Migration Pressures into the European Union: Evidence from Albania, Egypt, Moldova and Tunisia

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Abstract

This paper aims to better understand emigration pressures into the European Union by looking at the determinants of the propensity to migrate at the individual level. The analysis is based on survey data from Albania, Moldova, Egypt and Tunisia collected by the European Training Foundation (ETF) in 2006. Within this context the study focuses on (i) the selection of migrants in terms of skills and in terms of labor market integration and (ii) information frictions as major factors for inefficient labor mobility. It argues that where superior information is present, intentions do better predict migration behavior because the individual has formed her intention based on more rational expectations about host country conditions. The paper finds ambiguous selection effects and high migration pressures of unemployed and less wealthy people. It finds further that better information indeed leads to migration intentions being more certain and provides policy recommendations that result from these findings.

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1 Introduction

The migration of skilled people has become a hotly debated issue in both sending and receiving countries. In the case of the European Union (EU), for example, efforts are under way to attract skilled labor through increasingly selective immigration policies. In order to counteract a trend in immigration statistics that has left the EU with a considerably higher share of unskilled immigrants than other regions, especially the USA, policies favoring immigration of highly skilled workers have been introduced in a number of European countries, including France, Germany, Ireland and the UK. Moreover, in September 2007, Franco Frattini, the EU Commissioner for Justice, Freedom, and Security, proposed the introduction of a unified "Blue Card" which aims at attracting highly skilled migrants from outside the EU.

But—even if one accepts this preference for highly-skilled immigration—effectively selecting immigrants and protecting borders against low-skilled immigrants is difficult. Pressures are immense, due to enormous economic inequalities between sending and receiving countries, especially in North-South migration. Even less influence can be exerted by sending countries, as there is hardly a way to establish restrictive *emigration* policies. Hence, it is in the interest of both groups of countries to understand the factors that determine the decision of individuals to migrate and—ideally—to cooperate politically. It is important to learn more about the characteristics of people who decide to move, why they go abroad and where. Understanding these determinants may ultimately help to better match supply and demand of migrant labor, to predict migrant flows and to boost the success for migrants in the host country.

Against this background this paper will look at the determinants of the propensity to migrate at the individual level. Geographically, it will focus on the EU as a receiving region and Albania, Moldova, Egypt and Tunisia as sending countries. The analysis will be based on survey data collected by the European Training Foundation (ETF) in 2006. The survey was designed to study migration intentions and the characteristics of migrants (and non-migrants) in sending countries and thus provides a unique micro data set. The approach to analyze characteristics is based on the theory of intentions established by the work of Ajzen (1988). In addition, the detail in the ETF data allows to expand Ajzen's model and to define degrees of likelihood of an individual to migrate and to indentify individuals who are just before migrating. Thus, the paper will also contribute to evaluating how well intentions predict migration behavior.

Within this context the study focuses on two main areas that may cause migration pressure. First, it looks at the selection of migrants in terms of skills and in terms of labor market integration. Despite numerous existing studies the interest in this issue has not ceased and it is not yet comprehensively understood. Second, the paper argues that information frictions are major factors for inefficient labor mobility. Not only do information asymmetries exist in the traditional way where the host employer can not observe the skills of the migrant, but also on the side of the migrant who, if not well informed about conditions in the host country, will evaluate the migration option based on subjective and often inaccurate expectations. It is argued that where superior information is present, intentions do better predict migration behavior because the individual has formed her intention based on more rational expectations about host country conditions.

The paper finds that the selection of migrants is not clear-cut. Overall, education does not significantly affect migration intentions but it can facilitate to realize migration behavior. Also, people who are not well integrated into the home country's labor market are more likely to migrate. With respect to information and expectations the paper finds that while expectations about the benefits of migration affect migration intentions, it may be the quality of information that a potential migrant has that determines migration behavior and thus ultimately leads to more efficient migration flows. Results from this study will help to better understand the characteristics of migrants and give policy recommendations on how to improve benefits from migration.

The paper is structured as follows. First, the theory of intentions and its application to migration will be reviewed. Subsequently, the data and conditions in the survey countries will be presented and the models for estimation introduced. The results of a logit model on migration intentions, an ordered logit model on an index with increasing propensity to migrate will be presented in section four, followed by a robustness analysis which discusses particularities of the data set. The study concludes with a summary of findings and elaborates on policy implications that result from this research.

2 THEORY OF MIGRATION INTENTIONS

2.1 General Overview

Most economic literature on migration agrees that the main driving forces behind migration are differences in (expected) net returns between sending and receiving countries. Thus, a migrant holding certain characteristics and skills weighs expected gains in the potential host country against costs associated with migration and gains that can be obtained when staying in the home country.[1] Some literature also stresses that this migration decision is not only evaluated by the migrating individual alone but rather by the whole family following a strategy of risk diversification.[2]

Gains are widely defined by wage differences. Nevertheless, these differences are not the only important factor as is demonstrated by the fact that the poorest countries are not the ones sending the largest numbers of migrants.[3] Consequently, gains may also originate from other inequalities in the political, economic, social, demographic and geographical environment (e.g. freedom, protection, better health care); or generally better living conditions than in the origin country.

Costs associated with migration vary and may include the actual migration costs (e.g. travel costs, visa), psychic cost of leaving the home country and family, adjustment costs in the host country or risks underlying migration decisions.[4]

Over the past years difficulties in finding adequate data to study the characteristics of migrants prompted economists to make more use of intentions data and thereby study migration behavior indirectly—an approach that is also followed by in this study.[5] This allows looking at individual characteristics that are important to determine migration at a time when the migrant is still in the country of origin and therefore mitigate some of the selection problems of host country data. Host country data do not give a full picture of migration pressures as it includes

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[1] See for example, Sjaastad (1992), Todaro (1969), Harris and Todaro (1970), Molho (1986), Borjas (1994), Chiswick (1999), Hatton and Williamson (1998) and Massey et al. (1993) or Bauer and Zimmerman (1998) for an overview of approaches.
[2] Stark and Bloom (1985), Stark (1991), Katz and Stark (1986), Lakshmansamy (1990), Findlay (1987)
[3] Massey 2005, Hatton and Williamson (2005), Waddington and Sabates-Wheeler (2005)
[4] e.g. Schwartz (1973). Carrington et al. (1996), Bauer et al. (2000), Gordon and Molho (1995), Drinkwater (2003), Langley (1974), Hart (1975)
[5] see e.g. Hughes and McCormick (1985), Papapanagos and Sanfey (2001), Drinkwater (2003) Adams (1993), Bilsborrow et al. (1987).

only those people who have actually migrated and who have been selected due to factors such as immigration policies and proximities between sending and receiving countries (Jasso et al. (2000)).

Obviously, it is arguable whether intentions are an adequate predictor of actual migration behavior. Thus, it is fundamental to explore the link between intentions and subsequent actions. The starting point for this analysis is the work on the 'theory of reasoned action' of Ajzen (1985, 1988). It does not differ essentially from economic theory but approaches the migration decision from the socio-psychological angle. Based on this theory the action (emigration) is taken after the consequences have been weighed against the present status—all based on individual conditions, perceptions and expectations. Manski (1990) and Burda et al. (1998) point out that although there is some informational content in intentions-based survey questions, researchers should not expect too much from such data. Manski (1990) stresses that there is no reason that differences on the individual level between intentions and behavior should "average out" in the aggregate. Also, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001), hint at the general problem of using subjective variables as a dependent variable in econometric modeling.

However, many studies confirm that, 'actions' are very well predicted by intentions.[6] And numerous studies have emphasized the applicability of the theory of intentions or reasoned action to the migration context. Although, based on internal migration, where following the migrant is much more practical than in international migration, they find a close relation between intentions and actions.[7]

It should be kept in mind, however, that the costs of international migration are higher; migrants face more obstacles and practical issues might dominate individual characteristics (e.g. need more resources, different language, getting a visa and work permit etc.). It may also be possible that the time between forming intentions and the actual action or emigration is longer in international migration. This may lead to an increased tendency of the individual adjusting her intentions until it comes to international migration, though empirical evidence for

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[6] Louviere et al. (2000), Böheim and Taylor (2002), Kule et al. (2002), Papapanagos and Sanfey (2001), Sandu and De Jong (1996).

[7] E.g. Fuller et al. (1986), De Jong et al. (1996); Sandu and De Jong (1996); De Jong, 2000 for Thailand; Fawcett (1986); Hughes and McCormick (1985), Gordon and Molho (1995) for the UK; Lu (1999), Yang (2000), Zohry (2005) for Egypt, Burda (1993) and Burda et al. (1998) for Germany, Ahn et al. (1999) for Spain and Faini et al. (1997) for Italy, Knight and Song (2003) for China, Drinkwater (2003), Liebig and Souza-Poza (2004) for EEC and EU countries.

this is scarce. Gardener et al. (1986) for example finds that legal obstacles had been the main reason for Philippines abandoning their plans to migrate. Moreover, van der Erf and Heering (2002) analyze survey data from Morocco asking whether the significance of the characteristics that are said to predict intentions hold when these intentions are refined including timing of migration and actual steps already taken towards migration. They find that individual characteristics under these circumstances increasingly become less important predictors.[8] These concerns about the discrepancies between intentions and behavior will be picked up in this study and tested to the extent possible. Due to the detail in the data underlying this study, these problems can, in fact, be mitigated as will be explained further below.

Most studies of intentions in international migration start with individual human capital or socio-demographic characteristics, such as gender, age, education, work experience, unemployment and language skills as essentially determining migration decisions.[9] It is beyond the scope of this review to report all results of studies that have been done, so the following will focus on only those that will be particularly important for the approach in this work.

A recurring question when it comes to characteristics of migrants is whether migrants are positively or negatively selected, and as indicated, this is very controversial. Borjas (1987) argues that a more unequal income distribution in the sending country leads to an adverse skill mix of migrants, thus, negative selection. This view is widely challenged; and Chiswick (1978, 1999, 2000) in particular, points out that positive selection can be expected—a higher income inequality in the sending country would only attenuate positive self-selection.[10] Mora and Taylor (2005), Taylor et al. (2003), Adams (2005) and Funkhauser (1992) all find that human capital variables have a significant positive impact on the decision to migrate. Finally, Chiquiar and Hanson (2005) and Orrenious and Zavodny (2005) come up with general evidence for intermediate selection in Mexican migration to the U.S.. Chiquiar and Hanson (2005) also conclude, that migrants tend to positively self-select when the costs of migrating are high, and vice versa. Overall, the underlying selection in the migration decision is ambiguous and likely

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[8] However, their sample size becomes very small.
[9] Also see De Jong et al. (1996), Grasmuck and Pessar (1991), Bilsborrow (1993), Mora and Taylor (2005) Boyd and Grieco (2004), Stark and Taylor (1991).
[10] See Chicquiar and Hanson (2002), Liebig and Souza-Poza (2004).

different with respect to specific sending and receiving countries as well as to motives of migration. Also, findings vary according to whether host or origin data was used.[11]

Asymmetric information may also affect the composition of migrants. In the absence of any signaling and screening mechanisms by the host country's employers, asymmetric information would lead to adverse selection of migrants (Katz and Stark (1987)). Thus, if there were a screening mechanism in place, such as private recruitment firms, the skill level of migrants would increase as the additional information would be reflected in wages (Chau and Stark (1999)). The basic model of asymmetric information has another application to the context of migration. Most importantly, the migrant also lacks information about conditions in the destination country.[12] As a result, the migration decision has to be based on expectations (under asymmetric information) that may lead to inefficiencies in the number and composition of people leaving. There is usually a mixture of sources of information available to potential migrants and it would be crucial to know *how* information is obtained and (subjective) expectations are formed. High positive expectations may lead to large numbers of people emigrating regardless of their skills. A rather pessimistic perspective would dissuade highly skilled people to leave. Both outcomes are likely to be formed based on inaccurate information about the conditions in the host country.

