

Immigration Enforcement, Police Trust and Domestic Violence

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Abstract

Domestic violence is a serious under-reported crime in the United States, especially among immigrant women given their reluctance to seek assistance for fear of deportation. While the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) allows battered immigrants to petition for legal status without relying on abusive U.S. citizen or legal permanent resident spouses, we find that intensified interior immigration enforcement has curbed the VAWA self-petition rate. In contrast, sanctuary policies limiting the cooperation of law enforcement with Immigration Customs Enforcement partially counteract that impact. The impacts, which prove robust to alternative measures of the policies, support hypothesized changes in victims' reporting in response to the policies. Understanding survivors' responses to immigration policy is crucial given growing police mistrust and vulnerability to crime among immigrants.

Keywords: Immigration Enforcement, Trust Acts, Domestic Violence, United States.

JEL codes: J12, J16, J15, K37.

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*“He told me nobody would help me, because I don’t have papers”,
Domenica, The New York Times, June, 2018*

1. Introduction

The past decades have witnessed an extraordinary growth in immigration enforcement that relies heavily on state and local law enforcement to apprehend undocumented immigrants. Police testimony, anecdotal reports, and empirical research suggest local police involvement in immigration enforcement increases fear and mistrust among immigrant communities, reducing their willingness to engage with the police (Nguyen and Gill 2015). In response, some states and localities have limited the cooperation of their law enforcement personnel with Immigration Customs Enforcement (ICE) via, so-called, sanctuary policies.³ These are state Trust Acts, as well as local level ordinances, resolutions and practices intended to increase community trust and cooperation with the police. This study provides the first empirical evidence on how domestic violence reporting among immigrants responds to interior enforcement and sanctuary policies.

Domestic violence is a serious under-reported crime in the United States, with 20 people being physically abused by an intimate partner every minute.⁴ Immigrant women (those with a non-immigrant visa, as well as the undocumented) are particularly prone to this type of violence given their often reliance on a partner to adjust their immigration status. In addition, many of them have a low socio-economic status and depend on their partners’ income –traits linked to domestic violence (Aizer 2010).⁵ Their partners may use their immigration status as a control mechanism to ensure they do not leave an abusive

³ Los Angeles Policy Department. 2009. “The LAPD Fights Crime, Not Illegal Immigration.” *LA Times*, Oct. 27. Available at: <http://articles.latimes.com/2009/oct/27/opinion/oe-bratton27>

⁴ Domestic violence national statistics retrieved from www.ncadv.org

⁵ According to the National Violence Against Women Survey (NVAWS), approximately 23 percent Hispanic/Latino females are victimized by intimate partner violence during their lifetimes. In addition, forty-eight percent of Latinas report that their partner’s violence increased after they immigrated to the United States (Tjaden and Thoennes 2000).

relationship.^{6,7} While immigrant survivors still qualify for protections under the 1994 Violence Against Women Act (VAWA),⁸ intensified enforcement has resulted in greater reluctance to seek assistance (Orloff, Jang, and Klein 1995). This situation might have deteriorated further following the Administration’s June 11, 2018 decision to disallow protection from deportation on the grounds of domestic violence.⁹ Understanding how domestic violence reports by immigrants respond to immigration enforcement and sanctuary policies is crucial given the high economic and social cost of domestic violence, as well as the growing share of mixed-status marriages.^{10,11,12}

To our knowledge, this is the first study examining how tougher immigration enforcement, as well as the subsequent policies limiting law enforcement cooperation with ICE, might impact VAWA self-petitions. As such, it contributes to the growing literature analyzing the impact of immigration enforcement on immigrants (*e.g.* Amuedo-Dorantes and Arenas-Arroyo 2019; Amuedo-Dorantes, Arenas-Arroyo, and Sevilla 2018; Bohn, Lofstrom, and Steven 2014), as well as to our understanding of the impact of sanctuary-city practices. In addition, the analysis makes an important contribution to the domestic violence literature by examining the response of domestic violence reports to other types of changes. For

⁶ See: <https://www.nationallatinonetwork.org/safety-planning/systems-based-safety-and-security-from-the-aggressor/143-english/facts-statistics>

⁷ Furthermore, immigrant women are very likely to have at least one U.S.-born citizen child (Passel 2006). Fear of losing their children precedes legal status, language or money considerations when deciding whether to report the behaviour to the authorities (Kasturirangan, Krishnan, and Riger 2004) .

⁸ Under the 1994 VAWA, immigrant victims of domestic abuse can petition for legal status without relying on the sponsoring of their abusive citizen/legal permanent resident spouse, parent or child.

⁹ See: <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/11/us/politics/sessions-domestic-violence-asylum.html>

¹⁰ The World Health Organization describes violence against women as a “global public health problem of epidemic proportions.” For a detailed discussion of these costs and the urgency of this problem, please visit: http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2013/violence_against_women_20130620/en/

¹¹ Costs of domestic violence against women alone in 1995 exceeded an estimated \$5.8 billion. These costs included nearly \$4.1 billion in the direct costs of medical and mental health care and nearly \$1.8 billion in the indirect costs of lost productivity.

See: <https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/intimatepartnerviolence/consequences.html>

Unfortunately, these costs are not unique to the United States, pointing to the global nature of domestic violence. For instance, gender-based violence against women is estimated to cost approximately 226 billion euros per year across the European Union. As such, a 10 percent reduction in this type of violence would result in roughly 7 billion euros/year in savings (Jourová 2016).

¹² The share of married couples with at least one non-citizen member per married couples has increased from 7 percent to 10 percent between 2001 and 2016.

instance, Miller and Segal (2016) show how an institutional change, such as having more female officers, increases the number of domestic violence incidents reported to the police. In our case, we explore how the adoption of tougher immigration enforcement policies, followed in some instances by the adoption of practices or formal policies limiting law enforcement cooperation with ICE, might affect immigrants' VAWA self-petitions. Understanding these impacts is crucial given the current policy environment of heightened immigration enforcement and the Administration's decision to consider domestic violence as proper grounds for protection from deportation, even if referred to individuals seeking asylum.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional framework surrounding migrant self-petitions due to domestic violence, whereas Section 3 outlines the hypothesized impacts of intensified immigration enforcement and sanctuary practices on the VAWA self-petition rate. Subsequently, Section 4 describes the data used in the analysis, whereas Section 5 details the methodological approach. Section 6 presents the main findings, followed by a number of identification and robustness checks. Finally, Section 7 summarizes our findings and closes the study.

