TRANSITION FATIGUE?

CROSS-COUNTRY EVIDENCE FROM MICRO DATA

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Preliminary. Please Do Not Quote!

Abstract

The transition process has had different distributional impacts across different interest groups and countries leading to differences in the support for transition. We study such support attitudes using The New Barometer Data for 14 transition economies over 1991-2004. We document that the overall support for both economic and political transition is low, heterogenous across countries and individuals and is higher in the beginning of this century. The old, unemployed, less skilled, poor and those living in the CIS countries express lower support. We also find evidence that transition-related hardship, opinion on the speed of reforms, political preferences and preferences towards redistribution, ideology and social capital matter. Better governance, inequality and differences in the provision of public goods seem to explain lower support for transition in the CIS countries.

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1. Introduction

The parallel processes of transition to a market economy and to democracy in former socialist countries during the last two decades were unprecedented. The implementation of political and economic reforms began in the early 1990s in almost all the then socialist countries, both in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), although the paths of reform implementation and the sequence of the reforms differed across countries, ranging between a so-called "big-bang" approach (mostly CEE countries) and "gradualism" (mostly CIS).¹

The transition process hase been characterized almost everywhere by a U-shaped trend of output and an increase in unemployment. However, both the depth and duration of the initial transitional recession and the speed of the subsequent recovery differed considerably across countries.² A common feature to all the transition economies was the need to refocus the orientation of international trade, to restructure internal production, and to reallocate labor across regions, sectors and firms (Campos and Coricelli, 2002). Privatization, trade liberalization and economic restructuring took place in a situation of institutional change, a collapse of many institutions that provided social protection and at the same time introduction of the new ones, such as taxation or banking. The initial stages of transition have brought about increases in income inequality and unemployment in many countries. Thus, transitional reforms soon produced both economic "winners" and "losers" (Brainerd, 1998), and for those who were less ready or able to face these changes, the costs of transition may well have outweighed, at least for some time, its benefits.

Recent performance of the transition countries is characterized by a strong economic growth and, in case of the new EU member states, a decline in unemployment and a convergence towards the EU institutions. Average economic growth has been accelerating in nearly all transition countries, averaging 5,9% between 2000 – 2007, up from only 1,1% in 1995-1999.³ On the other hand, the pace of reforms in 2007 was the slowest since the transition began (*ibid*). And, in a stark contrast with improving living standards, the recent EBRD Transition Report (2007) shows that there is a widespread dissatisfaction with the outcomes of transition. In 2007, 49 percent of respondents disagreed (and only 35 percent agreed) with the statement that the economic situation in their country today is better than around 1989, with similar numbers corresponding to a political situation, 44 and 35 percent, respectively (EBRD, 2007; see also Guriev and Zhuravskaya, 2007, p. 2). Countries with the largest proportion of dissatisfied with economic situation were Hungary (75 percent), Ukraine (70 percent), Kyrgyzstan (70 percent), Bulgaria (63 percent) and Moldova (61

Although a simplification and generalisation, these definitions are useful for a general description of the transition process. See, for example, Roland (2002) for a comprehensive discussion of the political economy of transition and a survey of studies on economic policy reform.

In fact, the relative output performance of transition countries has been the subject of much debate in the literature. Among the potential explanations of the diversity of outcomes are geographical factors (such as proximity to the EU), history (such as the length of time under Soviet rule or the degree of pre-socialism development of capitalist informal institutions) as well as the different paths and sequences of reforms.

³ EBRD, Transition Report 2007. Data refer to 29 countries, 2006 and 2007 are estimated.

percent) (*ibid.*). Moreover, also privatization, one of the most important transition reforms, receives low support, with over 80 percent of respondents willing to revise privatization (EBRD, 2007; Denisova et al., 2007, p. 2).

It is unclear whether this is due to a "fatigue for some countries following accession to the European Union, uncertainties over the chances of EU membership for those in the "waiting room" or complacency brought on by the large oil and gas windfall" (EBRD, 2007, p. vi). In general, it seems that there is a certain "transition fatigue" in the region, a discontent with transition process that could be also responsible for more frequent changes of government in several countries in the recent years.

As most transition countries had rapidly and convincingly adopted fully democratic institutions, the discontent of the "losers" (or the expectations of those who fear becoming such) could be expressed through the channels of representative democracy and of civil society. This may have several consequences: (a) a slow down or temporary stop of the process of economic reforms (as in Fernandez and Rodrik, 1991); (b) a reversal – through the electoral process – of the governing majority,⁴ and following that a reversal of the initial reforms; (c) an upsurge of populist and nationalistic ideas (as recently documented, e.g., by Rupnik, 2007 and Krastev, 2007).⁵ Therefore, subjective well-being and public attitudes towards reforms are important not only as a measure of utility (indeed, many recent studies on happiness show that), but are also crucial for the design and implementation of policies.

Indeed, a large theoretical political economy literature has shown that voters' opinions are crucial for the successful implementation of the reforms, and that interest group coalitions may influence or even reverse the reform process. In general, reforms might be reversed because they are not the outcome of optimal planning under full-certainty. Instead, they are often adopted as part of a trial-and-error procedure under aggregate (as well as individual) uncertainty, and in the absence of credible compensating mechanisms for losers. Thus reforms may be resisted ex-ante even when they would be ex-post beneficial (as in Fernandez and Rodrik, 1991) or, when enacted, they may face ex-post political opposition from those who have experienced economic losses. Rodrik (1995) shows that as the probability of getting a job in the private sector declines, state sector workers become anti-reform and vote for high subsidies. However, he also observes that unemployment may strengthen support for reforms in situations where everybody is experiencing very high unemployment. As Fidrmuc (1999) observes, it is likely that workers in the state sector and those already unemployed will support rapid reforms only at the outset of transition, while later will vote for a reduction in the speed of reforms. On the other hand in his model workers in the private sector always benefit from, and hence also always vote in favor of rapid reforms.⁶ In general, this

⁴ Kornai (2006) computes that, out of 38 elections that took place in 8 CEE countries between 1989 and 2004, in 30 cases the result has been one of "electoral dismissal".

⁵ As the first author observes: "Populism is antiliberal but it is not antidemocratic. It gives voice to the losers of the reform" (Krastev, 2007, p. 60)

⁶ In a parallel vein, but without entering into considerations of political economy, also Blanchard (1997) find s that there exist an optimal speed of mobility (rate of dismissals) from the state to the private sector that ensures a smooth transition to a market economy. If dismissals are either too fast or too slow then the process is endangered, and he argues that reforms may be reversed if economic gains do not accrue soon enough. He also argues that public support for reforms is U-shaped, following similar pattern in output and

literature shows that reforms are endogenous to the economic outcomes of previous reforms, and in particular to their distributional impact (Kim and Pirttilä, 2006). The link between outcomes and reforms depends on the degree of (democratic) support for the reforms, which in turn depends on the net benefit that each individual receives from their implementation. In this framework, it is important to analyze the link between individuals' economic and labor market characteristics and their attitudes towards the reform process.

What determines these individual attitudes? Who is against the reforms? Are there differences across countries and institutions? Or differences between the early and late stages of transition? Finally, why in some countries the support for transition is lower than in others? These are the questions that we deal with in this paper.

While several studies have touched upon these questions, the majority of them either uses aggregate level data or is limited to only one country or one year. In addition, many studies have used indirect measures of preferences, such as those based on voting behavior; when the direct measures are available, individual-level data are scarce. Moreover, voting preferences are imperfect measures of attitudes towards reforms: since institutions are different across countries, such indirect measures may reflect both attitudes *and* institutions (Scheve and Slaughter, 2001; Mayda, 2006). We attempt to overcome these critiques by employing a unique data set of comparable surveys and using direct questions on attitudes towards economic and political systems in 14 transition economies over 1991-2004.

To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first one that analyses these questions using individual level data in a cross-country framework for this time span. Our data cover the entire period from the beginning of transition up to the first Eastern EU enlargement. Moreover, we are able to distinguish between attitudes towards economic and political systems. By using individual level data and controlling for country specific effects we also alleviate the endogeneity problems that are likely to be present in aggregate data (see Landier et al., 2008). Finally, as the suddenness and spread of these events were to a large extent unexpected and certainly unprecedented, they may to some extent be analyzed as a (quasi) natural experiment in reform adoption.⁷

Our main findings are as follows. First, we document that the support for transition is indeed low in 14 countries, with the lowest numbers being in the CIS countries. Second, similar to previous literature, the support is lower among the old, less skilled, unemployed and poor. Attitudes towards transition to a market economic were more negative in the 1990s (as well as 2000) than in 2004. In general, there are large similarities in the attitudes towards the economic and political systems, but also some significant differences. We also find evidence for an important role of additional individual experiences and values, such as economic hardship during the transition, opinions on the speed of reforms, political preferences and preferences towards redistribution, ideology and social

employment. Roland (2002) uses political economy considerations to argue for the importance of keeping unemployment as low as possible along the path of transition.

⁷ This aspect has indeed been exploited in some recent studies (see, for example, Alesina and Fuchs-Shueldeln, 2007; Landier et al., 2008). A few socialist countries had however begun to adopt a set of more limited market-oriented economic reforms before 1990. The foremost example (outside the sample of countries studied in this paper) is China, where reforms were started around 1978 (See e.g. Lin, Cai and Li, 2002), but also Yugoslavia had adopted a widely decentralized system of enterprise management since the 1970s.

capital. Finally, we show that institutions matter, and unequal provision of public goods as well as better governance seem to explain lower transition support in CIS countries.

The remaining of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. Section 3 presents the data and discusses measurement issues. Determinants of the attitudes towards transition in 14 countries are analyzed in Section 4, while Section 5 follows with country-specific analysis. The impact of additional individual variables is discussed in Section 6 and the role of macro-economic and political institutions in providing some explanations is suggested in Section 7. Section 8 concludes.

2. Related literature

Several empirical studies have analyzed the determinants of the support for reforms in transition countries using different support definitions and including different countries and years. Fidrmuc (2000) shows with aggregate county-level data that high unemployment is associated with less support for market reforms (defined as voting for the pro-reform parties⁸) in the Czech and Slovak Republics, Hungary and Poland. In contrast with the so-called responsibility hypothesis (when voters held the government responsible for the state of the economy), voters are found to be forward looking, since they support parties which they expect to deliver policies favorable to them.

Hayo (2004) analyses support towards market reforms and creation of the market economy in CEECs using both macro data and micro data for 1995. Using Central and Eastern Eurobarometer data over 1990-1996 he finds in only half of the countries majority supporting the creation of the market economy, confirming Blanchard's hypothesis of the U-shaped support for market reforms. He also finds a strong negative relation between inflation rate and support for the market reforms, and no significant effect of unemployment. There is also some evidence that high speed of privatization and higher inequality are negatively correlated with pro-reforms attitudes. On the micro-level, the author finds a negative effect of unemployment on the support for market economy in 1995. The author also compares the results from the New Democracy Barometer to the ones using CEEB micro data. However, it is not clear what countries and time periods are used for this comparison and only income, education, age and gender variables (together with countries and time dummies) were included into the latter.

Kim and Pirttilä (2006), similarly to Hayo (2004), combine Central and Eastern Eurobarometer data (1990-1997) with macro data to test whether public support for reforms is influenced by the economic outcomes of previous reforms and by individuals' welfare measured by growth, inflation, unemployment and income inequality. They find that support for reforms depends on both past macroeconomic performance, "ex-post political constraints" (income inequality and inflation), and expected individual performance during future reforms, "ex-ante political constraints". Support for reforms, in turn, affects positively progress in reforms (an index of the level of structural reforms),

⁸ Tucker (2002) surveys 101 articles that study post-communist elections and voting in 16 political science and post-communist area studies journals between 1990 and 2000 and reports that only 3 articles use individual data in multiple countries and multiple elections.

confirming the importance of political constraints. The authors conclude that transition reforms are not an exogenous process, but depend crucially on political economy considerations.

Opper (2004) using country-level data analyses the determinants of progress in privatization in a political economy framework. She finds that financial constraints, distribution of political power and interest group pressure determine progress in large-scale privatization, but not in small-scale privatization.

In a cross-country study, Doyle and Fidrmuc (2006) analyze motives behind support for the EU membership in the EU candidate countries using both regional macro aggregates and individual data from the Candidate Countries Eurobarometer for 2002. They find that regions with low unemployment and high wages show greater turnout to referenda (albeit not greater support). The authors also find that, surprisingly, those who are most likely to benefit from the redistribution funds of the EU (living in poor regions and those less well off) were more likely to oppose their country's membership or abstain from voting in their countries' referenda on accession. Conversely, the pro-EU are those who are likely to benefit from the new economic opportunities – young, educated, skilled and relatively well off. These are the same characteristics that other studies find to be positively correlated with support for market reforms. Thus, as authors argue, accession to the EU may be perceived as the final crucial element of the post-communist transition.

A recent paper by Landier et al. (2008) using World Value Survey data combined with country-level data investigates the determinants of and causes behind "capitalism aversion" measured by the attitudes towards private ownership, private profit and competition. They find evidence for the support of both the "self-interest" and "slow learning" hypotheses and show that cultural determinants matter. They also provide some evidence that at the country level, pro-market opinions affect the nature of economic institutions.

There exist several studies that use micro data to analyze individual preferences towards reforms in a single country. Doyle and Fidrmuc (2003) using survey data for the Czech Republic (1990-1992 and 1993-1998) show that unemployment began to have an effect on voting in the Czech Republic during the later stages of transition when winners and losers of the reforms were identified. They also find support for the so-called responsibility hypothesis (i.e. that voters with low incomes and those living in areas with high unemployment show less support for the proreform parties). They do not find conclusive evidence of the so-called individualist versus sociotropic behavior often analyzed in this sort of studies, as both individual and regional variables were significant. Valey (2004) finds a small effect of unemployment on voting behavior in Bulgaria. Although high unemployment reduces somewhat the support for market reforms, unemployed people demand more, rather than less, reform in locations with high unemployment, showing support for the Rodrik's hypothesis. In addition, he shows that many voters believed that high unemployment was a necessary short-term cost of market reform and voted for the pro-reform party. The author also argues that these results have important implications for the Optimal Speed of Transition literature, since the voters supported a rapid rather than gradual reform. Eble and Koeva (2002) provide evidence on the determinants of individual reform preferences in Russia after the August 1998 crisis using RLMS Round 8 data. The authors use two measures of preferences: opinion about the reform process in general and attitudes towards market reform only. They

confirm that individual attitudes towards reform are affected by individuals' economic gains or losses during transition (a so-called "economic hypothesis"). They also find that some societal groups, such as younger individuals, are more flexible in adapting to changes than older individuals (a so-called "ideological hypothesis"). Finally, their findings show that local economic conditions matter: people who live in high-arrears regions are more likely to oppose to the reform process, and there exist a significant effect of regional income level, ethnic composition, oil production and crime rates (but not unemployment rate). Finally, Jackson et al. (2003) analyze confidence in state firms vs. de novo private firms in Poland using both aggregate and survey data from three Polish elections. They show that these de novo firms, the individuals they employ and the residents in areas where they exist support pro-reform political parties.

In addition, Denisova et al. (2007) analyses the determinants of the support for revision of privatization in 28 transition countries in 2006 using individual-level Life in Transition Survey data. The authors find that respondents with less human capital, older individuals, those in less skilled jobs, in poorer health, and with only vocational educations favor revising privatization. In addition, significant and sustained economic hardships during transition (e.g., food cuts, forced asset sales, and wage cuts) are associated with greater support for revising privatization. They also find that institutions, such as governance, democracy, private ownership and inequality affect the link between transition-related experience and support for the revision of privatization. ⁹

Related strand of the literature examines subjective well-being in transition countries. Blanchflower (2001) uses the Central and Eastern Eurobarometer data to estimate wage curves and well-being regressions in 23 transition countries over 1990-1997 and finds that happiness is, in general, lower in these countries. He also finds that satisfaction with democracy is U-shaped in age, and is the lowest among the least educated, females, and the unemployed. Moreover, he also analyzes the attitudes towards the market reforms and the direction of these reforms (see also references therein for earlier contributions). He finds that support for market reforms followed a U-shaped pattern across years, is lowest in the CIS countries, and among the least educated, females, and the unemployed and is U-shaped in age. Sanfey and Teksoz (2007) using World Value Survey data find that individuals in transition economies have significantly lower life satisfaction compared with those in non-transition countries, and that in several countries it has returned to the pre-transition levels after a drop in mid-1990s. The authors find that people are in general happier in countries that have made more progress in transition and were inequality is lower. They also show that the most vulnerable groups include older individuals with obsolete skills and those with limited education. In addition, self-employed have satisfaction levels as high as, or higher than, full-time employees, suggesting that entrepreneurship can be a rewarding strategy in transition. Guriev and Zhuravskaya (2007) using data from the World Value Survey and Life in Transition Survey arrive at similar conclusions. The authors provide several reasons for lower life satisfaction in transition countries. In particular, they show that it is due to the depreciation of human capital, deterioration of public goods, income volatility and social injustice. Once these effects are controlled for and

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⁹ Blanchflower and Freeman (1997) using ISSP data compare attitudes of workers in the former communist countries (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Russia and Slovenia) to those in Western countries. They find that citizens of ex-communist countries report a greater desire for egalitarianism, less satisfaction with their jobs, more support for trade unions and state intervention than do Western citizens.

differences in samples are accounted for, the difference between transition and non-transition countries disappears. Easterlin (2008) also uses World Value Survey data and finds that life satisfaction has indeed followed the U-shaped pattern of GDP in transition economies, but the recovery falls short of that of GDP by 1999. The largest loss in life satisfaction is experienced by less educated and older individuals. He also suggests that transition has risen satisfaction with material living levels, but has decreased satisfaction with employment, health and family security.

