if they enter the labor force, while condition (31c) ensures that non-participating type are better out of the labor force. It is worth noting that the value of the assistance benefit \( b \) has no impact on conditions (31a) to (31c).

We first show that if \( ((a, \chi), (a', \chi')) \in (\mathcal{K}_P)^2 \), then \( (w_{ax}, x_{ax}) = (w_{a'x}, x_{a'x}) \). From (31a), one obtains

\[
 \frac{L(a, w_{ax})}{L(a, w_{a'x})} \geq \frac{x_{ax}}{x_{a'x}} \geq \frac{L(a, w_{ax})}{L(a, w_{ax})}
\]

The first inequality is obtained by replacing \( a' \) by \( a \) in the right-hand side of (31a). The second by inverting the roles of \((a, \chi)\) and \((a', \chi')\). The two extremes implies that \( L(a, w_{ax}) = L(a, w_{a'x}) \), so \( w_{ax} = w_{a'x} \) and therefore \( x_{ax} = x_{a'x} \). (31a) is equivalent to (12). Hence, although there are two dimensions of heterogeneity, the allocation can be indexed with respect to skill \( a \) only, as we do in the main text and henceforth do in the Appendices. This is because the \( \delta \) characteristics is irrelevant for labor demand and wage-setting decisions. The \( \delta \) heterogeneity only matters for determining the participation decisions. In other words, although there is a bidimensional heterogeneity, the screening problem under random participation à la Rochet and Stole (2002) can be treated as a unidimensional screening problem, except for the smooth participation rate.

Let \( a \mapsto (w_a, x_a, \Sigma_a) \) be an allocation such that for all \( a \), \( \Sigma_a = L(a, w_a) : x_a \) and for all \( a \) and \( a' \) (12) is verified. Condition (12) can be rewritten as:

\[
 \log \Sigma_{a'} - \log \Sigma_a \leq \log L(a', w_{a'}) - \log L(a, w_{a'})
\]

Using the symmetric inequality where \( a \) and \( a' \) are inverted gives:

\[
 \log L(a', w_a) - \log L(a, w_a) \leq \log \Sigma_{a'} - \log \Sigma_a \leq \log L(a', w_{a'}) - \log L(a, w_{a'})
\]

(32)

Assume \( a' > a \) and consider the two extreme parts of (32). They implies that

\[
 0 \leq \int_a^{a'} \left\{ \frac{\partial \log L}{\partial a} (t, w_{a'}) - \frac{\partial \log L}{\partial a} (t, w_a) \right\} dt
\]

31
Since \( a' > a \), and \( \partial^2 \log L(a, w) / \partial a \partial w > 0 \), this last inequality requires \( w_{a'} \geq w_a \). Take \( a' > a \). Then from (32) we get
\[
\frac{\log L(a', w_a) - \log (a, w_a)}{a' - a} \leq \frac{\log \Sigma_a - \log \Sigma_{a'}}{a' - a} \leq \frac{\log L(a', w_{a'}) - \log (a, w_{a'})}{a' - a}
\]
As \( a' \) tends to \( a \), the left-hand side of this condition tends to \( \partial \log L(a, w_a) / \partial a \). Since \( a' \to w_{a'} \) is continuous, the right-hand side tends to \( \partial \log L(a, w_a) / \partial a \) as well. Hence, \( t \mapsto \Sigma_t \) admits a right-derivative for \( t = a \), which equals to \( \partial \log L(a, w_a) / \partial a \). Redoing the same reasoning for \( a' < a \) implies
\[
\frac{\Sigma_a}{\Sigma_a} = \frac{\partial \log L}{\partial a}(a, w_a)
\] (33)