2. Institutional Background

2.1 Domestic Violence among Immigrants: Violence Against Women Acts (VAWA)

Remaining married is essential for foreign spouses of U.S. citizens or LPRs who wish through adjust their temporary status and apply for lawful permanent residence under the family-based category. Indeed, according to the Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA) provisions, foreign spouses of U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents (LPR) can be sponsored by their spouses as long as they are living together. This requirement tends to discourage immigrant spouses from leaving abusive marriages and, instead, appears to reinforce the prevalence of domestic violence. In that regard, Raj *et al.* (2005) show how the

odds of IPV reporting are higher for immigrant women who had spousal dependent visas or whose partners refused to change their immigration status or threatened them with deportation, than for other immigrant women.¹³

To address this problem, the 103rd Congress included three provisions related to abused aliens in the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) of 1994:¹⁴ (1) self-petitioning by abused spouse and children, (2) suspension of deportation, and (3) cancelation of removal. The House Judiciary Committee explained: “the purpose of permitting self-petitioning is to prevent the citizen or resident from using the petitioning process as a means to control or abuse an alien spouse.”¹⁵ The 1994 VAWA was the first federal law addressing domestic violence crimes in mixed-status marriages, which have been on the rise. As shown in Figure 1, the share of marriages between a citizen and a non-citizen has grown from slightly over 7 percent in 2001 to more than 10 percent in 2016.

Under the new legislation, battered immigrant spouses and children could gain lawful permanent residency (*i.e.* apply for a ‘green card’), independent of their batterers. Specifically, immigrant spouses can self-petition for their status adjustment if they could prove:

1. The abuser is U.S. citizen or has lawful permanent resident status,¹⁶
2. The petitioner resides in the United States with the spouse,¹⁷

¹³ While both men and women can be the victims of domestic violence, women are more prone to this type of violence (Nelson, Bougatsos, and Blazina 2012). Other key demographic traits include age and minority status. For instance, younger and minority immigrant women are more likely to experience domestic violence (Bredling et al. 2014). According to prior studies, forty-eight percent of Latinas report that their partner’s violence against them increased after they immigrated to the United States. Similarly, a survey of immigrant Korean women to the United States found that 60 percent had been battered by their husbands (Tjaden and Thoennes 2000).

¹⁴ VAWA is Title IV of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, P.L. 103-322. The Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) of 1994 and its subsequent reauthorizations in 2000 and 2005 authorized funding related to domestic violence for enforcement efforts, research and data collection, prevention programs, and services for victims.

¹⁵ U.S. Congress. House Committee on the Judiciary. Violence Against Women Act of 1993, report to accompany

H.R. 1133, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess., H. Rept. 103-395, p. 37.

¹⁶ VAWA I § 40701(a)(1)(C)(iii).

¹⁷ VAWA I §§ 40701(a)(1)(C)(iii), 40701(a)(2)(B)(ii).

3. The petitioner entered marriage “in good faith”,¹⁸
4. The petitioner’s deportation would result in “extreme hardship” to either her/himself and any children,¹⁹
5. The petitioner is a person of “good moral character”,²⁰ and
6. The petitioner and/or a child are or have been subject of domestic violence or extreme cruelty perpetrated by the spouse during the marriage.²¹

There are two steps to applying for a green card of your own (*i.e.* self-petition) without the support of an abusive spouse under VAWA. First, one has to file Form I-360, along with the supporting evidence included in the Table C in the appendix, to the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). After USCIS receives the I-360 petition, it acknowledges receipt and starts to review the application. If USCIS believes the petition will be granted with the information provided, it will send a “Prima Facie Approval” letter. While no status adjustment has taken place yet, the migrant can use that letter to qualify for some types of public assistance. Once USCIS approves the I-360, the migrant can move onto the second stage, which is to apply for status adjustment (*i.e.* green card or lawful permanent residence) using Form I-485 and supporting documents.²²²³ The overall processing time (until a final decision has been reached) can take anywhere between 150 days to 10 months.

2.2 Interior Immigration Enforcement and Sanctuary Policies

Not long after the enactment of the first Violence Against Women Act, and following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the United States embarked in an impressive buildup of interior immigration enforcement. Between 2003 and 2013, funding for the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agency –the federal agency responsible for interior immigration

¹⁸ VAWA I § 40701(a)(1)(C)(iii)(1).

¹⁹ AWA I § 40701(a)(1)(C)(iv)(II).

²⁰ VAWA I § 40701(a)(1)(C)(iii).

²¹ VAWA I § 40701(a)(1)(C)(iii)(I).

²² If married to a U.S. citizen, both steps can be done concurrently.

²³ The approval rate has remained constant since 1997.

enforcement— increased approximately 80 percent, the number of apprehensions more than doubled and the number of interior removals increased by three-fold.²⁴ The intensification of interior enforcement occurred through a number of programs that have made it easier for state and local law enforcement to partner with federal authorities in enforcing immigration violations (Nguyen and Gill 2015). For example, the U.S. government’s 287(g) program allowed for state and local law enforcement agencies to partner with the federal government under joint Memorandum of Agreements that deputized officers for them to exercise immigration enforcement within their jurisdictions. Between 2006 and 2010, the budget for the program rose from \$5 million to \$68 million, with the number of participating officers rising over 1,500 (Nyugen and Gill 2015).

Similarly, Secure Communities —an information-sharing program used in the apprehension and deportation of unauthorized immigrants— was adopted by every jurisdiction in the country during the 2008 to 2014 period. The intent was to replace the more expensive to sustain, as well as highly controversial, 287(g) program.²⁵ Under Secure Communities, local law enforcement agencies submit information from arrests to an integrated database with ICE that allows for the identification of the immigration status and criminal activity of any individual. ICE can send a request to hold the individual in question (“ICE hold” or detainer) to allow federal officers to reach the location and start deportation procedures if appropriate. By 2013, every jurisdiction in the United States was covered under Secure Communities, compared to just 14 jurisdictions in 2008.²⁶ The program, which was discontinued after 2014, became reactivated by President Donald Trump in February 2017.

²⁴ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, *Budget in Brief*, fiscal years 2003-2013 (<http://www.dhs.gov/dhs-budget>). Data on apprehensions can be found at <http://www.dhs.gov/yearbook-immigration-statistics-2013-enforcement-actions>, Table 33 and data on interior removals can be found in <http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/deportation-and-discretion-reviewing-record-and-options-change>

²⁵ In November of 2014, due to intense criticism of the program, Secure Communities was discontinued. The program was replaced with the Priority Enforcement Program, which is still an information-sharing program between federal and local authorities, but now only allows state and local law enforcement to detain those individuals convicted of serious crimes.

²⁶ <http://www.ice.gov/secure-communities>

In addition, some states adopted immigration enforcement measures that reached the labor market, as in the case of employment verification (E-Verify) mandates. E-Verify mandates, which can be universal and reach all employers in the public and private sectors or solely refer to public sector employees and contractors, require employers to use the government's free online program to ascertain the employment eligibility of new hires (Amuedo-Dorantes and Bansak 2012). In some states, these mandates were part of omnibus immigration laws, as in Alabama, where HB56 went as far as to require that school administrators verify the legal status of children enrolled in K-12.²⁷

Altogether, the various programs and initiatives were responsible for 1.8 million deportations from 2009 to 2013 alone (Vaughan 2013). The impressive growth in deportations largely relied on ICE's use of detainers. Using detainers, ICE can request that local law enforcement agencies detain individuals for 48 hours beyond their lawful release date(excluding weekends and holidays).²⁸ This additional time allows ICE to obtain more information about the arrested immigrant, or to arrange a transfer of custody to begin removal proceedings. Many jurisdictions complained about the lack of community cooperation with the police as a trade-off to increased police involvement in immigration enforcement (Khashu 2009). Additionally, police testimony, anecdotal reports, and empirical research have supported this concern, alleging that immigration enforcement can increase fear and mistrust on the police, negatively impacting immigrant crime reporting (Abrego, 2011; Burnett, 2017; Nguyen and Gill, 2016; Vidales *et al.*, 2009; Vishnuvajjala, 2012).