Our paper complements this literature. In analyzing individual support for transition, we control for a large array of individual characteristics and cover multiple countries since the early transition in 1991 till its late stage in 2004. We also distinguish between economic and political system change. In addition, following Guriev and Zhuravskaya (2007) approach, we test several potential explanations for the variation in the support for transition between different countries.

3. Data and descriptive evidence

The individual data used in this paper come from the New Barometer Surveys (New Democracy Barometers), including the New Europe Barometers, the New Russian Barometers and the New Baltic Barometers. These are representative surveys of the populations in transition countries collected by the Centre for the Study of Public Policy (CSPP) at the University of Aberdeen and the Paul Lazarsfeld Society, Vienna.

As each survey round contains a large number of common questions, which are maintained across time and countries, the set of available surveys constitutes a unique dataset that allows meaningful cross-country comparisons across several years. This allows us to identify trends in political and economic transformations and also, given the composition of the questionnaires, to analyze the determinants of individual attitudes in the face of such changes. Surveys are undertaken independently from governments and face-to-face interviews are performed by trained interviewers working for established national research institutes in the national language (with the exception of the Baltic states, Belarus, and Ukraine, where Russian was also used). The survey includes nationwide multistage random samples of around 1,000 respondents per country (in Russia – around 2,000) over 18 years old.

We merge several waves of the New Europe Barometer, the New Russia Barometer and the New Baltic Barometer data. Our sample includes 14 transition economies, the earliest year being 1991 and the latest one 2004. Ten countries in our sample became members of the EU after the 2004 or 2007 enlargements (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia), Croatia is currently a candidate for EU membership, while three countries are members of the CIS (Belarus, Russia and Ukraine).

For the purpose of this paper we focus on two dependent variables, which have been constructed on the basis of the following questions, which had been included in all surveys:

Economic evaluation:

- Q.1 "Here is a scale for ranking how the economy works (from +100 at top to -100).
 - a) Where on this scale would you put the socialist economy before the revolution/1989?

b) Where on this scale would you put our present economic system?"

Political evaluation:

- Q.2 "Here is a scale for ranking how our system of government works (from +100 at top to -100).
 - a) Where on this scale would you put the former communist regime?
 - b) Where on this scale would you put the present system with free elections and many parties?"

Our two main dependent variables are constructed from these responses, respectively. They are both calculated as the difference (or "distance") between the responses to Question b (present) and responses to Question a (past) for economic and political evaluations, respectively. Thus, a larger positive (negative) difference implies a larger positive (negative) assessment of the present regime relative to the former one (in the economic or governmental dimensions, respectively). The larger is the value of this distance, the more positive is an individual about current state of the economy or politics, relative to the past, and thus, we assume, the more supportive she is for transition and the reforms which have been adopted in her country.

An important issue with using the subjective data is that several factors may affect individual attitudes, such as ordering of the questions, wording, individual differences in the perception of scale, introducing a measurement error into these attitudes (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001). Regarding the ordering of these questions, they are usually asked at the beginning of the corresponding sections on economy and public affairs, *before* the questions on the personal (or family) economic situation or political preferences. Note that by taking differences across individual answers for the same person we difference away such individual-specific factors, thus reducing the measurement error and the potential biases associated with it.¹⁰ Another potential criticism of this distance measure is that it does not account for *absolute* ranking of the present or past, which can be positive or negative. Accordingly, we shall test the robustness of this definition.

The set of explanatory variables employed in the regressions includes standard socio-economic indicators used in the literature. In the final sample we keep individuals with non-missing information on the key explanatory variables. Table A1 in the Appendix presents sample size by country. In addition, we have also collected data on several macroeconomic variables and institutions in each country. Definitions of all the variables are presented in Table A2 in the Appendix.

Figure 1 shows the proportion of positive, negative and zero evaluations of past and present economic (left panel) and political systems (right panel) for 1993 and 2004. Focusing on the economic system first reveals that the majority of respondents valued negatively present economic system in 1993, but in 2004 this evaluation was dominated by positive answers. Regarding past, the majority of respondents gave positive scores both in 1993 and 2004. The picture is somewhat different for the political system as the majority of individuals gave positive evaluations to both past and present political systems in both years, and by 2004 the proportion of positive answers have increased. Note also that zero evaluations constitute only a small proportion. The developments over time of the support for present, past and transition (i.e. "distance") are shown

¹⁰ Note that country-specific effects will be taken care of in the regressions below.

in Figure 2. This figure confirms that while support for the past economic system is high across 1991-2004, it is much lower for the past political system. There is also an increase over time in the ranking of both past and present systems. As a result, our "distance" measure has a U-shaped profile for the economic system, while for the political system, it is decreasing sharply till 1998 and then increasing, but only to a small extent. The U-shaped pattern in the support for economic transition seems to be in line with Blanchard's hypothesis and several studies mentioned above. However, it follows the development of GDP only in several countries (see Appendix Figure A1). Note also that these aggregate changes may be driven by the changes in the countries' composition in our sample. This is addressed in Figure 3. In general, it confirms the above mentioned observations. It also shows that a country with the largest support for both economic and political transition is Czech Republic, while a country with the lowest support is Ukraine. In general, on average, citizens do not seem to give a favorable evaluation for the economic system they live in, and they seem to have regrets for the past. On the other hand, on average, they appear to be reasonably satisfied with the present political system, but in some instances they still do not see it as an improvement over the past. This is true, in particular, of the current CIS members, but also several other countries, such as Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, Latvia, Bulgaria and Croatia express a negative evaluation of the political "distance" in 2004.

Another way to look at these evaluations is to adopt a classification developed by political scientists (see Lazar, Mishler and Rose, 2007) in reference to the same set of data. The classification is explained in Table 1a, and it is used in Table 1b to classify the data according to country averages. Again, the results are quite striking: the Czech Republic is the only consistently "pro-market" and pro-democracy country. Regarding the economic system, most countries are, on average, either "negative" or "nostalgic". Only a few are "positive", meaning that citizens give a positive evaluation of both the socialist and the market economy. For the political system, similarly, the majority of responses in countries are "reactionary" or "compliant".

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Table 1a: Classification into groups according to the evaluation of the economic or political system

Table 1b: Classification of countries into groups according to the evaluation of the economic and political systems

These preliminary data also suggest that there might be some correlation, at the individual level, between the attitudes towards the economic and the political system. Table 2 shows that this is indeed the case: for instance, although the "nostalgic" assessments of the economic system represent less than half in all years (43%), among those who are politically reactionary the nostalgic responses constitute 81%.

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Table 2: Group linkages for the evaluations of the economic and political systems

Overall, support for the transition experience seems rather less than enthusiastic. While this should not come as a whole surprise, as similar attitudes are well document in the EBRD Transition Reports, we nevertheless find it somewhat puzzling, at least *prima facie*, if we confront the pattern of these responses with the evolution of standard macroeconomic and institutional indicators, especially in the EU new member states. As it is shown in the Appendix Table A3, most indicators show a consistent improvement across time in all countries, the main exceptions being the Gini inequality index, Governance Indicators and life expectancy, that have deteriorated in several countries. Of course, differences in individual characteristics and transition experience may drive these support for transition attitudes. We examine these issue in the sections below.

4. Determinants of the economic and political system evaluations

We now turn to a more structured analysis and relate the individual responses to the characteristics of the respondents. We employ our "distance" measure (defined, as before, as the difference between the ranking of the economic or political systems currently and under socialism) as a dependent variable. Column 1 in Table 3 reports the baseline equation for the economic distance, and column 1 in Table 4 shows the analogous regressions for the political system. Let us focus on the support for economic transition first. Several individual characteristics affect significantly the support attitudes. In particular, distance appears to be significantly related to gender (females discount present versus past more than males), age, education, urbanization and income. These results are consistent with the "losers vs. winners" approach often referred to in the literature on transition (see section 2), and confirm that support for transition is low among old, unemployed, less educated individuals, and those living in rural arrears or belonging to the lowest household income quartiles. Note, in particular, that university level education increases "distance" by more than 20 points, while being unemployed decreases it by about 10 points, in both the economic and political evaluations.

Insert

Table 3. Determinants of evaluation: Economic system, present versus past

Table 4. Determinants of evaluation: Political system, present versus past

Coefficients on country-specific effects, in general, confirm the picture above. Relatively to Slovenia, individuals in the Czech Republic, Poland and Croatia are significantly more positive about transition, whereas those in the CIS countries, but also in Lithuania, Latvia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Slovakia and Romania are significantly more negative *ceteris paribus*. ¹¹

In columns (2) to (5) we restrict the sample of observations in several ways in order to get a better "feel" for the appropriateness of our chosen dependent variable. In particular, column (2) shows that if we measure "distance" only for those individuals, who valued negatively the past ("past \leq 0"), then individual characteristics are no longer significant (with the exception of

¹¹ To account for country-specific trends we have also introduced interaction dummies between countries and years. The results (not reported, but available on request), however, remained largely unaffected.

university education). On the other hand, the results in column (1) are confirmed for the subset of those individuals who valued the past positively (see column 3). This suggests that results in column (1) are driven by those individuals who are in a way "disappointed", i.e. who value positively the past. Column (4) shows that our results are sharper when we limit the sample to the two opposite subgroups of "nostalgic" and "pro-market" individuals. If instead we only look at the pro-market group, most individual characteristics are non significant, with the exception of being female, living in cities and being relatively rich. In this particular respect it is interesting to observe that, while females in general give lower support for the change in the economic system, within the "pro-market" group they significantly support change.

Overall, Table 3 seems to suggest that relative support for transition is mainly driven by the contrast between those individuals who are "nostalgic" about the past and those who are more explicitly "pro-market". This in general reinforces our interpretation of the dependent variable.

As for the political system (Table 4), results in general are similar to those obtained for the economic system, both with respect to the individual characteristics and country effects, as well as for the different sub-samples. The overall results for the political system change seems to be driven again by the contrast between those individuals who are "reactionary" and those who are "democrats", although in this case the differences between to four sub-groups seems less clear.

To obtain an additional insight on the motivation to support change in the economic system, we have re-estimated the baseline equation of Table 3 for five different sub-groups. These were selected on the basis of their responses to the following question:

"When you compare the overall economic situation of your houesehold with what it was before the big transformation in the economy, would you say that in the past if was: much better / a little better / about the same / a little worse / a lot worse?"

In general, the effect of individual charactersitics on the support for economic change does not change much between the five groups. However, it is interesting to observe that, for the group that thought that the past was "a lot worse", being unemployed (or, at the opposite, being in the highest household income quartile) lowers (or respectively, raises) by a considerable amount their evaluation of the change (results not reported, available upon request). People who think the past was worse are most probably expecting the largest positive change, so they are likely to react more strongly to either the disappointement of bein unemployed, or to the benefit of having a large income. Second, these additional results suggest that the evaluation of the distance between present and past evaluations of the economic system, does not only reflect the subjective experience of the interviewees, as it is measured by the economic situation of their household.

It is also likely that individual evaluations of economic and political systems are correlated. Indeed, the correlation between these two measures is 0.63. Table 5 reports estimates of the baseline equation (from column 1 of Tables 3 and 4), allowing for correlated errors across equations using seemingly unrelated regressions method. Overall, the results from OLS estimates are confirmed, although there is some gain in efficiency for individual coefficients, and, in particular, for the year effects.

Insert

Table 5. Determinants of evaluation - present versus past, SUR model

Another potential criticism against using the distance measure is that, as it reflects only a relative evaluation, it does not take into account the "absolute" evaluation of the current or of the past systems given by the respondents. For instance, the same distance of 70 could characterize someone who likes *both* the past and the present (past = 30; present = 100), someone who dislikes them both (past= -100; present = - 30) and someone who dislikes the past but is reasonably satisfied with the present (past = -40; present = 30). As these absolute evaluations might contain additional information, we have used the classification in Table 1 to divide our sample in eight different sub-groups (four for the evaluation of the economic system, and four for the political system). Which characteristics account for individual respondents placing themselves in any of these groups? To address this question, Table 6 reports the marginal effects from the multinomial logit regressions for "positive", "pro-market" and "nostalgic" groups relative to the "negative" for the evaluation of the economic system (columns 1-3) and for "compliant", "democrat" and "reactionary" groups relative to "sceptic" for the political system (columns 4-6).

Insert

Table 6. Determinants of adhesion to group evaluations of economic and political systems

Several interesting facts are evident from this Table. First, only few individual characteristics are significant for the "positive" and "compliant" groups. Second, the impact of individual characteristics on the likelihood of being "pro-market" and "democrat" is qualitatively opposite to the impact for "nostalgic" and "reactionary" groups. For instance, the likelihood of being "pro-market" (see column 2) is significantly lower for females, unemployed and pensioners and is decreasing with age. On the other hand, university graduates are 7 percentage points more likely to be "pro-market" relative to those with elementary education, and so do individuals in the highest household income quartile. Country-specific effects are similar to those previously identified: the Czech Republic having the largest positive coefficient and the CIS countries having the largest negative coefficients. Time effects are also worth noting: in the nineties, the probability of being "pro-market" for the reference individual would have been on average about 5 percentage points lower than in 2004.

Looking at the political system and, again, focusing on the group of those who support the change to the new system (i.e. "democrats", column 5), we find a very similar pattern of individual characteristics. The only differences worth mentioning are that the CIS countries' effects are larger in absolute terms and that time effects do not matter any more: there is no significant difference between 1990s and this century.

Overall, the results from the multinomial logit analysis reinforce those from OLS regressions above. Individual characteristics shape the pattern of individual evaluations regarding the economic and political system in a strong and plausible way. Country effects are also large and consistent across

different specifications. Most important, this analysis shows that, unsurprisingly, characteristics that drive individuals' likelihood to belong to a "pro-market" group go in the same direction as those that drive their attitudes towards support for transition. In other words, those who have lower support attitudes are, consistently, less likely to belong to the "pro-market" groups, and vice versa. Therefore, this validation exercise gives us more credibility for interpreting the OLS regressions results as support for reforms or, at least, for transition.

5. Country-level analysis

In the previous section, the responses of the dependent variables to individual characteristics were restricted to be uniform across countries, allowing only for fixed country and time effects. As we have shown, country dummies are in effect quite significant, which suggests that it may be appropriate to further explore the nature of cross-country differences.

Tables 7 and 8 present country-specific regressions for the determinants of individual evaluations of the economic and political systems, respectively. The baseline model is the same as in column (1) of Tables 3 and 4. The only notable exception is introduction of a minority dummy for the Baltic states. Ethnic minorities constitute a significant part of the population in these countries (especially, in Estonia and Latvia) and may have different attitudes towards economic and political reforms due to their specific situation that, in turn, may confound our results.¹³

Insert

Table 7. Determinants of evaluation - present versus past by country: Economic system

Insert

Table 8. Determinants of evaluation - present versus past by country: Political system

Analysis of the determinants of attitudes on a country by country basis reveals that there is indeed some heterogeneity across countries. Regarding economic distance (Table 7), age has a negative correlation with the dependent variable in all countries, except for Romania and Croatia. On the contrary, being a female has a significantly negative effect only in about half of the countries: Hungary, Poland (at 10% level), Slovenia, the three Baltic states, Bulgaria and Russia. University education has a positive association in all countries, except for Romania, Croatia and Belarus. Urbanization is also, in general, positive and significant in all countries, but Slovenia, Romania, Ukraine and Belarus. Being in the highest household income quartiles always has a positive and

¹² To make this statement more clear, consider as an example the fact of being unemployed. Our results suggest that this:

⁽i) will lower the probability of being "pro-market"

⁽ii) will increase the probability of being "nostalgic".

⁽iii) will also decrease overall support for transition, and hence our measure of economic "distance".