Based on unique survey data of potential migrants from Tonga to New Zealand McKenzie et al. (2007) test the expected income and the expected employment impact on migration intentions and look at whether these expectations are over or underestimated. Besides finding that expectations do indeed have an impact on migration intentions, they surprisingly find that migrants tend to underestimate income and employment in the host country. This contradicts the general belief that migrants expect paradise-like conditions in the destination country.[13] Their main explanations are that first, potential migrants over proportionally weigh negative experiences of previous migrants, which is in line with behavioral studies in psychology (Taylor (1991)). Secondly, they argue, and empirically confirm, that migrants who have extended family abroad have lower wage expectation compared to those with immediate

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[11] Constant and Massey (2002), Burda et al. (1998), Borjas and Bratsberg (1996), Beenstock (1996), Jasso and Rosenzweig (1988).

[12] Also see Molho (1996).

[13] Their title is: A land of milk and honey with streets paved with gold: Do emigrants have over-optimistic expectations about incomes abroad?

family. This apparent unwillingness to reveal true income to extended family members may reflect an intention to limit remittances to immediate family members. These findings point out that the source of information that the potential migrant draws upon is crucial for forming expectations and thus intentions to migrate.

O'Connell (1997) shows in his theoretical work that uncertainty about unobservable conditions in the destination country and about future developments in source and destination country indeed impact on migration predictions, and may lead to speculative migration—"try your luck"—or discourage migration—"wait and see". Still, there are hardly any empirical studies on this. One example can be studied from Burda et al. (1998) who analyze East-West German migration intentions using the option value theory to explain migration today versus tomorrow under uncertainty.[14] They find a U-shaped relation of the income effect on migration intentions in this setting. Further, van Dalen et al. (2005a) explicitly include expectations about net benefits of migration into their study with data from four African countries.[15] They find that the optimism of migration, as they call positive expectations, has a large impact on the intentions to migrate. Expectations about conditions when *not* migrating were included in a migration decision model for internal migration in Thailand by De Jong (2000) who argues that these expectations are the main factor impacting (negatively) on migration intentions. He considers migration as a two-step procedure; first, the intentions are formed influenced by various individual characteristics. The second step involves the actual migration behavior which he is actually able to track using internal migration data. This study will build upon a modified version of his two-step pattern.

2.2 Research Focus

From the theory and literature reviewed the following can be summarized. Economic motives and conditions, and how they are perceived, are the primary cause of migration. Economic prospects at all levels (regional, community, household and individual) are important in both initiating and perpetuating migration. Networks are crucial in determining migration flows and may help reducing costs and risks for migrants and their families. At the individual level the characteristics of the migrant are important as are the individual perceptions which, based on

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[14] Also see Burda (1995).
[15] Ghana, Senegal, Egypt and Morocco

the available information level, lead to expectations that result in particular migration intentions. Critical is to what degree intentions actually predict behavior. The above propositions can be summarized in the following diagram which visualizes migration decision-making.[16]

Figure 1: Migration Decision Making

Based on this foundation the study will focus on two questions. With respect to individual characteristics the self-selection of migrants will be central. Thus, variables of crucial interest are education and other skills, labor market integration and income. It is expected that the impact of skills may be positive, however, the literature also points out that this might not be as

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[16] The diagram is a modified version of the diagram in De Jong (2000).

clear-cut. An unfavorable labor market status is likely to be associated with increased migration intentions and poorer migrants may feel more pressure for migration. The second focus regards networks, information and expectations, their links to one another and impact on migration intentions and behavior. It will be crucial to further distinguish how these factors impact on intentions in general and on actual behavior. The basic idea is that if people have more accurate information about the destination countries through networks or other forms of information gathering, the expectations they form about the migration process are more realistic which in turn results in their intentions better predicting actual behavior than for people who have less certain information. The next section will look at the survey countries and data that this study is based on and describe the models and the pool of variables available to test the above propositions.

3   DATA, STYLIZED FACTS AND ECONOMETRIC APPROACH

3.1 The Survey Countries

Four countries are relevant in this study, Albania, Moldova, Egypt and Tunisia. Table 1 presents their main destination regions showing that the EU is main destination for Albanians and Tunisians; Moldavians primarily go to Russia and Egyptians to the Gulf region. Another table presenting the top-20 receiving countries is included in the appendix (A1).

Table 1

Destination regions for immigrants from the survey countries

Host region	Albania	Moldova	Egypt	Tunisia
LAC	0.5%	0.2%	0.3%	0.2%
EU27+	83.0%	10.8%	9.1%	76.4%
ECA	6.0%	78.1%	1.0%	2.3%
MENA	1.4%	3.9%	72.4%	11.7%
North America	5.6%	3.5%	7.4%	2.3%
Africa	1.4%	1.6%	6.4%	5.1%
South Asia	1.2%	1.4%	1.4%	1.4%
East Asia and Pacific	0.9%	0.5%	2.0%	0.5%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: Parsons, Skeldon, Walmsley and Winters (2007).

The large majority of migrants from Moldova are young, married, males who usually work in the Russian construction industry. The proportion of women is higher within the migrant flows to Italy, Greece, Spain and Turkey, where they work primarily in domestic and care services. About 40 percent of Moldavians are seasonal migrants, man of them illegal. As in the rest of Moldova's working population, most migrants have secondary education and 20-25 percent of them completed university. Permanent migrants tend to be better educated than temporary ones. According to estimates by Docquier and Markfouk (2006), 45.8 percent of Moldavan immigrants in OECD countries are skilled—they represent 3.4 percent of the tertiary educated labor force in Moldova.[17] Moldovan migrants remit home about 56 percent of their earnings. The share of migrants in the total active age population is estimated to be 18 percent. [18]

The tradition of emigration from Albania goes back 15 years to the break down of the Former Soviet Union; in 2000 8.4 percent of the Albanian labor force lived in OECD countries. Albanian migrants tend to be young, disproportionately male, better educated, and the primary destinations are Greece and Italy. 9 percent of the Albanian tertiary educated labor force lives in OECD countries and 18.4 percent of all Albanian emigrants are highly skilled. Migrant remittances represent an important source of foreign exchange for Albania. Also, it was found that migrants are generally well positioned to find a job or establish a business on their return to Albania.[19]

A study by Giubilaro (1997) found that Tunisia had a migrant potential of 19 percent of the working age population and predicted that given the labor market pressures, emigration would increase (predicted for the time 2005-2010). Recently, increasingly significant numbers of qualified workers have emigrated from Tunisia, not only towards Europe (and France in particular) but also towards the Gulf States and North America. This is likely due to the considerable improvement in the levels of education of the Tunisian population over the past 30 years, and because of high levels of unemployment among higher education graduates. Unemployment among young graduates is a huge problem and rose from 10.2% in 2004 to 14% in 2005. This rate is expected to increase further, in 2016 to 21.6% and in 2017 to

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[17] Note that many the overal selection rate is likely to be lower as most Moldovans go to Russia (not OECD), they tend to be less skilled (Goerlich and Trebesch (2008)).

[18] Okólski (2004), Goerlich and Trebesch (2008), Ghenecea and Gudumac (2004), CBS AXA (2005).

[19] Castaldo et al. (2005), Kule et al. (2002), Docquier and Marfouk (2004), Papanagos and Sanfey (2001).

26.1%.[20] The share of tertiary educated Tunisians who reside in OECD countries is 12.5 percent and the selection rate (share of skilled emigrants of all emigrants) is 14.9 percent.

Unemployment is also a crucial factor for migration from Egypt. Official estimates placed unemployment at about 9 percent in 2004, but independent estimates are closer to 20 percent. Most migrants are males migrating to Arab Gulf countries such as Saudi Arabia, Libya, Jordan, and Kuwait. Estimates of number of migrants to the region range form 1.5 to 1.9 million 88 percent of which migrate to the aforementioned countries. Unfortunately estimates of the share of tertiary educated migrants to the Gulf countries do not exist, but for OECD countries the share is 4.6 percent of the respective population in Egypt. The selection rate of Egyptian emigrants to OECD countries is comparatively high with 58.9 percent. Recently Egypt has also witnessed massive immigration flows from neighboring African countries due to conflict and political instability in the Sudan and Sub-Saharan Africa.[21]

3.2 The Data

The following analysis is based on a survey of potential migrants which was conducted by the European Training Foundation (ETF) in 2006.[22] The underlying questionnaire of the survey has five sections. The first section gathers general demographic information of the individuals interviewed. The second section concentrates on work related variables. The third identifies who principally intends to migrate abroad. Subsequently, section four extensively interviews those who want to move abroad and asks a variety of questions determining a) how likely it is that they really will migrate, b) where and why they want to leave and c) how they envision their migration process. Section five returns to the full set of respondents and asks questions regarding the household members, dwellings and additional income sources. The survey resulted in a total sample size of 3,834 respondents, 998 from Albania, 1,009 from Moldova, 812 from Egypt and 1,015 from Tunisia.

Details about the survey design can be found in the appendix. What should be mentioned here are potential problems that arise from misrepresentation of the data of the respective national population which may result in a bias of the estimates. This concerns primarily Egypt where

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[20] European Training Foundation (2007)), Docquier and Marfouk (2006), Giubilaro (1997).
[21] Zohry (2005), Docquier and Marfouk (2006), Adams (1993).
[22] There was another survey undertaken simultaneously which targeted return migrants. Also, another country, the Ukraine, will be added soon.

some villages and governorates were over-sampled to increase coverage of potential migrants to Europe. In addition individuals outside the labor force who were not in full-time education were excluded. The latter added to the already existing problem of male overrepresentation.[23] Overall, comparison with other data from the countries shows that national representation was not fully achieved (see appendix for more detail). This has to be kept in mind throughout the analysis. Also, it should be emphasized that this analysis is based on data from four particular countries and results may not necessarily apply to migrants from other countries.

3.3 The Model

Dependent variables

Two models will be used to answer the relevant research questions which apply a maximum likelihood estimation method. The first is a simple logit model estimating the determinants of intentions to migrate; the second is an ordered logit which will give more insight into actual migration behavior—to the possible extent.

The dependent variable of the first model is based on one question, which is whether the person intends to move abroad (1912 cases) or not (1922 cases). The dependent variable of the second model is an intensity index of the propensity to migrate. Accordingly, the individuals who intend to move are further categorized by increasing likelihood that they will actually do so. The three categories— maybe, likely and certain— are calculated based on a set of variables asked to determine how close potential migrants are to really migrating. For example, respondents are asked how likely it is that they move within the next 6 months or within the next two years; about their ability to finance migration and various questions about whether they know about, and already possess, certain prerequisites such as passport, visa, work contract or approval for study. The very rich set of variables in this regard allows a detailed classification distinguishing between the degrees of likelihood of migration. Still, it should be kept in mind that we do not observe who will actually migrate. The dependent variables are summarized in Table 2.

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[23] Women are also underrepresented in Tunisia. In general, educated people tend to be overrepresented but there is no sign that this occured in a systematic way. The survey was unfortunately not corrected by weights to lessen these issues.

Table 2

Intent to move abroad by country

	Albania	Egypt	Moldova	Tunisia	Total
no (stay)	56%	53%	56%	37%	50%
maybe	17%	14%	12%	29%	18%
likely	17%	19%	19%	24%	19%
certain	11%	15%	13%	11%	12%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

The model will have two main specifications with the basic model including individual and household characteristics, network factors and country dummies (see table A5 in the appendix for descriptives). The extended model adds two more variables, i.e. expectations and an "awareness of programs assisting migration" variable. These two variables are crucial, especially when the study proceeds to the second model, but not free from criticism (see below).

