

Compliance for the Big Brothers
- An Empirical Analysis on the Impact of the Anti-trafficking Protocol

Seo-Young Cho ^(a)

Krishna Chaitanya Vadlamannati ^(b)

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Abstract:

The Anti-trafficking Protocol reflects interests of the major powers and therefore countries are expected to comply with the Protocol. In their compliance behaviors, member states will strategically select certain obligations in order to ensure the efficiency of the compliance. Among the three main obligations of the Protocol – prevention, protection and prosecution –, we predict that countries select prevention first because compliance with this obligation is less costly but reflects higher interests of the major powers and therefore is the most ‘efficient compliance’. We empirically test this hypothesis by employing panel data of 140 countries during the period of 2001-2009. As the theory predicts, the ratification of the Protocol has the strongest effect on prevention policy of a member state compared to protection and prosecution. Our findings are robust to the method of estimation and the choice of variables.

Keywords: Anti-trafficking Protocol; ratification; efficient compliance

JEL codes: F22; F53; K33

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^(a) Department of Economics, University of Goettingen, Platz der Goettinger Sieben 3

D-37073 Goettingen, Germany, Telephone: +49 (0)551 39-7368, scho@uni-goettingen.de

^(b) Department of Economics, University of Goettingen, Platz der Goettinger Sieben 3

D-37073 Goettingen, Germany, Telephone: +49 (0)551 39-10616, kvadlam@uni-goettingen.de

1. Introduction

Human trafficking is a growing phenomenon worldwide, threatening national security and damaging domestic human rights reputation of a country. The US Department of State estimates that there exist more than 12 million victims of human trafficking in the world, making the global prevalence of trafficking victims 1.8 per 1,000 inhabitants (US Department of State, 2010). Interpol also suggests that human trafficking is a multi-billion-dollar business, steadily catching up with drug and arms trafficking (<http://www.interpol.int/Public/THB/>). In responding to the need to combat such a crime, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children, in 2000. The Convention and the Protocol are arguably the most serious international regime to combat human trafficking (UNODC 2006). In particular, the Protocol provides the internationally recognized definition of human trafficking for the first time¹ and regulates obligations of member states in order to achieve the three objectives: preventing human trafficking, protecting trafficking victims and prosecuting traffickers. As a decade has passed after the emergence of the Anti-trafficking Protocol, it is worthwhile investigating whether the Protocol has created any effect on achieving its mandates, which is the aim of this paper.

Indeed, whether a treaty has an effect is a different question from whether countries meet the objectives of the treaty. Countries may still comply with the objectives even in the absence of the treaty. The relevant question is whether the ratification of the treaty can create an additional effect on compliance. With respect to the impact of human rights treaties, theoretical predictions

¹ According to the Anti-trafficking Protocol, *trafficking in persons shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or service, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs* (article 3-(a)).

are rather skeptical because those treaties lack enforcement mechanisms (Beyefsky 2001). Thus, human rights treaties are often criticized as an ‘empty promise’ or a ‘cheap talk’, particularly in the realist tradition (Hoffmann 1956; Fisher 1981), while some other schools try to illuminate possible functions of human rights treaties in generating effects such as norm processing (Keck and Sikkink 1998) and recognition-building (Keohane 1984).

Similar to other human rights treaties, the Anti-trafficking Protocol does not have an official tool to punish violators. It means that there is no cost imposed on non-compliers and the lack of punishment may encourage potential violators to join the Protocol for a window-dressing purpose as argued in studies on other treaties such as the Convention against Torture (Hathaway 2002; Vreeland 2008). However, as more closely looking into the development and creation of the Protocol, one can find a special feature of the Anti-trafficking Protocol. The objectives of the Protocol reflect national preferences of the major powers and the major powers are interested in other countries’ complying with the Protocol. In most other human rights treaties, this is not the case. Improving human rights records of a foreign country is rarely of interests of the major powers and the major powers do not exercise pressure or sanction on non-compliers (Krasner 1993; Goldsmith and Posner 2005). However, combating human trafficking is different. The US, arguably the supreme power, is known to be one of the major destination countries for trafficking victims. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2006) defines the US as a destination country with very high inflows of human trafficking. Also, the US Annual Report on Trafficking in Persons (2005) estimates that 14,500–17,500 individuals are trafficked into the US from other countries every year. Facing huge flows of human trafficking inside its own territory, the US has great interests in reducing human trafficking coming from other countries. In fact, the adoption and promotion of the Anti-trafficking Protocol reflects American hegemony (Winer 2004) and the Protocol is arguably a replica of the US domestic law, the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act (TVA 2000) (US Senate Hearing 2004).²

² Without any further need to adopt a new legislation, the US signed the Protocol in 2000 and ratified it in 2005, a much faster pace compared to its ratification of other international human rights treaties. In fact, the US has not ratified several major human rights treaties such as the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women; and the Convention on the

To facilitate the international anti-trafficking regime virtually identical to the pre-existing domestic law, the US regularly evaluates states' compliance through its Annual Reports on Trafficking in Persons. The tier-ranking provided by the Reports functions as a monitoring mechanism on states' anti-trafficking efforts and the US officially declares that it exercises pressure on non-compliers through international aid (US Dept. of State, Annual Report on Trafficking in Persons, 2007). In addition to the US, the European Union and most other developed countries also confront high flows of human trafficking into their countries. According to the UNODC Incidence Index (2006), 13 EU and 18 OECD member states receive very high or high inflows of human trafficking (see annex 1). In addition to the numbers of victims coming into these countries, economic losses caused by human trafficking are also tremendous. The ILO (2005) estimates that annual profits from forced labor and human trafficking in industrialized countries are USD 3.5 billion and they are not taxed and likely to be used for illegal activities including crimes. It shows that combating human trafficking is not an empty axiom but reflects an urgent need of the developed world.

As the Protocol reflects the preference of the major powers and is also promoted by them, countries are expected to ratify the Protocol in the first place in order to demonstrate their good will for the major powers and to gain international recognition by doing so. Furthermore, countries will comply upon ratification as the major powers will keep their eyes on the performance of member states. In doing so, countries decide upon their compliance behaviors with the following consideration: how to satisfy the need of the major countries. In order to meet this goal, countries will be strategic and select the most efficient way to comply. The criteria of the most efficient compliance are arguably 'the minimum costs' and the 'maximum benefits'. The benefit would include the recognition from the major powers and the costs consist of efforts to establish new legislation, enforce the new law with police and judiciary capacity and implement necessary policy programs, as well as domestic resistance against such changes. With

Rights of the Child. Also, it took the US for 25-30 years to ratify the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

this regard, countries will be tactical in making compliance-decisions and strategically select certain obligations, ensuring the highest appreciation from the major power with minimum costs.

In the Anti-trafficking Protocol, there are three main pillars of the objective: prevention, protection and prosecution, so-called 3Ps. We predict that countries will select an objective with which they can most efficiently comply. The obligations of the chosen objective should be a main concern of the major powers so that compliance with such obligations fulfills the needs and preference of the major countries. At the same time, the costs of compliance should be relatively smaller and affordable. Based on these selection criteria, compliance with prevention is arguably the first choice for many countries. The obligations of prevention consist of conducting anti-trafficking public and media campaigns; training government officials and police/military personnel; controlling borders, airports and train stations; and pursuing international cooperation with other governments and exchanging information³. These obligations can be mostly fulfilled by utilizing existing legislation and resources and therefore less costly than accomplishing protection and prosecution efforts requiring new legislative adoption. Furthermore, border controlling is of main concerns of the major powers because traffickers transport victims across borders and major countries demand stricter border controls to countries sending victims as one can see from the anecdotal evidence between the US and Mexico (<http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE66I4NQ20100719>).

Thus, prevention is arguably the first candidate when countries make a decision to comply. In the paper, we hypothesize that the Anti-trafficking Protocol has the strongest impact on prevention policy and empirically analyze this question by using panel data from 140 countries for the period of 2001-2009. To measure compliance, we code information taken from the Annual Reports on Trafficking in Persons and construct a five-point scale index on the level of compliance with prevention, protection and prosecution, respectively. Through the empirical

³ In addition to the listed obligations, article 9 recommends that countries take social and economic initiatives to prevent human trafficking and alleviate the factors that make persons vulnerable. However, we exclude this obligation in our analysis because of two reasons: first, the vagueness of the obligations (Fredette 2009) and second, the exclusion of this obligation in the criteria of the tier ranking (US Dept. of State, Annual Report on Trafficking in Persons, 2009).

analysis, we find that the ratification of the Protocol has a positive, significant effect on prevention policy of a country but not on the other two types of policy, confirming our hypothesis of 'efficient compliance'. A positive effect on protection is partially found but the impact is mainly driven by developed countries. This main finding is not altered by the method of estimation and the choice of control variables.

Our paper continues as follows. In section 2 we present our theoretical arguments and hypotheses. Section 3 describes the methodologies of measuring anti-trafficking policy (3Ps) and ratification. Section 4 follows with estimation strategies and section 5 empirical results. In section 6, we conclude with policy implications.

2. Hypothesis: 'Efficient Compliance'

Why do countries comply with a human rights treaty – despite the lack of enforcement mechanisms? The answer can be summarized with the concepts of 'state power' and 'state interests' (Simmons, Chapter 4, 2009). Both realist and rational functionalist traditions argue that countries comply with a treaty if the objectives meet their national interests and preference. Furthermore, if the major countries have interests in enforcing compliance with the treaty, compliance of member states would increase and countries whose national interests are inconsistent with the treaty would also comply due to coercion and pressure from the major powers.

In compliance literature, the realist view of coercion tends to lead to a conclusion that human rights treaties are futile because human rights records of other countries are rarely of great concerns of the major countries. However, the Anti-trafficking Protocol is an international legal frame evidently reflecting interests and preferences of the major powers. Confronting huge flows of human trafficking into their countries, the US and the EU have adopted anti-trafficking policy as their national priority (TVA2000; the Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings 2005) and actively promote efforts to combat human trafficking worldwide. Indeed, global efforts are particularly important in fighting human trafficking because of the transnational nature of the problem (UNODC 2006) and thus the major countries have strong

interests in reducing not only inflows of human trafficking into their own countries but also outflows from sending countries. Moreover, major destination countries receive victims of human trafficking from various countries without regional limitations. For instance, according to the UNODC (2006), trafficking victims found in the US come from 66 countries: from China to Mexico to Nigeria. Germany, another major destination, receives trafficking victims from 51 countries (Poland, Afghanistan, the Dominican Republic, etc). These wide ranges of human trafficking at the global level suggest that the interests of the major countries in combating human trafficking are not limited in certain neighboring countries but rather include most countries worldwide.