¹³ For the analysis of labour market performance of immigrants and non-citizens in transition countries see, for example, Kahanec and Zaiceva (2008).

significant effect. Belonging to an ethnic minority has a significant negative effect in all three Baltic states with the largest effect being in Estonia, reflecting probably the hardship of adjusting to the new system for individuals of Russian origin. It is remarkable that unemployment does not appear to be significant in Russia and Belarus: this could be presumably related to the fact that wage arrears rather than layoffs have been prevailing in Russia as a means to reduce the burden of labor costs on firms, and that very little reforms at all have taken place in Belarus.

As regards the political distance (Table 8), age has a negative effect in all countries, at least for some cohorts, except for Latvia (and it is significant at most at 10% level in Hungary). Being a female has a significantly negative effect again in about half of the countries: Poland, Slovenia, the Baltic states, Bulgaria and, marginally, in Belarus. University education has a positive effect everywhere, except for Croatia and Belarus. Urbanization is again generally positive and significant, except for Romania and Belarus, and being in the highest household income quartiles always has a positive and significant effect. The minority dummy for the Baltic countries is again negative and significant with the largest coefficient being in Estonia. Regarding unemployment status, the results suggest that it does not matter as much for the political attitudes as it is for the economic ones, since this variable is highly significant only in Latvia, Bulgaria and Croatia (and marginally significant in Hungary, Estonia and Lithuania).

Overall, this country-specific analysis provides some additional insights on the determinants of economic and political attitudes. Although there exists some relevant heterogeneity across countries, the differences are always related to the size and significance, but never to the sign, of the estimated coefficients. Moreover, individual characteristics, such as age, university education, urbanization, employment status and relative income, have almost always, with a few exceptions, significant effects on individuals' assessments of both the economic and political systems. Hence, these results can be taken as a broad confirmation of those obtained from pooling together all countries and presented in section 4. Thus, from now on, we return to the pooled dataset, and will move on to study the role of additional regressors and of institutional values.

6. The impact of additional regressors

In this section we further explore the link between individual assessments of the economic and political systems and additional individual characteristics or beliefs that are likely to influence those attitudes. The choice of additional regressors is motivated by the previous literature, whether focused on transition economies or, more generally, on the importance of institutions and of social capital. In Tables 9 and 10 we introduce several such variables into our baseline model (column 1 of Tables 3 and 4, respectively). Note that many (if not all) of these variables are likely to be endogenous. However, we believe that is definitely interesting to look at these regression results, even if we can only interpret them as reflecting simple partial correlations.

Insert

Table 9. The impact of additional variables: Economic system. Dependent variable: distance

Table 10. The impact of additional variables: Political system. Dependent variable: distance

First of all, the individual hardship experienced during the transition process may potentially influence individual evaluation of the relative performance of economic and political systems. To proxy for this, we construct two indicators, both of which refer to the year previous to the interview. The first variable, *wkhardship* (see column 1 in both Tables), measures the total number of weeks, during which a person was either unemployed or was not paid salary in full or a payment was delayed. The second variable, *dowithout* (see columns 2), is a so-called destitution scale (range: 0 to 9) that reflects the frequency a person or her family had to live without food, heating, electricity or clothes¹⁴. Consistent with *a priori* expectations, both variables have negative signs in both tables, suggesting that the more intense is economic hardship experienced by an individual, the lower is his support for the transition process (although the number of weeks with hardship is significant only at the 10% level in the equation for economic system).

Another potential variable that may be associated with individual's opinion on the transition process is the speed with which the reforms were actually implemented. As is suggested by the literature on the "Optimal Speed of Transition" (Aghion and Blanchard, 1994) and on the desirable sequencing of reforms (the so-called "Big-Bang vs. Gradualism debate", see, e.g., McMillan and Havrylyshyn, 2004, Murphy, Schleifer and Vishny, 1992 and Roland, 2002), reforms can either (be perceived to) go too fast or too slow, and in each case the individual assessment of the economic and, possibly, also of the political process would become more unfavorable. In our dataset, respondents were asked in 1995 and 1996 whether they thought that the reform process was going "too fast", "too slow" or "at the right speed". The results in column (3) of Tables 9 and 10 indicate that, as expected, both too high and too slow speed of the reforms influence negatively individuals' attitudes towards the transition process. Remarkably, conducting the reforms too fast may be associated with a stronger individual resistance, as suggested by the larger coefficient on the too fast dummy.

Individual preferences about political system may be another potentially omitted variable, especially, in the equation for political reforms. We attempt to proxy for such preferences, in particular, for preferences towards dictatorship, using the following two variables. Survey respondents were asked whether they would approve if the Parliament was suspended and whether it would be better to "to get rid of Parliament and elections and have a strong leader". Results in columns (4) and (5) indicate that such preferences matter indeed, and those who prefer dictatorship give 23-24 points less to the ranking of economic transition and 32 points less to the ranking of political transition.

The extent of corruption in a country may confound our results, since it may affect negatively individual attitudes towards the reform process. We attempt to control for that by generating a variable that equals 1 if an individual think that most or almost all "public officials are engaged in bribe-taking and corruption" in his country, and equals zero if he thinks that "very few" or "less than half public officials are corrupt". Unfortunately, this question was asked only in 2001 and 2004 and the sample size drops a lot. Nevertheless, as indicated in column (6) the rest of the individual

¹⁴ This variable is provided as such in the New Barometer Surveys, and is computed on the basis of several responses to more specific questions.

characteristics remain fairly robust, while the corruption variable is significant and has an expected negative sign for both economic and political attitudes.

As communism is believed to have shaped cultural preferences towards redistribution (Alesina and Fuchs-Schundeln, 2007), it is then likely that such preferences may in turn be correlated with individual attitudes towards transition from communism. This is indeed the case, as shown in column (7). Those who agree with the statement that "incomes should be made more equal so there is no big difference in income" as opposed to the statement "Individual achievement should determine how much people are paid" are more negative about the reform process.

In this sort of studies, it is important to control for the role of ideology. This can be done in several ways. One is to note, as it is usually done in the literature, that age can be used as a proxy for ideology. However, age could measure either the increased hardship imposed by transition on older individuals, or, indeed, the fact that older people's ideological values might have been shaped by communist institutions and culture. Indeed, as we have shown, older individuals are particularly negative about the transition process and are significantly more likely to belong to the "nostalgic" and "reactionary" groups. Alternatively, one can use directly the opinions and experience with communism. In column (8) we include the variable retcom, which is equal to 1 if an individual agrees with the statement "We should return to Communist rule", and in column (9) we include a variable excom, which indicates whether the respondent (or one of his family members) was formerly a member of the Communist Party. Both variables are significant and have negative signs, suggesting that "Communist ideology" is negatively correlated with individual support for transition. Moreover, the coefficient on the retcom dummy is the largest among all the regressors, which, however, could be also due to the high endogeneity of this variable. Note also that the sign and significance of the age effects is reduced (age above 60 becomes insignificant), which suggests that, indeed, the age variable acts also – but not only – as a proxy for ideology. 15

Finally, following the literature on the importance of "informal" institutions and of cultural values, we have introduced several variable that measure trust towards others (columns 10-13). Our findings suggest that all measures of trust (towards parties, parliament, the president or other people) are associated with a more positive assessment of the transition process. Overall, note that, throughout this exercise, the sign and significance other individual characteristics remain fairly robust to the introduction of additional variables and to the related changes in the composition and size of the sample.

In general, this section sheds additional light on the issue of who is against the transitional reforms, and may contribute to a better understanding of the potential reasons behind these assessments. For example, the experience of economic hardship during transition may be one reason why some people evaluate it negatively. Another potential complementary explanation could be that the reforms in some countries were conducted too fast, thus, generating economic "losers" that did not have enough time to adjust, or did not find adequate institutional support while having to adapt to, the changing environment. It is also worth noting that ideology and

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¹⁵ Still another way to control for ideology is to proxy it by individual right-left political orientation (DiTella and MacCulloh, 2005 show that it is important to distinguish between these two groups). We leave this for future research.

preferences towards redistribution matter. However, there may be other potential reasons for opposing transition across different countries, such as different macro-economic performance and institutional environment. We explore these issues in the next section.

7. In search of explanations: Macro variables and institutions

So far we have established that certain individual characteristics and values are important determinants of, or correlated to, attitudes towards transition. We have also documented that there exist differences across countries in these attitudes, as it is suggested by the relevance of country dummies in all regressions as well as by the analysis in section 5. In this section, we enquire to what extent these differences may be explained by different macro-economic or institutional indicators of the overall quality of the economic and political systems. Institutions and policies have been documented to affect individual attitudes towards specific reforms (such as privatization) as well as subjective well-being in post-communist countries (see, among others, Denisova et al., 2007; Guriev and Zhuravskaya, 2007). In order to study this potential influence, we introduce different macro and institutional variables into our baseline model. We focus in particular on how the introduction of these new variables affects the coefficients of the country dummies. The results are reported in Tables 11 and 12.

Insert

Table 11. Macro and Institutional determinants of country preferences: Economic system.

Dependent variable: distance

Table 12. Macro and Institutional determinants of country preferences: Political system.

Dependent variable: distance

Column (1) reproduces the results from Tables 3 and 4 (column 1) for comparative reasons (individual controls are included in all regressions, but are not reported in order to save space). Note that the largest negative country effects are for the CIS countries (Russia, Ukraine and Belarus). Column (2) introduces three traditional macro-economic control variables: aggregate unemployment, GDP per capita and inflation. As can be seen from this column neither of the variables is statistically significant. This may be due to several reasons. First, individuals may care more about their own economic performance (i.e. unemployment) than about unemployment in their country in general. Another reason may be different weights put on unemployment vs. inflation by the left-wing and the right-wing individuals. As is shown in DiTella and MacCulloch (2005), left-wing individuals care more about unemployment relative to inflation than right-wingers, consistent with partisan models of political economy. When averaging across left and right wing (as is done here), these differences may cancel out. Still another reason could be that we have omitted an indicator for the overall progress in transition. Hence, in column (4) we control

¹⁶ This is consistent with the so-called "individualist" hypothesis from the political economy literature discussed in section 2.

¹⁷ In addition, there might be a relevant discontinuity in the individual reactions to inflation, as many countries in our sample where characterized by hyperinflation in the early 1990s.

for the lagged EBRD transition index. Although one has to be careful when interpreting these results, since there definitely exist collinearity and endogeneity issues, the results suggest that, if anything, a higher unemployment rate is negatively correlated with the support for economic reforms, with no significant effect for political reforms. Note that although the inclusion of these macro-economic variables diminishes the significance of several country-specific dummies, the largest effects in Ukraine and Russia are still present in Table 11.

In column (3) we control for the extent of democracy in a country by introducing the Democracy Index from the Polity IV database. Somewhat surprisingly, the effect of the democracy on the evaluation of transition is negative. To understand correctly this result, one should note that, for most countries, this indicator does not vary to a great extent across time (see Table 4), with the exception of Romania (where it is increasing) and Belarus (where it is decreasing). Thus, its meaning is close to being a dummy reflecting only the difference between the EU members and non-members and not bringing much additional information to the regressions. Consistently, introducing this variable reinforces the negative value of the CIS country dummies. ¹⁸

Guriev and Zhuravskaya (2007) suggest that deterioration of public goods during transition is an important explanation of the lower happiness scores in these countries. As a measure for the availability of public goods, they suggest and experiment with the number of hospital beds per 1000 of people in a country, although they acknowedge that it is a measure of quantity rather than of quality of public goods. We also used this variable, both in levels (with an estimated negative effect) and in difference from 1991. Although we do not feel sufficiently confident in the quality of this indicator, the inclusion of this variable lowers the large negative values of the CIS countries dummies.¹⁹

Another reason why people may have negative attitudes towards the functioning of economic or political system is because of increased inequality. In line with Guriev and Zhuravskaya (2007), we find that the Gini index has a statistically significant negative effect in both Tables 11 and 12. While the inclusion of it does not, in general, diminishes the significance of the other included variables in Table 11, it does so in Table 12, suggesting that increased inequality might be an important explanation of individual support for the political system.

Finally, to analyze whether the quality of political institutions matter, we include World Bank Governance Indicators (an average of all indicators in column 8 and all of them separately in column 9). The results have to be compared relative to column (7) now, where the baseline regressions are run for a sub-sample with non-missing information on governance (43,000 observations). The coefficient of the governance variable is positive (although insignificant in the political system regressions) and suggests that the better is the quality of governance the higher is

This result is entirely driven by the evaluation of the present economic and political systems, since democracy variable was insignificant in the equations for the evaluation of past systems (not shown here, but available upon request). That implies that the higher is democracy, the lower individuals rank performance of current economy or political system. This result is interesting in itself and needs more analysis in the future research. However, it is also consistent with the results in Guriev and Zhuravskaya (2007), where the authors find negative relation between democracy score and happiness and Denisova et al. (2007), where in more democratic countries people who experienced economic hardship during transition were found to be more likely to favour re-nationalization.

¹⁹ We have also experimented with life expectancy a san additional regressor. However, it did not contribute to the disappearance of significant effects of CIS countries.

support for the present system relative to the past. Notably, the inclusion of this indicator (either an average or disaggregated) eliminates the significance of the negative country dummies. This may suggest that the quality of political institutions matters in explaining the negative attitudes towards functioning of a country's economic or political system. In addition, when included separately (column 9), the Governance Indicators have heterogeneous effect on economic and political attitudes. While political stability and regulatory quality matter for the attitudes towards economic system, it is the rule of law that has the largest positive effect for the evaluation of the political system.

8. Conclusions

As a presentation of the EBRD Survey on Life in Transition (2006) remarks, "17 years of transition have taken a toll". Indeed there is a certain "transition fatigue" in the region, a discontent with transition process that could be also responsible for more frequent changes of government in several countries in the recent years. In this paper we document the extent of this discontent in 14 transition countries during 1991-2004. We find that the impact was heterogeneous across different interest groups and countries. The lowest support for transition is found, in line with the literature, among old, females, less educated, unemployed and poor, i.e. those who were likely to "lose" from transition in relative terms. The evaluation of both economic and political systems is the lowest in CIS countries. On the other hand, there is also an increasing trend in support for change in the economic system, suggesting that it may likely continue in the future.

We have also found evidence that transition-related hardship, opinions on the speed of reforms, political preferences and preferences towards redistribution, ideology and social capital matter. Individuals who have experienced economic difficulties during the transition, have preferences towards dictatorship or redistribution of incomes, who think that corruption is widespread, who want to return to communism or are ex-Communist party members and those who are less inclined to trust both politicians or other people are also less likely to support the transition process. Interestingly, those who think that the reforms were conducted too fast are most likely to oppose the transition.

We also find evidence that macro-economic and political institutions matter. Unequal provision and the deterioration of public goods could be a potential explanation of the lower support for both economic and political reforms in the CIS countries, although the effect is weaker for the political system. Increased inequality seem to be an important explanation of the variation in individual support for the political system across countries. Finally, the quality of political institutions, in particular better governance, matters in explaining the lower support attitudes in CIS towards functioning of a country's economic or political system. In addition, we find that while political stability and regulatory quality matter for the attitudes towards economic system, it is the rule of law that has the largest positive effect for the evaluation of the political system.

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Tables

Table 1a: Classification into groups according to the evaluation of the economic or political system

Past	Present	Economic system	Political system
Positive	Positive	Positive	Compliant
Negative	Negative		
Negative	Neutral		
Neutral	Negative		
Neutral	Neutral	Negative	Sceptic
Positive	Neutral		
Positive	Negative	Nostalgic	Reactionary
Neutral	Positive		
Negative	Positive	Pro-market	Democrat

<u>Notes</u>: "positive" refers to evaluation greater than zero, "negative" – smaller than zero, "neutral" – equal to zero.

Table 1b: Classification of countries into groups according to the average evaluation of the economic and political systems

		Economic System	Political System
Czech R.	1991	Pro-mkt	Democrat
	2004	Pro-mkt	Democrat
Slovakia	1991	Nostalgic	Democrat
	2004	Nostalgic	Reactionary
Hungary	1991	Nostalgic	Compliant
	2004	Nostalgic	Compliant
Poland	1991	Negative	Skeptic
	2004	Nostalgic	Skeptic/Comp
Slovenia	1991	Negative	Democrat
	2004	Positive	Compliant
Estonia	1993	Nostalgic	Compliant
	2004	Positive	Compliant
Latvia	1993	Nostalgic	Reactionary
	2004	Nostalgic	Reactionary
Lithuania	1993	Nostalgic	Reactionary
	2004	Positive	Compliant
Bulgaria	1991	Nostalgic	Democrat
	2004	Nostalgic	Reactionary
Romania	1991	Negative	Democrat
	2004	Nostalgic	Democrat
Croatia	1992	Negative	Skeptic
	1998	Nostalgic	Skeptic
Russia	1992	Nostalgic	Reactionary
	2004	Nostalgic	Compliant
Ukraine	1992	Nostalgic	Reactionary
	2004	Positive	Compliant
Belarus	1991	Nostalgic	Reactionary
	2004	Positive	Compliant

Notes: based on average responses by country, using classification from Table 1a.