Variables of the first model

With respect to included skill variables table A1 in the appendix shows the education levels of individuals in the sample as well as language skills and labor market status by country and intent to move. Education is classified by primary education (also including no education), secondary and post-secondary education.[24] Looking at all countries the share of higher skilled people is higher among the "migrants" than among the general population. However, looking at the countries these numbers may be driven by Egypt and Tunisia which exhibit particularly high skill levels among their migrants. For the labor market status of individuals the analysis reveals that on total especially unemployed people intend to move, followed by casual workers and students. The number of professionals and those who work in middle and high management (high) is much higher for people who intend to stay at home. Most individuals work or have worked in the industry of public administration and utilities (not counting those who never worked or didn't answer the question) followed by petty trade and agriculture. Nevertheless, among those who intend to move, construction seems to be the leading industry.

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[24] The construction of this variable attempts to harmonize across education systems corresponding to information from the World Higher Education Database by the International Association of Universities (IAU) and the UNESCO (UNESCO, IAU WHED).

The survey gives information on several income sources, including yearly salary[25], income from other family members, rent, savings, pensions and social assistance, land, income from remittances, whether individuals consider their income as sufficient and finally how they compare to other households in the community. Remittances are of special interest here as they are often seen as an indicator for existing migration networks. In consequence, those who receive remittances are more likely to be among those who migrate as they are more exposed to the idea of migrating and already part of a network that may facilitate migration.[26] Descriptive analysis confirms this perception (see table A2).

Network factors are also present if the individual has a household member living abroad. This is relevant for 10 percent of the entire sample but almost 17 percent for those who have intention to move. Furthermore, 15 percent of the sample is aware of programs, of private or governmental nature, that assist in the migration process. As expected, this percentage is lower for those who intend to stay (7 percent) and higher for those who want to move (24 percent). With respect to expectations regarding the benefits of migration, most people (57 percent) across the entire sample expect to find better work opportunities upon return due to foreign experience.[27]

As mentioned before, the latter two variables must be looked at with care due to inherent endogeneity problems. Awareness of programs requires active involvement of the person, and as a result, there may be a tendency for people who intend to migrate to also be more aware of such programs. This technical problem could in principle be addressed by a two-step procedure using a suitable instrumental variable (IV). A useful variable could be the distance of an individual's residence to such center or another characteristic of how (easy) an individual can access information about the program. Unfortunately, such a variable is not found in the data and could not be constructed as geographical information on respondents is practically absent. Therefore, despite the endogeneity problem, the "awareness of programs" variable is included in the model as it can generate very interesting information.

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[25] In Euro and adjusted by 2006 exchange rates.
[26] Van Dalen et al. (2005b), Rapoport and Docquier (2005), Lucas and Stark (1985), Poirine (1997), VanWey (2004), Stark (1999)
[27] Roughly 60 percent of these people intend to migrate.

For the variable "positive expectations" or optimism about migration, it also proves problematic to distill the actual effect from other factors that impact on both, the expectations and the intent to move. In fact, expectations and the intent to move are very similar variables. A two-step procedure could, again, be one way to account for this problem. However, finding a suitable IV is even more difficult due to the similarity of the two variables. Van Dalen et al. (2005a) have done a similar exercise including expectations in an analogous model. They state that running a two-step procedure did not change the outcome significantly compared to directly including the variable; and they give preference to the model with only one equation.[28] Following this paper, the extended model includes a variable of expectation, that represents whether someone expects that migration will be associated with better job opportunities upon return.

Variables of the second model

Characteristics that impact on the intentions to migrate may not always be the same when it comes to predicting actual behavior. This is tested in the ordered logit model with three outcomes: maybe-, likely-, and certain migrants. The model uses the sub sample of only those who intend to migrate which allows adding more detailed variables as predictors and thus including more factors that may determine migration behavior.[29]

Factors that take migration intentions a step further to migration behavior generally include factors that constrain or facilitate migration. It was hypothized before that where people have better information they would be more certain about migration. Individuals who have less accurate information are likely to have a comparatively lower propensity category of migration. Table A3 shows that people mainly acquire information via friends abroad (if "other" is ignored). This is particularly prevalent in Egypt and Tunisia. Having been abroad, as a source of information, is comparatively higher in Albania and Moldova. Overall, institutions—i.e. schools, agencies, and other organizations—seem to have a minor role as an information resource.

For the subsample the data gives a lot of information regarding expectations; i.e. what work and what industry the migrant expects in the host country, and whether she expects financial

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[28] Unfortunately their IVs are not defined further.
[29] The model also includes the variables of the first model.

improvement or to get a better job due to migration upon return. Over 40 percent of migrants expect to work in a different industry abroad than where they work in their home country (see table A4). Expectations to work in hotel, restaurant and domestic services are leading in Albania and Tunisia; public administration and utilities in Egypt; and construction in Moldova. Also, 12 percent of people expect to work in higher skill level and 10 percent in a lower. The majority (41 percent) expects to work at the same level and the remaining share does not know.

Expected participation—not only awareness—of migration programs is also included. Problems of endogeneity may still be present but less pronounced as only the subsample is used. In fact, 23 percent are aware of programs that facilitate migration (governmental and private) of whom two thirds also plan to participate in such a program.[30] This variable is a way to get information about the destination country and shows commitment to migrate beyond intentions. In general, this variable is very interesting for policy makers but, as the sample shows, not many seem to even be aware of such programs which consequently limits the analysis (see table A3).

Another interesting variable is the primary reason why people intend to migrate. This seems to be either to improve work options or, more generally, living conditions. By country it can be seen though that this is particularly the case in Albania and Moldova and in Tunisia and Egypt personal reasons become more relevant (see table A3).

About one third of migrants are influenced by others in their migration decision as shown. Especially in Albania, migration seems to be a joint decision including also family and possibly friends. This confirms the notion that migration is not only an individual decision but also a household decision (Stark (1991)).

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[30] The other 8 percent who were aware of programs but would not participate, often considered the programs as costly and corrupt or did not meet qualifying requirements.

4 RESULTS

4.1 The Logit Model

The results from the basic model are presented in table A7 columns (1) in the appendix which shows the full set of variables included in the model and it pools all four counties.[31] The following analysis will not look at all variables but focus on i) selection relevant variables and ii) network variables including particularly the aspect of information and expectations.

Education is the one variable which is most important with respect to selection of migrants. The probability of migration intentions significantly increases by about 11 percentage points for tertiary compared to secondary education. The effect of primary education is small and insignificant. This is in line with other studies,[32] but already at this point, it should be hinted at the analysis of robustness which will study this finding with more detail; it appears that education is a variable that is significantly different across countries and findings are not clear cut.

Language skills are also positively associated with the intent to migrate.[33] While speaking two or more foreign languages proved insignificant and is excluded from the analysis, speaking more than one language, is significant with a marginal effect of 10 percentage points.

The labor market status of a person was categorized in six different categories: being an employee (base outcome), employer, casual worker, student, unemployed and unknown or never worked.[34] Only unemployment seems to have an impact. Compared to employees, the odds of moving increase by 78 percent (the marginal effect is 14 percentage points). This is in line with problems identified in the labor markets of the respective countries. Many unemployed people—young ones in particular—see migration as a way (back) into employment (Castaldo et al. (2005), Zohry (2005)).[35] An interaction of education and labor market status reveals, in fact, that particularly higher educated people who are unemployed or

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[31] Country dummies are included to account for country specific characteristics which apparently exist as the coefficients are significant for Moldova and Tunisia (Albania is the base outcome). The issue will further be discussed in the final section of the chapter.

[32] Van Dalen et al. (2005a), Sadiqi (2007), Goerlich and Trebesch (2008), Hay (1980) and others.

[33] Also see Mora and Taylor (2005).

[34] The latter is just a control for those where no answer or other information was given and has little importance for interpretation.

[35] Running the model including an interaction of age and labor market status however, did not confirm this.

have not yet worked, are more likely to be among the migrants. The result of this interaction is presented in Figure 2 showing the predicted probabilities of education grouped in two country pairs. This also adds to the notion that the education effect may not be clear-cut.

Figure 2

Predicted Probabilities: Education by employment status

Industries are said to be interrelated with migration (Mora and Taylor (2005)). The model confirms the perception of the descriptive analysis that predominantly people working in construction tend to move; followed by transport and repair industries and the hotel, restaurant and domestic services.

The work level of people is of particular interest to look at selection. People working in a higher work level seem to be less likely to move which is intuitive as they are well established in their home country and are not as much subject to emigration pressures. This finding tends to be ignored by policy makers in receiving countries who develop visa policies such as the blue card which target exactly this group. Evidence in the past has shown that while these visas

sound appealing (e.g. the German "Green Card") they do not necessarily attract many migrants.[36] The estimates from this model confirm such evidence.

There is a variety of variables with respect to financial resources that a person has. The income variables either directly refer to higher or lower income or indirectly via income sources.[37] The overall tendency is that these resources are inversely related to migration intentions as previous research found, but the effect is not very large.[38] The big exception is income from remittances which has to do with the presence of networks that may facilitate migration. Indeed, regular and occasional income from remittances significantly increases the likelihood to move by 25 and 21 percentage points respectively.[39] Similar to other research, positive network effects are also confirmed in this study. In addition to the proxy of remittances for existing networks, the variable "presence of a family member abroad" increases the odds of migration by 29 percent.[40]

Overall, it can be said that better educated but less integrated people tend to migrate and networks are crucial factors enhancing people to consider the migration option.

The model is extended by two variables as shown in table A7 columns (2). The first may reveal important information for policy makers. The variable indicates the awareness of programs that assist with migration. In general, these could include temporary work programs, assistance by recruiting firms, pre-departure training or other services that facilitate migration. In the concrete case of the survey, these programs concern "private recruitment or governmental assistance" programs. As explained in the previous section, the potential endogeneity of tis variable could not be treated by an adequate instrument. Nevertheless, it is still important to show the positive correlation between awareness of programs that assist with migration and propensity to migrate (without causality). Also, there may indeed also be people who started actively thinking about migration in reaction to hearing about existing programs and not only people who actively search for programs to pursue their intentions.

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[36] See Focus-Migration (2005) for the German Green Card.
[37] E.g. someone with income from rent has property to rent out and thus likly to have comparatively more resources than someone without this income.
[38] Also see Stark (1991), Goerlich and Trebesch (2008), van Dalen et al. (2005b), Adams (1993), McKenzie and Rapoport (2004), (Skeldon 1997), Waddington and Sabates-Wheeler (2005).
[39] Also see van Dalen et al. (2005b).
[40] Massey et al., 1994, 1998; Munshi, 2003; Winters et al. 2001, Bauer et al. 2000, Hugo 1981, Taylor 1986, Gurak and Caces 1992, Groenewold 2001, McKenzie and Rapoport (2004).

As discussed, expectations play a fundamental role in the migration decision. While they may in principle go either way and over or underestimate the benefits from migration, the coefficient is surely positively associated with the odds of migrating.[41] How the inherent endogeneity problem is dealt with was discussed in the previous section.[42] Particularly interesting with this variable is to see how it changes when only the subsample is used.

Adding both, program-awareness and expectations, does not create much change in the other coefficients but increases the fit of the model. Nevertheless, the results have to be interpreted with care.