As a result, a number of local enforcement agencies from jurisdictions with sizeable immigrant communities grew concerned that their involvement with ICE might jeopardize

²⁷ In 2012, this part of the HB56 law, as well as several other pieces of the legislation, was struck down by federal courts. Arizona's SB 1070 was never fully enacted, but the piece of the law which allows a local law enforcement official during a routine stop or arrest to make a reasonable attempt to determine the immigration status of an individual suspected of being an unauthorized migrant has been upheld by the Supreme Court.

²⁸ The detainer is also used to notify law enforcement agencies of ICE's intention to assume custody of an immigrant or to request information from the law enforcement agency about an immigrant's impending release so ICE can attempt to assume custody before the immigrant is released from custody.

decades of advances in community policing, limiting resident willingness to contact the police, report crimes, or assist in police investigations (Magnus 2017; Burnett 2017). For instance, in cities like Los Angeles, which is home to 1.5 million immigrants, the Los Angeles Police Department has directly challenged escalations in federal immigration enforcement, stressing the damage associations between police and immigration enforcement has on Latino willingness to engage with the police (Gorman 2017). Many resisted fully cooperating with ICE. Through formal laws, ordinances, resolutions, regulations or simply practices that involved refusing to fully observe ICE detainers, they limited their cooperation with ICE on immigration enforcement matters in order to increase community trust and cooperation with the police. The adoption of these policies and practices rendered them the name of sanctuary cities. While some jurisdictions had adopted this practice in the early 2000s, the vast majority of the involved localities joined after interior immigration enforcement has reached its peak in 2013, as we shall discuss in the data section in greater detail.

It is in this complex context of intensified immigration enforcement and a small number of “sanctuary cities” that we seek to understand how immigrant victims’ VAWA self-petition rates respond to such policies by, potentially, altering domestic violence reporting and/or the abusive behavior of their offenders.

3. Conceptual Framework and Testable Hypotheses

Our aim is to gain a better understanding of how the intensification of interior immigration enforcement that has occurred since 9/11, followed by the adoption of sanctuary practices by local enforcement agencies, particularly after 2013, might be affecting VAWA self-petitions. VAWA self-petitions hinge on migrant victims’ valuation of the costs and benefits associated to filing Form I-360, which, in turn, are contingent on offenders’ response to the immigration policies in place. In what follows, we discuss possible scenarios.

On one hand, intensified immigration enforcement might inhibit some migrant victims from coming forward (*i.e.* increase misreporting) for fear they might face greater, than usual, scrutiny, possibly revealing information they might believe can compromise their ability to stay permanently in the United States. On the other hand, victims' misreporting might embolden offenders. They may become more likely to abuse their victims (*i.e.* increase domestic violence), in which case we would expect an increase in VAWA self-petitions as the incidence of domestic violence rises. In sum, whether intensified immigration enforcement reduces (via increased misreporting) or raises (via increased incidence of domestic violence) the VAWA self-petition rate remains an empirical question.

Similarly, although working in the exact opposite direction of intensified interior immigration enforcement, sanctuary practices could either bolster or curtail the VAWA self-petition rate. On one hand, migrant victims might feel more comfortable with coming forward, especially since local enforcement agencies are typically either directly involved or informed by other public agencies about domestic violence complaints. In that case, misreporting is likely to be somewhat tempered and, therefore, sanctuary practices might result in an increase in VAWA self-petitions. On the other hand, offenders, who are likely aware of their victims' increased willingness to report, might be more reticent to continue their behavior for fear they might be denounced to the proper authorities. The decreased incidence of domestic violence might result in a negative coefficient on sanctuary practices. In sum, whether sanctuary practices increase (via increased reporting by victims) or decrease (via reduced incidence of domestic violence perpetrated by their spouses) VAWA self-petitions remains an empirical question.

In what follows, we assess these competing hypotheses regarding the potential impacts of both, intensified interior immigration enforcement and sanctuary practices, on VAWA self-petitions.

4. Data Sources and Descriptive Statistics

Our purpose is to learn how immigration policy can affect VAWA self-petitions. Specifically, we wish to gauge the effect that the intensification of immigration enforcement that has taken place throughout the country since the early 2000s, followed by the restricted cooperation of some police departments with ICE, influences the granted number of VAWA self-petitions. To that end, we combine state-level data on VAWA self-petitions over the 2000-2016 period, with two population-weighted indexes. One is created using detailed data on interior immigration enforcement measures at the local and state levels. The second one uses information on Trust Acts enacted at the state level, as well as on the adoption of alike practices by counties, rendering them the label of “sanctuary cities.”

4.1 VAWA Self-Petitions

Data on VAWA self-petitions were obtained from the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) through a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request. On average, as shown in Table 1, yearly VAWA self-petitions at the state level averaged 0.21 per 1,000 foreign-born –that is, 21 per 100,000 non-citizen, over the period under consideration.

4.2 Interior Immigration Enforcement

We collect historical data on various immigration enforcement measures detailed in Table A in the Appendix. Data on 287(g) agreements at the county and state levels is gathered from the ICEs 287(g) Fact Sheet website.²⁹ Data on the rolling of the Secure Communities program at the county level is compiled from ICE’s releases on activated jurisdictions.³⁰ Once it reaches nationwide coverage, Secure Communities is replaced by the Priority Enforcement Program in 2015. Finally, data on state level omnibus immigration laws is gathered from the National Conference of State Legislatures.³¹

²⁹ <https://www.ice.gov/factsheets/287g>

³⁰ See: <https://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/sc-activated.pdf>

³¹ See: http://www.ncsl.org/documents/statefed/omnibus_laws.pdf

Since these immigration policies have been enacted at different geographic levels and points in time, we construct an index that serves as a proxy for the intensification of immigration enforcement and provides several advantages over inclusion of multiple policy indicators.³² *First*, the index not only addresses the distinct geographic coverage of various measures (some at the county level, others at the state level) through the construction of a population weighted measure of immigration enforcement but, in addition, it accounts for the number of months each measure was in place in that particular year. In that manner, it allows us to capture the depth and intensity of immigration enforcement in a given MSA, as opposed to just whether enforcement existed or not. *Second*, immigration enforcement is an interconnected system administered by various federal, state, and local authorities and agencies with similar missions and, some measures, such as Secure Communities, were enacted as a continuum of prior existing measures, like the 287(g) program. Not only are the various immigration enforcement initiatives correlated but, in addition, the effectiveness of any given measure is often linked to its combination with other initiatives. The index allows us to better address this interconnectedness by combining the various policies into an index. *Third*, the index provides a more manageable and comprehensive way of measuring and assessing the overall impact of intensified interior immigration.³³

To construct our index, we calculate the following population-weighted index for each enforcement initiative k :

$$(1) \quad IE_{st}^k = \frac{1}{N_{2000}} \sum_{c \in s} \frac{1}{12} \sum_{m=1}^{12} \mathbf{1}(E_{m,c}) P_{c,2000}$$

³² It is worth noting that the index is a proxy of the intensity of immigration enforcement to which respondents in a particular MSA might be exposed to. At the end of the day, the true intensity of any enforcement measure will inevitably vary across jurisdictions as each one is different and might implement alike measures more or less strictly depending on who is in charge of its implementation or other unobserved local traits. To address that limitation, we include area fixed-effects as well as area-specific time trends intended to capture such idiosyncrasies.