Table 2: Group linkages for the evaluations of the economic and political systems

E	conomic system	1		Political system	1	
All	Reactionary	Democrat	All Nostalgic Pro-mar			
		19	993			
Nostalgic	Nostalgic	Nostalgic	Reactionary	Reactionary	Reactionary	
47.14	82.76	24.75	26.91	47.87	3.27	
Negative	Negative	Negative	Sceptic	Sceptic	Sceptic	
21.32	7.58	23.01	24.26	18.71	14.93	
Positive	Positive	Positive	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	
18.99	8.09	16.51	21.45	18.87	5.95	
Pro-market	Pro-market	Pro-market	Democrat	Democrat	Democrat	
12.55	1.57	35.73	27.37	14.55	75.85	
		20	004			
Nostalgic	Nostalgic	Nostalgic	Reactionary	Reactionary	Reactionary	
33.79	73.57	14.11	25.01	55.52	3.58	
Negative	Negative	Negative	Sceptic	Sceptic	Sceptic	
9.39	5.12	9.93	13.44	12.12	13.30	
Positive	Positive	Positive	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	
40.54	18.97	30.43	35.06 21.23 10.42		10.42	
Pro-market	Pro-market	Pro-market	Democrat	Democrat	Democrat	
16.27	2.34	45.53	26.50	11.13	72.69	
		Average	(all years)			
Nostalgic	Nostalgic	Nostalgic	Reactionary	Reactionary	Reactionary	
42.87	80.66	19.90	27.52	52.33	3.32	
Negative	Negative	Negative	Sceptic	Sceptic	Sceptic	
19.18	7.21	20.51	21.50	16.30	14.00	
Positive	Positive	Positive	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	
23.85	10.40	19.59	24.26	18.88	8.27	
Pro-market	Pro-market	Pro-market	Democrat	Democrat	Democrat	
14.11	1.73	40.01	26.72	12.49	74.41	

- Notes:
 Col. 1-3: Evalutation of the economic system, for citizens which have expressed different evaluations. of the political system (% of total evaluations, all countries).
- Col. 4-6: Evalutation of the political system, for citizens which have expressed different evaluations of the economic system (% of total evaluations, all countries).

Sample size is 74679 and 73200, respectively for the evaluation of the economic and political systems.

Table 3. Determinants of evaluation: Economic system, present versus past

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
		Distance if	Distance if	Distance if pro-	
	Distance	past<=0	past>0	market=1 or	Distance if pro- market=1
		•	<u>_</u>	nostalgic=1	
female	-8.790**	-3.211*	-6.873*	-10.145**	1.786**
	(3.382)	(1.672)	(3.245)	(3.898)	(0.745)
age3039	-6.009***	-1.253	-5.515***	-9.035***	0.950
	(1.534)	(1.228)	(1.200)	(1.988)	(1.741)
age4049	-13.205***	-2.142	-10.224***	-16.993***	2.810
F0F0	(1.922)	(1.967)	(1.534)	(3.033)	(2.249)
age5059	-14.664***	-3.889*	-10.788***	-18.419***	2.882
24260m	(2.229) -9.733**	(1.917) 1.281	(1.596) -9.323**	(2.761) -12.222**	(2.164)
age60m	(3.962)	(2.261)		(4.698)	5.232 (3.697)
cocyocat	6.734**	3.362*	(3.219) 3.146*	8.903**	2.400
secvocat	(2.314)	(1.850)	(1.666)	(3.010)	(1.643)
uni	21.277***	7.923***	11.986***	27.874***	2.750
um	(2.054)	(1.748)	(1.780)	(3.205)	(2.492)
single	5.847***	0.797	4.317***	7.759***	-0.741
Sirigic	(1.514)	(1.288)	(1.244)	(2.052)	(1.245)
divwid	1.076	0.060	0.455	1.183	0.543
	(1.236)	(1.057)	(0.921)	(1.498)	(1.820)
city1	8.637**	3.563*	1.914	11.313**	5.930***
,	(3.367)	(1.900)	(2.099)	(4.644)	(1.338)
bigt1	0.179	-0.692	-0.466	0.745	1.372
3	(1.779)	(1.612)	(1.420)	(2.353)	(1.529)
unemployed	-11.962***	-4.580**	-8.465***	-15.767***	-0.729 [°]
	(2.583)	(1.671)	(2.001)	(3.302)	(1.301)
pens	-6.058**	-0.466	-2.550	-8.378*	3.325
	(2.297)	(2.124)	(1.760)	(3.946)	(2.880)
hwstudent	6.048***	1.302	4.409***	6.341**	-0.914
	(1.160)	(1.106)	(0.909)	(2.243)	(1.599)
hhincq2	1.509	-1.239	0.893	2.533	0.136
	(1.823)	(1.517)	(1.518)	(2.181)	(1.408)
hhincq3	6.652**	3.009	4.156*	10.099***	1.871
1.1.1	(2.549)	(1.966)	(2.271)	(2.959)	(1.762)
hhincq4	21.831***	9.554***	14.428***	31.614***	5.683***
	(2.504) 37.200***	(1.621) 44.062***	(2.132) 10.915***	(2.692) 59.249***	(1.551) 24.313***
CZ	(1.097)	(1.152)	(1.580)	(1.619)	
sk	-21.020***	4.801***	-17.554***	-32.754***	(0.560) 8.096***
SK	(0.935)	(1.255)	(1.138)	(0.996)	(0.734)
hu	-24.585***	-6.945***	-10.041***	-35.787***	-3.596**
IIu	(1.281)	(0.936)	(1.715)	(1.758)	(1.400)
pl	9.649***	25.196***	-6.133***	16.896***	13.878***
Ρ.	(1.161)	(0.882)	(1.176)	(1.564)	(0.953)
ee	-2.600	18.027***	2.687	0.680	5.002***
	(2.491)	(2.396)	(2.084)	(3.158)	(1.045)
lt	-48.560***	-11.727***	-32.828***	-62.806***	4.479**
	(2.473)	(2.291)	(2.046)	(3.178)	(1.631)
lv	-37.080***	-16.494***	-24.081***	-48.348***	-5.660***
	(2.486)	(2.125)	(2.164)	(3.055)	(1.401)
bu	-36.123***	6.909***	-43.648***	-49.751***	20.296***
	(0.723)	(1.034)	(0.947)	(1.056)	(1.749)
ro	-10.176***	3.587**	-19.026***	-18.581***	9.758***
	(2.087)	(1.640)	(1.588)	(2.967)	(1.343)
cr	10.924***	12.315***	-11.089***	11.361***	19.093***
	(2.481)	(1.945)	(2.612)	(2.980)	(1.354)
ru	-49.706***	-19.348***	-35.390***	-68.511***	-8.427***
	(2.132)	(1.990)	(1.928)	(2.609)	(1.268)
ua	-67.976***	-21.666***	-49.614***	-80.299***	-0.876
	(1.378)	(1.903)	(1.084)	(1.953)	(1.967)
by	-48.075***	-9.912***	-28.409***	-66.040***	-2.193
	(1.917)	(2.141)	(1.717)	(3.537)	(1.498)

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Cont. Tab.5					
yr91	-9.849	-29.775***	-18.818**	-10.202	-0.399
	(9.520)	(7.786)	(7.167)	(12.123)	(3.750)
yr92	-24.200***	-35.652***	-31.913***	-28.832***	-3.965
	(6.836)	(6.744)	(7.242)	(6.343)	(4.700)
yr93	-20.317**	-22.826***	-28.343***	-22.926**	-0.771
	(7.713)	(5.729)	(6.683)	(8.287)	(3.894)
yr95	-23.955**	-20.661***	-32.418***	-25.126**	-4.858
	(10.348)	(6.028)	(8.804)	(11.569)	(3.913)
yr96	-18.779*	-14.335**	-31.342***	-21.748**	6.694
	(9.149)	(6.245)	(6.085)	(9.440)	(4.351)
yr98	-17.961	-18.108**	-28.912***	-18.902	5.425
	(10.448)	(6.551)	(7.887)	(12.033)	(3.828)
yr00	-26.023**	-2.995	-32.198***	-23.003**	11.386**
	(9.956)	(7.386)	(7.861)	(10.393)	(4.078)
yr01	0.341	8.645	-9.427	3.775	12.909***
	(8.183)	(5.379)	(7.941)	(10.100)	(3.049)
Constant	-1.999	41.726***	-25.910***	-14.524	60.338***
	(9.721)	(6.879)	(7.097)	(11.684)	(4.699)
Observations	74679	24866	49813	42550	10534
R-squared	0.18	0.14	0.14	0.24	0.07

Notes: Estimation method: OLS. Standard errors clustered by country are reported in parentheses.

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Reference individual is male, age 20-29, less than secondary school education, married, living in rural or small town, employed, with household income in the 1st quartile. Reference country and year: Slovenia, 2004. For definitions of variables, see text and Data Appendix.

Table 4. Determinants of evaluation: Political system, present versus past

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
		Distance if	Distance if	Distance if	Distance if
	Distance	past<=0	past>0	democrat=1 or	democrat=1
	7 204**	•		reactionary=1	
female	-7.284**	-3.787**	-3.981	-11.997**	0.829
5752020	(2.600)	(1.311)	(2.348)	(4.033)	(0.746)
age3039	-5.053*** (1.436)	0.494	-4.932*** (1.365)	-9.126***	1.697*
2004040	(1.436) -11.469***	(1.357) 1.022	(1.365) -8.987***	(2.208) -18.074***	(0.945) 1.119
age4049	(1.752)	(2.177)	(1.616)	(2.624)	(1.761)
age5059	-13.347***	1.008	-10.223***	-19.909***	3.316*
agesoss	(2.712)	(2.113)	(2.321)	(3.448)	(1.703)
age60m	-10.851**	2.561	-10.401***	-16.305**	4.879**
agee	(4.348)	(2.464)	(3.404)	(6.069)	(2.151)
secvocat	10.836***	5.735***	5.545***	16.591***	4.338***
	(2.314)	(1.162)	(1.521)	(3.523)	(1.243)
uni	27.017***	13.037***	14.458***	40.730***	7.108***
	(2.462)	(1.723)	(2.636)	(4.413)	(1.768)
single	4.678***	0.882	3.544***	5.214**	-0.364
	(1.332)	(1.453)	(1.045)	(2.361)	(1.666)
divwid	0.840	-0.140	0.040	-0.130	-0.508
	(1.618)	(1.103)	(1.776)	(2.023)	(0.860)
city1	8.416*	4.391*	1.086	12.392*	6.730***
hight	(3.948)	(2.328)	(1.751)	(5.840)	(1.520)
bigt1	-1.269	0.152	-3.000* (1.527)	-1.681	2.796*
unemployed	(2.501) -9.832***	(1.837) -2.961**	(1.537) -5.823***	(3.862) -15.460***	(1.397) 2.295**
unemployed	(2.308)	(1.361)	(1.875)	(3.338)	(0.954)
pens	-3.199	1.943	-1.033	-3.447	3.789***
Perio	(2.123)	(2.059)	(1.981)	(3.776)	(1.153)
hwstudent	6.367***	4.555***	2.043	9.453***	1.384
	(1.217)	(1.201)	(1.480)	(1.884)	(1.090)
hhincq2	3.587*	1.836	2.250*	5.654* [*]	0.615
·	(1.703)	(1.669)	(1.226)	(2.575)	(1.385)
hhincq3	10.077***	5.187***	5.646**	14.710***	2.391*
	(2.018)	(1.431)	(2.012)	(3.095)	(1.333)
hhincq4	21.639***	10.272***	12.763***	32.945***	5.154***
	(2.442)	(1.200)	(2.086)	(4.148)	(1.305)
CZ	47.999***	45.633***	3.855	60.237***	32.899***
-1.	(1.666)	(1.627)	(2.664)	(2.626)	(0.736)
sk	-4.488*** (1.10E)	11.248***	-13.581***	-11.746*** (1.975)	11.238***
hu	(1.195) -21.493***	(1.055) -1.049	(1.516) -11.330***	-38.456***	(1.058) -2.972***
Tiu	(1.230)	(0.892)	(1.902)	(1.904)	(0.727)
pl	16.749***	24.557***	-4.316**	20.783***	18.493***
Α.	(1.187)	(0.937)	(1.586)	(1.639)	(0.841)
ee	-2.331	14.104***	-7.359***	-4.627	10.427***
	(2.100)	(1.639)	(2.240)	(2.851)	(0.991)
lt	-22.235***	-1.785	-25.462***	-40.990***	11.559***
	(2.271)	(1.769)	(2.154)	(3.285)	(1.360)
lv	-22.477***	-11.147***	-21.473***	-40.701***	0.892
	(2.213)	(1.591)	(2.265)	(3.158)	(0.957)
bu	-1.608	32.834***	-23.712***	-5.364**	32.159***
	(1.215)	(0.569)	(1.235)	(1.841)	(0.661)
ro	27.740***	32.078***	4.158*	38.923***	29.882***
cr	(1.890) 7.932***	(1.326) 0.569	(1.925) -11.225***	(3.041) 11.536***	(0.976) 15.038***
cr	(2.521)	(2.149)	(3.584)	(3.441)	(1.491)
ru	-49.949***	-24.573***	(3.564) -37.944***	-86.273***	-6.353***
1 4	(1.453)	(1.645)	(1.871)	(2.110)	(1.281)
ua	-49.443***	-4.665***	-43.431***	-77.658***	15.252***
	(1.878)	(1.523)	(1.348)	(2.586)	(1.368)
by	-40.494***	-9.502***	-28.352***	-71.932***	-4.134***
_ ′	(2.058)	(1.638)	(2.101)	(2.927)	(1.215)
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Cont.	Tab.4
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yr91 14.859 -1.921 -5.991 19.568 (12.524) (7.675) (8.004) (18.645) yr92 -2.839 -10.870 -19.588* -4.040 (9.377) (9.002) (10.604) (14.101) yr93 2.556 -2.843 -12.277 2.641 (8.834) (5.861) (8.894) (13.666)	6.791 (4.441) 4.706 (5.323) 6.103*
yr92 -2.839 -10.870 -19.588* -4.040 (9.377) (9.002) (10.604) (14.101) yr93 2.556 -2.843 -12.277 2.641	4.706 (5.323) 6.103*
(9.377) (9.002) (10.604) (14.101) yr93 2.556 -2.843 -12.277 2.641	(5.323) 6.103*
yr93 2.556 -2.843 -12.277 2.641	6.103*
(9.924) (5.961) (9.904) (12.666)	(2.016)
(0.034) (3.001) (0.034) (13.000)	(2.916)
yr95 -1.325 -3.483 -14.361 -1.459	3.572
(10.696) (6.136) (9.858) (16.288)	(4.329)
yr96 0.360 -0.607 -21.066*** -1.456	11.568**
(7.757) (6.337) (6.965) (12.065)	(4.077)
yr98 -6.069 -8.270 -17.904 -6.981	6.792
(12.542) (5.629) (10.463) (18.837)	(4.688)
yr00 -8.688 4.121 -15.727* -10.473	9.197**
(7.318) (5.262) (8.118) (11.265)	(3.103)
yr01 -1.214 9.986** -7.495 0.470	13.374***
(7.767) (4.565) (8.061) (11.995)	(3.516)
Constant 1.387 39.755*** -24.306*** 6.456	61.545***
(10.517) (6.811) (7.330) (16.875)	(3.655)
Observations 73200 35310 37890 39703	19562
R-squared 0.16 0.13 0.09 0.24	0.08

Notes: Estimation method: OLS. Standard errors clustered by country are reported in parentheses.

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Reference individual is male, age 20-29, less than secondary school education, married, living in rural or small town, employed, with household income in the 1st quartile. Reference country and year: Slovenia, 2004. For definitions of variables, see text and Data Appendix.