On the other hand, countries sending victims abroad – mostly developing countries – may or may not have a national preference in compliance with the Anti-trafficking Protocol. Sending victims abroad costs the loss of human capital, damages in state reputation and the violation of national borders. However, as victims no longer live in the country and therefore exploitation occurs outside their own country, the problem is less noticeable and urgent than in receiving countries. Some sending countries even neglect the situations that their own nationals are being smuggled to developed countries because of expectation on remittance and/or population pressure. To explain the compliance of sending countries, international pressure from the major countries would play a more important role rather than pure interests of sending countries.

As combating human trafficking is of interests of the major powers, the Anti-trafficking Protocol can function as an international instrument for their needs to lock-in commitments of member states and provide internationally recognized legitimacy for the objectives. Thus, countries not only ratify but also comply with the Protocol as long as their compliance is under supervision of the major powers. Countries' compliance decisions can be well-explained by the power and the needs of the major countries. In other words, countries will comply not because of their own needs but rather because of the needs of the major power and how to satisfy the major power is the key factor in compliance. This compliance behavior would be more notable for developing countries which are under the influence of the major powers.

On the other hand, one should also note that compliance is costly (Hathaway 2007) and countries will calculate how they can fulfill the needs of the major power with less cost. Compliance with the Protocol requires new legislative adoption and policy implementation which may cost not only monetary burdens of a country but also trigger domestic resistance due to potential conflict with existing law – in particular immigration law. Thus, countries will make a strategic decision on what to comply among many obligations and select certain obligations which they can comply with less cost but satisfy the preference of the major powers.

As mentioned earlier, prevention policy is the first candidate to fulfill the criteria of ‘efficient compliance’ with the minimum cost for the complier and the maximum satisfaction of the major powers. Among the obligations prescribed for prevention by the Protocol, no area requires new legislative adoption, which potentially causes domestic resistance or conflicts with other laws. Also, most anti-trafficking public campaigns and training programs for government officials and military can be implemented with existing resources. Keeping borders is a basic responsibility for a sovereign state. Furthermore, there is another distinctive advantage of border controlling. It is of great concerns of the major powers. The major countries often conduct border controlling to crack down human trafficking as seen in examples of the US and Mexican borders and the Spanish and North African sea borders and demand stricter border controlling to sending countries. Indeed, border controlling is one of the quickest and easiest (although arguably not most effective in tackling root causes of human trafficking in the long run) ways to reduce flows of human trafficking. Additionally, international cooperation with other governments and international organizations can easily impress the major countries because these activities are more visible to the outside world compared to domestic court proceedings for prosecution and the implementation of protection programs.

On the contrary, prosecution policy is highly costly to implement. To comply with obligations for prosecution, countries need to adopt the newly defined concept of human trafficking in national legislation: the criminalization of human trafficking with specific and strict penal codes and the delegation of anti-trafficking enforcement personnel including police and prosecutors (The Protocol, art. 5). The criminalization of human trafficking calls for amendment in general immigration law and careful interpretation in court proceedings of related cases (Fredette 2009).

Furthermore, assigning enforcement personnel exclusively for anti-trafficking tasks produces monetary burdens. Compliance with protection policy (The Protocol, part II) is also costly, particularly triggering domestic resistance against the policy adoption. Assistance programs for shelters, medical care and job training might be less costly for many countries if effectively cooperating with NGOs and other social networks and utilizing existing facilities. However, granting victims (temporal or permanent) residency would conflict with immigration law in many countries. Also, generous treatment for victims may create incentives for traffickers to operate in the country and therefore induce more human trafficking (Akee et. al. 2007).

Furthermore, the major countries may not be interested in protecting victims found in other countries, although the major powers might be more concerned about protection in their own territories because of their human rights reputation.

Given a greater demand and need of the major countries and a lower cost of compliance, prevention is arguably the first choice for many countries to comply and our theory predicts that the ratification of the Protocol has the strongest effect on prevention, compared to the other two. Furthermore, the impact on prevention is expected to be stronger in developing countries where the costs of compliance and pressure from the major countries are more serious issues. Based on the theoretical prediction, we hypothesize our arguments as following.

H1: *Ceteris paribus*, the ratification of the Anti-trafficking Protocol has the strongest impact on the state compliance on prevention policy.

H2: *Ceteris paribus*, the strong impact of the ratification on prevention is more pronounced in developing countries.

Additionally, we expect that the impact on prevention is significant in most countries regardless of country types – whether the country receives or sends victims of human trafficking – because border control can be a quick, although temporal, solution to crack down illicit human flows. Probably, receiving countries comply with prevention policy because of their national interests to reduce inflows of human trafficking, while sending countries comply due to pressure from the major countries.

H3: *Ceteris paribus*, the ratification has significant impact on prevention in both countries of origin and destination.

On the other hand, it might be possible that countries of origin are also likely to comply with protection policy because obligations for protection mainly apply to countries of destinations where victims are present. Thus, countries of origin comply with protection by introducing law and programs which will not be utilized in reality and therefore bear almost no costs. However, if pressure from the major countries is a stronger driving force for compliance than countries' preference for cheaper costs, the impact of ratification will be stronger in prevention policy in these countries.

H4: *Ceteris paribus*, in countries of origin, the ratification has greater impact on protection if countries are more concerned about monetary costs than pressure from the major powers.

H5: *Ceteris paribus*, in countries of origin, the ratification has greater impact on prevention if countries are more concerned about pressure from the major powers than monetary costs.

3. Measuring Anti-trafficking Policy and Treaty Ratification

We use our own constructed indices on the three main anti-trafficking policy areas namely, prevention, protection and prosecution. The index on each of the three policy measures is coded on a scale of 1 to 5 where the lowest value means full compliance and the highest value no compliance. Thus, a lower score implies a higher degree of policy-conformity. This index is constructed annually from 2001 to 2009 for approximately 140 countries. The sources of information used for coding the index are from the Annual Reports of Trafficking in Persons (US Department of State, 2001-2009). There are two prime reasons employing these indices for our study. First, unlike the aggregate tier ranking provided by the Reports (tier 1, 2, 2 Watchlist and 3), our policy indices not only distinguish compliance in the three different areas but also measure the level of compliance in each area, separately. Second, our indices are coded based on the specific content to measure compliance with the requirements of the Anti-trafficking Protocol, while the tier ranking is given based on compliance with the US TVA. Additionally, the third reason for employing this dataset is its reliability. The coding for each variable for each

country-year is independently evaluated by at least four trained coders⁴. We illustrate the measurement scale of each of the three indices as following

a. Codification for the index on Prevention policy (based on part III, article 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 of the Protocol)

Score 1: if the country demonstrates strong efforts in fulfilling all the seven requirements for preventing human trafficking. (These include: implementing public and media campaigns for anti-trafficking awareness, training government and military officials including peace keepers, facilitating information exchange among relevant authorities, monitoring borders, train stations, airports, etc., adopting national action plans for combating trafficking in persons, promoting cooperation with NGOs and international organizations in the country, and facilitating bilateral and/or multilateral cooperation with other governments).

Score 2: if the country demonstrates relative strong efforts in fulfilling the aforementioned requirements for preventing human trafficking.

Score 3: if the country demonstrates moderate efforts in fulfilling the aforementioned requirements for preventing human trafficking.

Score 4: if the country demonstrates limited efforts in fulfilling the aforementioned requirements for preventing human trafficking.

Score 5: if the country demonstrates no effort in fulfilling the aforementioned requirements for preventing human trafficking.

b. Codification for the index on Protection policy (based on part II, article 6, 7 and 8 of the Protocol):

⁴ We thank Nina Breitenstein, Ulrike Heyken, Laura Felfeli and Lukas Semmler for their assistance while coding the data on compliance.

Score 1: if the country does not punish victims trafficking in persons for acts related to the situations being trafficked and exerts strong efforts in fulfilling the following requirements namely, giving victims information on and assistance for relevant court and administrative proceedings, supporting for physical, psychological and social recovery of victims such as the housing, medical assistance, job training, residence permit, other assistance for rehabilitation, and repatriation.

Score 2: if the country does not punish victims trafficking in persons for acts related to the situations being trafficked and exerts moderate efforts in fulfilling the aforementioned requirements.

Score 3: if the country does not punish victims trafficking in persons for acts related to the situations being trafficked and exerts limited efforts in fulfilling the aforementioned requirements.

Score 4: if the country fails to ensure that victims of trafficking are never punished for acts related to the situations being trafficked but provides only limited assistance in fulfilling the aforementioned requirements.

Score 5: if the country punishes victims of trafficking in persons for acts related to the situations being trafficked and does not provide any assistance and support.

c. Codification for the index on Prosecution policy (based on article 5 of the Protocol):

Score 1: if the country has a legislative measure prohibiting trafficking in persons and maintains a stringent level of penalty (for more than five years in imprisonment or punishment equivalent to other related crimes such as rape, labor exploitation, etc), and the law is fully enforced in the form of investigations, arrests, prosecutions, convictions and punishment of such offenders.

Score 2: if the country has a legislative measure prohibiting trafficking but the law is not fully enforced.

Score 3: if the country has no legislative measure prohibiting trafficking but applies some other related law to punish offenders of such crime and the law is fully enforced.

Score 4: if the country has no legislative measure prohibiting trafficking but applies some other related law to punish offenders of such crime and the law is not fully enforced.

Score 5: if the country has neither legislative measure prohibiting trafficking nor the law is fully enforced.

Naturally, the three dimensions of anti-trafficking policy are not independent of each other. As seen in table 1, however, the three different components that make up the anti-trafficking policy are only moderately correlated with each other, albeit the protection and prevention correlate relatively more strongly at $r = 0.68$. It indicates that the differentiated levels of compliance on each of the 3Ps, which our disaggregate indices capture, are not trivial but rather substantial.

Table 1: Bivariate correlations among the three forms of Anti-trafficking policies

	Prosecution	Protection	Prevention
Prosecution	1.000		
Protection	0.550	1.000	
Prevention	0.500	0.680	1.000

Our main independent variable of interest is the ratification of the UN Protocol Preventing, Suppressing and Punishing Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children (the Anti-trafficking Protocol)⁵ as part of the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. We focus on the Protocol in our study instead of the Convention because it exclusively addresses objectives to combat human trafficking while the Convention includes issues on wide ranges of crimes such as drug and arms trafficking and money laundering. We code the value 1 for the year in which the country ratified the Anti-trafficking Protocol and thereafter, and 0 otherwise.