³³ In this manner, we capture the depth or intensity of enforcement, versus whether enforcement existed or not. See Amuedo-Dorantes, Arenas-Arroyo, and Sevilla (2018)

where $\mathbf{1}(E_{m,c})$ is an indicator function that informs about the implementation of a particular policy in county c during month m in year t . The index IE_{st}^k takes into account: (1) the number of months during which policy k was in place in year t ,³⁴ as well as (2) the size of the state’s population affected by its implementation.³⁵ The overall enforcement to which women living in state s and year t are exposed to is then computed as the sum of the indices for each enforcement initiative at the (state, year) level:³⁶

$$(2) IE_{s,t} = \sum_{k \in K} IE_{s,t}^k$$

Figure 2 displays the evolution of interior immigration enforcement as captured by the index from equation (2) over the period under examination. Interior immigration enforcement took off in the mid-2000s, following the increased adoption of 287(g) agreements and, after 2008, that of the Secure Communities program. Figure 3 depicts the temporal and geographic variation in immigration enforcement. Over the period under examination, the intensity of police-based immigration enforcement averaged 0.66 (see Table 1).³⁷

4.3 Trust Acts and Sanctuary Practices

Finally, we also gather data on the enactment of Trust Acts, as well as on the adoption of the so-called sanctuary city practices. A non-negligible number of cities, counties, and states have either adopted formal laws limiting the cooperation of their law enforcement with ICE through the enactment of Trust Acts³⁸ or, alternatively, through ordinances, resolutions,

³⁴ Specifically, the summation over the 12 months in the year captures the share of months during which the measure was in place in any given year.

³⁵ To weigh it population-wise, we use the term: $P_{c,2000}$ —namely, the population of county c according to the 2000 Census (prior to the rolling of any of the enforcement initiatives being considered), and N —the total population in state s .

³⁶ Where k refers to each policy, *i.e.*: 287(g) local agreements, 287(g) state agreements, Secure Communities, Omnibus Immigration Laws.

³⁷ The index values ranged from 0 (no enforcement) to 3.98 (close to full-year state-wide implementation of all four police-based immigration enforcement measures being considered).

³⁸ For instance, California Senate Bill 54 effectively makes California a “sanctuary state” by legalizing and standardizing state-wide non-cooperation policies between California law enforcement agencies and federal

regulations or simply the practice of refusing to observe ICE detainees.³⁹ These practices, most of which flourished after the implementation of the Secure Communities Program, were aimed at increasing community trust and cooperation with the police, particularly in immigrant communities. Their adoption rendered these localities the label of “sanctuary cities.”⁴⁰

As with immigration enforcement, we opt for combining all the various actions on the part of local and state-level law enforcement departments into a separate index in order to gauge their impact. Specifically, using information on the adoption timing of such practices, we construct a population-weighted index indicative of the adoption of Trust Acts or alike sanctuary city practices at the state-year level, which we refer to as: $SCP_{s,t}$.⁴¹

$$(3) \text{ Sanctuary City Practices}_{s,t} = SCP_{s,t} = \sum_{k \in K} \left[\frac{1}{N_{2000}} \sum_{c \in S} \frac{1}{12} \sum_{m=1}^{12} \mathbf{1}(SCP_{m,c}) P_{c,2000} \right]_{s,t}^k$$

Figure 2 displays the evolution of such practices, which takes off after a peak in interior immigration enforcement and seems to stabilize after 2014. More detailed on the temporal and geographic variation in sanctuary policies is provided by Figure 4. Because the vast majority of Trust Acts creating the so-called sanctuary cities were enacted around 2013 (see Figure A in the appendix for a distinction between state- vs. local-level sanctuary policies), the share of the immigrant population residing in sanctuary areas averaged 5 percent between 2000 and 2016 (see Table 1).⁴²

immigration authorities. See: <https://www.fairus.org/legislation/state-local-legislation/california-sanctuary-state-bill-sb-54-summary-and-history>

³⁹ An ICE detainer—or “immigration hold”—is one of the tools used by ICE to apprehend individuals who come in contact with local and state law enforcement agencies. It is a written request that a local jail or other law enforcement agency detain an individual for an additional 48 hours (excluding weekends and holidays) after his or her release date in order to provide ICE agents extra time to decide whether to take the individual into federal custody for removal purposes.

⁴⁰ See: <https://cis.org/Map-Sanctuary-Cities-Counties-and-States>

⁴¹ Where k refers to whether the adoption of the local or statewide Trust Acts, ordinances, regulations, resolutions, policies or, simply, practices.

⁴² Table 1 also displays the means and standard deviations for other controls included in our study. For instance, population wise, the share of Hispanics in the various U.S. states averages 10 percent and unemployment rates 6 percent.

5. Methodology

In order to learn about the impact of tougher interior immigration enforcement and the adoption of sanctuary city practices on the rate of VAWA self-petitions, we exploit the temporal and geographic variation in the adoption of both policies using panel data for the 2000-2016 period:

$$(4) \quad y_{s,t} = \alpha + \beta_1 IE_{s,t} + \beta_2 SCP_{s,t} + X'_{s,t} \beta_3 + \gamma_s + \theta_t + \gamma_s t + \varepsilon_{s,t}$$

where $y_{s,t}$ is our outcome variable – the share of VAWA self-petitions per 100,000 non-citizen population in state s and year t . The vector $IE_{s,t}$ represents the immigration enforcement index capturing the intensity of enforcement to which individuals living in state s in year t are exposed to according to equation (2). Likewise, the vector $SCP_{s,t}$ represents the sanctuary city practice index, and it captures the share of individuals in state s and year t covered by Trust Acts or residing in what have been labeled as sanctuary localities (see equation (3)).

In addition to our key controls, equation (4) includes a vector of state-level time-varying characteristics (*i.e.* $X_{s,t}$).⁴³ The latter include: the ratio of female to male wages constructed following Aizer (2010),⁴⁴ the annual unemployment rate in the state and the natural log of per capita income in the state and year. These are included to identify the impact of relative income separately from the impact of general economic conditions in the state. We also include a series of race and ethnicity controls capturing the share of Hispanics, blacks and Asians, as well as the natural log of the number of women between the ages of 15

⁴³ Table B in the Appendix defines each regressor and its source.