Table 5. Determinants of evaluation - present vs. past: SUR model

	(1) Economic system:	(2) Political system:
	Distance	Distance
female	-8.396***	-7.251***
	(0.565)	(0.610)
age3039	-5.994***	-5.094***
2004040	(0.946) -13.347***	(1.022) -11.527***
age4049	(0.969)	(1.047)
age5059	-14.581***	-13.277***
	(1.038)	(1.122)
age60m	-9.927***	-10.950***
secvocat	(1.169) 6.872***	(1.263) 10.748***
secvocat	(0.733)	(0.792)
uni	21.388***	26.971***
	(0.964)	(1.041)
single	5.705***	4.595***
divwid	(0.877) 1.507*	(0.948) 0.909
uivwiu	(0.790)	(0.853)
city1	9.097***	8.575***
	(0.736)	(0.795)
bigt1	0.278	-1.209*
unomployed	(0.668) -12.072***	(0.721) -9.673***
unemployed	(1.019)	(1.101)
pens	-6.116***	-3.284***
	(0.953)	(1.030)
hwstudent	6.112***	6.276***
hhinca?	(1.096) 1.813**	(1.184) 3.908***
hhincq2	(0.789)	(0.853)
hhincq3	7.189***	10.545***
	(0.799)	(0.864)
hhincq4	21.961***	22.019***
CZ	(0.850) 37.145***	(0.918) 48.089***
CZ	(1.688)	(1.824)
sk	-20.895***	-4.394**
	(1.734)	(1.874)
hu	-24.297***	-21.445***
pl	(1.729) 10.635***	(1.869) 17.121***
ρi	(1.600)	(1.730)
ee	-1.685	-2.140
	(1.676)	(1.811)
lv	-36.062*** (1.723)	-23.357***
lt	(1.723) -48.294***	(1.862) -22.754***
it.	(1.635)	(1.767)
bu	-36.365***	-1.765
	(1.579)	(1.706)
ro	-9.692***	28.102***
cr	(1.754) 10.497***	(1.896) 7.893***
CI	(1.775)	(1.918)
ru	-50.100***	-50.002***
	(1.447)	(1.564)
ua	-68.805***	-50.818***
hv	(1.691)	(1.828)
by	-48.987*** (1.796)	-40.408*** (1.941)

Cont. Tab.5		
yr91	-9.584***	14.937***
	(1.303)	(1.408)
yr92	-24.118***	-2.596**
	(1.135)	(1.226)
yr93	-19.564***	2.885***
	(0.961)	(1.039)
yr95	-23.196***	-1.212
	(0.980)	(1.060)
yr96	-18.205***	0.267
	(1.356)	(1.465)
yr98	-17.758***	-5.951***
	(1.111)	(1.201)
yr00	-25.639***	-8.145***
	(1.455)	(1.573)
yr01	0.204	-0.705
	(1.175)	(1.269)
Constant	-2.669	0.953
	(1.879)	(2.030)
Correlation	0.5	723
Breusch-Pagan test of	23425	5.855,
independence: chi2(1)	Pr = 0	0.0000
Observations	71	526

Observations
71526

Notes: Estimation method: SUR. Standard errors in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Reference individual, country and year: as in T.5-6.
For definitions of variables, see text and Data Appendix.

Table 6. Determinants of adhesion to group evaluations of economic and political systems

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
		Economic system	1	Р	olitical system	n
	Positive	Pro-market	Nostalgic	Compliant	Democrat	Reactionary
Female	-0.015	-0.020***	0.049**	0.003	-0.033***	0.030**
	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.019)	(0.005)	(0.010)	(0.013)
age3039	-0.012*	-0.019***	0.031***	0.001	-0.022***	0.029***
age4049	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.007)
	-0.018	-0.036***	0.076***	0.010	-0.043***	0.069***
age5059	(0.011)	(0.005)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.008)	(0.008)
	-0.011	-0.041***	0.073***	0.011	-0.050***	0.078***
age60m	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.016)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.016)
	-0.012	-0.023**	0.047*	-0.004	-0.036**	0.068***
secvocat	(0.014)	(0.010)	(0.026)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.024)
	0.005	0.022***	-0.040***	-0.005	0.042***	-0.045***
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.012)	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.009)
Uni	0.001	0.072***	-0.121***	-0.027***	0.116***	-0.108***
	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.013)	(0.007)	(0.012)	(0.010)
Single	-0.003	0.013**	-0.032***	011	0.019**	-0.023***
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.005)
Divwid	-0.007*	-0.002	0.003	-0.011*	-0.001	0.004
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.008)
city1	-0.014	0.026**	-0.049***	-0.024*	0.027	-0.031*
bigt1	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.020)	(0.016)
	-0.001	0.002	-0.006	-0.007	-0.006	0.005
unemployed	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.013)	(0.012)
	-0.013	-0.030***	0.057***	-0.001	-0.043***	0.052***
	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.014)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.013)
Pens	0.013	-0.024***	0.033***	0.025**	-0.020**	0.013
	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.011)
hwstudent	0.007 (0.007)	0.013** (0.006)	-0.038*** (0.007)	-0.009 (0.008)	0.032*** (0.009)	-0.023** (0.010)
hhincq2	-0.001	0.004	-0.012	-0.006	0.017**	-0.012**
hhincq3	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.011)	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.006)
	-0.000	0.022***	-0.030**	-0.017***	0.046***	-0.033***
hhincq4	(0.010)	(0.005)	(0.014)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.010)
	0.022**	0.068***	-0.120***	-0.022***	0.097***	-0.087***
	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.014)	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Cz	0.017	0.186***	-0.134***	-0.080***	0.253***	-0.111***
	(0.013)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.007)
Sk	-0.050***	-0.050***	0.174***	-0.031***	-0.022***	0.082***
	(0.005)	(.002)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Hu	-0.015	-0.071***	0.185***	0.035***	-0.089***	0.142***
PI	(0.010) -0.038***	(0.003) 0.058***	(0.008) 0.043***	(0.010) -0.040***	(0.005) 0.082***	-0.004
Ee	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.006)
	0.066***	0.000***	0.053***	0.022**	-0.010	0.050***
Lv	(0.013)	(0.009)	(0.015)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
	-0.100***	-0.082***	0.266***	-0.063***	-0.114***	0.144***
	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.012)
Lt	-0.083***	-0.092***	0.298***	-0.048***	-0.101***	0.154***
	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.013)
Bu	-0.135***	-0.060***	0.260***	-0.025***	0.003	0.103***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Ro	-0.085*** (0.008)	-0.032*** . (0.005)	0.122*** (0.013)	-0.030*** (0.010)	0.094***	-0.061*** (0.008)
Cr	-0.108***	0.030***	0.024	-0.111***	-0.010	-0.034***
Ru	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.010)
	-0.096***	-0.115***	0.302***	-0.051***	-0.210***	0.269***
Ua	(0.008)	(0.003)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.008)
	-0.144***	-0.111***	0.388***	-0.069***	-0.158***	0.310***
	(0.006)	(0.001)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Ву	-0.063***	-0.099***	0.292***	-0.019***	-0.153***	0.246***
	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.008)

COIIL. Tab.o	Cont.	Tab.6
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COIIL. Tab.o						
yr91	-0.188***	-0.065***	0.005	-0.147***	0.014	-0.040
	(0.022)	(0.016)	(0.042)	(0.018)	(0.053)	(0.040)
yr92	-0.203***	-0.078***	0.077**	-0.156***	-0.045	0.024
	(0.026)	(0.012)	(0.043)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.039)
yr93	-0.190***	-0.065***	0.115**	-0.121***	-0.010	0.016
	(0.025)	(0.017)	(0.047)	(0.024)	(0.037)	(0.042)
yr95	-0.171*** .	-0.050**	0.123**	-0.104***	-0.011	0.023
	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.056)	(0.025)	(0.045)	(0.052)
yr96	-0.161***	-0.046**	0.080	-0.141***	-0.020	0.025
	(0.016)	(0.020)	(0.060)	(0.017)	(0.037)	(0.035)
yr98	-0.161***	-0.046**	0.082	-0.114***	-0.035	0.045
	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.061)	(0.020)	(0.043)	(0.062)
yr00	-0.124***	-0.031	0.170***	-0.057*	-0.025	0.074
	(0.027)	(0.022)	(0.054)	(0.034)	(0.032)	(0.042)
yr01	-0.052***	0.012	0.008	-0.017	0.001	0.030
	(0.037)	(0.022)	(0.049)	(0.035)	(0.031)	(0.042)
Observations		74679			73200	
Pseudo Rsquared		0.09			0.07	

Notes: Marginal effects from multinomial logit. All variables definitions as in Tables 5 and 6.

Baseline groups are negative and sceptic, for economic and political outcomes, respectively.

Standard errors clustered by country are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Reference individual, country and year: as in T.5-6. For definitions of variables, see text and Data Appendix.

Table 7. Determinants of evaluation - Present vs. past by country: Economic system

Dependent variable: distance														
	Czech R	Slovakia	Hungary	Poland	Slovenia	Estonia	Latvia	Lithuania	Bulgaria	Romania	Croatia	Russia	Ukraine	Belarus
Female	3.089	-2.260	-4.904 **	-3.675 *	606 ***	- 29.068 ***	-34.351 ***	-31.441 ***	-5.660 **	0.581	-1.583	-2.828 **	-2.743	-1.572
	(2.434)	(2.405)	(2.085)	(2.072)	(2.164)	(2.047)	(2.071)	(1.810)	(2.238)	(2.466)	(2.549)	(1.207)	(1.931)	(2.195)
age3039	-10.847 **	2.020	-2.303	-2.012	-3.296	-13.501***	-5.443	-7.524**	-5.638	0.937	8.112**	-8.665***	-1.602	-4.133
	(4.354)	(4.115)	(3.505)	(3.395)	(3.791)	(2.940)	(3.400)	(3.054)	(4.022)	(4.189)	(4.030)	(1.885)	(3.216)	(4.139)
age4049	-17.482***	-11.351***	-12.144***	-10.997***	-7.505*	-25.960***	-14.637***	-11.802***	-20.501***	-4.726	2.169	-13.085***	-12.907***	-12.370***
	(4.309)	(4.264)	(3.604)	(3.589)	(3.992)	(3.173)	(3.576)	(3.177)	(4.009)	(4.364)	(4.231)	(1.983)	(3.254)	(3.945)
age5059	-24.943***	-5.611	-10.520***	-14.531***	-4.907	-27.805***	-14.739***	-13.325***	-19.131***	-5.925	4.323	-20.501***	-9.955***	-17.270***
	(4.809)	(4.809)	(4.042)	(4.162)	(3.947)	(3.328)	(3.732)	(3.377)	(4.112)	(4.528)	(4.540)	(2.173)	(3.555)	(4.402)
age60m	-14.570**	-2.196	-4.568	2.816	1.633	-32.621***	-11.339**	-2.627	-21.910***	5.359	16.180***	-24.900***	-10.910***	-15.425***
	(6.513)	(5.961)	(4.863)	(4.418)	(3.443)	(3.912)	(4.584)	(4.318)	(4.818)	(5.130)	(5.388)	(2.747)	(3.855)	(5.326)
secvocat	12.283***	8.553***	8.244***	10.380***	1.981	3.578	3.096	-2.352	19.446***	-2.175	-2.549	5.433***	-0.164	0.063
	(3.402)	(3.195)	(2.476)	(2.547)	(2.576)	(2.567)	(2.869)	(2.526)	(2.866)	(3.120)	(3.036)	(1.818)	(2.621)	(3.047)
Uni	28.071***	16.500***	30.949***	35.746***	17.406***	15.514***	18.029***	22.753***	24.966***	3.884	0.827	18.656***	8.365**	-6.352
	(4.804)	(4.723)	(3.574)	(3.982)	(3.554)	(3.135)	(3.476)	(3.084)	(4.053)	(4.689)	(4.272)	(2.099)	(3.297)	(4.010)
Single	-2.887	4.858	2.927	8.801***	12.205***	0.223	7.633**	10.081***	9.390***	10.900***	5.871*	8.512***	9.037***	2.808
	(4.166)	(3.865)	(3.562)	(3.109)	(2.912)	(2.819)	(3.281)	(3.061)	(3.275)	(3.957)	(3.553)	(1.881)	(3.165)	(4.043)
Divwid	2.303	-1.604	1.780	-1.396	-0.128	2.199	-4.652*	-0.415	7.719**	8.069**	7.496*	4.177**	-2.450	-1.299
	(3.856)	(3.874)	(3.018)	(3.502)	(3.669)	(2.587)	(2.610)	(2.402)	(3.205)	(3.908)	(4.248)	(1.630)	(2.471)	(2.930)
city1	19.263***	27.786***	9.775***	17.830***	2.089	11.594***	4.838*	14.361***	21.143***	2.015	5.960*	16.992***	2.379	-2.817
	(3.426)	(3.850)	(2.901)	(2.500)	(3.179)	(2.527)	(2.609)	(2.341)	(3.024)	(3.242)	(3.428)	(1.736)	(2.348)	(2.776)
bigt1	12.897***	1.765	1.585	9.706***	-1.882	6.154**	0.827	6.924***	-1.522	-4.122	0.591	2.537*	-5.466**	1.239
	(2.705)	(2.572)	(2.314)	(2.567)	(2.350)	(2.434)	(2.546)	(2.202)	(2.847)	(2.995)	(2.956)	(1.428)	(2.302)	(2.801)
unempl.	-13.696**	-14.020***	-6.946*	-8.007**	-13.700***	-11.682***	-10.303***	-12.253***	-8.888**	-19.862***	-14.348***	-1.627	-15.339***	2.592
· ·	(6.616)	(4.217)	(4.021)	(3.492)	(4.051)	(3.725)	(3.449)	(3.037)	(3.531)	(4.782)	(5.068)	(2.563)	(3.368)	(5.325)
Pens	-7.710	-7.630	3.688	-8.151**	-2.883	-7.253**	-1.255	4.371	-5.717	-2.258	-15.992***	4.059*	-7.657***	-3.822
	(5.196)	(4.976)	(3.660)	(3.615)	(2.900)	(3.308)	(3.742)	(3.454)	(4.103)	(4.217)	(4.925)	(2.234)	(2.940)	(4.443)
hwstud.	7.859	20.796***	6.892	4.827	9.165***	5.697	-3.340	0.608	3.873	7.150	4.233	6.538***	2.937	14.614***
	(6.046)	(5.924)	(4.433)	(3.549)	(3.477)	(3.709)	(4.009)	(3.226)	(5.416)	(4.374)	(3.809)	(2.275)	(3.516)	(5.118)
hhincg2	3.487	2.203	6.198**	9.375***	-3.578	-7.525***	-0.506	0.243	5.165	8.836**	0.921	6.159***	0.854	1.165
	(3.813)	(3.738)	(3.067)	(3.002)	(3.139)	(2.613)	(2.758)	(2.408)	(3.260)	(3.778)	(3.551)	(1.682)	(2.594)	(3.094)
hhincq3	14.350* [*] **	6.064	9.800***	12.693***	6.119*	-3.815	-0.390	4.608*	13.370***	16.024***	0.401	14.186***	6.745**	6.503* [*]
	(4.025)	(3.771)	(3.237)	(3.003)	(3.263)	(2.664)	(2.867)	(2.421)	(3.525)	(3.963)	(3.730)	(1.796)	(2.677)	(3.261)
hhincq4	26.867* [*] **	25.904***	22.778***	21.580***	11.648***	13.250***	19.225***	26.075* [*] **	28.796***	19.371***	12.034***	30.666***	14.187***	15.113* [*] **
'	(4.166)	(3.888)	(3.402)	(3.127)	(3.368)	(2.630)	(2.917)	(2.681)	(3.823)	(4.228)	(3.745)	(1.860)	(2.767)	(3.598)
Min	, ,	` /	` /	` '	, ,	-47.093 [*] **	-21.386***	-11.346***	, ,	` /	, ,	` ,	` ′	` ′
						(2.024)	(2.101)	(1.947)						

Cont. Tab.	7													
yr91	0.657	8.153	4.153	11.708***	-7.901**			•	34.724***	19.118***	•	•		
	(4.532)	(5.174)	(3.847)	(4.177)	(3.259)				(3.720)	(3.318)				
yr92	-9.078**	5.041	-15.482***	2.967						-0.364		-21.215***	-57.479***	
	(3.887)	(3.943)	(4.267)	(4.134)						(3.533)		(2.228)	(3.054)	
yr93	6.696*	-12.869***	-16.117***	17.835***	21.359***	-30.761***	20.414***	-55.129***	-14.285***		-1.398	-8.472***	-45.435***	-75.061***
1	(4.002)	(4.144)	(3.996)	(4.278)	(3.409)	(2.987)	(2.882)	(2.833)	(3.673)		(3.660)	(2.320)	(2.788)	(3.135)
yr95	7.111*	0.699	-10.051***	51.992***	19.542***	-29.024***	21.404***	-70.891***	-22.877***		7.149*	-31.175***	-72.609***	-89.866***
1	(4.007)	(3.490)	(3.725)	(4.085)	(3.497)	(3.209)	(3.227)	(3.116)	(3.680)		(3.708)	(2.274)	(2.799)	(3.267)
yr96						-17.463***		-60.749***				-12.002***		
,						(3.423)		(3.169)				(2.175)		
yr98		-4.636		39.013***	-5.567				21.454***	8.085**	-27.854***	-20.391***	-79.746***	-42.936***
,		(3.983)		(4.362)	(3.852)				(4.058)	(3.690)	(4.247)	(2.359)	(2.851)	(3.226)
yr00						-0.801	9.388***	-70.724***				-28.932***		
1						(3.772)	(3.481)	(3.230)				(2.321)		
yr01			23.866***	3.096		3.454	51.153***	-37.336***	34.250***			-2.130		
,			(4.047)	(4.866)		(3.487)	(3.507)	(3.352)	(3.736)			(2.251)		
Constant	1.783	-51.005***	-51.370***	-47.061***	-21.731***	42.670***	-50.444***	-7.867*	-70.532***	-40.742***	-13.322**	-62.692***	-32.383***	-2.444
	(6.973)	(6.527)	(5.750)	(5.562)	(5.221)	(4.529)	(4.811)	(4.708)	(5.741)	(5.819)	(5.538)	(3.180)	(4.447)	(5.626)
Observ.	4386	3801	4168	5700	3639	5494	4310	6317	5952	3740	3642	14661	4653	3434
R-sa.	0.07	0.08	0.11	0.13	0.08	0.25	0.19	0.20	0.15	0.04	0.04	0.11	0.25	0.24

Notes: Estimation method: OLS. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All variables definitions as in Tables 5 and 6.