⁵ This Protocol was adopted by resolution A/RES/55/25 of 15th November 2000 at the fifty-fifth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. Later, the Protocol was opened for signature from the member states of the UN from December 2000 to December 2002. Finally, the Protocol entered into force from December 2003 onwards upon its ratification by 20 respective signatory states.

4. Estimation Strategy

We estimate pooled Time Series Cross-Section (TSCS) regressions across a large sample of 140 countries during the period 2001 – 2009⁶. Accordingly, our model to be estimated is specific as:

$$Policy_{it} = \phi_1 + \psi_2 H_{it-2} + \psi_3 Z_{it} + \nu_t + \omega_{it} \quad (1)$$

Where, $Policy_{it}$ represents each of the aforementioned 3P-indices of country i in year t . H_{it-2} denotes our main hypothesis variable namely, the ratification of the Anti-trafficking Protocol. While, ν_t are time fixed effects, ω_{it} is well behaved error term. We lag two years for the main variable of interest, H_{it} , because of two main reasons. First, it may take some time for a country to change domestic legislation and policy accordingly upon ratification because the adoption of new law requires the approval of the parliament. Second, contemporary relation between ratification and anti-trafficking policy might be subject to reverse-causality. How many years upon ratification are needed to generate any effect depends on legislative procedures, the urgency of the objectives and other political considerations of a country and there is no consensus on this question⁷. To estimate a required duration, we run the regressions with all possible choices of lagged-independent variables – from H_{it} to H_{it-8} . We find that ratification today (H_{it}) and one year ago (H_{it-1}) shows positive correlation only with prevention policy, while H_{it-2} has positive correlation with prevention and protection and H_{it-3} onwards with all 3Ps. We suspect that the positive correlation at time t and $t-1$ might be a reverse-feedback; the level of anti-trafficking policy affects ratification-decisions. On the other hand, a new positive correlation gradually arises after two years upon ratification: first with protection and later with prosecution. Based on this finding, we surmise that it would take at least two years upon ratification to generate real effects on domestic policy. Reverse-feedback issues are further checked by Granger Causality tests and the results show that reverse-causality is cleared up by lagging two years of the main variable of interest, as discussed in section 4.2. more in detail.

⁶ Given the missing observations in our dependent variables and other explanatory variables, our panel is unbalanced.

⁷ Simmons (2009) uses different choices – one year, two year-lagged, and contemporary ratification – depending on types of treaties, while Neumayer (2005) takes only contemporary values of ratification.

We estimate our model using ordered probit with time fixed effects. We select ordered probit over logit because the scale of our 3P indices are very close to being normally distributed (Long 1997). With the ordered probit models, we cluster the analysis on countries and estimate the Huber-White corrected robust standard errors, a method which is robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation (Wiggins 1999). By clustering on country, we assume that the data is correlated within clusters but not across. We could not control for country-specific effects in the ordered probit models for two main reasons. First, due to the incidental parameter problem: having country-dummy variables causes an inconsistency problem in this type of non-linear estimations (Lancaster 1999, Wooldbridge 2002). Second, we include time invariant variables such as regional effects and (in/out)flows of human trafficking. Usage of two-way fixed effects in such cases will not only be collinear with time-invariant regressors, but also generate biased estimates (Beck 2001). Finally, as part of robustness check, we include country-specific effects by using a pooled OLS method with two-way fixed effects in order to control for omitted variable biases. As pooled data are susceptible to having highly correlated data between and across panels that could lead to highly optimistic standard errors (Beck and Katz 1995), we use the both standard errors clustered at country level and a Newey-West method which allows us to compute an AR1 process for autocorrelation and obtain Huber-White corrected robust standard errors, which are robust to heteroskedasticity (Newey and West 1987).

The vector of control variables (Z_{it}) include other potential determinants of government policy combating human trafficking which we obtain from the extant literature on the subject. We follow the pioneer studies topic of Avdeyeva (2010) and Bartilow (2008) which are closely related to our topic and other comprehensive evaluations on determinants of government policy on related problems (Neumayer 2005; Simmons 2009). Accordingly, the models control the effects of development by including per capita income (logged) in US\$ 2000 constant terms (World Bank 2009). Following others (Simmons 2009) we include the log of the total population (World Bank 2009). Large countries will have more opportunities to include human trafficking because of the weaker state authority, leading to tight government policy. To measure the nature of the political regime in power which would affect compliance behaviors, we include a measure of democracy using the Polity IV data (Marshall and Jaggers, 2009). Democracies are more likely to be responsive to demands for compliance (Cho 2010). We subtract the autocracy score

from the democracy score, as is standard when using the Polity data. The democracy score ranges from +10 (full democracy) to -10 (full autocracy)⁸. Additionally, we account for the quality of institutions by including two measures from ICGR political risk indicators namely, the control of corruption coded on a scale of 0 – 6 (which reinforce the legitimacy of the state by controlling the corruption often associated with human trafficking) and law and order coded on a scale of 0 – 6 (related to the ability of the state to protect victims, prevent the crime and prosecute criminals involved in human trafficking). In both indices, highest value denotes good governances.

Furthermore, there is a gender aspect in human trafficking. Existing statistics on human trafficking suggest that it is a gendered crime; more than 70% of victims are females exploited in sex and domestic services (UNODC 2006; IOM CTM 2010). As female legislators and political representatives can be more concerned about interests of women (Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004) and thus more likely pursue anti-trafficking policy (Bartilow 2008), the female share in parliament is included as a proxy to gender representation. Additionally, if female voters are empowered, male legislators would also take the concern of female constituents more seriously. Thus, women's general empowerment, proxied by the female share in labor force, is included as a control variable.

Unlike to most other human rights treaties, the Anti-trafficking Protocol is of US interests and actively promoted by the US (Winer 2004). We thus control for possible bias towards a particular country by including a country's voting behavior in line the US in the United Nations General Assembly⁹ on key issues (i.e. key votes). The voting behavior index is based on the definition of Thacker (1999) who codes votes in agreement with the US as 1, votes in disagreement as 0, and abstentions as 0.5¹⁰. In any case, the resulting numbers are then divided

⁸ We also use average of Freedom House index on civil and political liberties. The results do not change substantially.

⁹ Qian and Yanagizawa (2009, 2010) however argue that this bias largely existed in various US state department reports ranging from Human rights to Religious freedom predominantly during the cold war period.

¹⁰ Alternatively, we also utilize the voting index based on the definition of Kegley and Hooock (1991) who follow the same definition as Thacker (199) expect that he excludes the abstentions. Our results not change qualitatively upon changing the index.

by the total number of votes in each year (Dreher, Sturm and Vreeland 2009). The data for both the indices comes from Dreher, et al. (2009). In addition, the membership of the EU and the OECD are included because clubs of advanced countries express particular interests in combating human trafficking and adopt anti-trafficking policy as their priority (European Commission 2004).

Facing high flows of human trafficking would also affect national policy response because the more severe the problem is, the more it becomes a state priority. 5-point indices on in-and outflows of human trafficking (0 being no flow to 5 being very high flow), taken from the UNODC (2006), are used to measure the flows of human trafficking in a country. Finally, we include the regional dummy variable, being a Sub-Saharan African country, in order to correct potential information bias as data related to human trafficking in Africa tend to lack detailed information compared to other regions (UNODC 2006). For details on data sources see appendix (annex 2).

4.1. Variables selection issue – Extreme Bounds Analysis (EBA)

With few empirical studies on human trafficking policy, one of the main challenges in empirical analysis is coming up with a reliable model. We overcome this problem by employing (variants of) the extreme bounds analysis (EBA hereafter) proposed by Leamer (1983) and Levine and Renelt (1992). We examine whether the aforementioned variables are indeed robust determinants of anti-human trafficking policy, independent of which additional variables are included. The EBA is also a neutral way of coping with the problem of selecting variables for an empirical model in situations where there are inconclusive suggestions in the literature. In order to perform EBA estimations we shall use a similar approach in Levine and Renelt (1992) but with a few minor changes. First, our sample of 140 countries for the period 2001–2009 is panel, unlike Levine and Renelt’s. Second, we investigate the robustness of all the variables selected earlier instead of selecting variables later. In order to perform EBA, the following equation is estimated:

$$y_{it} = \delta_C C + \delta_E E + \delta_Z Z + \omega \quad (2)$$

Where, y is 3P indices, vector C includes “commonly accepted” explanatory variables which are also referred in the literature as “focus variables” (in our case, this is the ratification variable as

our theory predicts). These variables are always included in our estimations here. The vector E contains the “variable(s) of interest” that one would like to examine (in our case all the control variables described above). These are the variables on which there is no consensus in the literature but according to the broader literature is related to the dependent variable. These are often referred in the literature as “doubt variables” which are considered by some and ignored by others in their studies (Hafner-Burton 2005). The vector Z by definition takes three possible variables at a time (i.e., represents the variable in the E vector) (Levine and Renelt 1992, Folster and Henrekson 2001). While δ denotes coefficient of respective variables, ω denotes the error term. The main advantages of EBA is that it reduces the multicollinearity problem as it allows for only three variables at a time from vector Z along with variable of interest in vector E to perform estimations. This apart, EBA also significantly reduces the under-specification problems associated with the typical regression models. The basic EBA test for the main variable of interest(s) in E states that if the lower extreme bound for δ_E – i.e., the lowest value for δ_E minus two standard deviations – is negative, while the upper extreme bound for δ_E – i.e., the highest value for δ_E plus two standard deviations – is positive with statistical insignificance, the variable E is not robustly related to y (Levine and Renelt 1992).

Considering the critics of McAleer et.al (1985) and Sala-i-Martin (1997) on stringent testing criterion, we follow less stringent test proposed by Gassebner et al. (2009) and Dreher et al. (2009) which report the percentage of the regressions in which the coefficient of the variable in vector E is statistically different from zero at the 5%-level (i.e. % sign column). Unlike Sala-i-Martin (1997), we report the unweighted parameter estimate of δ_E and its standard error, as well as the unweighted cumulative distribution function, $CDF(0)$. The latter represents the proportion of the cumulative distribution function lying on each side of zero. The $CDF(0)$ indicates the larger portion of the area under the density function either above or below zero, i.e., whether this happens to be $CDF(0)$ or $1-CDF(0)$. Thus the $CDF(0)$ always lies between 0.5 and 1.0. We estimate the EBA using ordered probit with time effects with country-clustered standard errors.