4.2 The Ordered Logit Model

The ordered logit model only includes the subsample of those who intend to migrate. Due to the additional questions that respondents were asked if they intended to migrate, this model allows adding detail to the explanatory variables. The model takes migration intentions further, and identifies characteristics associated with people who are extremely likely to migrate in the near future (outcome "certain"), likely to do so (outcome "likely") or uncertain in the realization of their migration intentions (outcome "maybe"). As figure 1 shows (see above) the step from intentions to behavior may have additional determinants resulting for example from visa policy constraints. Also, it should be noted that the model is based on the "selected" subsample and the endogeneity problems with the mentioned variables is likely to be less pronounced.[43] The results are reported in the appendix, table A8. The first column shows odds ratios and subsequent columns marginal effects for each outcome. The details are as follows:

Higher education has a positive impact on the propensity to migrate compared to secondary education; the proportional odds increase by 78 percent. Thus, better educated people who intend to migrate are more likely to actually do so. Given the options that more educated versus unskilled people have and selective immigration policies present in many countries, this finding makes intuitive sense. With respect to language skills, speaking the language of the country where the individual would move to fluently compared to ok does not intensify the propensity

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[41] Also see McKenzie et al. (2007) and van Dalen et. Al (2005a).

[42] I is basically ignored following the research of van Dalen et al (2005a).
[43] Note that the subsample is indeed likely to be selected, thus it should be emphasized that the model compares within the group of intending migrants and not includes non-migrants.

to migrate; but having very poor language skills clearly seems to be an obstacle to moving. The proportional odds decrease by 34 percent compared to the reference group.[44]

The variable on labor market status brings new insights. The skill level of work had no significant effect. Unemployment still has a positive coefficient but is insignificant. It could be speculated that unemployed people may face more obstacles when realizing migration intentions than working people as their status may signal a lower ability to sustain in the workforce. Therefore they do have increased pressure to migrate but are not more likely to realize this.

The effect of being a student decreases the propensity to migrate significantly. The marginal effects for each category are 12 percentage points for maybe migrants, minus 4 for likely and minus 8 percentage points for certain migrants. The outcome for students could result from the possibility that students are usually still outside the labor market and at the beginning of their career. As a result, they may be less certain about their career path and consequently less sure about emigration. This is something policy makers in sending countries should keep in mind. Labor market policies that create perspective to the (skilled) work force may effectively change the mind of these students. Contrary, a slow and problematic transition of graduates into the labor market may increase migration pressures substantially.

Income seems to matter much less. While still significant, even the magnitude of the income from remittances is also much lower changing the odds by (only) 33 percent. Thus, the network effect of remittances seems to primarily work towards recipients being more familiar with the idea of migration and having ties and access to information about possible host countries rather than being associated with people who are certain about migration. Further insights into remitting motives and spending patterns would help to further elaborate on this finding which is not possible with the present data.

Subjective and relative income measures, however, seem to make more of a difference. Considering ones income as sufficient is positively associated with the intensity index of migration intentions. This may reflect the ability to better finance migration and make use of services facilitating migration. It should be stressed that this does not contradict the previous

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[44] Language skills are a very important factor for integration in the host country, see Chiswick and Miller (1995, 2003).

finding (and that of other studies) of increased migration intentions among the less wealthy because the model addresses only those who intend to migrate.[45] People who feel relatively deprived compared to their neighbors seem to be more determined to actually migrate stressing the impact of the local community (Stark and Taylor (1989, 1991). Although barley significant, the odds of migrating increase by 27 percent if the person feels worse off compared to other households in the community.

An interesting variable is also whether the decision to migrate was a joint or individual decision (Stark (1991)). This had a negative effect in the model. Hence, wherever other family members take part in the migration decision the migrant herself may be less sure about it. This leads to the reason why people migrate. Personal reasons seem to be of primary importance. Personal reasons primarily include people saying they generally did not see a future in their home country, they were following their family, or left to get married. This finding confirms the trend in the EU that migration has primarily happened through channels of family reunification rather than channels explicitly designed for labor migration (refugees and asylum seekers are not considered here). Work related reasons are negatively associated with the propensity to migrate (compared to personal reasons) but insignificant. Living conditions related reasons have a negative and significant impact compared to personal reasons. But it should also not imply that economic reasons (better work and eventually better living) are not major reasons for people to migrate.

A crucial variable in this study concerns how potential migrants gather information about the destination countries and how this affects their migration decision. Comprehensive information is important to fully evaluate the migration option, hence, may replace diffuse expectations about migration (not general positive or negative expectations per se) by more objective considerations. This would result in more predictable and stabilized migration flows that attribute the economic purpose of migration. The variable of information source in the model has seven categories: information from news, institutions, friends abroad, immediate family abroad, having been abroad, and other. It is assumed that the information from institutions, family abroad and having been abroad results in "better" information (also see McKenzie et al. (2007)). Indeed, compared to news which is the base outcome, these three categories have a

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[45] See Adams (1993), Burda et al. (1998) and McKenzie and Rapoport (2004).

significant positive effect. Having been abroad has the strongest impact and increases the odds by 120 percent. It should be noted that the share of return migrants in this group is likely to be very small due to the survey design, so these people are mostly visitors.[46] The conclusion from the variable is that this better information results in the migrant being better able to form realistic migration intentions. Thus, where sound incorporation is present migration intentions better predict migration behavior. This finding should strengthen policy options for predicting migration flows. Governments in both sending and receiving countries may engage in policies that address information frictions and generally increase information in this respect. This may support more stable and targeted migration flows as migrants are more capable of evaluating potential benefits from migration in their decision-making.

Information about migration assistance programs can be distinguished between those who actually plan to participate in the program and those who are only aware of them. It should be added that these programs also play into the information hypothesis as such programs transmit knowledge—at least theoretically—about the migration process and perspectives in the host country. The coefficients are positive and significant only for the potential participants which is intuitive and in line with the previous discussion. Endogeneity may again be a problem in this variable, which is not accounted for. In fact, it may be interesting to model program participation itself in a separate model—one idea to extend this research.

There are more variables available describing the expectations of migrants—though not all are included in the extended model (see table A9). With regard to the skill level that people expect to work in, those who expect a medium level work compared to low, have increasing odds by 1.4. The high level dummy is insignificant. The variable measuring whether someone expected a higher, same or lower level than the present level which could be seen as a sign of unrealistic expectations was tested and proved insignificant and was excluded. Including the expected industry and whether it differs from the current industry was tested, proved insignificant and excluded. Expectations about better work opportunities upon return also turned out insignificant.[47] The only significantly positive variable with respect to expectations is the belief

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[46] In fact, respondents were asked whether the had been abroad for more than six months and had returned more than 3 months and less than 10 years ago; if this was the case they were asked the „partner" survey on return migrants which is not touched upon in this paper.

[47] Note that against the notion that all people who intend to migrate would also have these positive expectations the variable also has many cases of zero (for people who intend to migrate).

to improve financially by migrating. While it is interesting to look at descriptive outcomes for these expectations, they seem to be rather irrelevant for determining how certain someone is about migrating. This supports the argument of information replacing expectations when intentions are further evaluated towards migration behavior.

Interestingly, the country dummies are significant in all models which implies that there are country specific characteristics that play a role in the likelihood of migration. Compared to Albania, the odds ratios for Egypt and Moldova are larger than one and smaller for Tunisia. There may be many different factors that play into these outcomes. It is beyond the scope of this study to speculate or further investigate all these factors. Nevertheless, the following section will analyze country level differences in education specifically. Models estimated for separated samples by country have shown that countries primarily differ in this variable and that the impact of education is more ambiguous when differentiating between the countries.

4.3 Robustness of Results

In fact, it seems that the previous finding on education is very much driven by the sample from Egypt. For all the other countries the variable becomes insignificant and even has a negative sign in the case of Moldova.[48] For Egypt the model returns with an extremely large coefficient for education. On the one hand the explanation may lie within the survey design, i.e. the special problems that interviewers faced in Egypt which do not rule out that highly skilled people intending to migrate were systematically over-represented. Moreover, Egypt has a selection rate[49] of almost 60 percent in OECD destinations (Docquier and Marfouk (2006)). Consequently, the large effect in tertiary education may also be a special feature of emigration from Egypt.

A model with interactions has been added to further investigate the effect of education which is based on the pooled sample (see table A10). This allows to specifically look at the problem that education may be driven by the sample from Egypt and simultaneously keep the larger sample size.[50]

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[48] The estimations by countries are not shown.
[49] Share of skilled emigrants among all emigrants.
[50] Sample size became more critical in the by country models.

Figure 3

Predicted Probabilities: Education by Country

The results show that the effect on the probability to move of tertiary compared to secondary education is positive and significant. As Albania is the base outcome for the countries, this positive effect concerns tertiary educated Albanians. The country dummy for Egypt is insignificant; for Moldova negative and significant; and positive and significant for Tunisia. The interaction effect of Egypt with tertiary education is positive but insignificant and with primary education negative and significant. Moldova has significant and negative interaction effects with both primary and tertiary education. There are no significant interaction effects for Tunisia. What all this means for the predicted probability to move is shown in figure 3 which visualizes the effects of education by country.

This leads to the conclusion that the positive impact in the sample is not only driven by Egypt, but also by Albania. While in Tunisia the predicted probability does not really change in education, it becomes smaller for tertiary educated people in Moldova.

A similar exercise has been done for the ordered logit model which is graphically documented in figure 4 showing the predicted probabilities of education levels by country for each outcome. The curves indicate that the effect of education is also ambiguous in the ordered logit model.

Figure 4

Predicted Probabilities: Education by Country

The main effect of tertiary education is insignificant and of primary education it is negative and significant. Only the main effect of Tunisia is significant and negative. Interaction effects for primary education are positive and significant for Egypt and Moldova (compared to Albania). The same applies to the tertiary interaction effects but the effect is even larger. Overall, it seems that education level affect migration very differently in each country. Thus, the previous finding of education in both models has to be looked at carefully as findings are not unambiguously clear. Egypt seems the most problematic country.

Consequently the next model drops the cases from Egypt and reruns both types of models.[51] Results are shown in table A11. The first model indeed returns with insignificant variables for education. In the second model though the odds ratio still increases significantly by a factor of 1.9 for tertiary versus secondary educated people. From the analysis above, it is likely that this is particularly driven by Moldova and on a macro level Moldova has indeed a high selection

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[51] The basic model for the logit and the extended model for the ordered logit.

rate, but it is not clear why the predicted probabilities in figure 4 are as different as they are for each outcome.[52]

The final section will summarize the findings from the study and develop policy implications for sending and receiving countries.

5 CONCLUSION

The purpose of this paper was to bring more insights about the migration decision and to find factors that may increase migration pressure. With respect to the self-selection of migrants the paper finds an ambiguous effect of education on the intent to migrate. In the respective countries education is likely to be less important for the initial formation of intentions (except for Egypt). However, when it comes to taking actual steps toward migration the education effect is positive. Furthermore, unemployed, low skilled workers and poorer people are more likely to migrate but more resources help to ultimately realize these migration intentions.

The migration decision is based on expected benefits that are evaluated using available information. As migrants are usually not fully informed, their expectations are subjective and may eventually lead to inefficient migration flows. Findings in this study suggest that people are indeed more likely to realize migration intentions if they have better information and thus, information may help to adjust expectations to be more objective. This in turn may improve matching migrant demand and supply and ultimately reduce migration pressure in receiving countries.

Overall, the migration decision has to be understood in two steps; in the first people feel the push factors in their home country which cause them to look for places where they expect improvement. In the second step, the pull factors play an additional role, and the skills and resources of the migrant help to realize migration. This is also where the selective immigration policies come into play. Still, it should be kept in mind that while the more skilled and

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[52] Another modification that has been applied to the models is a modification of the dependent variable. The survey has two variables based on the questions whether it is likely that the person emigrates within the next 6 months or two years. Respondents could choose from a scale of 5 likelihoods. Models assuming a negative binomial distribution were estimated for the full and the subsample. They very much confirm previous results and especially the strong effect of tertiary education for Egypt.

wealthier people have an advantage to realize migration, this does not mean that other people will not migrate. Intentions have indeed been identified as a good predictor for migration behavior, so eventually many will find their way to do so. There are several policy implications from this study and recommendations that may help to better manage these flows.