Table 8. Determinants of evaluation - Present vs. past by country: Political system

	Dependent variable: distance													
	Czech R	Slovakia	Hungary	Poland	Slovenia	Estonia	Latvia	Lithuania	Bulgaria	Romania	Croatia	Russia	Ukraine	Belarus
female	2.363	-3.414	-3.556	-5.782 ***	-4.887 **	-25.697 ***	-18.309 ***	-21.705 ***	-8.020 ***	0.042	-0.345	-0.836	-3.336	-4.598*
	(2.493)	(2.582)	(2.439)	(2.138)	(2.346)	(2.318)	(2.430)	(2.211)	(2.441)	(2.696)	(2.431)	(1.303)	(2.468)	(2.585)
age3039	-6.115	5.564	-0.483	-2.447	-3.264	-10.507***	0.309	-1.313	-9.629**	2.959	6.783*	-6.154***	-5.475	-8.406*
	(4.456)	(4.427)	(4.093)	(3.548)	(4.062)	(3.163)	(3.798)	(3.512)	(4.144)	(4.523)	(3.845)	(1.996)	(3.911)	(4.571)
age4049	-5.438	-9.947**	-8.134*	-10.037***	-13.784***	-18.156***	-4.813	-10.032***	-19.629***	-5.292	7.353*	-14.742***	-14.712***	-10.538**
	(4.384)	(4.489)	(4.185)	(3.792)	(4.269)	(3.352)	(3.904)	(3.651)	(4.276)	(4.750)	(3.939)	(2.094)	(4.208)	(4.524)
age5059	-12.310**	-2.534	-2.478	-11.360***	-11.449***	-19.391***	-0.687	-12.823***	-22.695***	-12.787**	12.796***	-21.601***	-19.845***	-14.768***
	(4.964)	(5.164)	(4.760)	(4.303)	(4.083)	(3.657)	(4.285)	(3.941)	(4.443)	(5.080)	(4.231)	(2.338)	(4.560)	(5.035)
age60m	-4.182	-3.540	11.792**	-3.331	-1.891	-24.471***	2.180	1.178	-24.123***	-9.840*	14.980***	-26.546***	-22.004***	-28.074***
	(6.669)	(6.433)	(5.765)	(4.497)	(3.625)	(4.253)	(5.338)	(5.075)	(5.313)	(5.604)	(5.161)	(3.014)	(5.190)	(6.111)
secvocat	19.422***	13.099***	15.899***	11.319***	3.916	5.042*	4.503	3.062	22.391***	4.135	-2.793	7.890***	7.025**	3.577
	(3.510)	(3.480)	(2.903)	(2.615)	(2.765)	(2.871)	(3.536)	(3.105)	(3.204)	(3.363)	(2.899)	(1.954)	(3.427)	(3.786)
uni	33.656***	25.226***	37.426***	38.402***	20.534***	19.088***	15.290***	33.122***	29.908***	22.259***	-4.029	21.838***	24.256***	3.035
1	(4.965)	(5.163)	(4.088)	(4.122)	(3.937)	(3.427)	(4.065)	(3.643)	(4.349)	(4.914)	(3.928)	(2.295)	(4.185)	(4.910)
single	0.565	2.591	7.014*	7.490**	5.787*	-5.931*	7.823**	7.773**	3.060	9.292**	8.398**	5.943***	7.298*	-0.628
l	(4.181)	(4.050)	(4.033)	(3.329)	(3.036)	(3.031)	(3.738)	(3.475)	(3.594)	(4.389)	(3.297)	(1.990)	(3.853)	(4.463)
divwid	0.110	-2.043	-3.227	-2.419	-7.613*	7.157**	0.179	-4.215	-0.671	-2.630	2.502	4.873***	-4.085	-3.430
l	(3.972)	(4.296)	(3.444)	(3.594)	(4.022)	(2.954)	(3.086)	(2.933)	(3.443)	(4.325)	(3.879)	(1.747)	(3.224)	(3.554)
city1	21.299***	29.664***	5.543*	14.888***	10.060***	15.043***	8.172***	27.623***	19.744***	3.650	14.321***	14.358***	-16.284***	5.203
	(3.488)	(4.051)	(3.268)	(2.584)	(3.442)	(2.756)	(3.027)	(2.762)	(3.282)	(3.568)	(3.175)	(1.852)	(3.089)	(3.311)
bigt1	11.561***	6.204**	-2.999	5.192*	-1.518	3.649	6.494**	14.312***	-3.209	7.248**	0.071	2.204	-22.303***	1.488
	(2.768)	(2.789)	(2.695)	(2.664)	(2.537)	(2.705)	(3.021)	(2.668)	(3.162)	(3.290)	(2.829)	(1.528)	(3.072)	(3.339)
unempl.	-10.309	-5.971	-8.038*	-4.499	-4.804	-6.576*	-14.440***	-6.727*	-11.020***	-4.304	-13.977***	-0.149	-6.723	8.442
	(6.996)	(4.770)	(4.645)	(3.604)	(4.357)	(3.942)	(3.803)	(3.590)	(3.871)	(5.190)	(4.620)	(2.801)	(4.486)	(5.995)
pens	-7.113	-2.268	-2.772	-0.942	-2.683	-3.358	-2.333	8.695**	-10.356**	10.456**	-19.203***	2.688	-1.479	4.407
	(5.310)	(5.500)	(4.153)	(3.696)	(3.143)	(3.750)	(4.396)	(4.162)	(4.596)	(4.698)	(5.012)	(2.448)	(4.091)	(5.065)
hwstud.	9.183	22.921***	6.291	8.356**	3.659	4.478	-5.417	6.225	0.447	8.709*	0.064	7.067***	3.425	20.174***
	(5.832)	(6.062)	(5.163)	(3.569)	(3.898)	(4.101)	(4.927)	(3.843)	(5.451)	(4.609)	(3.628)	(2.380)	(4.378)	(5.694)
hhincq2	2.555	7.762*	7.675**	6.357**	3.304	-6.195**	-1.865	3.736	12.130***	8.817**	6.015*	7.124***	-1.153	3.044
	(3.965)	(4.142)	(3.537)	(3.073)	(3.374)	(2.885)	(3.179)	(2.914)	(3.760)	(4.001)	(3.422)	(1.823)	(3.372)	(3.738)
hhincq3	11.266***	15.514***	15.347***	9.375***	14.677***	-3.012	1.921	5.911**	22.074***	15.948***	7.614**	14.559***	6.604*	8.603**
	(4.074)	(4.196)	(3.766)	(3.047)	(3.506)	(2.933)	(3.406)	(2.916)	(4.012)	(4.143)	(3.504)	(1.933)	(3.546)	(3.963)
hhincq4	21.406***	30.057***	29.293***	18.680***	20.817***	10.054***	8.546***	21.220***	37.760***	19.870***	14.064***	27.065***	10.405***	10.516**
	(4.213)	(4.314)	(3.935)	(3.187)	(3.728)	(2.824)	(3.275)	(3.103)	(4.251)	(4.546)	(3.557)	(1.987)	(3.572)	(4.279)
min						-62.534***	-38.388***	-27.324***						
						(2.199)	(2.432)	(2.253)						

Cont. Tab.8	3													
yr91	23.916***	23.424***	14.071***	22.737***	9.310**				82.787***	53.966***				
	(4.656)	(5.589)	(4.311)	(4.456)	(3.619)				(4.063)	(3.729)				
yr92	6.863*	24.732***	-28.105***	18.858***						43.111***		-21.012***	-23.857***	
	(3.959)	(4.266)	(4.918)	(4.502)						(3.987)		(2.363)	(4.078)	
yr93	26.071***	16.710***	1.691	36.700***	28.272***	-5.659*	10.081***	-11.015***	42.890***		-4.030	-3.181	-35.176***	-56.996***
	(4.086)	(4.618)	(4.487)	(4.571)	(3.597)	(3.389)	(3.431)	(3.212)	(3.949)		(3.466)	(2.468)	(3.504)	(3.557)
yr95	13.002***	23.146***	-4.307	56.541***	26.277***	10.828***	18.192***	-25.543***	40.725***		-21.441***	-20.422***	-57.632***	-59.976***
	(4.142)	(3.783)	(4.080)	(4.324)	(3.584)	(3.610)	(3.785)	(3.737)	(4.071)		(3.456)	(2.407)	(3.691)	(3.751)
yr96						5.089	2.169	-23.501***				-8.198***		
						(3.731)	(3.931)	(3.506)				(2.295)		
yr98		14.071***		39.891***	-0.462				44.660***	33.144***	-45.327***	-16.780***	-88.022***	-20.196***
		(4.256)		(4.485)	(3.984)				(4.276)	(4.059)	(4.048)	(2.572)	(3.635)	(3.406)
yr00						-12.251***		-27.191***				-18.058***		
						(4.232)		(3.713)				(2.484)		
yr01			5.881	2.365		-3.588	-1.991	-22.143***	40.334***			-1.622		
			(4.611)	(4.989)		(3.873)	(4.112)	(3.725)	(3.993)			(2.311)		
Constant	16.162**	-40.032***	-34.767***	-19.037***	-8.815	48.133***	-5.123	-6.186	-46.287***	-13.944**	18.444***	-44.314***	12.414**	7.634
	(7.160)	(7.021)	(6.686)	(5.772)	(5.507)	(4.943)	(5.698)	(5.438)	(6.260)	(6.206)	(5.282)	(3.354)	(5.804)	(6.565)
Observ.	4398	3771	4025	5609	3574	5313	3914	6040	5941	3708	3642	14632	4512	3387
R-sq.	0.07	0.08	0.10	0.11	0.08	0.22	0.11	0.12	0.16	0.09	0.07	0.08	0.19	0.13

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All variables definitions as in Tables 5 and 6.

Table 9. The impact of additional variables: Economic system. Dependent variable: distance

_	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)
female	-13.657**	-9.752**	-13.182**	-7.874**	-8.587**	-4.263*	-5.475**	-7.417**	-3.207***	-6.737**	-7.039**	-7.726***	-3.909***
	(5.506)	(4.281)	(5.632)	(3.055)	(3.480)	(2.081)	(2.066)	(3.039)	(0.895)	(2.385)	(2.377)	(2.535)	(1.152)
age3039	-5.966***	-4.383**	-5.767**	-6.164***	-5.969 [*] **	-7.744***	-3.200*	-5.308***	-2.161	-5.971***	-5.886***	-6.049***	-5.469**
	(1.302)	(1.688)	(2.127)	(1.839)	(1.738)	(2.476)	(1.672)	(1.676)	(2.313)	(1.871)	(1.699)	(1.778)	(2.150)
age4049	-14.522***	-11.643***	-15.108***	-13.514***	-13.334***	-16.751***	-10.388***	-10.781***	-9.500 [*] *	-13.552***	-13.078***	-13.385***	-13.103***
	(2.012)	(2.492)	(1.970)	(2.004)	(1.943)	(2.219)	(1.708)	(2.296)	(3.594)	(2.005)	(1.857)	(1.900)	(1.912)
age5059	-16.241***	-12.086***	-13.905***	-15.529***	-13.886***	-19.746***	-10.625***	-11.479***	-7.385 [*] *	-14.404***	-14.364***	-15.101***	-14.662***
	(2.725)	(2.529)	(2.813)	(2.642)	(2.366)	(2.741)	(2.577)	(2.367)	(3.015)	(2.609)	(2.460)	(2.563)	(2.808)
age60m	-11.299**	-6.140	-13.991**	-10.957**	-8.576 [*]	-18.211***	-7.068 [′]	-5.601 [′]	0.327 [′]	-10.675**	-10.504**	-11.238**	-10.930**
	(4.815)	(4.639)	(5.211)	(4.419)	(4.309)	(3.842)	(4.068)	(4.021)	(5.318)	(4.563)	(4.309)	(4.643)	(4.295)
secvocat	3.647*	2.491	4.196	5.604**	5.970**	9.614*	7.809***	3.170	5.836*	8.390***	8.473***	8.502***	9.350**
	(1.927)	(1.849)	(2.733)	(2.316)	(2.334)	(4.417)	(1.887)	(1.890)	(2.851)	(2.282)	(2.139)	(2.391)	(3.318)
uni	15.012***	13.349***	17.214***	17.487***	17.746***	24.809***	18.977***	13.887***	15.182***	22.201***	21.920***	22.536***	24.625***
	(2.677)	(2.602)	(2.611)	(2.093)	(2.070)	(3.543)	(2.146)	(2.447)	(4.453)	(2.395)	(2.326)	(2.399)	(3.453)
single	2.404	4.731**	1.366	4.446**	5.463***	8.747***	5.272***	5.993***	4.627	5.730***	5.510***	6.520***	11.036***
3	(1.889)	(2.176)	(1.759)	(1.485)	(1.556)	(2.173)	(1.418)	(1.552)	(2.621)	(1.761)	(1.806)	(1.563)	(1.689)
divwid	3.165	4.730***	3.555	2.061	1.346	-0.326	0.872	3.014*	6.147***	2.005	1.869	1.944	1.561
	(2.107)	(1.561)	(2.138)	(1.335)	(1.394)	(1.642)	(1.574)	(1.429)	(1.789)	(1.264)	(1.249)	(1.137)	(1.771)
city1	14.459 ^{***}	14.854***	13.379 ^{**}	9.479* [*]	8.553* [*]	-0.437	7.966* [*]	7.335* [*]	15.899 ^{***}	9.768**	10.269 ^{**}	10.213**	3.297
' '	(3.516)	(3.163)	(4.740)	(3.367)	(3.479)	(3.829)	(3.379)	(3.269)	(3.986)	(3.743)	(3.552)	(3.484)	(4.417)
bigt1	ì.137 [′]	2.866	1.000	0.932 [′]	-0.029 [°]	-1.594	-0.110	-0.781	3.252	0.682 [´]	0.799 [′]	0.673 [′]	-1.148
	(2.197)	(1.897)	(2.876)	(1.728)	(1.851)	(2.713)	(2.187)	(1.512)	(2.463)	(1.956)	(1.900)	(1.795)	(2.089)
unempl.	-11.850***	-9.581 [*] **	-10.318**	-10.594***	-11.536***	-12.837***	-10.003***	-9.594 [*] **	-13.114***	-10.827***	-11.042***	-11.329***	-9.067 [*] *
	(3.192)	(2.830)	(3.838)	(2.384)	(2.430)	(2.380)	(2.084)	(2.412)	(2.372)	(2.431)	(2.453)	(2.483)	(3.202)
pens	-7.957 [*] *	-7.628 [*] *	-2.300	-5.676 [*] *	-5.950 [*] *	-0.926	-7.130 [*] **	-4.513 [°]	-12.624***	-7.121 [*] **	-7.444 [*] **	-7.291 [*] **	-5.660 [*] *
· .	(3.328)	(3.087)	(5.082)	(2.413)	(2.724)	(2.888)	(2.127)	(3.004)	(2.393)	(2.299)	(2.178)	(2.389)	(2.521)
hwstud.	6.106***	7.652***	4.470**	6.019***	5.608***	1.198	6.994***	5.234***	7.553***	5.592***	5.627***	5.352***	5.239**
	(1.748)	(1.306)	(1.867)	(1.069)	(1.219)	(2.455)	(1.432)	(1.314)	(1.960)	(1.404)	(1.452)	(1.627)	(2.359)
hhincq2	-2.452	-0.148	-3.124	1.662	0.923	9.734***	0.323	0.883	3.162	3.180	2.820	2.970	7.568**
	(2.430)	(1.846)	(2.428)	(1.891)	(2.051)	(2.119)	(2.279)	(1.632)	(2.057)	(2.269)	(2.304)	(2.436)	(3.353)
hhincq3	3.308	5.451**	4.039	7.287**	6.853**	15.481***	3.359	5.267**	12.068***	9.485***	9.018***	9.212**	14.351***
	(3.531)	(2.439)	(4.100)	(2.630)	(2.638)	(2.990)	(2.632)	(2.038)	(2.097)	(2.861)	(2.910)	(3.075)	(4.092)
hhincq4	18.069***	16.344***	16.666***	21.487***	21.654***	33.665***	16.245***	19.289***	21.675***	24.435***	24.050***	24.473***	32.176***
	(3.371)	(2.901)	(3.357)	(2.781)	(2.545)	(4.625)	(2.510)	(1.969)	(2.446)	(3.319)	(3.336)	(3.209)	(5.422)
	wkhardship	dowithout	reffast	parlsusp.	leader	corrupt.	equalinc	retcom	excom	trustpart	trustparl	trustpres	trustpeop
	-0.159*	-4.457***	-35.157***	-23.834***	-22.904***	-25.149***	-16.546***	-52.054***	-16.372***	6.974***	7.712***	6.554***	1.939*
	(0.084)	(0.494)	(4.344)	(2.714)	(2.305)	(2.093)	(2.226)	(3.854)	(2.235)	(1.274)	(1.060)	(0.740)	(1.002)
			refslow										
1			-20.739***										
			(3.344)										
Constant	10.851	-2.852	35.766***	-4.045	9.258	-17.362***	-3.211	12.528	-13.854**	-23.046**	-28.123***	-34.013***	-40.260**
1	(6.712)	(10.778)	(9.237)	(8.524)	(8.799)	(4.245)	(10.617)	(8.017)	(5.693)	(10.162)	(9.241)	(9.217)	(13.505)
Obs.	28821	36265	15379	63238	61953	16040	40021	54108	20920	56348	56929	53788	26759
R-sq.	0.25	0.25	0.29	0.20	0.20	0.13	0.18	0.25	0.28	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.15

Notes: Estimation method: OLS. Standard errors clustered by country are in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. For variables definitions, see text and Data Appendix. Additional controls include country and year dummies.