4.2. Endogeneity Concerns – Panel Granger Causality

It is quite possible that our key explanatory variable – the ratification of the Anti-trafficking Protocol– is endogenous to having better government policy against human trafficking. It may be that government policy in tackling this problem may affect the ratification of such a treaty. To test for the existence of reverse feedback effects from government policy towards the ratification of the Protocol, we use a dynamic model of Granger Causality (Granger 1969). Accordingly, the variable x is said to granger cause a variable y if the past values of the x help explain y , once the past influence of the y has been accounted for. We follow Dreher and Siemers (2009) to account for granger causality in a panel setting as:

$$y_{it} = \sum_{j=1}^p \psi_j y_{it-1} + \sum_{j=1}^p \xi_j x_{it-1} + \delta_i + \zeta_t + \omega_{it} \quad (3)$$

Here, the parameters are denoted as: ψ_{it} and ξ_{it} for country i during the year t , the maximum lag length is represented by p . y_{it} represents ratification for country i during the year t , while x_{it} is 3Ps, respectively. While δ_i is unobserved individual effects, ζ_t is unobserved time effects. ω_{it} denotes the error term. We utilize different lag structures to test this relationship. Given that we have small T (nine years per country) we restrict our analysis with three year lag period and check for joint significance using F-statistic.

5. Empirical Results

We begin with our EBA results on determinants of anti-human trafficking policy presented in table 2 which consists of three sets, each for prevention, protection and prosecution. As seen there, we find the democracy variable in all three sets to be robust determinant of anti-human trafficking policy, with CDF(0) being equal to one. The same is the case with the corruption variables whose CDF(0) remains close to one. The results also show that a greater female participation in labor force has higher levels of anti-trafficking policies. Also, the results are in line with our theory regarding the linear relationship between income levels and government policies on anti-trafficking. With respect to population effects, the results are similar, but statistically weaker in one of the sets (related to prosecution).

Regarding the dummies of regions and membership, we find that countries associated with OECD and EU member countries exert strong positive impact – i.e. with the negative sign – on all three forms of anti-trafficking policies and are largely in line with theoretical expectations. The only variables for which we find fragile results include law and order and women MPs in parliaments. Overall, the EBA results provide ample support to the baseline variables chosen on theoretical grounds. Finally, we find that scores of the 3P indices robustly improve for countries voting in line with the US in UN General Assembly. It is well-known that there is a parochial bias in such policy coding specially initiated or reported by the US on such issues (Qian and Yanagizawa 2009, 2010), so that our finding is not surprising.

Before moving on to the regression analysis, we discuss the results of Granger Causality tests¹¹. The null hypothesis here is rejected at lag length one for all three forms of anti-human trafficking policies. However, at lag two, we cannot reject the null at conventional levels of significance. The results do not change when we introduce one more lag structure. In other words, the joint F-statistic is significant at 10% level for all the 3Ps at lag one, but becomes insignificant after introducing two lags.

The results of regression estimates in assessing the impact of the Anti-trafficking Protocol on domestic policy framework are presented in table 3. We start with our main variable of interest – the ratification of the Anti-trafficking Protocol in column 1. The policy index score is a scale stretching from 1 (full compliance) to 5 (no compliance). In column 1 we could not find any significant impact of the ratification on prosecution. However, in line with our main hypothesis, prevention responds to the ratification of the Anti-trafficking Protocol at the 1% level of significance in column 2. The same holds when we substitute prevention by protection in column 3, albeit with 10% significance level. Therefore the positive effects suggest that the ratification of the Protocol improves government policy on anti-human trafficking with respect to prevention and, to some extent, protection.

¹¹ The results of Granger Causality tests are not shown in the paper but can be obtained by the authors upon request.

In columns 4 – 6 we control for outflows of human trafficking (countries of origin); and column 7 – 9 captures inflows (countries of destination) instead. Controlling for these variables, we do not find any significant changes in our baseline results as observed in column 1 – 3 (see table 3). Notice that the Anti-trafficking Protocol shows a robustly positive association with prevention across the columns in table 3, signifying that member states, as expected, comply with the Protocol but strategically select an area to comply. The impact is most pronounced at prevention policy arguably because of two reasons: low costs of compliance and high demand from the major powers. Countries comply with obligations for prevention because they can fulfill the requirements by utilizing existing resources without causing much domestic resistance. More importantly, prevention policy can arguably produce an immediate solution to reduce flows of human trafficking by border controlling and such activities satisfy the need of the major power and also are visible outside so that it efficiently signals good will of the country.

On the other hand, the index of prosecution employed here includes, among other things, legislative measures and implementing these measures to prohibit trafficking in persons. This effectively means that the enforceability of the law in terms of investigations, arrests, prosecutions, convictions and punishment of such offenders comes into the picture. Our finding that ratification of the Protocol does not affect prosecution is in line with our theoretical arguments (hypothesis 1) that the costs associated with prosecution are much higher compared to prevention and protection.

With respect to marginally significant effects on protection, it is mainly driven by developed countries. In the sample of only developing countries (table 4), the results confirm a positive effect of ratification on prevention. But, the significant effect on protection found in the full-sample disappears. One interesting finding here is that the effects of the Protocol on prevention are not only strong but also significantly different from zero at 1% level in all models. These results are in line with our second hypothesis that developing countries are more constrained with costs of compliance and pressure from the major powers and thus actively select prevention to efficiently comply.

To better illustrate the magnitude of the effect of ratification, we calculate the marginal effects of ratification on prevention policy at the mean of all other independent variables (table 5). First, table 5 reports the observed sample frequency and shows the estimated probabilities of observing a given index score (1-5) of prevention policy at the mean of all control variables. The observed frequency of score 2 is 23%, while the probability of observing that score at mean is 25% in the full-sample. The observed mean score is 2.9, while the estimated mean score holding all other variables at mean is 2.89. The ratification of the Protocol increases probabilities to be score 1 (full-compliance) by 4.5% and score 2 by 10%, *ceteris paribus*. On the other hand, ratification decreases probabilities to be worse scores of 3, 4 and 5 by 2%, 9% and 3%, respectively. When we control for in/outflows of human trafficking, the results do not change significantly. In the sample of developing countries, the frequency of score 2 is 20%, while the probability of observing that score at mean is 19%. The mean score is also a little lower than that of the full sample: 3.1 for both observed and estimated mean. By ratifying the Protocol, developing countries increase probabilities to be score 1 by 2.7% and score 2 by 8.7%. Different from the full-sample, ratification also increases probabilities to be score 3 by 1.9%, while decreasing probabilities to be score 4 and 5 by 8.8% and 4.6%, respectively. Again the results do not change by controlling for the in/outflows of human trafficking. The results show that countries, whether a developing country or not, increase probabilities to be a score above the mean and decrease probabilities to be a score below the mean by ratifying the Protocol.

Turning to our analysis on disaggregating the sample further by countries sending (origin) or receiving (destination) very high and high flows of human trafficking (table 6), the results show that the ratification of the Anti-trafficking Protocol does not affect protection and prosecution¹² policy of respective governments at conventional levels of significance in neither of the samples. The exception is prevention which has a negative sign (i.e. positive association) and significantly different from zero at conventional levels of significant in all the samples as evident from table 6. This provides support for our third hypothesis with respect to prevention in countries of origin and destination. To a large extent this could be explained by the fact that, compliance for prevention is arguably the first choice for many countries because the costs associated with such

¹² One exception is a marginally significant effect on prosecution in countries of origin at 10% level (column 1).

compliance is lower and exercising this policy can produce a result quick and visible to others at least in a short run. Interestingly, countries without facing high flows of human trafficking also tend to take the same path in compliance along side with countries of origin and destination. Probably, it is because human trafficking has become a global phenomenon spreading out quickly and countries without facing high flows at the moment are not necessarily immune to potential danger of the problem.

On the other hand, these results do not provide support for our fourth hypothesis with respect to countries of origin. The fact that we could not find any significant effect of the Anti-trafficking Protocol on protection in these countries shows that countries are more concerned about being under pressure from the major powers than the monetary costs associated with human trafficking. If it is vice-versa, then one should have found some support for the effect of the Anti-trafficking Protocol on protection policy of countries of origin as compliance with this type of policy comes with virtually no cost. Instead, a strong, positive effect of ratification on prosecution support our fifth hypothesis.

Interestingly, in our estimations, the control variables are consistent with our theoretical expectations. There is a positive relationship between economic development (per capita GDP) and government policy on anti-trafficking. An increase in the level of income is associated with overall socio-economic development and improvement in government policy framework thereby. We also find that female labour force has a negative sign (i.e. a positive effect) and mostly significant at conventional levels of significance, confirming that women's empowerment enhances anti-trafficking policy. On the other hand, we could not find significant effects of women MPs in respective parliaments. It implies that policy improvement in anti-trafficking generally works through the empowerment of female constituents rather than political representation. Likewise, we could not find any support that large countries have good anti-trafficking policies. The results of the population variable remain largely insignificant across the estimations. In all the models, irrespective of estimation method, democracy is positively associated with better anti-trafficking policies. On the other hand, improvement in controlling corruption tends to improve policy framework, law and order remains grossly insignificant throughout the models, probably because combating human trafficking requires specifically

targeted efforts beyond general practice of law and order. We also find some support, albeit marginal, for voting in line with the US in UN General Assembly, suggesting the influence of American hegemony. While EU member countries are positively associated with effective anti-trafficking policies, the same is not replicated for OECD group, which remains insignificant in most of our models, indicating different priorities between two groups of advanced countries. Lastly, we find the positive association of in/outflows of human trafficking with anti-trafficking policy as per our theoretical expectations. Both retain a negative sign and remain statistically significant at conventional levels of significant. Summing up, our main results on the ratification of the Anti-trafficking Protocol showed net positive effect on government prevention policy, despite the inclusion of several of these highly significant controls.

5.1. Robustness checks

We examine the robustness of our main findings in the following ways. First, in order to increase our sample size, we estimate our baseline models by replacing ICGR's corruption and rule of law indices with World Bank Governance indices¹³¹⁴. Due to high correlation of these variables with per capita GDP (log), we replace per capita GDP with high, middle and low income countries' dummies. With these alterations, our total number of countries in the sample increase from 117 to 140. The results are captures in annex 4 and 5. Despite these changes our original results do not change drastically when estimated with different sample sizes.