First of all, from looking at migration pressures it is unlikely that the EU will be successful in effectively receiving primarily migrants from her "wish-list" of skills. Selective migration policies will help to influence the composition of migrants but they also ignore the characteristics of migration pressures in neighboring countries from less skilled and unemployed people.

For the sending countries the study confirms that it is mostly the problems in the labor markets and the resulting conditions that push people to migrate. The primary fear of sending countries is that they loose especially skilled people and the hope is that they at least get compensated for this loss. This study shows that migration may in fact be beneficial for those countries. In the short term, it relieves unemployment and migrants may generate benefits via remittances and skill transfer. The sending country should therefore have an interest to make their emigration successful. With respect to the emigration of skilled people in particular, governments should take advantage of the time span where people put their migration intentions into action. For example, the study showed that students who intend to migrate may not be as sure about it, so if governments manage (in the medium to long term) to support a smooth transition of graduates into the labor market, they may as well stay in their home country, integrate well and in turn not develop migration intentions.

Overall, for both sending and receiving country the main task is to shape the flow of migrants to make it economically more beneficial. The key recommendation from this study is to ensure this through improving the quality and access of information. If good information about migration and the destination country is made available, migrants can form their expectations more rationally based on facts, thereby increasing the efficiency of migration flows. While to a substantial degree access to information is already being facilitated in a globalized world via the Internet, easier and cheaper international travel, and migrant networks, governments could play a productive role in specifically targeting the flow of information as to enhance the formation of solid expectations about migration.

For the host countries such policy requires that it tracks the skills that are in demand and honestly communicates them. In the past, policy makers have tended to focus almost exclusively on high-skilled skills gaps while largely ignoring that a large part of unskilled jobs are actually done by migrant workers. While political reasons for this are obvious, economically there is a strong case for more honesty in this debate. As many less than successful high-skilled visa programs, e.g. in Germany, have demonstrated, high-skilled skills gaps are difficult to fill through migration. With this in mind, policy makers should make efforts to better define labor demand in their countries, attempt to understand incentives and motivations to migrate and to communicate regularly on these topics with sending countries. This information should be accompanied by information on the social and cultural aspects in the country and on challenges of integration that the migrant may be confronted with.

Sending countries will have to come to terms with the fact that emigration will continue. Consequently, they have to make the best out of it. On the one hand, this means creating attractive options for their workforce to reduce incentives to emigrate. On the other hand, they have to help prepare those migrants who intend to leave to be successful. In any case, they should be actively involved in the migration process and promote policies that facilitate return flows of resources and skills (e.g. dual citizenship, improvement n financial sector to reduce remitting costs etc.) and ensure their interests and the wellbeing and success of the migrant in this process.

Programs that facilitate migration through information could be of various natures. They can be governmental lead or private; focus on information transfer only or also provide practical information, or facilitate skills recognition. They could provide pre-migration training or assist contracts between employers and migrants. Lots of options may be possible; for all of them it would be important for governments to ensure that the services provided are well balanced and reflect the interest of both countries. Overall, people will certainly keep migrating; host and origin governments have to look beyond their borders and work together if they want to manage and maximize benefits from these labor flows.

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Appendix:

The ETF Survey

The survey is designed to represent the national population in the age range of the 18 to 40 year-old people. In each country, a 2-stage cluster sample was selected, in which first-stage clusters were a minimum of 4-6 regions chosen to represent the geographical diversity of the country, and second-stage clusters were villages, communes or municipalities chosen to represent the geographical diversity of the selected regions. The detail of this cluster selection had been agreed with the respective local service providers who carried out the interviews, such that at both stages (selection of regions, and selection of villages, communes or municipalities), areas with high and low levels of development, areas of high and low levels of international migration, and both rural and urban areas were included. Initially, it was anticipated that 1000 interviews would be conducted in each country with interviewers following random routes for their interviews and certain procedures in choosing the interviewee within the respective households to minimize any selection bias.

The analysis of representation of the respective national population in the survey data was undertaken by comparing the data to other data sources from the country (Census and Surveys) and UN population data. For Egypt comparison with other data shows that men are highly overrepresented – a problem already mentioned. Further young people are strongly overrepresented for both men and women. With respect to Tunisia men in general are highly overrepresented compared to the Tunisian population. Further, based on UN data, men are overrepresented in their mid 20s and women in the early 20s while census data shows comparable ages for men and only women tend to be younger. Education was not possible to assess (due to lack of comparable data) accept that the illiteracy rate in the census is much higher than in the sample indicating that the people in the sample are better educated.

Also, the sample of Albanians differs from its population but not to such an extent. The analysis shows that men are overrepresented in the sample. The comparison of the age-distribution illustrates that individuals in the sample tend to be younger than the national population. This is caused by a high overrepresentation of young men in the sample; women are slightly older than the national population. With respect to education primary educated men

and especially women are underrepresented, hence the individuals in the survey are better educated than the Albanian population of the respective age group.

Representation in the sample from Moldova is much better with respect to age and gender and more questionable when it comes to education. Educated people are overrepresented and individuals with general secondary education are underrepresented. Splitting by gender reveals that men with vocational education are highly oversampled and that females are highly underrepresented in primary education and overrepresented in vocational and university education

Tables

Table A 1
Top 20 Host Countries of Migrants from the Survey Countries

Host country	Albania	Host country	Moldova	Host country	Egypt	Host country	Tunisia
Greece	403856	Russian Federation	277527	Saudi Arabia	1015124	France	364498
Italy	167439	Ukraine	222478	Jordan	127018	Germany	61508
Germany	92415	Romania	27679	United States of America	123192	Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	15689
United States of America	39861	United States of America	20674	Occupied Palestinian Territory	103457	Israel	9949
TFYR Macedonia	25001	Germany	14845	Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	55681	Saudi Arabia	9545
Serbia and Montenegro	13451	Israel	14305	United Arab Emirates	48652	Serbia and Montenegro	8851
Pakistan	8568	Kazakhstan	9531	Lebanon	45602	Syrian Arab Republic	8509
Canada	6281	Pakistan	7941	Oman	42090	United States of America	8458
Kuwait	4158	Greece	6358	Germany	40852	Democratic Republic of the Congo	8167
Switzerland	3426	Latvia	6216	Italy	38706	Belgium	7995
Turkey	3313	Italy	4496	Canada	36924	Switzerland	6978
South Africa	3206	Kuwait	3805	Syrian Arab Republic	34828	Pakistan	6250
United Kingdom	3130	Jordan	3303	Australia	33432	Algeria	5735

Top 20 Host Countries of Migrants from the Survey Countries

Host country	Albania	Host country	Moldova	Host country	Egypt	Host country	Tunisia
Philippines	3105	Portugal	3040	Greece	32697	Canada	5551
France	2852	Belarus	2994	Democratic Republic of the Congo	29088	Italy	5384
Russian Federation	2577	South Africa	2971	United Kingdom	26946	Côte d'Ivoire	5081
Argentina	2330	Canada	2487	Sudan	24706	Ghana	5058
Jordan	2244	Turkey	2333	France	23148	Occupied Palestinian Territory	4905
Democratic Republic of the Congo	2165	Spain	2272	Pakistan	22261	Jordan	4603
Austria	2149	Democratic Republic of the Congo	1982	Israel	21700	United Kingdom	4159

Source: Parsons, Skeldon, Walmsley and Winters (2007).

Table A 2
Skills and labor market status by country and intent to move

	Albania		Egypt		Moldova		Tunisia		Total	
	stay	move	stay	move	stay	move	stay	move	stay	move
Education										
primary	162	159	76	45	151	139	101	154	490	497
secondary	310	224	235	189	318	249	125	233	988	895
tertiary	86	57	117	150	94	58	147	255	444	520
Language Skills										
One language	223	154	172	144	73	38	77	60	545	396
More than one language	335	286	256	240	490	408	296	582	1,377	1,516
up to two languages	387	339	391	348	412	302	218	306	1,189	1,091
More than two language	171	101	37	36	151	144	155	336	733	821
Labor Market Status										
employed	215	175	168	115	234	162	130	163	747	615
employer	170	72	60	45	40	27	81	68	351	212
casual worker	6	13	48	66	86	77	30	88	170	244

Skills and labor market status by country and intent to move

	Albania		Egypt		Moldova		Tunisia		Total	
	stay	move	stay	move	stay	move	stay	move	stay	move
student	66	33	95	83	53	53	59	139	273	308
unemployed	65	113	57	75	102	95	31	134	255	417
never worked and unknown	36	34			48	32	34	20	118	86
Work level										
high	81	38	138	87	61	39	140	93	420	257
medium	139	109	87	121	178	137	70	156	474	523
low	211	189	63	49	208	179	42	148	524	565
never worked	127	104	140	127	116	91	112	220	495	542

Table A 3
Migration Decision

	Albania	Egypt	Moldova	Tunisia	Total
Reason for leaving the home country by country					
Improve living conditions	160	91	170	254	675
Personal	85	87	71	185	428
Work related	128	189	142	140	599
Other	67	17	61	54	199
Did others influence the migration decision?					
No	224	262	272	523	1,281
Yes	216	122	174	115	627
Way of getting information about the destination country by origin country					
News	13	38	30	134	215
Institution	9	8	16	17	50
Family at home	11	26	50	24	111
Friends abroad	131	180	55	129	495
Been abroad	49	15	71	28	163
Family abroad	58	22	22	34	136
Other	169	95	202	276	742
Awareness and participation in migration assistance programs					
Not aware	357	302	358	443	1,460
Aware but would not participate	15	49	31	62	157
Would participate	68	33	57	137	295

Table A 4
Expectations about work in the host country

	Albania	Egypt	Moldova	Tunisia	Total
Expected industries abroad by country					
Petty trade	17	22	3	18	60
Manufacturing and mining	26	15	17	62	120
Construction	72	66	139	53	330
Commerce	5	36	27	94	162
Agriculture	26	8	21	33	88
Hotel, restaurant and domestic	134	72	94	108	408
Public administration and utilities	34	103	11	60	208
Transport and repair	55	32	27	44	158
Other and ICT	15	30	25	57	127
Never worked/no answer	56		82	82	220
Expected industries abroad by country					
Same	270	264	185	392	1,111
Different	170	120	261	212	763
Expected skill level abroad by country					
Lower	41	33	82	34	190
Same	222	183	182	211	798
Higher	46	41	50	90	227
Don't know	39	1	78	117	235
Never worked	92	126	54	190	462

Table A 5
Descriptive Statistics: Logit Model

		mean	sd
Demographics	Age	27.177	6.523
	Female	0.379	0.485
	Married	0.434	0.496
	Number of children	0.766	1.111
Relation to household head (HHH)	Spouse of HHH	0.205	0.404
(HHH=base outcome)	Son/Daughter of HHH	0.549	0.498
	Grandchild of HHH/Other	0.024	0.154
	Size of HH	4.563	1.634
	Some family living abroad	0.131	0.337
Language	Speaks more than one language	0.735	0.441
Education	Primary	0.252	0.434
(secondary=base outcome)	Tertiary/Post-secondary	0.248	0.432
Labor market status	Employer	0.155	0.362
(employed=base outcome)	Casual worker	0.106	0.308
	Student	0.148	0.355
	Unemployed	0.16	0.367
	Never worked/Unknown	0.052	0.222
Industry of work	Petty Trade	0.099	0.299
(public admin. And utilities=base outcome)	Manufacturing and mining	0.055	0.229
	Construction	0.081	0.272
	Commerce	0.078	0.268
	Agriculture	0.081	0.273
	Hotel, restaurant and domestic services	0.073	0.26
	Transport and repair	0.078	0.268
	ICT and other	0.075	0.264
	Never worked/Unknown	0.262	0.44
Skill level of work	Medium	0.261	0.439
(high=base outcome)	Low	0.281	0.45
	Never worked/Unknown	0.275	0.447
Income from	Salary	104.157	183.846
Income compared to others in the community	Better	0.246	0.431
("same"=base outcome)	Worse	0.126	0.331