⁴⁴ Following Aizer (2010), we construct the ratio of female to male wages. This measure overcomes the endogeneity of individual wages and accounts for the fact that theory predicts that potential, not actual, wages affect domestic violence. The measure reflects the exogenous demand for female and male labor, and it is based on the index of labor demand originally proposed by (Bartik 1991). Exploiting the history of sex and race segregation by industry, we construct measures of local labor market wages of women (men) based on wage changes in industries dominated by women (men).

and 44 in the state in a given year. Lastly, the vector $X_{s,t}$ includes information on the natural log of homicides, other than domestic ones, to address secular trends in violent crime.

Equation (4) also includes a series of state and year fixed effects, as well as state-specific linear trends. Combined, the aforementioned controls allow us to capture a variety of statewide policy changes, such as welfare reform, expansions in the EITC, changes in Medicaid eligibility, or state laws potentially correlated to domestic violence rates. They also help us capture linear trends in domestic violence in any given state.

Our interest is on β_1 and β_2 , which capture the impact of intensified immigration enforcement and sanctuary practices on the VAWA self-petition rate. As discussed in Section 3, $\beta_1 < 0$ would be suggestive of migrant victims' reticence to report domestic violence and self-petition to adjust their status in the midst of intensified immigration enforcement; whereas $\beta_1 > 0$ would be suggestive of offenders' empowerment to abuse their victims aware of their unwillingness to report. Likewise, $\beta_2 > 0$ would be suggestive of migrant victims' willingness to report domestic violence and self-petition to adjust their status when sanctuary practices ameliorate their perception of how their complaint might be received by the corresponding authorities; whereas $\beta_2 < 0$ would be suggestive of offenders' fear to perpetrate further attacks on their victims aware of their increased willingness to report.

Equation (4) is estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS). Observations are weighted by the non-citizen population in the (state, year) cell, and standards errors are clustered at the state level.

6. Immigration Policy and VAWA Self-Petitions

6.1 Main Findings

Our preliminary results from estimating equation (4) are shown in Table 2. The first model specification does not include any of the state-level time-varying traits that might be

considered endogenous, whereas the second model specification does. Both model specifications include state and year fixed-effects, as well as state-specific time trends to account for any unobserved state-level time-varying traits not accounted for in our modeling.⁴⁵

Regardless of the model specification used, the estimated coefficients reveal the damage caused by intensified immigration enforcement, as well as the important role played by sanctuary city practices in counteracting immigrants' fear to report to the police in the midst of intensified enforcement. Specifically, a one standard deviation increase in immigration enforcement, approximately equal to 1.3 times the average level of interior immigration enforcement during the 2000 through 2016 period, curbs the VAWA self-petition rate by 10 percent. In contrast, a one standard deviation increase in sanctuary city practices, equal to 4 times its average level over the 2000 through 2016 time span we focus on, boosts the rate of petitions by 2 percent.

The fact that interior immigration enforcement curtails VAWA self-petitions, while sanctuary practices bolster them, reveals important information regarding the mechanisms likely at play. In particular, as hypothesized in Section 2.2, the findings suggest that migrant victims' reporting is likely driving our results. After all, offenders' response to both policies would suggest the exact opposite impacts for both policies. Namely, intensified immigration would bolster the incidence of domestic violence and, therefore, the VAWA self-petition rate, whereas sanctuary policies would inhibit such incidence for fear they might be denounced to the proper authorities.

6.2 Identification Challenges

One of the main underlying assumptions in our empirical strategy is that differences in the VAWA self-reports across states did not predate the adoption of intensified

⁴⁵ We also experiment with including state-year fixed effects. Our results prove robust to the use of that alternative state-time level control. Therefore, we opt for the less restrictive use of a state-level temporal trend.

immigration enforcement or sanctuary city practices. To assess if that was the case, we estimate equation (5), which adds a full set of dummies spanning from four years prior to the adoption of any immigration enforcement or sanctuary city practice in the state in question to the controls in equation (4), as follows:

$$(5) \quad y_{s,t} = \alpha + \sum_{b=-3}^{-1} \delta_b^{IE} D_{IE_{s,b}} + \sum_{b=-3}^{-1} \delta_b^{TA} D_{SCP_{s,b}} + \beta_1 IE_{s,t} + \beta_2 SCP_{s,t} + X'_{s,t} \beta_3 + \gamma_s + \theta_t + \gamma_{st} + \varepsilon_{s,t}$$

where $D_{IE_{s,b}}$ is a dummy for b years prior to the enforcement index turning positive and $D_{SCP_{s,b}}$ is a dummy for b years prior to the sanctuary city practice index turning positive.

Table 3 shows the results from estimating equation (5) via OLS. It is evident that reductions in VAWA self-petitions did not take predate the adoption of tougher immigration enforcement measures by the states, as none of the coefficients for the years preceding the adoption of tougher immigration enforcement are statistically different from zero. Furthermore, the point estimate on the immigration enforcement index continues to be statistically different from zero, with the same one standard deviation increase in immigration enforcement lowering the VAWA self-petition rate by 10 percent. Similarly, the estimates in Table 3 confirm that the positive impact of sanctuary city practices in promoting VAWA self-petitions did not precede the adoption of those policies by the states. Rather, despite the inclusion of the additional placebo indicators, the point estimate on the sanctuary city index is still statistically different from zero and of alike magnitude to the estimate in the second model specification of Table 2.

A second threat to identification refers to endogeneity stemming from various sources. In particular, when assessing the impact of any policy, it is reasonable to be concerned about the non-random nature of the policy in question. Which states adopt tougher immigration enforcement policies, and which ones are more likely to embrace sanctuary practices? While it is obvious that no policy is ever random, from an econometric

perspective, our concern should rest on whether the adoption of the policies in question is somewhat related by our outcome of interest -namely, VAWA self-petitions. To that end, we gather data on the adoption of various immigration enforcement and sanctuary policies at the county level for the first year of data in our sample. Then, we use our state-level dataset to estimate the following equation:

$$(6) \quad Y_c = \alpha + X'_s \alpha + Z'_s \mu + \varepsilon_s$$

where Y_c is the year in which the immigration enforcement or sanctuary city policy indexes first turned positive in each county c . The vector X'_s is the VAWA self-petition rate for state s in 2000 -the first year of our sample and prior to the rollout of any of the policy measures being examined. The vector Z'_s contains our remaining regression controls -namely, the ratio of female to male wages, annual unemployment rate in the state, the natural log of per capita income, share of Hispanics, blacks and Asians, as well as the natural log of the number of women between the ages of 15 and 44 and the natural log of homicides. In this manner, we seek to gauge if the VAWA self-petition rate prior to the rollout of interior immigration enforcement and sanctuary policies can help predict the adoption timing of such policies. The results from this exercise are displayed in Table 4. The rate of VAWA self-petitions prior to the adoption of stricter enforcement and sanctuary policies, does not seem to play a statistically significant role in explaining or predicting the year in which both sets of policies emerged in each U.S. county for the first time. As such, while non-random, neither intensified immigration enforcement nor the adoption of sanctuary policies in various U.S. counties seem to be correlated to the VAWA self-petition rate in the state.