Second, we re-estimate all our models with pooled OLS two-way fixed effects. We drop the time invariant variables from our models and perform two-way fixed effects because accounting for unit (country) heterogeneity is an additional robustness check since time series cross-sectional results can be sensitive to specification (Wilson and Butler 2007). These results are displayed in annex 5. The results show that protocol ratification leads to improvement in government policy on anti-trafficking with respect to prevention but not protection and prosecution. These results do

¹³ Much of the missing observations stems from the absence of ICGR data for several countries in our sample.

¹⁴ Because of 0.90 correlation between the World Bank Governance rule of law and corruption indices, we drop the former from our models.

not change with two-way fixed effects when estimated for the sample of only developing countries (see annex 6).

Third, it is possible that our key explanatory variable – the ratification of the Protocol – is endogenous to having better anti-trafficking policies. Apart from omitted variable bias, endogeneity could also result from the fact that ratification can also be a result rather than a cause of designing better anti-trafficking policies in a country. The results of Granger Causality tests show that the two years-lagged main variable of interest minimizes potential reverse-causality. However, to ensure the robustness of the results, we further utilize an instrumental variable (IV) approach using two-stage least squares with IV (2SLS – IV) with fixed effects, where we instrument for the potentially endogenous ratification variable. Agreed that perfectly valid instruments are very hard to come by, nevertheless, we make use of counts of ratifications by all countries in each region to which that the particular country belongs (excluding that particular country's ratification). The idea of peer effects on the likelihood of ratification of a treaty by an individual country is not new in the political economy literature. Studies by Simmons and Elkins (2003 and 2004) highlight the possibility that some key government policies might diffuse among countries¹⁵. The validity of the selected instrument depends on instrument relevance requiring the instrument must be highly correlated with the explanatory variable in question – otherwise it has no power (Bound, Jaeger and Baker 1995) and it should not vary systematically with the disturbance term in the second stage equation, i.e. $[\omega_{it} | IV_{it}] = 0$. In other words, it cannot have an independent effect on the dependent variable. As far as our instrument is concerned, we know of no empirical argument linking system-wide regional ratifications with anti-trafficking policy of an individual government.

The annex 7 reports our central results. The bottom of each table lists additional statistics that speak to the strength of the instrument. The first-stage F-test, Cragg-Donald statistics (Cragg and Donald 1993, Stock et al. 2002) report the test statistic used to test the null hypothesis that the parameter estimate for the instrument in the first stage regression is equal to zero. The results

¹⁵ Gassebner, Gaston and Lamla (2011), de Soysa and Vadlamannati (2010), Eichengreen and Leblang (2008), Pitlik (2007), Blonigen, Davies, Waddell and Naughton (2007), Davies and Naughton (2006) have all follow similar approach, albeit with respect to various other government policies.

show that our instrument is significant at 1% level in all models, confirming the strong correlation of regional ratifications and ratification of an individual government in the same region. In addition, the Sargan J-Statistic shows that the null of exogeneity cannot be rejected at the conventional level of significance in all our 2SLS models, confirming that the instrument meets the requirement of exclusion restriction. With respect to our main results, we do not see any drastic change neither in the significance level nor with the expected sign of the ratification variable. We find that ratification has significant, positive impact with a negative sign on prevention in both full sample and developing countries (see annex 7). Although impact on protection and prosecution is also pronounced in the 2SLS-IV estimations, the magnitudes and levels of significance are stronger for prevention. In summary, the results taken together seem remarkably robust to sample size, specification, and testing procedure. The basic ratification variable remained unchanged in its significance levels despite several alternative specifications and estimation techniques.

6. Conclusion

Over the past few years, the growing phenomenon of human trafficking worldwide, which some perceive as a challenge to national security while others see it as damaging prospect for human rights reputation of a country, has baffled many policy experts in this field. Although the problems associated with human trafficking has come to forefront by extensive media coverage, it hogged limelight only when the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children, in 2000. Surprisingly, even after a decade of emergence of Anti-trafficking Protocol, there are seldom empirical studies assessing the effectiveness of such protocols in tackling problems associated with human trafficking. Despite much anecdotal evidence pointing towards the impact of such protocol, there has been little systematic empirical research that addressed this issue, also taking the question of causality seriously. Most studies have addressed the issues related to treaty ratifications often related to human rights, empowerment rights and so on grossly ignoring the issues of human trafficking. This study uses the UN treaty on protocol ratification of anti-trafficking on comprehensive

measure of government policy on anti-trafficking, 3Ps – Protection, Prevention and Prosecution that captures broad changes in the government policy on anti-trafficking of a country. To the best of our knowledge, this is one of the pioneer empirical studies that looks beyond theoretical frameworks.

Using the data for 140 countries during the period 2001 – 2009, we find positive effects of the ratification of the Protocol only on prevention policy of anti-trafficking. These results remain consistent for both full sample and developing countries sample. Furthermore, the results do not change significantly when we test these effects exclusively for countries with high in/outflows of human trafficking. In addition, we also control for potential reverse-feedback effects running from anti-trafficking policy framework to ratification using the 2SLS-IV method of estimation. Even after controlling for endogeneity, the ratification of the Protocol seems to predict better government policy on anti-trafficking but only on prevention, a result that is robust to changes in specification and testing method. These results support our arguments about prevention as the compliance with this obligation is less costly and also reflects higher interests of the major powers and therefore is the most ‘efficient compliance’. Our results vindicate those (such as UN and other international agencies and NGOs) who highlight the importance for such protocols in countering the problems related to human trafficking, including child trafficking. Future research may do well to look at the organizational advantages of those ratifying countries that are well placed to counter human trafficking problems and the implications of their motives for overall socio-economic development.

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Table 2: Results of EBA – Baseline Variables

Set 1: Prevention						
Variables	Average Beta	Average Standard Error	% Sign	CDF-U	Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Democracy Polity IV	-0.051	0.011	1.000	1.000	-0.101	0.000
ICGR Law and Order	-0.054	0.059	0.389	0.867	-0.396	0.282
ICGR Corruption	-0.422	0.072	1.000	1.000	-0.728	0.000
Women MPs in Parliament	0.003	0.006	0.000	0.698	-0.015	0.025
Female Labor Force	-0.021	0.007	0.823	0.986	-0.051	0.007
Per capita GDP (log)	-0.13	0.049	0.651	0.935	-0.469	0.15
Population (log)	-0.122	0.042	0.909	0.993	-0.251	0.018
UNGA Voting	-1.268	0.385	0.84	0.983	-2.949	0.567
EU Membership dummy	-0.656	0.234	0.783	0.974	-1.611	0.422
OECD Membership dummy	-0.752	0.218	0.903	0.991	-1.608	0.234
Sub-Saharan African dummy	-0.115	0.138	0.149	0.826	-1.004	0.636
Set 2: Prosecution						
Variables	Average Beta	Average Standard Error	% Sign	CDF-U	Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Democracy Polity IV	-0.057	0.012	1.000	1.000	-0.113	0.000
ICGR Law and Order	-0.101	0.075	0.331	0.836	-0.444	0.253
ICGR Corruption	-0.326	0.076	1.000	0.999	-0.671	0.000
Women MPs in Parliament	-0.003	0.007	0.000	0.713	-0.026	0.020
Female Labor Force	-0.025	0.008	0.783	0.980	-0.063	0.011
Per capita GDP (log)	-0.175	0.050	0.829	0.981	-0.443	0.133
Population (log)	-0.040	0.043	0.074	0.808	-0.197	0.130
UNGA Voting	-1.943	0.401	1.000	1.000	-3.725	0.000
EU Membership dummy	-0.973	0.229	0.994	0.999	-1.925	0.111
OECD Membership dummy	-1.032	0.262	1.000	0.999	-1.986	0.000
Sub-Saharan African dummy	0.507	0.158	0.851	0.985	-0.309	1.277
Set 3: Protection						
Variables	Average Beta	Average Standard Error	% Sign	CDF-U	Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Democracy Polity IV	-0.056	0.011	1.000	1.000	-0.106	0.000
ICGR Law and Order	-0.103	0.059	0.417	0.882	-0.426	0.222
ICGR Corruption	-0.393	0.075	1.000	1.000	-0.692	0.000
Women MPs in Parliament	0.002	0.006	0.000	0.668	-0.019	0.024
Female Labor Force	-0.024	0.007	0.943	0.996	-0.058	0.003
Per capita GDP (log)	-0.152	0.049	0.720	0.951	-0.477	0.133
Population (log)	-0.102	0.042	0.697	0.976	-0.261	0.046
UNGA Voting	-1.411	0.376	0.920	0.992	-3.216	0.350
EU Membership dummy	-0.776	0.244	0.869	0.988	-1.756	0.304
OECD Membership dummy	-1.007	0.248	1.000	0.999	-1.895	0.000
Sub-Saharan African dummy	-0.147	0.138	0.331	0.856	-1.043	0.666

Notes: Results based on 175 regression combinations for all three sets respectively, using ordered probit time-specific fixed effects. ‘Average Beta’ and ‘Average Standard Error’ report the unweighted average coefficient and standard error, respectively. ‘% Sign.’ refers to the percentage of regressions in which the respective variable is significant at least at the 5% level. ‘CDF-U’ is the unweighted CDF as detailed in the text. The threshold to consider a variable robust is 0.9. ‘Lower Bound’ and ‘upper Bound’ give the lowest and highest value of point estimate minus / plus two standard deviations.