Table 10. The impact of additional variables: Political system. Dependent variable: distance

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)
female	-10.061**	-7.065**	-9.186**	-6.828***	-7.141**	-4.848**	-4.072**	-6.268**	-4.443***	-6.197***	-6.295***	-6.879***	-3.869***
	(3.761)	(3.047)	(3.398)	(2.102)	(2.374)	(2.093)	(1.534)	(2.182)	(0.868)	(1.798)	(1.736)	(1.906)	(1.043)
age3039	-4.173 [*] *	-2.904	-3.748	-5.442***	-4.402 [*] *	-3.189	-1.402 [°]	-3.169 [*]	-3.476	-4.134 ^{**}	-4.204**	-4.060**	-2.294
5	(1.457)	(1.777)	(2.924)	(1.677)	(1.636)	(2.933)	(1.918)	(1.532)	(3.235)	(1.699)	(1.560)	(1.652)	(2.576)
age4049	-12.166***	-10.273***	-13.904***	-11.604***	-11.183***	-12.534***	-8.774***	-7.967***	-9.370**	-11.782***	-11.225***	-11.691***	-10.975***
	(2.094)	(2.405)	(2.431)	(2.027)	(1.623)	(2.962)	(2.166)	(2.109)	(3.874)	(1.851)	(1.812)	(1.716)	(2.602)
age5059	-13.313***	-12.217***	-12.860**	-14.228***	-12.001***	-16.287***	-8.037 [*] *	-9.719 [*] **	-9.571 [*] *	-12.774***	-12.515***	-13.475***	-13.286***
	(3.518)	(3.177)	(4.676)	(3.453)	(2.813)	(3.459)	(2.989)	(2.550)	(4.133)	(2.619)	(2.548)	(2.615)	(3.498)
age60m	-9.909**	-9.899*	-11.917*	-11.938**	-9.046*	-15.321***	-6.896*	-6.843*	-8.093	-11.322**	-11.037**	-12.911**	-12.677***
	(4.485)	(4.957)	(6.641)	(4.726)	(4.381)	(3.433)	(3.756)	(3.330)	(5.241)	(4.335)	(4.096)	(4.393)	(4.091)
secvocat	9.305***	6.564**	7.056**	8.984***	8.867***	11.296*	11.613***	3.749*	8.386**	11.184***	11.253***	11.162***	10.980**
	(2.738)	(2.323)	(2.497)	(2.108)	(2.523)	(5.250)	(1.879)	(2.012)	(3.648)	(2.792)	(2.703)	(2.852)	(4.270)
uni	23.182***	19.805***	22.825***	22.034***	21.969***	25.896***	23.676***	15.349***	24.096***	27.271***	26.878***	27.524***	26.914***
	(3.437)	(3.298)	(2.840)	(2.135)	(2.596)	(3.696)	(2.391)	(3.107)	(5.547)	(2.895)	(2.853)	(2.904)	(4.873)
single	1.044	2.667	-0.347	3.749**	4.736***	9.530***	4.639***	4.397***	1.958	5.071***	4.947***	6.090***	9.837***
	(2.609)	(2.349)	(3.248)	(1.478)	(1.455)	(2.004)	(1.412)	(1.377)	(2.961)	(1.513)	(1.555)	(1.163)	(1.762)
divwid	2.524	3.504	3.992	1.987	1.615	1.660	0.742	3.950**	3.171	1.601	1.647	1.752	1.669
	(2.179)	(2.082)	(2.477)	(1.652)	(1.758)	(2.622)	(1.568)	(1.690)	(2.653)	(1.626)	(1.644)	(1.393)	(2.664)
city1	13.412***	14.313***	12.970**	9.182**	7.797*	0.414	6.812	6.367*	16.130***	10.284**	10.751**	10.771**	3.062
	(4.214)	(3.233)	(5.238)	(3.701)	(4.030)	(4.322)	(4.303)	(3.326)	(3.959)	(4.057)	(3.919)	(3.707)	(4.386)
bigt1	1.029	2.667	-0.211	-0.254	-0.788	-5.074	-3.478	-1.351	4.058	0.064	0.188	0.385	-2.049
	(3.093)	(2.124)	(3.537)	(2.295)	(2.700)	(3.397)	(3.190)	(1.974)	(2.633)	(2.252)	(2.258)	(2.361)	(2.497)
unempl.	-4.125	-5.879**	-9.292**	-7.657***	-9.254***	-8.741***	-9.802***	-5.274***	-6.884***	-9.163***	-9.385***	-9.080***	-6.869**
	(2.600)	(2.430)	(3.775)	(1.853)	(2.070)	(2.781)	(1.957)	(1.549)	(2.064)	(2.271)	(2.310)	(2.240)	(2.573)
pens	-6.311*	-2.803	-4.220	-3.149	-4.140	-2.501	-5.540**	-0.891	-5.947	-5.846**	-5.922**	-5.264**	-4.238
	(3.034)	(3.153)	(4.111)	(1.911)	(2.446)	(4.466)	(2.158)	(2.413)	(3.465)	(2.376)	(2.317)	(2.428)	(3.226)
hwstud.	5.715**	6.518***	6.449**	6.556***	6.397***	5.060**	6.970***	6.322***	8.127***	6.166***	6.070***	5.896***	8.245***
	(2.080)	(1.169)	(2.126)	(1.042)	(1.172)	(1.846)	(1.554)	(1.111)	(2.133)	(1.389)	(1.376)	(1.233)	(1.664)
hhincq2	0.993	3.476***	1.673	4.274**	2.252	9.361**	2.184	1.669	5.356***	3.303	3.624	3.756	7.721
	(2.062)	(1.124)	(2.077)	(1.740)	(1.850)	(3.979)	(2.107)	(1.734)	(1.626)	(2.330)	(2.197)	(2.168)	(4.701)
hhincq3	7.789**	9.181***	8.780**	10.580***	8.964***	16.750***	6.087**	5.822***	14.573***	10.542***	11.030***	11.166***	14.753**
	(3.127)	(1.876)	(3.163)	(1.903)	(1.926)	(4.741)	(2.532)	(1.814)	(2.738)	(2.778)	(2.601)	(2.570)	(5.541)
hhincq4	18.237***	17.864***	17.811***	21.100***	19.957***	33.166***	15.776***	16.844***	23.577***	22.984***	23.346***	23.501***	30.380***
	(3.776)	(2.690)	(3.668)	(2.613)	(2.516)	(6.107)	(2.952)	(2.166)	(3.462)	(3.076)	(3.069)	(2.825)	(6.360)
	wkhardship	dowithout	reffast	parlsusp.	leader	corrupt.	equalinc	retcom	excom	trustpart	trustparl	trustpres	trustpeop
	-0.227***	-3.957***	-33.892***	-32.330***	-31.592***	-28.593***	-21.814***	-73.622***	-20.199***	8.320***	9.005***	8.790***	2.560**
	(0.050)	(0.421)	(3.042)	(5.183)	(2.198)	(2.936)	(2.669)	(6.071)	(2.877)	(1.519)	(1.324)	(1.083)	(1.110)
			refslow										
			-13.678***										
		0.1.005	(3.496)		15.05-	0.145		0.1.05-11		00.0==:			
Constant	26.568***	24.986***	39.860***	5.239	15.257	0.147	8.076	21.606**	14.440**	-20.978*	-27.595**	-39.947***	-29.640*
	(6.011)	(3.456)	(5.856)	(9.268)	(9.027)	(5.524)	(12.383)	(8.478)	(4.962)	(10.630)	(9.171)	(8.843)	(16.563)
Observ.	28206	35669	15118	62403	60894	15730	39202	53331	20797	55505	56041	52928	26409
R-squared	0.20	0.22	0.23	0.19	0.18	0.11	0.16	0.26	0.24	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.13

Notes: Estimation method: OLS. Standard errors clustered by country are in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Variables definitions as in Table 11. Additional controls include country and year dummies.

Table 11: Macro and Institutional determinants of country preferences: Economic system. Dependent variable: distance

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)		(9)
CZ	37.200***	33.502***	29.328***	25.731***	64.880***	14.703***	30.624***	40.912***		54.800***
	(1.097)	(2.672)	(2.787)	(3.233)	(15.286)	(3.683)	(5.637)	(8.305)		(11.223)
sk	-21.020***	-15.508	-29.115**	-29.827**	-6.604	-48.789***	-50.470*	-24.582		-15.060
	(0.935)	(10.417)	(10.738)	(10.501)	(15.788)	(13.457)	(27.754)	(34.205)		(26.642)
hu	-24.585***	-24.036**	-26.502***	-31.140***	0.433	-40.930***	-46.788**	-31.063		2.440
	(1.281)	(8.277)	(7.265)	(7.303)	(14.395)	(9.638)	(19.928)	(24.583)		(26.074)
pl	9.649***	16.499	5.029	1.812	12.710	7.467	-12.860	12.215		57.761
	(1.161)	(14.313)	(13.800)	(13.393)	(13.637)	(22.712)	(31.215)	(37.001)		(37.478)
ee	-2.600	-2.709	-25.291	-27.526	2.355	-28.425	-65.186	-40.288		-35.994
	(2.491)	(17.797)	(16.785)	(15.958)	(22.195)	(33.369)	(46.033)	(52.821)		(41.117)
lt	-48.560***	-45.302**	-52.289***	-49.875***	-2.462	-38.872	-78.818**	-50.633		-42.377
	(2.473)	(17.426)	(14.765)	(14.239)	(26.567)	(23.195)	(36.075)	(43.938)		(35.296)
lv	-37.080***	-33.046	-51.232**	-50.351**	-2.755	-53.619	-93.358*	-51.776		-44.848
	(2.486)	(20.327)	(18.674)	(17.887)	(29.440)	(31.347)	(48.023)	(59.667)		(48.906)
bu	-36.123***	-29.775	-46.007**	-41.835*	-6.675	-58.293	-102.117*	-39.365		13.328
	(0.723)	(22.201)	(20.145)	(19.499)	(27.599)	(34.382)	(54.213)	(72.757)		(63.780)
ro	-10.176***	-12.534	-36.571	-33.322	-10.521	-77.440*	-104.626	-26.412		50.173
	(2.087)	(23.310)	(21.164)	(19.730)	(25.621)	(37.623)	(62.639)	(85.881)		(79.498)
cr	10.924***	18.010	-37.947	-37.297	-29.022	-113.900**	-107.102	-27.052		24.806
.	(2.481)	(17.776)	(22.677)	(22.894)	(26.797)	(45.836)	(72.998)	(90.716)		(79.348)
ru	-49.706***	-50.457**	-80.266***	-76.692***	-22.001	-94.868*	-147.139**	-34.593		103.719
u	(2.132)	(21.728)	(20.269)	(19.422)	(34.705)	(46.449)	(63.222)	(96.289)		(94.245)
	-67.976***	-68.902**	-100.244***	-93.061***	-46.627	-139.916**	-175.323**	-55.391		53.121
ua										
h. r	(1.378)	(29.811)	(25.692)	(24.772)	(37.138)	(49.093)	(78.208)	(114.096)		(102.688)
by	-48.075***	-54.732	-104.782***	-94.855***	-40.351	-221.836***	-201.975*	-48.968		61.791
	(1.917)	(31.186)	(29.506)	(29.147)	(44.356)	(57.139)	(105.690)	(145.999)		(122.752)
munempl		-1.120	-1.169	-1.432**	-1.473*	-3.378**	-3.041	-1.729		0.480
		(0.698)	(0.667)	(0.599)	(0.745)	(1.145)	(2.076)	(1.980)		(1.861)
gdppcwdi		-0.104	-0.917	-1.001	0.291	-5.714	-7.976	-5.488		-3.965
		(2.737)	(2.265)	(2.048)	(2.287)	(3.461)	(5.775)	(6.695)		(6.997)
nflwdi		-0.003	-0.000	-0.000	-0.001	0.014	-0.058	-0.083**		-0.117**
		(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.016)	(0.033)	(0.038)		(0.045)
dem			-5.308***	-5.526***	-5.347**	-10.074***	-8.092	-6.400		-7.785*
			(1.240)	(1.474)	(1.847)	(3.279)	(5.144)	(5.380)		(4.317)
				lavgti	hbeds	gini		gov	voice	-0.766
				10.621	-8.213**	-291.656***		1.544**		(0.532)
				(7.529)	(3.468)	(84.154)		(0.710)	polstab	2.427***
										(0.574)
									goveff	-0.258
									_	(0.528)
									regq	1.244**
									٥.	(0.524)
									ruleol	0.879
										(0.974)
									cntrcorr	0.014
										(0.679)

Constant	-1.999	8.747	79.119	47.726	95.674	297.772***	239.994	37.034	-155.523
	(9.721)	(51.694)	(49.073)	(51.489)	(54.969)	(71.478)	(145.224)	(203.148)	(174.406)
Observations	74679	74679	74679	74679	73329	50647	43087	43087	43087
R-squared	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.19	0.19	0.20	0.20	0.21

Notes: Estimation method: OLS. Standard errors clustered by country are in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. %. For definitions of macro and institutional variables, see text and Data Appendix. Additional controls include variables as in Table 5 and year dummies

Table 12: Macro and Institutional determinants of country preferences: Political system. Dependent variable: distance.