Descriptive Statistics: Logit Model

		mean	sd
Income satisfaction	Sufficient	0.49	0.5
("ok"=base outcome)	Not sufficient	0.221	0.415
	Regular remittances	0.028	0.165
	Occasional remittances	0.134	0.34
	Other family member	0.634	0.482
	Agriculture	0.278	0.448
	Savings	0.141	0.348
	Rent	0.1	0.3
	Social assistance and pension	0.248	0.432
	Land owner	0.372	0.483
	Awareness of programs assisting migration	0.153	0.36
	Expects better work opportunities	0.576	0.494
Country dummies	Egypt	0.238	0.426
(Albania=base outcome)	Moldova	0.262	0.44
	Tunisia	0.207	0.405
Number of observations		3409	

Table A 6
Descriptive statistics for ordered logit model

		mean	sd
Demographics	Age	26.016	6
	Female	0.301	0.459
	Married	0.347	0.476
	Number of children	0.556	0.966
Relation to household head (HHH)	Child, grandchild or other of HHH	0.658	0.474
(HHH and spouse=base outcome)	HH Size	4.667	1.662
Education	Primary	0.251	0.434
(secondary=base outcome)	Tertiary/Post-secondary	0.259	0.438
Labor market status	Employer	0.116	0.321
(employed=base outcome)	Casual worker	0.123	0.329
	Student	0.153	0.36

Descriptive statistics for ordered logit model

		mean	sd
	Unemployed	0.208	0.406
	Never worked/Unknown	0.046	0.21
Ability to speak language of potential destination country	Very well	0.449	0.498
("ok"=base outcome)	Hardly	0.264	0.441
Skill level of work	Medium	0.279	0.448
(high=base outcome)	Low	0.297	0.457
	Never worked/Unknown	0.286	0.452
Industry of work	Petty Trade, Commerce, hotel, restaurant	0.226	0.418
(public admin. and utilities=base outcome)	Manufacturing, mining and agriculture	0.131	0.337
	Construction, transport and repair	0.2	0.4
	Other or never worked/Unknown	0.348	0.477
Income from	Salary	79.427	115.217
Income satisfaction	Sufficient	0.453	0.498
("ok"=base outcome)	Not sufficient	0.238	0.426
Income compared to others in the community	Better	0.225	0.418
("same"=base outcome)	Worse	0.144	0.351
	Remittances	0.247	0.431
	Other family member	0.614	0.487
	Agriculture	0.273	0.446
	Savings	0.125	0.33
	Rent	0.077	0.267
	Social assistance and pension	0.258	0.438
	Land owner	0.367	0.482
Reason for leaving	Improve living conditions	0.352	0.478
(personal=base outcome)	Better work	0.332	0.471
	Other	0.116	0.32
	Migration decision influenced by others	0.377	0.485
Information about destination country via:	Institution	0.029	0.168
(news=base outcome)	Family at home	0.062	0.242
	Friends abroad	0.275	0.447

Descriptive statistics for ordered logit model

		mean	sd
	Been abroad	0.094	0.292
	Other	0.363	0.481
	Family abroad	0.073	0.26
Migration assisting programs	Would participate	0.162	0.369
	Is aware but no participation intend	0.088	0.284
Expected skill level of work abroad	Medium	0.329	0.47
(Low=base outcome)	High	0.238	0.426
	Never worked/Unknown	0.096	0.295
	Expects better work opportunities	0.738	0.44
	Expect to improve financially by migrating	0.937	0.243
Country dummies	Egypt	0.249	0.433
(Albania=base outcome)	Moldova	0.252	0.434
	Tunisia	0.214	0.41
	Number of observations	1540	

Table A 7
Logistic Regression on the Intend to Migrate

Basic Model (1) and Extended Model (2)		(1)		(2)	
(Intend to migrate = 1)		Odds Ratio	Marg.Effect	Odds Ratio	Marg.Effect
Demographics	Age	0.990	-0.003	0.994	-0.002
		(0.010)	(0.002)	(0.011)	(0.003)
	Female	0.395***	-0.227***	0.427***	-0.204***
		(0.043)	(0.026)	(0.050)	(0.027)
	Married	0.959	-0.010	0.961	-0.010
		(0.142)	(0.037)	(0.155)	(0.040)
	Number of children	0.820***	-0.049***	0.844**	-0.042**
		(0.052)	(0.016)	(0.058)	(0.017)
Relation to household head (HHH)	Spouse of HHH	1.569***	0.112***	1.498**	0.101**
(HHH=base outcome)		(0.237)	(0.037)	(0.243)	(0.040)
	Son/Daughter of HHH	1.363**	0.077**	1.380**	0.079**

Logistic Regression on the Intend to Migrate

Basic Model (1) and Extended Model (2)		(1)		(2)	
(Intend to migrate = 1)		Odds Ratio	Marg.Effect	Odds Ratio	Marg.Effect
		(0.196)	(0.036)	(0.214)	(0.038)
	Grandchild of HHH/Other	1.994**	0.168***	1.842**	0.151**
		(0.537)	(0.061)	(0.516)	(0.068)
	HH Size	1.045*	0.011*	1.022	0.005
		(0.028)	(0.007)	(0.030)	(0.007)
	Family abroad	1.289*	0.063*	1.323*	0.070*
		(0.170)	(0.033)	(0.191)	(0.036)
Education	Primary	1.496***	0.100***	1.360***	0.075***
(secondary=base outcome)		(0.153)	(0.025)	(0.149)	(0.026)
	Tertiary/Post-secondary	0.966	-0.009	0.977	-0.006
		(0.099)	(0.026)	(0.110)	(0.028)
Speaks more than one language		1.554***	0.110***	1.462***	0.094***
		(0.160)	(0.025)	(0.169)	(0.029)
Labor market status	Employer	1.047	0.011	1.067	0.016
(employed=base outcome)		(0.131)	(0.031)	(0.151)	(0.035)
	Casual worker	1.159	0.037	1.093	0.022
		(0.158)	(0.034)	(0.166)	(0.038)
	Student	0.939	-0.016	0.912	-0.023
		(0.167)	(0.044)	(0.176)	(0.047)
	Unemployed	1.776***	0.142***	1.854***	0.153***
		(0.262)	(0.035)	(0.288)	(0.038)
	Never worked/Unknown	1.101	0.024	1.302	0.066
		(0.240)	(0.055)	(0.306)	(0.059)
Industry of work	Petty Trade	0.930	-0.018	0.889	-0.029
(public admin. And utilities=base outcome)		(0.179)	(0.048)	(0.191)	(0.052)
	Manufacturing and mining	1.268	0.059	1.265	0.059
		(0.252)	(0.049)	(0.264)	(0.052)
	Construction	1.890***	0.156***	2.000***	0.171***
		(0.362)	(0.045)	(0.418)	(0.050)

Logistic Regression on the Intend to Migrate

Basic Model (1) and Extended Model (2)		(1)		(2)	
(Intend to migrate = 1)		Odds Ratio	Marg.Effect	Odds Ratio	Marg.Effect
	Commerce	1.061	0.015	1.072	0.017
		(0.200)	(0.047)	(0.225)	(0.052)
	Agriculture	1.173	0.040	1.083	0.020
		(0.233)	(0.050)	(0.236)	(0.054)
	Hotel, restaurant and domestic services	1.530**	0.105**	1.377	0.080
		(0.290)	(0.046)	(0.287)	(0.052)
	Transport and repair	1.617**	0.119***	1.687**	0.130**
		(0.309)	(0.046)	(0.353)	(0.051)
	ICT and other	1.421*	0.087*	1.304	0.066
		(0.263)	(0.045)	(0.272)	(0.052)
	Never worked/Unknown	0.949	-0.013	0.735	-0.075
		(0.318)	(0.084)	(0.268)	(0.088)
Skill level of work	Medium	1.545***	0.108***	1.799***	0.146***
(high=base outcome)		(0.204)	(0.032)	(0.268)	(0.037)
	Low	1.560***	0.111***	1.948***	0.165***
		(0.226)	(0.036)	(0.324)	(0.041)
	Never worked/Unknown	1.183	0.042	1.748	0.138
		(0.359)	(0.076)	(0.606)	(0.085)
	Salary	0.997***	-0.001***	0.997***	-0.001***
		(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Income compared to others in the community	Better	1.049	0.012	1.062	0.015
("same"=base outcome)		(0.105)	(0.025)	(0.117)	(0.027)
	Worse	1.224	0.050	1.373**	0.079**
		(0.156)	(0.032)	(0.193)	(0.035)
Income satisfaction	Sufficient	0.718***	-0.083***	0.689***	-0.092***
("ok"=base outcome)		(0.070)	(0.024)	(0.074)	(0.026)
	Not sufficient	1.075	0.018	1.004	0.001
		(0.126)	(0.029)	(0.128)	(0.031)

Logistic Regression on the Intend to Migrate

Basic Model (1) and Extended Model (2)		(1)		(2)	
(Intend to migrate = 1)		Odds Ratio	Marg.Effect	Odds Ratio	Marg.Effect
Income from	Regular remittances	2.862***	0.245***	2.914***	0.256***
		(0.744)	(0.052)	(0.792)	(0.058)
	Occasional remittances	2.335***	0.205***	2.216***	0.196***
		(0.315)	(0.030)	(0.326)	(0.035)
	Other family member	0.841**	-0.043**	0.863	-0.037
		(0.074)	(0.022)	(0.084)	(0.024)
	Agriculture	0.837	-0.044	0.848	-0.041
		(0.103)	(0.031)	(0.112)	(0.032)
	Savings	0.965	-0.009	1.041	0.010
		(0.118)	(0.030)	(0.134)	(0.032)
	Rent	0.662***	-0.102***	0.672***	-0.096***
		(0.089)	(0.032)	(0.099)	(0.034)
	Social assistance and pension	1.119	0.028	1.192*	0.044*
		(0.104)	(0.023)	(0.120)	(0.025)
	Land owner	1.017	0.004	0.951	-0.012
		(0.120)	(0.029)	(0.120)	(0.031)
Awareness of programs assisting migration				4.964***	0.371***
				(0.640)	(0.025)
Expects better work opportunities				3.698***	0.309***
				(0.316)	(0.019)
Country dummies	Egypt	0.856	-0.039	0.840	-0.043
(Albania=base outcome)		(0.112)	(0.033)	(0.120)	(0.035)
	Moldova	0.531***	-0.156***	0.713**	-0.083**
		(0.077)	(0.034)	(0.111)	(0.037)
	Tunisia	1.592***	0.116***	0.821	-0.048
		(0.221)	(0.034)	(0.128)	(0.038)
	Number of observations	3628	3628	3409	3409
	Log-likelihood	-2160.49	-2160.49	-1846.44	-1846.44
	Chi-square	548.810	548.810	707.379	707.379
	Pseudo R-Square	0.141	0.141	0.215	0.215

Logistic Regression on the Intend to Migrate

Basic Model (1) and Extended Model (2)		(1)		(2)	
(Intend to migrate = 1)		Odds Ratio	Marg.Effect	Odds Ratio	Marg.Effect