To show the reciprocal, let \( a \mapsto (w_a, x_a, \Sigma_a) \) be an allocation such that for all \( a \), \( \Sigma_a = L(a, w_a) \cdot x_a \), \( a \mapsto w_a \) is non-decreasing and (33) holds. We have to show that (12) holds for all \( a' \neq a \). Assume that \( a' < a \) (respectively \( a' > a \)). Then we have for all \( t \in [a', a] \) (resp. for all \( t \in [a, a'] \)), that \( w_t \geq w_{a'} \) (respectively \( w_t \leq w_a \)). Since \( \partial^2 \log L(a, w) / \partial a \partial w > 0 \) this implies that:
\[
\int_a^{a'} \left\{ \frac{\partial \log L}{\partial a}(t, w_a) - \frac{\partial \log L}{\partial a}(t, w_{a'}) \right\} dt \geq 0
\]
which induces
\[
\int_a^{a'} \frac{\partial \log L}{\partial a}(t, w_t) dt \geq \log L(a, w_{a'}) - \log L(a', w_{a'})
\]
Integrating (33) between \( a' \) and \( a \), we see that the left-hand side of the last inequality equals to \( \log \Sigma_a - \log \Sigma_{a'} \). Therefore, one has
\[
\log \Sigma_a \geq \log \Sigma_{a'} + \log L(a, w_{a'}) - \log L(a', w_{a'})
\]
which is equivalent to (12).

### C Proof of Proposition 1

From (3), one gets that \((T(w_a) + b) L(a, w_a)\) equals \(L(a, w_a) \cdot w_a - \Sigma_a\), so the budget constraint (11) can be rewritten as
\[
b = \int_{a_0}^{a_1} [L(a, w_a) \cdot w_a - \Sigma_a] \cdot G(a, \Sigma_a) \cdot f(a) \, da - E
\]
Let \( \sigma_a = \log \Sigma_a \). We use optimal control by considering \( \sigma_a \) as the state variable and \( w_a \) as the control.
\[
\max_{w_a, \sigma_a} \int_{a_0}^{a_1} [L(a, w_a) \cdot w_a - \exp \sigma_a] \cdot G(a, \exp \sigma_a) \cdot f(a) \, da
\]
\[s.t: \quad \dot{\sigma}_a = \frac{\partial \log L}{\partial a}(a, w_a)
\]
Let \( q_a \) be the multiplier associated to the equations of motion of \( \sigma_a \) and let \( Z_a = -q_a \). The Hamiltonian writes
\[
\mathcal{H}(w, \sigma, q, a) \overset{\text{def}}{=} [L(a, w) \cdot w - \exp \sigma] \cdot G(a, \exp \sigma) \cdot f(a) + q \cdot \frac{\partial \log L}{\partial a}(a, w)
\]

32
Since we assume that a maximum exists where \( w_a \) is a continuous function of \( a \) (see footnote 15), there exists a differentiable function \( a \mapsto q_a \), such that the following first-order condition are verified

\[
0 = \frac{\partial H}{\partial w} = \frac{\partial (L(a, w) \cdot w)}{\partial w} (a, w_a) \cdot G(a, \Sigma_a) \cdot f(a) + q_a \cdot \frac{\partial^2 \log L}{\partial a \partial w} (a, w_a) \tag{34a}
\]

\[
-\dot{q}_a = \frac{\partial H}{\partial \sigma} = -\{G(a, \Sigma_a) - [L(a, w_a) \cdot w_a - \Sigma_a] \cdot g(a, \Sigma_a)\} \cdot \Sigma_a \cdot f(a) \tag{34b}
\]

together with the transversality conditions \( q_{a_0} = q_{a_1} = \mu_{a_0} = \mu_{a_1} = 0 \). Using \( q_{a_1} = 0 \), \( Z_a = -q_a \), one has \( Z_a = \int_0^{a_1} \dot{q}_t \cdot dt \). Hence, (34b) with (1) gives (13b). The transversality condition \( q_{a_0} = 0 \) gives \( Z_{a_0} = 0 \) in (13a). From (7), one has

\[
\frac{\partial (L(a, w) \cdot w)}{\partial w} (a, w_a) = (1 - \eta(w_a)) \cdot L(a, w_a) \cdot w_a \tag{35}
\]

From (10a) and (10b) one obtains

\[
\frac{\partial^2 \log L}{\partial a \partial w} (a, w_a) = \frac{\alpha_a}{\varepsilon_a} \cdot \frac{\eta(w_a)}{a} \tag{36}
\]

Introducing these two last expressions into (34b) gives the first equality in (13a).