	(4)	(2)	(2)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(0)		(0)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)		(9)
CZ	47.999***	45.466***	41.097***	41.660***	40.143**	28.269***	37.817***	37.954***		41.407***
-1.	(1.666)	(3.139)	(3.885)	(5.744)	(17.228)	(4.901)	(7.487)	(7.571)		(9.206)
sk	-4.488***	3.144	-11.036	-10.918	-12.641	-9.789	-21.572	-21.228		-12.980
h	(1.195)	(12.831)	(13.346)	(13.521)	(16.360)	(19.760)	(37.761)	(38.503)		(25.790)
hu	-21.493***	-18.277*	-20.905*	-20.179	-19.282	-20.303	-34.591	-34.381		-20.083
-1	(1.230)	(10.112)	(10.179)	(11.728)	(15.359)	(14.638)	(28.521)	(28.611)		(25.504)
pl	16.749***	26.686	14.780	15.292	12.871	36.439	7.430	7.763		31.043
	(1.187)	(16.853)	(17.045)	(17.912)	(17.574)	(28.768)	(39.547)	(40.332)		(34.909)
ee	-2.331	4.827	-18.746	-18.382	-20.468	8.212	-44.755	-44.427		-55.677
I.	(2.100)	(22.552)	(22.575)	(23.286)	(24.640)	(45.847)	(70.213)	(70.272)		(44.164)
lt	-22.235***	-12.901	-20.166	-20.531	-22.338	11.156	-36.208	-35.834		-40.011
L	(2.271)	(22.030)	(21.402)	(20.745)	(29.083)	(31.816)	(47.495)	(48.347)		(34.826)
lv	-22.477***	-11.809	-30.705	-30.839	-33.055	-6.083	-57.219	-56.668		-71.716
le	(2.213)	(25.288)	(24.912)	(24.534)	(31.599)	(44.590)	(69.904)	(70.538)		(49.518)
bu	-1.608	11.766	-5.078	-5.724	-7.505	17.107	-46.928	-46.098		-18.770
	(1.215)	(27.453)	(26.998)	(25.981)	(31.175)	(47.542)	(77.381)	(78.746)		(60.295)
ro	27.740***	36.834	11.757	11.254	9.127	13.607	-43.336	-42.303		2.634
	(1.890)	(30.539)	(30.308)	(29.386)	(31.489)	(57.129)	(95.345)	(95.780)		(73.516)
cr	7.932***	21.407	-37.031	-37.117	-38.775	-65.735	-87.458	-86.404		-58.780
	(2.521)	(22.688)	(28.360)	(27.971)	(29.863)	(61.066)	(117.307)	(117.776)		(75.839)
ru	-49.949***	-39.833	-70.902**	-71.452**	-73.335*	-44.666	-111.811	-110.328		-6.027
	(1.453)	(28.892)	(28.877)	(27.795)	(36.616)	(63.297)	(98.304)	(100.366)		(83.105)
ua	-49.443***	-33.515	-66.157	-67.268*	-68.998	-54.900	-120.543	-118.961		-43.118
	(1.878)	(41.061)	(39.418)	(37.582)	(42.474)	(74.522)	(121.645)	(123.159)		(94.197)
by	-40.494***	-29.597	-81.546*	-83.078*	-84.111*	-119.529	-141.827	-139.814		-49.633
	(2.058)	(41.181)	(41.420)	(39.016)	(46.877)	(91.250)	(172.171)	(172.711)		(115.888)
munempl		-0.585	-0.637	-0.596	-0.618	-2.353*	-2.789	-2.772		-0.950
		(0.815)	(0.817)	(0.865)	(0.905)	(1.261)	(2.152)	(2.063)		(1.980)
gdppcwdi		1.082	0.249	0.262	0.001	-0.233	-5.304	-5.271		-6.201
		(3.462)	(3.335)	(3.330)	(3.304)	(5.340)	(8.398)	(8.389)		(6.850)
inflwdi		-0.007	-0.005	-0.005	-0.005	-0.019	-0.073	-0.074		-0.088*
		(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.012)	(0.050)	(0.051)		(0.043)
dem			-5.559**	-5.524**	-5.487**	-8.223*	-6.203	-6.181		-7.750
			(1.974)	(2.006)	(1.995)	(4.210)	(8.638)	(8.621)		(5.066)
				lavgti	hbeds	gini		gov	voice	-1.309**
				-1.656	0.080	-237.235***		0.020		(0.526)
				(8.997)	(4.016)	(62.720)		(0.376)	polstab	1.266*
										(0.607)
									goveff	0.028
										(0.508)
									regq	0.796
										(0.512)
									ruleol	2.453**
										(0.982)
									cntrcorr	-1.190*
										(0.573)

Constant	1.387	-13.895	59.519	64.397	62.750	161.055	176.715	174.040	37.511
	(10.517)	(72.888)	(73.628)	(67.275)	(78.611)	(128.013)	(236.655)	(237.389)	(167.849)
Observations	`73200 <i>´</i>	`73200 <i>´</i>	`73200 <i>´</i>	`73200 <i>´</i>	`71961´	` 49846 ´	` 42334 ´	` 42334 ´	42334
R-squared	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.17	0.18	0.16	0.16	0.17

Notes: Estimation method: OLS. Standard errors clustered by country are in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. For definitions of macro and institutional variables, see text and Data Appendix. Additional controls include variables as in Table 5 and year dummies.


Figures

Figure 1: Proportion of economic and political systems evaluations, 1993 and 2004



Source: authors' tabulations from the New Barometers data.


Figure 2: The Dynamics of Support, 1991-2004



Source: authors' tabulations from the New Barometers data.

Notes: 1996 and 2000 are excluded , since only Russia and the Baltics are available for these years.

Figure 3: Support for the economic and political systems change by country



Source: authors' tabulations from the New Barometers data.

Appendix

Table A1: Sample size by country

	1991	1992	1993	1995	1996	1998	2000	2001	2004	Total
Bulgaria	892	0	1035	1043	0	766	0	1086	1130	5952
Czech Republic	611	1187	998	822	0	0	0	0	768	4386
Slovak Republic	264	522	458	932	0	777	0	0	848	3801
Hungary	756	594	818	876	0	0	0	650	474	4168
Poland	941	962	763	819	0	996	0	629	590	5700
Romania	949	956	0	0	0	1043	0	0	792	3740
Croatia	0	982	989	987	0	684	0	0	0	3642
Slovenia	835	0	810	631	0	610	0	0	753	3639
Belarus	0	0	874	888	0	959	0	0	713	3434
Ukraine	0	624	816	834	0	801	0	0	1578	4653
Russia	0	1974	1741	1765	2310	1544	1686	1821	1820	14661
Estonia	0	0	1474	1053	839	0	593	826	721	5506
Latvia	0	0	1346	855	729	0	648	732	769	5079
Lithuania	0	0	1688	766	855	0	960	1059	990	6318
Total	5248	7801	13810	12271	4733	8180	3887	6803	11946	74679

Source: authors tabulations form the New Barometer data.

Notes: finals sample size includes respondents with non-missing information on the key variables.

Table A2: Variables definitions and sources

Variable	Description and sources
Dependent variables:	
distec distpol	Distance between present and past. Constructed as a difference between the individual ranking of the functioning of the present economy (political system) and past social economy (political system). It ranges from -200 and +200 and is treated as continuous.
Positive, negative, nostalgic, pro-market. Compliant, sceptic, reactionaty, democrat	Binary mutually exclusive variables defining whether individual belongs to a specific group based on his evaluations of past and present economic (political) systems. Constructed as is shown in Table 2a following Lazar, Mishler and Rose (2007)
	Source: New Europe Barometers, New Russian Barometers, New Baltic Barometers.
Independent individual characteristics:	
Female	Dummy variable equals to 1 if female
Agel30	Dummy indicating if individual's age is less than 30 years old (Reference category)
Age3039	Dummy indicating if individual's age is greater than 30 and less than 39 years old
Age4049	Dummy indicating if individual's age is greater than 40 and less than 49 years old
Age5059	Dummy indicating if individual's age is greater than 50 and less than 59 years old
Age60m	Dummy indicating if individual's age is greater than 60 years old
Elementary education	Dummy indicating if an individual has elementary education (Reference category)
Secondary or vocational education	Dummy indicating if an individual has secondary or vocational education

University	Dummy indicating if an individual has university degree
Married	Dummy indicating if an individual is married or cohabiting (Reference category)
Single	Dummy indicating if an individual is single
Divorced or widowed	Dummy indicating if an individual is divorced, separated or widowed
Small town or rural	Dummy indicating if an individual resides in a small town or rural area (with population less or equal to 5,000; in Russia <20,000) (Reference category)
Big town	Dummy indicating if an individual resides in a big town (with population greater than 5,000 and less than 100,000; in Russia – between 20,000 and 1,000,000)
City	Dummy indicating if an individual resides in a city, including capital (with population >100,000; in Russia >1,000,000)
Employed	Dummy indicating if an individual is employed (full-time, part-time, family helper, apprentice or self-employed, including and working pensioners in some countries)
Unemployed	Dummy indicating if an individual is unemployed (including both with and without benefits in Russia)
Pensioner	Dummy indicating if an individual is a pensioner
Housewife or student	Dummy indicating if an individual is a house-keeper or a student, since in several countries it was not possible to disentangle these two categories.
Hh income quartile 1	Dummy indicating if household is in the first quartile of the country-specific income distribution (Reference category)
Hh income quartile 2	Dummy indicating if household is in the second quartile of the country-specific income distribution
Hh income quartile 3	Dummy indicating if household is in the third quartile of the country-specific income distribution
Hh income quartile 4	Dummy indicating if household is in the fourth quartile of the country-specific income distribution
Minority	Dummy indicating if an individual belongs to an ethnic minority in a country (in the Baltic states)
Number of weeks with hardship	Number of weeks during which a person was either unemployed or salary was delayed or not paid in full last year (1993, 1995, 1996, 1998)
Doing without	Destitution scale constructed by sociologists and political scientists indicates a degree of hardship (increasing from 0 to 9) based on the information whether a person or his family had to live without food, heating, electricity or clothes (1993 – 2001)
Reforms right	Dummy indicating whether an individual thinks that reforms in his country are being conducted at the right speed (Reference category) (1995, 1996)
Reforms fast	Dummy indicating whether an individual thinks that reforms in his country are going too fast (1995, 1996)
Reforms slow	Dummy indicating whether an individual thinks that reforms in his country are going too slow (1995, 1996)
Parliament suspend	Dummy indicating whether an individual would approve if the Parliament was suspended (1991 - 2004)
Leader	Dummy that equals 1 if an individual agrees with the statement: it would be better to get rid of Parliament and elections and have a strong leader (1992-2004)
Corruption	Dummy that that equals 1 if an individual think that most or almost all "public officials are engaged in bribe-taking and corruption" in his country, and equals zero if he thinks that "very few" or "less than half public officials are corrupt"

(2001, 2004). Equal income Dummy that equals 1 if an individual agrees with the statement that "incomes should be made more equal so there is no big difference in income" as opposed to the statement "Individual achievement should determine how much people are paid" (1992, 1993, 1995, 1998, 2004) Dummy equals 1 if an individual agrees with the statement "We should return to Return to Communism Communist rule" (1993-2004) Ex-Communist Dummy equals 1 if an individual or his family were members of the Communist party (1993, 1995, 1998) Trust parties Variable indicating a degree of individual's trust in political parties (ranges from 1 to 7) (1992-2004) Trust Parliament Variable indicating a degree of individual's trust in Parliament (ranges from 1 to 7) (1992-2004) Trust President Variable indicating a degree of individual's trust in President (ranges from 1 to 7) (1993-2004)Trust people Variable indicating a degree of individual's trust in people of his country (ranges from 1 to 7) (1998-2004) Source: New Europe Barometers, New Russian Barometers, New Baltic Barometers. Macroeconomic variables and political institutions: Unemployment rate Unemployment rate (Source: EBRD. For Belarus the data are from IMF International Financial Statistics CD Rom, for Ukraine - from World Development Indicators CD Rom, for Estonia in 1990 and 1991 – from the World Development Indicators online database) GDP per capita GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2000 international \$) (Source: World Development Indicators online database) Inflation Inflation, GDP deflator (annual %) (Source: World Development Indicators online database) Transition Indicators Average of 97 EBRD indicators of the progress in transition, lagged one year (Source: EBRD, 2007) Hospital beds Hospital beds per 1000 of people in a country (Source: World Developmen Indicators CD Rom) Gini Gini index (Source: Transmonee dataset. For Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Ukraine, Croatia and Belarus 1990 is used instead of 1991. In Latvia 1997 is used instead of 1995, and 2000 instead of 2001. For Lithuania, 1996 is used instead of 1995. For Russia instead of 1993 use 1994. For Slovakia instead of 1995 use 1996. For Slovenia and Ukraine instead of 2004 use 2002. Democracy Democracy Indicator, which is an additive eleven-point scale (0-10) (Source: Polity IV) Governance Average of the World Bank Governance Indicators (Source: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/sc chart.asp). They include the following six indicators: Voice and Accountability / Political Stability / Government Effectiveness /


Regulatory Quality / Rule of Law / Control of Corruption.

Table A3: Indicators of macroeconomic performance and institutional quality

	Transition Indicators	Unempl. rate	GDP per capita	Priv.sector (% GDP)	Inflation rate	Gini Index	Democracy Index	Governance Indicators	Life expect.
Czech R.			'	,					
1991	2.11	4.10	13.27	15	36	0.19	8		71.90
1995	3.30	4.02	14.27	70	17	0.22	10	79.03	73.07
1998	3.48	6.45	14.68	75	11	0.21	10	74.28	74.42
2004	3.74	8.40	17.53	80	4	0.23	10	73.32	75.72
Slovakia									
1991	2.11	9.53	9.59	15	35		8		70.88
1995	3.11	13.10	9.54	60	10	0.24	7	66.30	72.25
1998	3.22	12.49	11.24	75	5	0.26	9	67.23	72.57
2004	3.67	17.10	13.43	80	6	0.25	9	72.63	73.96
Hungary	0.07	17.10	10.10	00	Ü	0.20	Ü	72.00	70.00
1991	2.37	8.22	10.42	30	36	0.21	10		69.38
1995	3.48	10.17	10.54	60	27	0.24	10	74.70	69.79
1998	3.78	7.80	11.78	80	13	0.25	10	78.03	70.56
2004					4		10		
	3.89	6.31	15.55	80	4	0.27	10	78.68	72.65
Poland	0.44	10.05	0.05	40		0.00	0		70.50
1991	2.41	12.25	6.95	40	55	0.26	8	74.55	70.59
1995	3.22	14.94	8.25	60	41	0.32	9	71.55	71.89
1998	3.52	11.00	9.84	65	11	0.33	9	72.45	73.00
2004	3.66	18.20	12.17	75	4	0.37	10	67.40	74.49
Slovenia									
1991	1.89	7.30	12.71	20	95	0.26	10		73.35
1995	2.93	7.35	13.57	50	25	0.25	10	80.88	73.44
1998	3.22	7.84	15.39	60	7	0.25	10	84.53	74.77
2004	3.37	6.48	19.09	65	3	0.24	10	81.98	76.57
Estonia									
1993	2.70	6.56	6.39	40	85		7		67.96
1995	3.15	9.71	6.83	65	31	0.40	7	73.30	67.85
2001	3.70	12.58	10.15	75	5	0.38	7	79.05	70.51
2004	3.81	9.65	12.83	80	2	0.38	7	82.15	71.57
Latvia	3.01	3.05	12.00	00	2	0.50	,	02.13	71.57
1993	2.26	8.73	5.49	30	54		8		66.72
1995	2.81	18.05	5.71	55	28	0.33	8	55.38	66.39
2001	3.29	13.10	8.66	65	2	0.33	8	71.07	70.10
2004	3.56	10.40	10.96	70	7	0.39	8	71.23	71.45
Lithuania									
1993	2.44	4.36	7.24	35	306		10		68.91
1995	2.85	17.54	6.84	65	49	0.35	10	60.75	69.01
2001	3.37	17.36	9.35	70	0	0.35	10	73.33	71.61
2004	3.52	11.38	11.99	75	3	0.31	10	75.73	71.92
Bulgaria									
1991	1.70	10.52	6.17	20	227	0.23	8		71.56
1995	2.33	13.69	6.07	50	63	0.38	8	39.68	71.05
1998	2.81	15.97	5.49	65	24	0.34	8	54.62	71.06
2004	3.37	12.03	7.68	75	5	0.36	9	60.27	72.36
Romania									
1991	1.26	3.03	5.90	25	195	0.26	5		69.78
1995	2.41	9.52	6.22	45	35	0.31	5	44.85	69.46
1998	2.89	6.32	5.83	60	55	0.30	8	52.10	69.30
2004	3.22	6.30	7.73	70	15	0.36	9	53.72	71.31
Croatia	0.22	0.00	7.75	, ,	10	0.00	J	30.72	71.01
1992	1.93	13.20	7.47		595		1		71.24
1992	2.70	14.50	7.47	•			0	41.85	72.08
					5				
1998 Bussis	3.04	11.40	8.94		8	0.35	0	49.80	72.50
Russia	4.00	F 00	0.00	65	4.400				00.07
1992	1.89	5.29	8.32	25	1490		6		66.87
1995	2.59	9.20	6.39	55	144	0.44	5	25.93	65.22
1998	2.55	11.90	5.96	70	19	0.45	5	27.12	66.78
2004	2.96	7.60	9.02	70	20		7	30.77	65.21
Ukraine									
1992	1.19	0.40	7.25	10	1761		6		68.88
1995	2.19	5.60	4.26	45	416	0.47	7	30.88	67.12
1998	2.48	11.30	3.75	55	12	0.31	7	23.95	67.97
2004	2.81	8.60	5.89	65	15	0.33	6	29.42	68.19
Belarus	=						-	·- -	
1992	1.26	0.50	4.74		1074		7		70.02
1995	2.00	2.50	3.47		661	0.25	3	16.12	68.46
1995	1.52	2.40	4.36	•	77		0	25.58	68.41
						0.25			
2004	1.81	2.50	6.42		23	0.25	0	14.18	68.39

 $\underline{\textit{Notes}}\textsc{:}$ See Data Appendix for definitions and sources.

Figure A1: GDP per capita and support for the economic system change



Source: authors' tabulations based on the data from the New Barometers and World Development Indicators.