Note:+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, Standard errors in parentheses

Table A 8
Ordered Logit Model on the Propensity to Migrate

Basic Model			maybe	likely	certain
		Odds Ratio	Marg. Effect	Marg. Effect	Marg. Effect
Demographics	Age	0.978*	0.005*	-0.001	-0.004*
		(0.013)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.002)
	Female	0.768*	0.060*	-0.017	-0.043**
		(0.105)	(0.031)	(0.010)	(0.021)
	Married	1.447*	-0.080**	0.016**	0.065*
		(0.280)	(0.041)	(0.006)	(0.035)
	Number of children	0.960	0.009	-0.002	-0.007
		(0.097)	(0.022)	(0.006)	(0.017)
Relation to household head (HHH)	Child, grandchild or other of HHH	0.960	0.009	-0.002	-0.007
(HHH and spouse=base outcome)		(0.156)	(0.036)	(0.009)	(0.028)
	HH Size	0.951	0.011	-0.003	-0.009
		(0.030)	(0.007)	(0.002)	(0.005)
Education	Primary	0.974	0.006	-0.001	-0.004
(secondary=base outcome)		(0.125)	(0.029)	(0.007)	(0.021)
	Tertiary/Post-secondary	1.783***	-0.122***	0.018***	0.104***
		(0.232)	(0.026)	(0.005)	(0.025)
Labor market status	Employer	0.921	0.018	-0.005	-0.014
(employed=base outcome)		(0.147)	(0.036)	(0.010)	(0.026)
	Casual worker	1.224	-0.044	0.008	0.035
		(0.206)	(0.035)	(0.005)	(0.031)
	Student	0.610**	0.115**	-0.040*	-0.075***
		(0.127)	(0.050)	(0.022)	(0.029)
	Unemployed	1.024	-0.005	0.001	0.004
		(0.161)	(0.035)	(0.008)	(0.027)

Ordered Logit Model on the Propensity to Migrate

Basic Model			maybe	likely	certain
		Odds Ratio	Marg. Effect	Marg. Effect	Marg. Effect
	Never worked/Unknown	2.328***	-0.160***	-0.011	0.171***
		(0.620)	(0.041)	(0.022)	(0.062)
Ability to speak language of potential destination country	Very well	0.945	0.013	-0.003	-0.009
("ok"=base outcome)		(0.113)	(0.027)	(0.007)	(0.020)
	Hardly	0.663***	0.094***	-0.029**	-0.065***
		(0.086)	(0.030)	(0.012)	(0.019)
Skill level of work	Medium	1.088	-0.019	0.004	0.014
(high=base outcome)		(0.182)	(0.037)	(0.008)	(0.029)
	Low	0.900	0.024	-0.006	-0.017
		(0.157)	(0.039)	(0.011)	(0.029)
	Never worked/Unknown	0.980	0.005	-0.001	-0.003
		(0.244)	(0.056)	(0.014)	(0.042)
Industry of work	Petty Trade, Commerce, hotel, restaurant	1.272	-0.052	0.011	0.042
(public admin. and utilities=base outcome)		(0.255)	(0.043)	(0.007)	(0.036)
	Manufacturing, mining and agriculture	1.571**	-0.094**	0.011***	0.083*
		(0.342)	(0.042)	(0.004)	(0.043)
	Construction, transport and repair	1.339	-0.063	0.011**	0.052
		(0.281)	(0.044)	(0.005)	(0.039)
	Other or never worked/Unknown	1.064	-0.014	0.003	0.010
		(0.250)	(0.052)	(0.012)	(0.040)
	Salary	1.001**	-0.000**	0.000**	0.000**
		(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Income satisfaction	Sufficient	1.541***	-0.096***	0.022***	0.073***
("ok"=base outcome)		(0.183)	(0.026)	(0.007)	(0.020)

Ordered Logit Model on the Propensity to Migrate

Basic Model		Odds Ratio	maybe Marg. Effect	likely Marg. Effect	certain Marg. Effect
	Not sufficient	0.990	0.002	-0.001	-0.002
		(0.146)	(0.033)	(0.008)	(0.025)
Income compared to others in the community	Better	1.030	-0.006	0.002	0.005
("same"=base outcome)		(0.129)	(0.028)	(0.007)	(0.021)
	Worse	1.272	-0.052*	0.010**	0.042
		(0.188)	(0.031)	(0.004)	(0.027)
Income from	Remittances	1.334**	-0.062**	0.012***	0.051**
		(0.170)	(0.027)	(0.004)	(0.023)
	Other family member	0.840*	0.039*	-0.009*	-0.030*
		(0.088)	(0.023)	(0.005)	(0.018)
	Agriculture	0.996	0.001	-0.000	-0.001
		(0.157)	(0.035)	(0.009)	(0.027)
	Savings	1.295	-0.056	0.010**	0.046
		(0.212)	(0.034)	(0.004)	(0.031)
	Rent	1.088	-0.018	0.004	0.014
		(0.206)	(0.041)	(0.008)	(0.033)
	Social assistance and pension	0.946	0.012	-0.003	-0.009
		(0.112)	(0.027)	(0.007)	(0.020)
	Land owner	1.115	-0.024	0.006	0.019
		(0.171)	(0.034)	(0.008)	(0.026)
Reason for leaving	Improve living conditions	0.750**	0.065**	-0.018*	-0.047**
(personal=base outcome)		(0.098)	(0.030)	(0.009)	(0.021)
	Better work	0.809	0.048	-0.013	-0.035
		(0.110)	(0.031)	(0.009)	(0.022)
	Other	0.980	0.004	-0.001	-0.003
		(0.184)	(0.042)	(0.011)	(0.031)
	Migration decision influenced by others	0.797**	0.051*	-0.014*	-0.037**

Ordered Logit Model on the Propensity to Migrate

Basic Model			maybe	likely	certain
		Odds Ratio	Marg. Effect	Marg. Effect	Marg. Effect
		(0.092)	(0.026)	(0.008)	(0.018)
Information about destination country via:	Institution	1.762*	-0.113*	0.004	0.109
(news=base outcome)		(0.584)	(0.058)	(0.014)	(0.072)
	Family at home	0.815	0.047	-0.014	-0.033
		(0.202)	(0.058)	(0.021)	(0.037)
	Friends abroad	1.127	-0.026	0.006	0.020
		(0.197)	(0.038)	(0.008)	(0.030)
	Been abroad	2.207***	-0.154***	-0.003	0.157***
		(0.532)	(0.039)	(0.016)	(0.054)
	Other	0.529***	0.144***	-0.042***	-0.102***
		(0.090)	(0.039)	(0.014)	(0.026)
	Family abroad	1.522*	-0.087*	0.010**	0.078*
		(0.357)	(0.045)	(0.004)	(0.047)
Migration assisting programs	Would participate	1.621***	-0.101***	0.012***	0.089***
		(0.237)	(0.028)	(0.004)	(0.029)
	Is aware but no participation intend	1.156	-0.032	0.006	0.025
		(0.189)	(0.035)	(0.006)	(0.029)
Country dummies	Egypt	1.609***	-0.101***	0.015***	0.086**
(Albania=base outcome)		(0.297)	(0.037)	(0.004)	(0.036)
	Moldova	1.794***	-0.122***	0.015***	0.107***
		(0.328)	(0.036)	(0.005)	(0.036)
	Tunisia	0.621***	0.109**	-0.033**	-0.076***
		(0.115)	(0.043)	(0.016)	(0.028)
	cut1	0.324**			
		(0.172)			
	cut2	2.365			
		(1.257)			
	Number of observations	1762	1762	1762	1762
	Log-likelihood	-1724.87	-1724.87	-1724.87	-1724.87

Ordered Logit Model on the Propensity to Migrate

Basic Model		Odds Ratio	maybe Marg. Effect	likely Marg. Effect	certain Marg. Effect
	Chi-square	322.582	322.582	322.582	322.582
	Pseudo R-Square	0.094	0.094	0.094	0.094
Note:+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, Standard errors in parentheses					

Table A 9
Ordered Logit Model on the Propensity to Migrate

Extended Model		Odds Ratio	maybe Marg. Effect	likely Marg. Effect	certain Marg. Effect
Demographics	Age	0.984	0.003	-0.001	-0.003
		(0.014)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.003)
	Female	0.721**	0.072**	-0.017*	-0.054**
		(0.102)	(0.032)	(0.010)	(0.023)
	Married	1.398*	-0.070*	0.011**	0.059
		(0.283)	(0.041)	(0.005)	(0.037)
	Number of children	0.971	0.006	-0.001	-0.005
		(0.103)	(0.023)	(0.004)	(0.018)
Relation to household head (HHH)	Child, grandchild or other of HHH	1.047	-0.010	0.002	0.008
(HHH and spouse=base outcome)		(0.179)	(0.037)	(0.008)	(0.029)
	HH Size	0.970	0.007	-0.001	-0.005
		(0.033)	(0.007)	(0.001)	(0.006)
Education	Primary	1.078	-0.016	0.003	0.013
(secondary=base outcome)		(0.150)	(0.029)	(0.005)	(0.025)
	Tertiary/Post-secondary	1.902***	-0.128***	0.008	0.120***
		(0.279)	(0.027)	(0.006)	(0.029)
Labor market status	Employer	0.955	0.010	-0.002	-0.008
(employed=base outcome)		(0.165)	(0.037)	(0.008)	(0.029)
	Casual worker	1.004	-0.001	0.000	0.001
		(0.184)	(0.039)	(0.008)	(0.032)
	Student	0.597**	0.117**	-0.037	-0.080**
		(0.136)	(0.054)	(0.023)	(0.031)

Ordered Logit Model on the Propensity to Migrate

Extended Model			maybe	likely	certain
		Odds Ratio	Marg. Effect	Marg. Effect	Marg. Effect
	Unemployed	1.068	-0.014	0.003	0.011
		(0.179)	(0.035)	(0.006)	(0.029)
	Never worked/Unknown	2.162***	-0.140***	-0.017	0.157**
		(0.604)	(0.042)	(0.023)	(0.064)
Ability to speak language of potential destination country	Very well	1.055	-0.011	0.002	0.009
("ok"=base outcome)		(0.137)	(0.028)	(0.005)	(0.022)
	Hardly	0.687***	0.083***	-0.021**	-0.061***
		(0.094)	(0.031)	(0.010)	(0.021)
Skill level of work	Medium	0.906	0.021	-0.004	-0.017
(high=base outcome)		(0.174)	(0.042)	(0.009)	(0.032)
	Low	0.812	0.045	-0.010	-0.035
		(0.160)	(0.044)	(0.011)	(0.032)
	Never worked/Unknown	0.906	0.021	-0.004	-0.017
		(0.246)	(0.059)	(0.013)	(0.046)
Industry of work	Petty Trade, Commerce, hotel, restaurant	1.325	-0.058	0.008**	0.051
(public admin. And utilities=base outcome)		(0.288)	(0.043)	(0.004)	(0.041)
	Manufacturing, mining and agriculture	1.694**	-0.104**	0.003	0.100**
		(0.394)	(0.041)	(0.008)	(0.048)
	Construction, transport and repair	1.414	-0.071	0.008**	0.063
		(0.319)	(0.044)	(0.003)	(0.043)
	Other or never worked/Unknown	1.080	-0.016	0.003	0.013
		(0.269)	(0.053)	(0.009)	(0.043)
	Salary	1.001*	-0.000*	0.000*	0.000*
		(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)