**D Proof of Proposition 2**

We first show that \( Z \) is positive on \((a_0, a_1)\). From (13b), one has

\[
\dot{Z}_a = \left( \frac{\pi_a}{1 + \pi_a} - \frac{x_a}{w_a} \right) (1 + \pi_a) \cdot w_a \cdot h_a \tag{37}
\]

Assume by contradiction that \( Z \) is negative at some point. Since \( a \mapsto Z_a \) is continuous, there exists an interval where \( Z \) remains negative. Given that \( Z_{a_0} = Z_{a_1} = 0 \), this implies the existence of a maximal interval \([a, \bar{a}]\) such that \( Z_a = Z_\bar{a} = 0 \) and such that \( Z_a \leq 0 \) for all \( a \in [a, \bar{a}] \).

- Since \( Z_a = 0 \) and \( Z_\bar{a} \) is negative in the neighborhood on the right of \( \bar{a} \), one has \( \dot{Z}_a \leq 0 \). Given (37) this implies that:
  \[
  \frac{\pi_a}{1 + \pi_a} \leq \frac{x_a}{w_a}
  \]

- Since \( Z_a \leq 0 \), one has from (13a) that \( \eta(w_a) \geq 1 \) for all \( a \in [a, \bar{a}] \). Given (8), this implies that \( x_a/w_a \) is nondecreasing, so
  \[
  \frac{x_a}{w_a} \leq \frac{x_\bar{a}}{w_\bar{a}}
  \]

- Since \( Z_\bar{a} = 0 \) and \( Z_\bar{a} \) is negative in the neighborhood on the left of \( \bar{a} \), one has \( \dot{Z}_\bar{a} \geq 0 \). Given (37) this implies that
  \[
  \frac{x_\bar{a}}{w_\bar{a}} \leq \frac{\pi_\bar{a}}{1 + \pi_\bar{a}}
  \]

33
These three inequalities lead to $\pi_{a_2} \geq \pi_{a_2}$, so one must have $a = a$. Since $a \to \pi_a$ is decreasing, hence, $Z_a$ is nonnegative on $(a_0, a_1)$ and can only be nil pointwise.

Next, assume by contradiction that there exists $a_2 \in (a_0, a_1)$ such that $Z_{a_2} = 0$. Since $Z_a$ is everywhere nonnegative, $a_2$ is an interior minimum of $Z_a$, so $\dot{Z}_{a_2} = 0$, and from (37)

$$\frac{\pi_{a_2}}{1 + \pi_{a_2}} = \frac{x_{a_2}}{w_{a_2}}$$

However since $Z_{a_2} = 0$, one has $\eta(w_{a_2}) = 0$ from (13a). Hence, from (8) and the differentiability of $a \to w_a, x_a/w_a$ admits a derivative with respect to $a$ that is nil. Since $Z_a$ can only be nil pointwise within $(a_0, a_1)$, there exists a real $a_3$ in the neighborhood of $a_2$ such that $a_3 > a_2$ and $Z_{a_3} > 0$. According to the mean value theorem, there exists $a_4 \in (a_2, a_3)$ such that

$$\dot{Z}_{a_4} = (Z_{a_3} - Z_{a_2})/(a_3 - a_2) > 0.$$  From (37), one obtains

$$\frac{\pi_{a_4}}{1 + \pi_{a_4}} > \frac{x_{a_4}}{w_{a_4}}$$

Since $a_4$ is in the neighborhood of $a_2$ then $(x_{a_4}/w_{a_4}) \simeq (x_{a_2}/w_{a_2})$ at a first-order approximation. However, since $\dot{\pi}_a < 0, (\pi_{a_4}/(1 + \pi_{a_4})) < (\pi_{a_2}/(1 + \pi_{a_2}))$ at a first-order approximation, which leads to the contradiction. Therefore, $Z_a$ is positive everywhere within $(a_0, a_1)$.