Endogeneity concerns may also stem from the non-random residential choices made by immigrants. For example, migrants might be sensitive to immigration enforcement due to a perceived unwelcoming environment or due to the inherent risk of deportation of themselves or loved ones in areas with tougher enforcement. Since migrants are a relatively

mobile population, it is reasonable to expect that they might move in response to the adopted enforcement measures. In those instances, exposure to tougher immigration enforcement, in itself, is likely to be endogenous and, in the example just given, result in a downward biased estimate of the impact of intensified immigration enforcement on self-petitions. Similarly, migrants might feel attracted to more permissive sanctuary locations. If that is the case, the impact of those policies might be overstated.

To assess the degree to which our estimates might be biased due to the self-selection of migrants into specific locations, we instrument migrants' likely exposure to the two types of immigration policies being examined using information on what their probable residential choices would have been in the absence of such measures. To that end, we utilize information on the past residential locations of non-citizens (in the spirit of Bartel, 1989; Card, 2001; and Cortes and Tessada, 2011; among many others). Specifically, we rely on data from the 1980 Census to construct the share of non-citizens in each state –a share we use to gauge what their most probable location would have been prior to the implementation of the two sets of immigration policies as follows:

$$(7) \text{ Share of Non - Citizens}_{s,1980} = \frac{\text{non-citizen}_{s,1980}}{\text{non-citizen}_{1980}}$$

Because we are instrumenting exposure to immigration enforcement due to the non-random residential location of immigrants -as opposed to due to the non-random adoption of the policies by counties and states, we interact the share in equation (7) with the enforcement and sanctuary city practices indexes in each state and year to instrument for the likely exposure to those measures. The *shift-share* instrument, where the *shift* is the level of enforcement or permissiveness adopted by each state in any given year (already shown to be exogenous to VAWA self-reports in Table 4). The *share* is given by the share in equation (6) above, which has been shown to be highly correlated to migrants' current locations due to immigrants'

entrenched tendency to reside in areas with established networks of their countrymen (Bartel 1989; Card 2001; Cortes and Tessada 2011, among others).

Table 5 displays the results from this additional identification check. The last rows confirm that the instrument fulfills basic requirements. The F-stats from the first stage regressions are larger than the recommended size of 10 (Stock and Yogo 2005). The estimated coefficients from the first stage regressions are positive and statistically significant, confirming the entrenched tendency for immigrants to locate in areas with established networks of their countrymen. Finally, the estimates from the second stage regression reveal that the same one standard deviation increase in the enforcement index lowers the VAWA self-petition rate by close to 16 percent, whereas a one standard deviation increase in the sanctuary city practices index raises that rate by 1.19 percent. Hence, as predicted above, our prior estimates provide us with a lower bound of the true impact of tougher immigration enforcement, and a possibly upper bound of the true impact of sanctuary city practices on VAWA self-petitions.

6.3 Robustness Checks

Thus far, we have demonstrated that immigration enforcement has curtailed VAWA self-petitions, whereas the adoption of sanctuary city practices has helped counteract that impact, supporting the idea that it is migrant victims' reporting of domestic violence (as opposed to changes in offenders' behavior) that is likely driving our results. In addition, we have shown that the suggested impacts did not predate the adoption of the policies. Moreover, the impacts do not appear to be largely different once we address the potential endogeneity biases afflicting our estimates.

In what follows, we address two additional concerns when gauging the impact of immigration enforcement, as well as when working on crime. First, we start with concerns regarding the measurement of interior immigration enforcement and sanctuary practices. As

noted earlier, our index collapses information on the adoption of various immigration enforcement measures that, despite all of them engaging the local or state law enforcement in alike ways, might look different in other regards, such as their propensity to result in actual deportations. To address this concern, we repeat the estimation of equation (4) using, instead, deportation figures. Specifically, we substitute the immigration enforcement index with the number of deportations related to immigration charges per 100,000 non-citizen in any given (state, year).

Similarly, because of the diversity of sanctuary practices adopted by local enforcement agencies, one might be concerned about mismeasurement issues when using the sanctuary practice index detailed in equation (3). Hence, we experiment with using, instead, a simple dichotomous variable indicative of whether the state had adopted a Trust Act -a clearly enacted and easily tracked legislative change.

Table 6 shows the results from re-estimating equation (4) using, instead, these two alternative measures of immigration enforcement and sanctuary practices. A one standard deviation increase in deportations would lower the VAWA self-petition rate by approximately 8 percent. In other words, increased deportations also appear to curtail VAWA self-petition rates just as we documented in Tables 2 through 4. Likewise, sanctuary city practices continue to counteract that impact, with the enactment of a Trust Act by the state being associated with a 5 percent higher rate of VAWA self-petitions.⁴⁶

In addition to the aforementioned measurement concerns, a common concern when working with petitions associated to reported criminal behavior is the ability to attribute the observed impacts to changes in reporting by the victims, as opposed to underground changes in the criminal behavior being examined. As discussed to this point, our findings are suggestive of a reduction (increase) in self-petitions in the midst of intensified immigration

⁴⁶ The average level of deportations is 630.41, with a standard deviation of 1067.89. The mean for Trust Acts is 0.01, with a standard deviation of 0.11.

enforcement (sanctuary policies) due to changes in migrant victims' reporting to the proper authorities as offenders' response to migrants' reporting fears would typically suggest the opposite impacts. However, to play devil's advocate, suppose that, in the midst of intensified enforcement, offenders curtail their behavior for fear that increased policing might translate into a higher probability of getting caught, whereas they do the exact opposite when policing is perceived as somewhat laxer. In that event, we would be unable to decipher if the measured impact of intensified immigration enforcement and sanctuary practices is due to changes in migrant victims' reporting or, rather, to changes in their offenders' criminal perpetrations.

Alternatively, one might be concerned about the role of massive deportations on the migrant stock's composition. If approximately 400,000 deportations were taking place on a yearly basis during the 2008-2012 period (Vaughan 2013), it is possible that changes in the composition of the migrant stock in the United States might have resulted in changes in domestic violence. For instance, if there are fewer low-educated and low-income women, traits often associated to a higher incidence of domestic violence (Aizer 2010) , it could be possible for VAWA self-reports to drop in the midst of intensified interior immigration, not because of curtailed reporting by women but, rather, due to reductions in domestic violence incidents. Likewise, if a laxer cooperation between law enforcement agencies and ICE helps attract migrants, especially women, of low socio-economic status, the incidence of domestic violence might rise and, as such, the rate of VAWA self-petitions. Once more, the impact would not be necessarily linked to increased reporting but, rather, to a potentially higher incidence of domestic violence among women in this lower socio-economic status.