Ordered Logit Model on the Propensity to Migrate

Extended Model			maybe	likely	certain
		Odds Ratio	Marg. Effect	Marg. Effect	Marg. Effect
Income satisfaction	Sufficient	1.817***	-0.126***	0.021***	0.104***
("ok"=base outcome)		(0.232)	(0.026)	(0.007)	(0.023)
	Not sufficient	1.069	-0.014	0.003	0.012
		(0.169)	(0.033)	(0.006)	(0.028)
Income compared to others in the community	Better	0.910	0.020	-0.004	-0.016
("same"=base outcome)		(0.122)	(0.029)	(0.007)	(0.022)
	Worse	1.267	-0.049	0.006**	0.043
		(0.208)	(0.033)	(0.003)	(0.031)
Income from	Remittances	1.395**	-0.069**	0.009**	0.060**
		(0.188)	(0.027)	(0.003)	(0.025)
	Other family member	0.868	0.030	-0.005	-0.025
		(0.099)	(0.024)	(0.004)	(0.020)
	Agriculture	0.969	0.007	-0.001	-0.005
		(0.159)	(0.035)	(0.007)	(0.028)
	Savings	1.348*	-0.061*	0.006**	0.055
		(0.239)	(0.034)	(0.003)	(0.034)
	Rent	1.042	-0.009	0.002	0.007
		(0.214)	(0.043)	(0.007)	(0.036)
	Social assistance and pension	0.981	0.004	-0.001	-0.003
		(0.125)	(0.027)	(0.006)	(0.022)
	Land owner	1.057	-0.012	0.002	0.010
		(0.169)	(0.034)	(0.006)	(0.028)
Reason for leaving	Improve living conditions	0.628***	0.102***	-0.025**	-0.077***
(personal=base outcome)		(0.093)	(0.033)	(0.010)	(0.024)
	Better work	0.665***	0.089***	-0.022**	-0.068***
		(0.100)	(0.033)	(0.010)	(0.024)
	Other	0.869	0.031	-0.007	-0.023
		(0.178)	(0.045)	(0.012)	(0.033)
Migration decision influenced by others		0.794*	0.050*	-0.011	-0.039*
		(0.096)	(0.026)	(0.007)	(0.020)
Information about	Institution	1.795*	-0.111**	-0.005	0.116

Ordered Logit Model on the Propensity to Migrate

Extended Model			maybe	likely	certain
		Odds Ratio	Marg. Effect	Marg. Effect	Marg. Effect
destination country via:					
(news=base outcome)		(0.612)	(0.056)	(0.020)	(0.075)
	Family at home	0.834	0.040	-0.010	-0.030
		(0.226)	(0.061)	(0.019)	(0.042)
	Friends abroad	1.284	-0.052	0.008*	0.044
		(0.251)	(0.040)	(0.005)	(0.036)
	Been abroad	2.578***	-0.169***	-0.026	0.195***
		(0.684)	(0.037)	(0.026)	(0.062)
	Other	0.654**	0.092**	-0.022*	-0.071**
		(0.126)	(0.043)	(0.012)	(0.031)
	Family abroad	1.782**	-0.111**	-0.002	0.113**
		(0.456)	(0.043)	(0.013)	(0.055)
Migration assisting programs	Would participate	1.639***	-0.098***	0.006	0.093***
		(0.264)	(0.030)	(0.005)	(0.033)
	Is aware but no participation intend	1.186	-0.035	0.005	0.031
		(0.212)	(0.036)	(0.003)	(0.033)
Expected skill level of work abroad	Medium	1.406**	-0.071**	0.011**	0.061**
(Low=base outcome)		(0.196)	(0.028)	(0.004)	(0.026)
	High	1.132	-0.026	0.004	0.022
		(0.211)	(0.039)	(0.006)	(0.033)
	Never worked/ Unknown	0.803	0.048	-0.012	-0.036
		(0.159)	(0.045)	(0.014)	(0.031)
Expects better work opportunities		1.179	-0.036	0.008	0.028
		(0.149)	(0.028)	(0.007)	(0.021)
Expect to improve financially by migrating		1.843**	-0.141**	0.052*	0.090***
		(0.440)	(0.058)	(0.030)	(0.029)
Country dummies	Egypt	1.476*	-0.080**	0.009**	0.071*
(Albania=base outcome)		(0.299)	(0.040)	(0.004)	(0.039)
	Moldova	2.238***	-0.157***	0.004	0.153***
		(0.439)	(0.035)	(0.009)	(0.040)

Ordered Logit Model on the Propensity to Migrate

Extended Model			maybe	likely	certain
		Odds Ratio	Marg. Effect	Marg. Effect	Marg. Effect
	Tunisia	0.569***	0.127***	-0.038*	-0.088***
		(0.118)	(0.049)	(0.020)	(0.030)
	cut1	1.024			
		(0.647)			
	cut2	8.059***			
		(5.133)			
	Number of observations	1540	1540	1540	1540
	Log-likelihood	-1493.58	-1493.58	-1493.58	-1493.58
	Chi-square	309.012	309.012	309.012	309.012
	Pseudo R-Square	0.103	0.103	0.103	0.103

Note:+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, Standard errors in parentheses

Table A 10
Basic Models with interaction: Country*Education

		Logit	Ordered Logit
Education	Primary	1.271	0.697*
(secondary=base outcome)		(0.224)	(0.147)
	Tertiary/Post-secondary	1.893***	0.882
		(0.439)	(0.283)
Country dummies	Egypt	0.843	1.057
(Albania=base outcome)		(0.139)	(0.244)
	Moldova	0.707**	1.346
		(0.123)	(0.303)
	Tunisia	1.856***	0.577**
		(0.344)	(0.129)
Interactions	Primary*Egypt	0.551**	2.107*
		(0.154)	(0.809)
	Primary*Moldova	0.598**	1.728*
		(0.149)	(0.544)
	Primary*Tunisia	0.796	1.309
		(0.201)	(0.406)

Basic Models with interaction: Country*Education

		Logit	Ordered Logit
Tertiary/Post-secondary*Egypt		1.403	3.113***
		(0.401)	(1.201)
Tertiary Post-secondary*Moldova		0.436***	2.545**
		(0.138)	(1.058)
Tertiary/Post-secondary*Tunisia		0.725	1.474
		(0.206)	(0.541)
Number of observations		3628	1762
Log-likelihood		-2147.18	-1721.96
Chi-square		569.976	326.823
Pseudo R-Square		0.146	0.095

Note:+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, Standard errors in parentheses

Table A 11
Models without Egypt

Logit (1)		(1)	(2)
Ordered Logit (2)		Odds Ratio	Odds Ratio
Demographics	Age	0.993	0.979
		(0.010)	(0.015)
	Female	0.530***	0.734**
		(0.066)	(0.115)
	Married	0.962	1.448
		(0.153)	(0.328)
	Number of children	0.777***	0.948
		(0.056)	(0.107)
Relation to household head (HHH)	Child, grandchild or other of HHH	1.192**	1.286
(HHH and spouse=base outcome)		(0.170)	(0.259)
	HH Size	1.065**	0.948
		(0.033)	(0.036)
Education	Primary	1.557***	1.058
(secondary=base outcome)		(0.191)	(0.165)
	Tertiary/Post-secondary	1.022	1.430**
		(0.116)	(0.258)
Labor market status	Employer	0.938	0.925

Models without Egypt

Logit (1)		(1)	(2)
Ordered Logit (2)		Odds Ratio	Odds Ratio
(employed=base outcome)		(0.133)	(0.195)
	Casual worker	1.181	1.174
		(0.185)	(0.250)
	Student	0.840	0.765
		(0.167)	(0.206)
	Unemployed	1.591***	1.188
		(0.255)	(0.218)
	Never worked/Unknown	0.934	2.541***
		(0.208)	(0.748)
	Speaks more than one language	1.193	
		(0.142)	
Ability to speak language of potential destination country	Very well		1.512**
("ok"=base outcome)			(0.244)
	Hardly		0.801
			(0.125)
Skill level of work	Medium	1.415*	0.804
(high=base outcome)		(0.215)	(0.187)
	Low	1.533**	0.700
		(0.254)	(0.169)
	Never worked/Unknown	1.157	0.652
		(0.354)	(0.209)
Industry of work	Petty Trade	1.021	
(public admin. And utilities=base outcome)		(0.232)	
	Manufacturing and mining	1.350	
		(0.308)	
	Construction	1.927**	
		(0.433)	
	Commerce	1.184	
		(0.253)	
	Agriculture	1.202	
		(0.273)	
	Hotel, restaurant and domestic services	1.524**	

Models without Egypt

Logit (1)		(1)	(2)
Ordered Logit (2)		Odds Ratio	Odds Ratio
		(0.321)	
	Transport and repair	1.672*	
		(0.367)	
	ICT and other	1.605**	
		(0.342)	
	Never worked/Unknown	1.055	
		(0.369)	
Industry of work	Petty Trade, Commerce, hotel, restaurant		1.523
(public admin. And utilities=base outcome)			(0.406)
	Manufacturing, mining and agriculture		1.732**
			(0.478)
	Construction, transport and repair		1.438
			(0.391)
	Other or never worked/Unknown		1.130
			(0.334)
	Salary	0.997***	1.001
		(0.000)	(0.001)
Income satisfaction	Sufficient	0.710***	1.583***
("ok"=base outcome)		(0.079)	(0.233)
	Not sufficient	0.891	1.084
		(0.122)	(0.208)
Income compared to others in the community	Better	1.142	0.849
("same"=base outcome)		(0.129)	(0.133)
	Worse	1.270*	1.062
		(0.184)	(0.204)
Income from	Regular remittances	2.767***	
		(0.760)	
	Occasional remittances	2.230***	
		(0.307)	
	Remittances		1.359**
			(0.195)
	Other family member	0.807**	0.971
		(0.081)	(0.129)

Models without Egypt

Logit (1)		(1)	(2)
Ordered Logit (2)		Odds Ratio	Odds Ratio
	Agriculture	0.863	0.945
		(0.113)	(0.166)
	Savings	0.807	1.150
		(0.120)	(0.256)
	Rent	0.624***	1.051
		(0.094)	(0.256)
	Social assistance and pension	1.089	1.061
		(0.112)	(0.152)
	Land owner	1.041	1.054
		(0.127)	(0.178)
Reason for leaving	Improve living conditions		0.585***
(personal=base outcome)			(0.101)
	Better work		0.603***
			(0.111)
	Other		0.763
			(0.178)
	Migration decision influenced by others		0.915
			(0.127)
Information about destination country via:	Institution		1.874
(news=base outcome)			(0.770)
	Family at home		0.734
			(0.243)
	Friends abroad		1.412
			(0.355)
	Been abroad		2.902***
			(0.895)
	Other		0.711
			(0.169)
	Family abroad	1.313*	1.586
		(0.185)	(0.490)
Migration assisting programs	Would participate		1.810***
			(0.327)
	Is aware but no participation intend		1.316

Models without Egypt

Logit (1) Ordered Logit (2)		(1) Odds Ratio	(2) Odds Ratio
			(0.307)
Expected skill level of work abroad	Medium		1.417**
(Low=base outcome)			(0.223)
	High		1.096
			(0.249)
	Never worked/Unknown		0.775
			(0.158)
	Expects better work opportunities		1.388**
			(0.208)
	Expect to improve financially by migrating		1.553
			(0.443)
Country dummies	Moldova	0.537***	2.331***
(Albania=base outcome)		(0.081)	(0.500)
	Tunisia	1.662***	0.562***
		(0.243)	(0.125)
	cut1		0.940
			(0.680)
	cut2		7.899***
			(5.754)
	Number of observations	2816	1156
	Log-likelihood	-1669.37	-1102.31
	Chi-square	446.978	249.104
	Pseudo R-Square	0.145	0.113
Note:+ $p<0.10$, * $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$, *** $p<0.001$, Standard errors in parentheses			