From (13a), one has $\eta(w_a) < 1$ for any $a \in (a_0, a_1)$, which has different implications.

i) For any $a \in (a_0, a_1)$, one has $\partial \log L/\partial w(a, w_a) > -1$ from (7). Moreover, at the 

**faire, 

$$\partial \log L/\partial w(a, w_a^{LF}) = -1$$**

from (7) and (8). Hence, from (5) $w_a < w_a^{LF}$ which means that optimal wages are distorted downwards. Furthermore, since $\partial L/\partial w(a, .) < 0$, one has $1 - L(a, w_a) < 1 - L(a, w_a^{LF})$ and unemployment rates are distorted downwards. Finally, $Z_{a_0} = Z_{a_1} = 0$ induces $w_{a_0} = w_{a_0}^{LF}, L(a_0, w_{a_0}) = L(a_0, w_{a_0}^{LF}), w_{a_1} = w_{a_1}^{LF}$ and $L(a_1, w_{a_1}) = L(a_1, w_{a_1}^{LF})$.

ii) Since $\eta(w_a) < 1, x_a/w_a$ is nonincreasing in $a$, so it is maximized at $a_0$. Since $Z_{a_0} = 0$ and $Z_a > 0$ on $(a_0, a_1)$, one must have $\dot{Z}_{a_0} \geq 0$. Therefore, $x_{a_0}/w_{a_0} \leq \pi_{a_0}/(1 + \pi_{a_0}) < 1$. Hence for all $a, x_a < w_a$ and participation rates are distorted downwards.

iii) $x < w$ for all $w$ implies that the employment tax rate $(T(w) + b)/w$ is always positive. Moreover, it is nondecreasing since $\eta(w) < 1$. So, the average tax rate $T(w)/w$ is increasing in wage $w$. Finally (8) and $\eta(w) \leq 1$ induces $T'(w) \geq (T'(w) + b)/w$, so marginal tax rate are positive everywhere.

E  Proof of Proposition 3

The proof of Proposition 3 extends the one of Proposition 1 in Appendix C. Let $\lambda$ be the multiplier associated to the budget constraint. From (3), $w_a - T(w_a) = (\Sigma_a/L(a, w_a)) + b$, so the Hamiltonian becomes:

$$H(w, \sigma, q, a, b, \lambda) \equiv \left[L(a, w) \Phi \left(\exp \sigma L(a, w) + b\right) + (1 - L(a, w) \Phi(b))\right]G(a, \exp \sigma) \cdot f(a)$$

$$+ \int_{\exp \sigma}^{\infty} \Phi(b + \chi) g(a, \chi) f(a) d\chi + \lambda [L(a, w) \cdot w - \exp \sigma] \cdot G(a, \exp \sigma) \cdot f(a) + q \cdot \frac{\partial \log L}{\partial a}(a, w)$$

34
The first-order conditions now become, where we define \( Z_a = -q_a/\lambda \)

\[
0 = \frac{1}{\lambda} \frac{\partial \mathcal{H}}{\partial w} = \left[ \frac{\partial L(a,w_a)}{\partial w} + \frac{\Sigma_a}{L(a,w_a)} \right] (a,w_a) \Phi\left( \frac{\Sigma_a}{L(a,w_a)} + b \right) - \Phi(b) - \frac{\Sigma_a}{L(a,w_a)} \Phi'(\frac{\Sigma_a}{L(a,w_a)} + b) \\
+ \frac{\partial (L(a,w) \cdot w)}{\partial w} (a,w_a) \cdot G(a,\Sigma_a) \cdot f(a) - Z_a \cdot \frac{\partial^2 \log L}{\partial a \partial w}(a,w_a)
\]

\[
\dot{Z}_a = \frac{1}{\lambda} \frac{\partial \mathcal{H}}{\partial \sigma} = \left\{ \frac{\Phi'\left( \frac{\Sigma_a}{L(a,w_a)} + b \right)}{\lambda} - G(a,\Sigma_a) + [L(a,w_a) \cdot w_a - \Sigma_a] \cdot g(a,\Sigma_a) \right\} \cdot L(a,w_a) \Phi\left( \frac{\Sigma_a}{L(a,w_a)} + b \right) + (1 - L(a,w_a)) \Phi(b) - \Phi(b + \Sigma_a) \cdot g(a,\Sigma_a) \cdot f(a)
\]

These two conditions with the transversality conditions \( Z_{a0} = Z_{a1} = 0 \), (35) and (36) give (23a) to (23d). Finally, the condition with respect to \( b \) is exactly (24).

References