Table 3: Effects of Protocol Ratification on Anti-trafficking Policy: Ordered Probit

Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	Ordered Probit Prosecution	Ordered Probit Prevention	Ordered Probit Protection	Ordered Probit Prosecution	Ordered Probit Prevention	Ordered Probit Protection	Ordered Probit Prosecution	Ordered Probit Prevention	Ordered Probit Protection
Protocol Ratification (t-2)	-0.209 (0.149)	-0.420*** (0.116)	-0.273* (0.141)	-0.167 (0.145)	-0.404*** (0.115)	-0.250* (0.139)	-0.244 (0.150)	-0.453*** (0.115)	-0.334** (0.145)
Per capita GDP (log)	-0.0398 (0.0823)	-0.119 (0.0748)	-0.151* (0.0838)	-0.0371 (0.0819)	-0.119 (0.0750)	-0.152* (0.0836)	0.0298 (0.0864)	-0.0498 (0.0723)	-0.0346 (0.0932)
Population (log)	-0.0561 (0.0512)	-0.142*** (0.0447)	-0.115** (0.0489)	0.0343 (0.0568)	-0.109** (0.0540)	-0.0709 (0.0579)	-0.00770 (0.0616)	-0.0932* (0.0481)	-0.0304 (0.0575)
Female Labor Force	-0.0232** (0.00935)	-0.0102 (0.00859)	-0.0181** (0.00863)	-0.0139 (0.00941)	-0.00646 (0.00842)	-0.0133 (0.00879)	-0.0270*** (0.00903)	-0.0140* (0.00839)	-0.0251*** (0.00855)
Women MPs in Parliament	-0.000823 (0.00730)	0.00364 (0.00665)	0.00274 (0.00705)	0.00185 (0.00693)	0.00476 (0.00677)	0.00426 (0.00700)	-0.00202 (0.00737)	0.00245 (0.00668)	0.000909 (0.00708)
Democracy Polity IV	-0.0260* (0.0151)	-0.0227 (0.0144)	-0.0289** (0.0142)	-0.0291** (0.0147)	-0.0237* (0.0144)	-0.0304** (0.0141)	-0.0241 (0.0151)	-0.0206 (0.0146)	-0.0257* (0.0149)
ICGR Law and Order	0.0371 (0.0883)	0.0235 (0.0631)	-0.00812 (0.0581)	0.0205 (0.0836)	0.0166 (0.0635)	-0.0180 (0.0584)	0.0462 (0.0907)	0.0344 (0.0660)	0.00887 (0.0637)
ICGR Corruption	-0.202** (0.0914)	-0.341*** (0.0804)	-0.287*** (0.0858)	-0.275*** (0.0900)	-0.369*** (0.0839)	-0.324*** (0.0881)	-0.239*** (0.0902)	-0.378*** (0.0835)	-0.353*** (0.0884)
UNGA Voting	-0.634 (0.497)	-0.826* (0.484)	-0.488 (0.451)	-0.334 (0.474)	-0.711 (0.509)	-0.341 (0.463)	-0.480 (0.496)	-0.677 (0.482)	-0.228 (0.447)
EU Membership dummy	-0.494* (0.271)	-0.271 (0.278)	-0.323 (0.265)	-0.426 (0.281)	-0.242 (0.273)	-0.281 (0.262)	-0.447* (0.271)	-0.227 (0.283)	-0.252 (0.268)
OECD Membership dummy	-0.468 (0.366)	0.0520 (0.275)	-0.216 (0.278)	-0.764* (0.407)	-0.0549 (0.271)	-0.354 (0.298)	-0.432 (0.368)	0.0949 (0.287)	-0.149 (0.276)
Sub-Saharan Africa dummy	0.462* (0.240)	-0.449** (0.197)	-0.489** (0.215)	0.417* (0.233)	-0.473** (0.192)	-0.521** (0.214)	0.533** (0.230)	-0.387** (0.187)	-0.389* (0.218)
Outflows of Human Trafficking				-0.174*** (0.0609)	-0.0660 (0.0487)	-0.0866 (0.0562)			
Intflows of Human Trafficking							-0.123* (0.0680)	-0.127** (0.0541)	-0.218*** (0.0650)

Pseudo R2	0.1983	0.1548	0.1736	0.2092	0.1564	0.1764	0.203	0.1601	0.1887
Log Pseudo likelihood	-847.1	-919.1	-895.5	-835.6	-917.3	-892.5	-842.1	-913.4	-879.1
Time Dummies	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
No. of Countries	117	117	117	117	117	117	117	117	117
No. of Observations	745	746	746	745	746	746	745	746	746

Notes: Standard errors clustered at country level in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 4: Effects of Protocol Ratification on Anti-trafficking Policy in Developing Countries: Ordered Probit

Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	Ordered Probit Prosecution	Ordered Probit Prevention	Ordered Probit Protection	Ordered Probit Prosecution	Ordered Probit Prevention	Ordered Probit Protection	Ordered Probit Prosecution	Ordered Probit Prevention	Ordered Probit Protection
Protocol Ratification (t-2)	-0.219 (0.165)	-0.384*** (0.134)	-0.123 (0.161)	-0.174 (0.157)	-0.363*** (0.130)	-0.0903 (0.158)	-0.248 (0.167)	-0.424*** (0.132)	-0.180 (0.166)
Per capita GDP (log)	-0.0248 (0.0892)	-0.0670 (0.0775)	-0.119 (0.0857)	0.0112 (0.0907)	-0.0530 (0.0780)	-0.102 (0.0845)	0.0250 (0.0923)	-0.00112 (0.0733)	-0.0260 (0.0956)
Population (log)	-0.0537 (0.0533)	-0.108** (0.0449)	-0.0981** (0.0497)	0.113* (0.0588)	-0.0411 (0.0548)	-0.00417 (0.0578)	-0.0187 (0.0610)	-0.0617 (0.0479)	-0.0307 (0.0575)
Female Labor Force	-0.0225** (0.00947)	-0.00814 (0.00893)	-0.0153* (0.00887)	-0.00402 (0.00988)	-0.000203 (0.00877)	-0.00456 (0.00871)	-0.0253*** (0.00891)	-0.0120 (0.00867)	-0.0212** (0.00885)
Women MPs in Parliament	-0.00261 (0.00903)	0.00299 (0.00809)	0.00114 (0.00754)	-0.00335 (0.00844)	0.00277 (0.00816)	0.000896 (0.00757)	-0.00358 (0.00907)	0.00176 (0.00793)	-0.000538 (0.00760)
Democracy Polity IV	-0.0258* (0.0149)	-0.0222 (0.0140)	-0.0290** (0.0143)	-0.0327** (0.0146)	-0.0250* (0.0141)	-0.0330** (0.0143)	-0.0248* (0.0149)	-0.0208 (0.0143)	-0.0273* (0.0149)
ICGR Law and Order	0.0742 (0.0880)	0.0627 (0.0650)	0.0606 (0.0610)	0.0647 (0.0837)	0.0574 (0.0662)	0.0530 (0.0637)	0.0756 (0.0900)	0.0665 (0.0671)	0.0649 (0.0653)
ICGR Corruption	-0.142 (0.108)	-0.327*** (0.0993)	-0.198** (0.0870)	-0.204** (0.100)	-0.351*** (0.103)	-0.232*** (0.0879)	-0.172 (0.105)	-0.368*** (0.104)	-0.259*** (0.0919)
UNGA Voting	-0.452 (0.506)	-0.438 (0.491)	-0.212 (0.470)	0.0660 (0.449)	-0.222 (0.515)	0.0821 (0.486)	-0.357 (0.501)	-0.315 (0.485)	-0.0344 (0.463)
EU Membership dummy	-0.650 (0.433)	-0.770* (0.442)	-1.013*** (0.359)	-0.478 (0.405)	-0.695* (0.420)	-0.904*** (0.334)	-0.546 (0.433)	-0.635 (0.456)	-0.827** (0.365)
Sub-Saharan Africa dummy	0.518** (0.249)	-0.356* (0.193)	-0.415* (0.218)	0.510** (0.243)	-0.371** (0.187)	-0.438** (0.215)	0.566** (0.238)	-0.299 (0.183)	-0.337 (0.220)
Outflows of Human Trafficking				-0.291*** (0.0653)	-0.118** (0.0516)	-0.165*** (0.0549)			
Inflows of Human Trafficking							-0.0909 (0.0714)	-0.125** (0.0612)	-0.180** (0.0727)
Pseudo R2	0.1147	0.1015	0.0979	0.1416	0.106	0.107	0.1176	0.107	0.1094
Log Pseudo likelihood	-713.3	-760.2	-717.5	-691.6	-756.4	-710.3	-711	-755.6	-708.3

Time Dummies	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
No. of Countries	95	95	95	95	95	95	95	95	95
Observations	599	599	599	599	599	599	599	599	599

Notes: Standard errors clustered at country level in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 5: Marginal Effects of Protocol Ratification on Anti-trafficking Policy:
Ordered Probit, Full sample and Developing countries

Full-Sample	C1	C2	C3	C4	C5	E[Y]
Sample Frequency	0.107239	0.229223	0.392761	0.19571	0.075067	2.902145
Probability at Mean	0.051952	0.25118	0.48489	0.17769	0.034288	2.89118
1. No flows:	C1	C2	C3	C4	C5	E[Y]
Marginal Effects	0.044618	0.101966	-0.02498	-0.08972	-0.03188	-0.34469
P-value	0.002	0	0.041	0	0.005	0
2. Outflows (origin):	C1	C2	C3	C4	C5	E[Y]
Marginal Effects	0.042868	0.0977	-0.02351	-0.08699	-0.03007	-0.33057
P-value	0.003	0.001	0.046	0.001	0.006	0.001
3. Inflows (destination):	C1	C2	C3	C4	C5	E[Y]
Marginal Effects	0.047348	0.110565	-0.02679	-0.09785	-0.03328	-0.36967
P-value	0.001	0	0.042	0	0.003	0
Marginal Effects for Developing countries sample						
Developing Countries-Sample	C1	C2	C3	C4	C5	E[Y]
Sample Frequency	0.058431	0.198664	0.414023	0.237062	0.09182	3.105175
Probability at Mean	0.031745	0.193112	0.473733	0.241266	0.060144	3.104952
1. No flows:	C1	C2	C3	C4	C5	E[Y]
Marginal Effects	0.027381	0.08775	0.018673	-0.08797	-0.04583	-0.32215
P-value	0.013	0.004	0.187	0.005	0.015	0.005
2. Outflows (Origin):	C1	C2	C3	C4	C5	E[Y]
Marginal Effects	0.025511	0.082532	0.018267	-0.08401	-0.0423	-0.30217
P-value	0.017	0.005	0.18	0.006	0.019	0.006
3. Inflows (Destination):	C1	C2	C3	C4	C5	E[Y]
Marginal Effects	0.029701	0.096733	0.021376	-0.09849	-0.04932	-0.35326
P-value	0.007	0.001	0.162	0.002	0.008	0.001

Table 6: Effects of Protocol Ratification on Anti-trafficking Policy in Countries of Origin, Destination and Others: Ordered Probit

Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	Ordered Probit Prosecution	Ordered Probit Prevention	Ordered Probit Protection	Ordered Probit Prosecution	Ordered Probit Prevention	Ordered Probit Protection	Ordered Probit Prosecution	Ordered Probit Prevention	Ordered Probit Protection
Protocol Ratification (t-2)	-0.445* (0.264)	-0.542** (0.215)	-0.206 (0.374)	0.0633 (0.342)	-0.793*** (0.272)	-0.516 (0.358)	-0.0479 (0.162)	-0.427*** (0.147)	-0.206 (0.171)
Per capita GDP (log)	0.200 (0.213)	0.0455 (0.146)	0.0295 (0.200)	-0.278 (0.378)	-0.592** (0.281)	-0.0256 (0.213)	0.00548 (0.0856)	-0.0763 (0.0840)	-0.157* (0.0927)
Population (log)	0.113 (0.0817)	-0.148** (0.0679)	-0.0537 (0.0961)	-0.162 (0.185)	-0.352** (0.160)	-0.0453 (0.120)	0.0206 (0.0604)	-0.0174 (0.0622)	0.0172 (0.0700)
Female Labor Force	-0.0128 (0.0156)	-0.0269** (0.0109)	0.00574 (0.0111)	0.0227 (0.0168)	-0.00954 (0.0130)	-0.00227 (0.0155)	-0.0246** (0.0124)	0.00152 (0.0121)	-0.0231** (0.0103)
Women MPs in Parliament	-0.0364*** (0.0125)	-0.0109 (0.0121)	-0.0103 (0.0144)	-0.0120 (0.0158)	-0.0110 (0.0156)	-0.0328* (0.0183)	0.00666 (0.00998)	0.00779 (0.00966)	0.00131 (0.00904)
Democracy Polity IV	-0.0202 (0.0245)	0.0139 (0.0298)	0.00688 (0.0310)	-0.00901 (0.0475)	0.0401 (0.0276)	0.00771 (0.0307)	-0.0327* (0.0187)	-0.0555*** (0.0165)	-0.0467*** (0.0179)
ICGR Law and Order	0.146 (0.193)	0.234** (0.102)	0.135 (0.122)	0.588* (0.332)	0.505 (0.322)	0.783* (0.440)	-0.00880 (0.0884)	-0.0452 (0.0790)	-0.0264 (0.0828)
ICGR Corruption	-0.169 (0.434)	-0.0778 (0.210)	-0.0692 (0.216)	-0.827*** (0.278)	-0.455* (0.240)	-0.932*** (0.202)	-0.271** (0.105)	-0.355*** (0.107)	-0.225** (0.0987)
UNGA Voting	-1.936** (0.888)	-0.121 (1.026)	-1.132 (1.229)	-0.580 (2.445)	-2.758 (1.887)	-0.268 (1.009)	0.112 (0.635)	-0.818 (0.669)	-0.205 (0.633)
EU Membership dummy	-0.541 (0.521)	-1.126*** (0.397)	-0.991*** (0.337)	-0.500 (0.492)	0.218 (0.324)	-0.259 (0.451)	-0.441 (0.547)	-0.535 (0.624)	0.464 (0.744)
OECD Membership dummy	0.340 (0.701)	-0.0125 (0.516)	0.312 (0.404)	-2.021*** (0.664)	0.102 (0.558)	-0.872** (0.438)	-0.261 (0.628)	0.489 (0.664)	-1.017 (0.812)
Sub-Saharan Africa dummy	-0.0178 (0.446)	0.0944 (0.246)	-0.247 (0.409)	dropped	dropped	dropped	0.373 (0.291)	-0.755*** (0.243)	-0.691*** (0.250)
Pseudo R2	0.1959	0.1003	0.0745	0.4178	0.2349	0.2781	0.1641	0.176	0.1969
Log Pseudo likelihood	-211.1	-233.1	-260.1	-100.7	-138	-135.7	-506.6	-545.9	-502.1
Time Dummies	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Sample countries	Origin	Origin	Origin	Destination	Destination	Destination	Others	Others	Others

No. of Countries	30	30	30	19	19	19	74	74	74
No. of Observations	210	210	209	131	131	131	446	447	448

Notes: Standard errors clustered at country level in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Annex 1: List of Countries of Origin and Destination

Source: UNODC Incidence Index on Flows of Human Trafficking (2006)

Incidence of Reporting of Origin Countries

Very High	High	Medium	Low	Very Low
Albania, Belarus, Bulgaria, China, Lithuania, Nigeria, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Thailand, Ukraine	Armenia, Bangladesh, Benin, Brazil, Cambodia, Colombia, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Ghana, Guatemala, Hungary, India, Kazakhstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Mexico, Morocco, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Slovakia, Uzbekistan, Viet Nam	Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Congo (Republic of), Cote d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, North Korea, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Haiti, Honduras, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Kenya, Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan, Liberia, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Peru, Senegal, Serbia & Montenegro, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovenia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Macedonia, Taiwan, Tajikistan, Togo, Turkey, Uganda, Tanzania, Venezuela, Zambia	Argentina, Bhutan, Botswana, Burundi, Canada, Cape Verde, Congo (Democratic People of), Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Lesotho, Madagascar, Maldives, Nicaragua, Panama, Rwanda, South Korea, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Tunisia, United States of America, Zimbabwe	Brunei, Chad, Chile, Costa Rica, Egypt, Fiji, Jamaica, Macao, Netherlands, Paraguay, Syria, Uruguay, Yemen

Incidence of Reporting of Destination Countries

Very High	High	Medium	Low	Very Low
Belgium, Germany, Greece, Israel, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Thailand, Turkey, USA	Australia, Austria, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Cambodia, Canada, China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, India, Kosovo, Pakistan, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Switzerland, UAE, UK	Albania, Argentina, Bahrain, Benin, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, Croatia, Curacao, Dominican Rep, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Estonia, Finland, Gabon, Chan, Guatemala, Hungary, Iceland, Ira, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Macao, Malaysia, Mexico, Myanmar, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, South Korea, Russia, Serbia and Montenegro, Singapore, South Africa, Sweden, Syria, Macedonia, Togo, Ukraine, Venezuela, Viet Nam	Aruba, Bangladesh, Belize, Brunei, Congo (Republic of), Costa Rica, Ecuador, Egypt, Haiti, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Kyrgyzstan, Lao, Libya, Luxembourg, Mali, Niger, Oman, Paraguay, Romania, Slovenia, Sri Lanka, Uganda, Tanzania, Uzbekistan, Yemen	Algeria, Bhutan, Brazil, Burundi, Chad, Chile, Congo (Dem. Rep.), Djibouti, Dominica, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gambia, Georgia, Honduras, Jamaica, Liberia, Malawi, Maldives, Morocco, Mozambique, Moldova, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Sudan, Tajikistan, Trinidad and Tobago, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Annex 2: Data Description and Sources

Variable	Description	Source
Prevention	Prevention policy measure. Scale 1(full compliance) to 5(no compliance).	US Dept. of State, Annual Reports on Trafficking in Persons (2001-2009)
Protection	Protection policy measure. Scale 1(full compliance) to 5(no compliance).	US Dept. of State, Annual Reports on Trafficking in Persons (2001-2009)
Prosecution	Prosecution policy measure. Scale 1(full compliance) to 5(no compliance).	US Dept. of State, Annual Reports on Trafficking in Persons (2001-2009)
Protocol Ratification	Code 1 if the country is a member of the Protocol in a given year. Otherwise, 0.	http://www.unodc.org/
Per capita GDP (log)	Per capita income in 2000 constant prices.	ERS International Macroeconomic Data Set
Population (log)	Total population in thousands.	World Development Indicator
Female Labor Force	Share of females in total labor force.	World Development Indicator
Women MPs in Parliament	Share of female legislators in parliament.	World Bank Gender Statistics
Democracy Polity IV	Measure of democracy. +10 (full democracy) to -10 (full autocracy)	Polity IV data (Marshall and Jaggers, 2009).
ICGR Law and Order	Assessment of law and order, respectively. 0 (lowest respect) to 3 (highest respect) for each component. The aggregate index has a scale of 0-6.	International Country Risk Guide by the PRS Group (2009)
ICGR Corruption	Assessment of corruption. 0 (greatest risk of corruption) to 6 (no risk of corruption)	International Country Risk Guide by the PRS Group (2009)
UNGA Voting	Voting in line with USA, definition according to Thacker	Dreher, Sturm and Vreeland (2009)
EU Membership dummy	Code 1 if the country is a member of the EU in a given year. Otherwise, 0.	http://europa.eu/
OECD Membership dummy	Code 1 if the country is a member of the OECD in a given year. Otherwise, 0.	http://www.oecd.org/
Sub-Saharan Africa dummy	Code 1 if the country belongs to Sub-Saharan Africa.	World Bank classification of regions
Outflows of Human Trafficking	Very high (5) to no outflow (0) of human trafficking	UNODC (2006)
Inflows of Human Trafficking	Very high (5) to no inflow (0) of human trafficking	UNODC (2006)

Annex 4: Robustness Check, Effects of Protocol Ratification on Anti-trafficking Policy: Extended Sample