Because of the well-known extended misreporting in domestic violence, including emergency room visits when they are needed (Frieze *et al.*, 1989), the only way to assess if changes in domestic violence are reflective of changes in victimization or, rather, of changes

in reporting, would be to have reliable and representative self-reported data on victimization at the (state, year) level. Unfortunately, such data are not publicly available.⁴⁷ Instead, we focus on examining the impact that intensified immigration enforcement and sanctuary policies appear to have had on a related type of criminal incident unlikely to suffer from misreporting –namely, domestic homicides. Unlike other types of homicides, domestic homicides are typically preceded by prior episodes of domestic violence, making domestic violence a key predictor of domestic homicide.⁴⁸ If the adoption of intensified immigration enforcement or sanctuary policies were significantly changing the behavior of potential offenders, we would expect to see subsequent changes in domestic homicides.

To explore if that has been the case, Table 7 displays the results from regressing various measures of domestic, as well as non-domestic, homicide rates on the policy variables capturing intensified immigration enforcement and the adoption of a sanctuary policy. In column (1), we look at all domestic homicide rates, regardless of whether they were committed by a partner or other family member. In column (2), we experiment with excluding from that figure domestic homicides committed by an ex-spouse, since domestic violence committed by ex-spouses might not qualify for a VAWA self-petition if the partners were separated for longer than 2 years. In column (3), we look at all other (or non-domestic) homicides. Finally, in columns (4) and (5), we split domestic homicides into those committed by a partner vs. those committed by other family members.

Regardless of the homicide measure used, we fail to find evidence of a statistically significant relationship between any of the two types of immigration policy measures and domestic (as well as non-domestic) homicide rates. In other words, domestic homicide rates do not appear to have significantly changed with immigration policy. The lack of significant changes in domestic homicides, unlikely to suffer from misreporting but highly correlated to

⁴⁷ The National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) collects representative data on victimizations. However, the data are not publicly available at the state level.

⁴⁸ Office of Justice Programs National Institute of Justice <https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/jr000250.pdf>

domestic violence incidents, provides further suggestive evidence of the impacts attributed to intensified interior immigration enforcement and sanctuary policies on the VAWA self-petition rate not being driven by changes in domestic violence but, rather, in its reporting.

7. Summary and Conclusions

Using data on VAWA self-petitions by state and year for the 2000 through 2016 period, and exploiting the temporal and geographic variation in the adoption of tougher immigration enforcement and sanctuary city practices limiting the cooperation between law enforcement and ICE, we gauge the impact of both sets of policies on the rate of VAWA-self petitions. We find that a one standard deviation increase in immigration enforcement, approximately equal to two-thirds of the average increase in interior immigration enforcement over the 2000-2016 period, curbs the rate of VAWA self-petitions by 5.5 percent. In contrast, the subsequent adoption of sanctuary practices appears to partially offset that impact, raising the rate of petitions by close to 2 percent.

The findings, which prove robust to a number of identification and robustness checks, underscore one of the many unintended consequences of tougher immigration enforcement, as well as the value of safeguards to guarantee immigrants feel safe to come forward when they are victims of crimes. To our knowledge, this is the first study examining how tougher enforcement, as well as the effectiveness of sanctuary practices, are affecting the reporting of domestic violence by migrant victims. Aside from contributing to the literature on the consequences of immigration policy on immigrants and their families (*e.g.* Amuedo-Dorantes, Arenas-Arroyo, and Sevilla 2018), the analysis informs about domestic violence survivors' behavioural responses to public policies (*e.g.* Iyengar, 2009). After all, the responsiveness of victims is key in the design of any criminal justice response. Plus, learning about these responses is crucial at a time of growing police mistrust by minorities and

heightened immigrant vulnerability to crime given migrants' reluctance to contact law enforcement.

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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics

Statistic	Mean	S.D.	N
<i>Dependent Variable</i>			
VAWA Self-petitions Rate	20.66	13.54	867
<i>Independent Variables</i>			
<i>Policy Measures:</i>			
Immigration Enforcement (IE)	0.66	0.90	867
Sanctuary City Practices (SCP)	0.05	0.22	867
<i>State-level Time-Varying Characteristics:</i>			
Share Hispanic	0.10	0.10	867
Share Black	0.11	0.11	867
Share Asian	0.01	0.03	867
Ln (Female Population)	0.30	0.02	867
Wage Ratio	1.03	0.18	867
Ln (Income Per Capita)	6.10	0.17	867
Unemployment Rate	0.06	0.02	867
Ln (Violent Crime)	9.48	1.26	867

Table 2: Immigration Policy and VAWA Self-petitions – OLS Estimates

Model Specification:	(1)	(2)
Regressors	Coefficient (S.E.)	Coefficient (S.E.)
Immigration Enforcement (IE)	-2.3499 (1.516)	-2.3010* (1.325)
Sanctuary City Practices (SCP)	2.0733** (0.910)	1.8011** (0.700)
Share Hispanic		-16.9786 (32.983)
Share Black		-43.6359 (32.688)
Share Asian		0.0000 (0.000)
Ln(Female Population)		32.6597 (43.742)
Wage Ratio		0.3391 (1.436)
Ln(Income Per Capita)		11.9351 (32.855)
Unemployment Rate		8.0622 (17.418)
Ln(Violent Crime)		-1.1579 (8.775)
Observations	867	867
R-squared	0.882	0.883
State FE	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes
State Time Trend	Yes	Yes
Dependent Variable Mean		20.66

Notes: All regressions include a constant term. Robust standard errors are in parentheses and standards errors are clustered at the state level. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10.

Table 3: Identification Check #1 – Event Study

Regressors	Coefficient (S. E.)
One Year Prior to the Adoption of IE	-3.3264 (2.137)
Two Year Prior to the Adoption of IE	-0.9712 (1.549)
Three Year Prior to the Adoption of IE	-0.1364 (1.182)
One Year Prior to the Adoption of SCP	0.6383 (0.591)
Two Year Prior to the Adoption of SCP	-0.1067 (0.646)
Three Year Prior to the Adoption of SCP	0.3973 (1.212)
Sanctuary City Practices (SCP)	2.0043** (0.847)
Immigration Enforcement (IE)	-3.0470* (1.846)
Observations	867
R-squared	0.889
State-level Time-Varying Characteristics	Yes
State FE	Yes
Year FE	Yes
State Time Trend	Yes
Dependent Variable Mean	20.66

Notes: The model includes a constant term, as well as the controls in specification (2) of Table 2. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 4: Identification Check #2 – Addressing the Non-random Enactment of Immigration Policies

Regressors	(1)	(2)
	First Year IE	First Year SCP
VAWA Self-petitions	0.0247 (0.034)	-1.8703 (4.817)
Share Hispanic	-8.8165 (5.727)	1,665.0197 (1,173.447)
Share Black	-9.4005* (5.292)	236.7133 (528.401)
Share Asian	0.0000 (0.000)	0.0151** (0.006)
Ln(Female Population)	18.9013 (19.616)	-3,889.7092 (2,470.511)
Wage Ratio	-0.2186 (3.494)	-348.9243 (507.156)
Ln(Income Per Capita)	4.2302 (3.156)	442.1871 (366.446)
Unemployment Rate	71.0725** (31.785)	-316.3891 (3,147.853)
Ln(Violent Crime)	-0.2628 (0.397)	-62.7132 (52.014)
Constant	2,007.4064*** (27.323)	-6,164.5717* (3,607.403)
Observations	3,142	3,142
R-squared	0.272	0.178

Notes: Table 4 displays the results from estimating equation (6) Robust standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the state level. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.

Table 5: Identification Check #3 – Instrumental Variable Estimation

Regressors	Coefficient (S. E.)
Immigration Enforcement (IE)	-3.7202** (1.826)
Sanctuary City Practices (SCP)	1.1289** (0.444)
Observations	867
R-squared	0.859
State-level Time-Varying Characteristics	Yes
State FE	Yes
Year FE	Yes
State Time Trend	Yes
Dependent Variable Mean	20.66
<i>First Stage for "IE"</i>	20.04***
IV	(2.55)
Sanderson-Windmeijer Multivariate F-test	108.51
<i>First Stage for "TA"</i>	10.21***
IV	(0.48)
Sanderson-Windmeijer Multivariate F-test	268.7

Notes: The model includes a constant term, as well as the controls in specification (2) of Table 2. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 6: Robustness Check #1: Using Alternative Policy Measures

Regressors	Coefficient (S. E.)
Deportations	-0.0015* (0.001)
Trust Acts	5.0213* (2.604)
Observations	867
R-squared	0.878
State FE	Yes
Year FE	Yes
State Time Trend	Yes
Dependent Variable Mean	20.66


Notes: The model includes a constant term, as well as the controls in Table 2. Deportations refer to those due to immigration charges. They are measured per 100,000 non-citizens. The data are available from: http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/charges/deport_filing_charge.php. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 7: Robustness Check #2: Modeling Domestic Violence Homicides

Column:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Subsample:	Domestic Homicides	Domestic Homicides	Other Homicides	Partner Homicides	Family Homicides
Immigration Enforcement (IE)	0.0066 (0.011)	0.0043 (0.010)	0.0213 (0.064)	0.0019 (0.008)	0.0024 (0.006)
Sanctuary City Practices (SCP)	0.0214 (0.019)	0.0207 (0.018)	0.0705 (0.293)	0.0184 (0.018)	0.0023 (0.009)
Observations	834	834	834	834	834
R-squared	0.750	0.734	0.930	0.740	0.455
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State-Trend	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Dependent Variable Mean	0.321	0.301	2.74	0.211	0.09

Notes: Domestic homicides committed by a partner (wife, husband, ex-wife, ex-husband) or family member (parent, son or daughter) are our dependent variable in column (1). Column (2) excludes those committed by an ex-wife or ex-husband since domestic abuse by the latter might not qualify for a VAWA self-petition if the victim was separated for longer than 2 years. Results prove robust to that exclusion. Column (3) refers to non-domestic homicides. Finally, column (4) regresses domestic homicides committed exclusively by a partner (wife, husband, ex-wife or ex-husband), whereas column (5) focuses on domestic homicides by a family member (parent, son or daughter). All homicides are measured per 100,000 people. All regressions include a constant term, as well as the controls in Table 2. Robust standard errors are in parentheses and standards errors are clustered at the state level. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10.

Figure 1
Share of Mixed-Citizenship Couples



Notes: Share of married couples with at least one non-citizen member per married couples.

Source: Authors' calculation using ACS data.

Figure 2
Average Values of the Immigration Enforcement and Trust Act/Sanctuary City Practices Indexes





Figure 4: Rollout of Sanctuary Policies



APPENDIX

Table A: Immigration Enforcement Programs

Nature of the Law	Law	Years	Where?	Objective	Who implements it?	Scope	Signed by	What it Consists of:
Police-Based Measures	287(g)	2002-2012	Street/Jail	Make communities safer by the identification and removal of serious criminals	State and local law enforcement entities	State and Local (County, City or Town)	State and local enforcement entities signed a contract (Memorandum of Agreement - MOA) with the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)	There are various functions: Task Force: allows local and state officers interrogate and arrest noncitizens during their regular duties on law enforcement operations. Jail enforcement permits local officers to question immigrants arrested on state and local charges about their immigration status. Hybrid model: which allow participate in both types of programs.
	SC	2009-2014 2017-	Nation's jail and prisons	Identify noncitizens who have committed serious crime using biometric information	Police	Local (County)	Jurisdictions	The program allows for the submission of biometric information on detainees checked against records in FBI and DHS databases.
	OILs	2010-	Street/Jail	Identification noncitizen	State and local law enforcement entities	State	State governor	Comprehensive laws that may include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> A "show me your papers" clause, enabling the police to request proper identification documentation during a lawful stop. Require that schools report students' legal status.

Table B: Variable Definitions and Sources

Variable Name	Definition	Source
VAWA Self-petitions Rate	Share of VAWA self-petitions per 100,000 non-citizens by state and year.	United States Citizenship and Immigration Services by Freedom of Information Act request.
Share Hispanic	Share Hispanic by state and year	
Share Black	Share black by state and year	
Share Asian	Share Asian by state and year	
Share Female	Share female between 15 and 44 years old	
Wage Ratio	Ratio of female to male wages constructed as in Aizer (2010)	American Community Survey (2000 to 2016)
Income Per Capita	Per capita income by state and year	
Unemployment Rate	Unemployment rate by state and year	
Violent Crime	Violent crime by state and year	Uniform Crime Reporting Statistics

Table C: Details on the VAWA Self-Petition Process

Processing times	150 days to 10 months - processing times can be tracked on the USCIS website.
Benefits	Receipt of certain public benefits when eligible (this might occur upon receipt of <i>prima facie</i> note acknowledging the petition and the possibility it might be granted) and, if granted, the ability to file for permanent residency for oneself and immediate relatives.
Cost	Form I-360, Petition for Amerasian, Widow(er), or Special Immigrant: \$0
Documents⁴⁹	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evidence of the abuser’s U.S. citizenship or lawful permanent resident status. • Marriage and divorce decrees, birth certificates, or other evidence of your legal relationship to the abuser. • One or more documents showing that the victim and the abuser resided together, such as employment records, utility receipts, school records, hospital or medical records, birth certificates of children, mortgages, rental records, insurance policies, or affidavits. • Evidence of the abuse, such as reports and affidavits from police, judges, court officials, medical personnel, school officials, clergy, social workers, and other social service agency personnel. • For individuals 14 years of age or older: affidavit of good moral character accompanied by a local police clearance, state-issued criminal background check, or similar report from each locality or state in the United States or abroad where the migrant has resided for six or more months during the three-year period immediately before filing the self-petition. • For spouses: evidence showing they entered the marriage in good faith, such as proof that one spouse has been listed as the other’s spouse on insurance policies, property leases, properly filed tax forms, or bank statements. One may also submit one’s affidavit or affidavits of others who have knowledge of the courtship, wedding ceremony, shared residence, and other life experiences, if available.

⁴⁹ Source: <https://www.uscis.gov/i-360Checklist>