Variables	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
	Ordered Probit Prosecution	Ordered Probit Prevention	Ordered Probit Protection	Ordered Probit Prosecution	Ordered Probit Prevention	Ordered Probit Protection	Ordered Probit Prosecution	Ordered Probit Prevention	Ordered Probit Protection
Protocol (t-2)	-0.255*	-0.512***	-0.334***	-0.231	-0.500***	-0.309**	-0.254*	-0.511***	-0.332***
	(0.152)	(0.107)	(0.125)	(0.147)	(0.105)	(0.122)	(0.151)	(0.104)	(0.124)
High Income Non-OECD dummy	-0.0420	0.141	0.440*	0.0308	0.184	0.526**	-0.0929	0.0822	0.348
	(0.240)	(0.259)	(0.228)	(0.242)	(0.265)	(0.239)	(0.241)	(0.253)	(0.216)
Middle Income dummy	0.277	0.164	0.300	0.271	0.161	0.293	0.239	0.121	0.229
	(0.188)	(0.188)	(0.197)	(0.182)	(0.186)	(0.192)	(0.185)	(0.192)	(0.189)
Low Income dummy	0.363*	0.102	0.146	0.342*	0.0893	0.119	0.359*	0.0982	0.136
	(0.195)	(0.207)	(0.218)	(0.193)	(0.208)	(0.214)	(0.194)	(0.211)	(0.222)
Population (log)	-0.0459	-0.160***	-0.143***	0.0135	-0.129**	-0.0828	-0.0199	-0.131***	-0.0963*
	(0.0506)	(0.0483)	(0.0473)	(0.0551)	(0.0560)	(0.0539)	(0.0564)	(0.0507)	(0.0506)
Female Labor Force	-0.0212***	-0.0182**	-0.0208***	-0.0154*	-0.0150**	-0.0149**	-0.0244***	-0.0219***	-0.0269***
	(0.00814)	(0.00745)	(0.00745)	(0.00890)	(0.00741)	(0.00743)	(0.00771)	(0.00736)	(0.00774)
Women MPs in Parliament	-0.00420	0.00232	0.00240	-0.00236	0.00343	0.00455	-0.00431	0.00226	0.00239
	(0.00653)	(0.00573)	(0.00547)	(0.00634)	(0.00595)	(0.00559)	(0.00658)	(0.00569)	(0.00572)
Democracy Polity IV	-0.0266**	-0.0147	-0.0239**	-0.0264**	-0.0145	-0.0236**	-0.0269**	-0.0151	-0.0247**
	(0.0123)	(0.0110)	(0.0118)	(0.0123)	(0.0109)	(0.0117)	(0.0124)	(0.0110)	(0.0122)
World Bank Corruption	-0.140	-0.435***	-0.441***	-0.195*	-0.467***	-0.507***	-0.120	-0.412***	-0.408***
	(0.103)	(0.0955)	(0.0950)	(0.104)	(0.0998)	(0.101)	(0.102)	(0.0955)	(0.0994)
UNGA Voting	-0.878**	-0.813**	-0.635	-0.703*	-0.713*	-0.454	-0.792*	-0.718*	-0.483
	(0.448)	(0.404)	(0.415)	(0.425)	(0.416)	(0.414)	(0.441)	(0.400)	(0.408)
EU Membership dummy	-0.405	-0.194	-0.165	-0.358	-0.165	-0.108	-0.351	-0.135	-0.0747
	(0.264)	(0.264)	(0.272)	(0.268)	(0.259)	(0.272)	(0.265)	(0.268)	(0.276)
OECD Membership dummy	-0.592*	-0.0542	-0.369	-0.814**	-0.172	-0.593**	-0.539	0.00960	-0.271
	(0.341)	(0.273)	(0.282)	(0.383)	(0.268)	(0.297)	(0.344)	(0.282)	(0.289)
Sub-Saharan Africa dummy	0.482***	-0.256*	-0.220*	0.423***	-0.292**	-0.288**	0.454***	-0.293**	-0.279**
	(0.162)	(0.139)	(0.129)	(0.163)	(0.136)	(0.129)	(0.169)	(0.141)	(0.130)
Outflows of Human Trafficking				-0.120*	-0.0654	-0.125**			
				(0.0623)	(0.0486)	(0.0499)			
Inflows of Human Trafficking							-0.0848	-0.0976**	-0.155***

							(0.0611)	(0.0498)	(0.0525)
Pseudo R2	0.1883	0.1411	0.1635	0.1934	0.1427	0.169	0.191	0.1447	0.1722
Log Pseudo likelihood	-1001.4	-1088.7	-1065.3	-995.1	-1086.7	-1058.3	-998.1	-1084.2	-1054.2
Time Dummies	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
No. of Countries	140	140	140	140	140	140	140	140	140
No. of Observations	875	876	876	875	876	876	875	876	876

Notes: Standard errors clustered at country level in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Annex 5: Robustness Check, Effects of Protocol Ratification on Anti-trafficking Policy: Extended Sample with Developing countries

Variables	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
	Ordered Probit Prosecution	Ordered Probit Prevention	Ordered Probit Protection	Ordered Probit Prosecution	Ordered Probit Prevention	Ordered Probit Protection	Ordered Probit Prosecution	Ordered Probit Prevention	Ordered Probit Protection
Protocol (t-2)	-0.272* (0.164)	-0.463*** (0.121)	-0.218 (0.135)	-0.229 (0.153)	-0.437*** (0.116)	-0.174 (0.131)	-0.274* (0.163)	-0.467*** (0.117)	-0.224* (0.134)
High Income Non-OECD dummy	-0.141 (0.273)	0.0784 (0.289)	0.181 (0.241)	-0.101 (0.264)	0.104 (0.291)	0.228 (0.242)	-0.159 (0.269)	0.0571 (0.284)	0.145 (0.227)
Middle Income dummy	0.204 (0.218)	0.250 (0.221)	0.197 (0.241)	0.170 (0.202)	0.229 (0.217)	0.167 (0.233)	0.187 (0.213)	0.229 (0.224)	0.160 (0.226)
Low Income dummy	0.254 (0.215)	0.138 (0.230)	-0.0434 (0.247)	0.181 (0.202)	0.0908 (0.236)	-0.123 (0.243)	0.257 (0.211)	0.143 (0.236)	-0.0406 (0.241)
Population (log)	-0.0295 (0.0498)	-0.136*** (0.0486)	-0.113** (0.0453)	0.0895* (0.0534)	-0.0687 (0.0568)	-0.00312 (0.0527)	-0.00933 (0.0550)	-0.110** (0.0507)	-0.0698 (0.0488)
Female Labor Force	-0.0173** (0.00840)	-0.0154** (0.00765)	-0.0146** (0.00735)	-0.00370 (0.00925)	-0.00737 (0.00779)	-0.00174 (0.00726)	-0.0200*** (0.00775)	-0.0190** (0.00748)	-0.0207*** (0.00773)
Women MPs in Parliament	-0.00823 (0.00726)	0.00169 (0.00655)	-0.000410 (0.00578)	-0.00680 (0.00685)	0.00268 (0.00677)	0.00119 (0.00603)	-0.00832 (0.00735)	0.00169 (0.00652)	-0.000421 (0.00618)
Democracy Polity IV	-0.0326*** (0.0120)	-0.0198* (0.0106)	-0.0329*** (0.0116)	-0.0359*** (0.0124)	-0.0215** (0.0104)	-0.0361*** (0.0115)	-0.0328*** (0.0122)	-0.0201* (0.0106)	-0.0339*** (0.0120)
World Bank Corruption	-0.0176 (0.107)	-0.306*** (0.0939)	-0.272*** (0.0916)	-0.0609 (0.102)	-0.334*** (0.0962)	-0.323*** (0.0949)	-0.00269 (0.106)	-0.287*** (0.0951)	-0.242** (0.0985)
UNGA Voting	-0.694 (0.464)	-0.595 (0.412)	-0.403 (0.467)	-0.375 (0.430)	-0.404 (0.428)	-0.104 (0.469)	-0.634 (0.458)	-0.517 (0.405)	-0.275 (0.450)
EU Membership dummy	-0.548 (0.400)	-0.550 (0.415)	-0.735* (0.376)	-0.372 (0.372)	-0.444 (0.400)	-0.560 (0.383)	-0.459 (0.405)	-0.435 (0.425)	-0.553 (0.384)
Sub-Saharan Africa dummy	0.517*** (0.161)	-0.232* (0.137)	-0.194 (0.128)	0.425** (0.165)	-0.293** (0.132)	-0.292** (0.125)	0.495*** (0.168)	-0.264* (0.139)	-0.248* (0.128)
Outflows of Human Trafficking				-0.228*** (0.0688)	-0.130*** (0.0500)	-0.214*** (0.0488)			
Inflows of Human Trafficking							-0.0698 (0.0646)	-0.0940* (0.0520)	-0.154*** (0.0553)

Pseudo R2	0.1061	0.0914	0.0883	0.1232	0.097	0.1036	0.1082	0.0951	0.0984
Log Pseudo likelihood	-859.2	-919.7	-878.7	-842.7	-914	-864	-857.2	-916	-869.1
Time Dummies	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
No. of Countries	117	117	117	117	117	117	117	117	117
No. of Observations	722	722	722	722	722	722	722	722	722

Notes: Standard errors clustered at country level in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

**Annex 6: Robustness Check, Effects of Protocol Ratification on Anti-trafficking Policy:
Pooled OLS with Two-way Fixed Effects**

Variables	1	2	3	4	5	6
	POLS (FE) Prosecution Full sample	POLS (FE) Prevention Full sample	POLS (FE) Protection Full sample	POLS (FE) Prosecution Developing Sample	POLS (FE) Prevention Developing Sample	POLS (FE) Protection Developing Sample
Constant	-7.682 (11.95)	-4.652 (13.22)	-21.76** (10.55)	-9.870 (13.16)	-0.697 (12.48)	-20.60** (9.923)
Protocol (t-2)	0.0473 (0.0905)	-0.303*** (0.114)	-0.148 (0.106)	0.0259 (0.111)	-0.298** (0.131)	-0.100 (0.121)
Per capita GDP (log)	-0.962 (0.616)	-0.271 (0.471)	-0.231 (0.452)	-0.958 (0.700)	-0.235 (0.500)	-0.0774 (0.479)
Population (log)	1.793* (0.936)	1.256 (1.278)	1.973* (0.998)	1.913* (1.003)	0.803 (1.195)	1.646* (0.897)
Female Labor Force	0.0370 (0.0905)	-0.0556 (0.0867)	0.183** (0.0784)	0.0591 (0.105)	-0.0673 (0.0989)	0.203** (0.0844)
Women MPs in Parliament	-0.0213** (0.00993)	0.00583 (0.0104)	-0.00477 (0.00980)	-0.0268** (0.0106)	0.00653 (0.0108)	-0.00210 (0.0104)
Democracy Polity IV	-0.0593** (0.0257)	-0.0305 (0.0230)	0.0381** (0.0185)	-0.0606** (0.0253)	-0.0332 (0.0225)	0.0371** (0.0185)
ICGR Rule of Law	0.0674 (0.110)	0.129 (0.120)	0.152 (0.107)	0.0222 (0.124)	0.216* (0.123)	0.212* (0.109)
ICGR Corruption	0.0146 (0.122)	-0.153 (0.114)	-0.0808 (0.114)	0.00953 (0.126)	-0.186 (0.114)	-0.0848 (0.120)
UNGA voting	0.344 (0.470)	-0.0408 (0.400)	0.891** (0.378)	0.317 (0.515)	0.0850 (0.444)	1.031** (0.401)
EU Membership dummy	-0.0578 (0.232)	-0.438* (0.235)	-0.341 (0.221)	0.0361 (0.273)	-0.558* (0.320)	-0.465 (0.303)
R-squared	0.207	0.133	0.129	0.228	0.148	0.134
Time dummies	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Country dummies	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
No. of Countries	117	117	117	95	95	95
Observations	745	746	746	599	599	599

Notes: Standard errors clustered at country level in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

**Annex 7: Robustness Check, Effects of Protocol Ratification on Anti-trafficking Policy:
2SLS-IV with Two-way Fixed Effects**

Variables	1	2	3	4	5	6
	2SLS-IV (FE) Prosecution Full sample	2SLS-IV (FE) Prevention Full sample	2SLS-IV (FE) Protection Full sample	2SLS-IV (FE) Prosecution Developing Sample	2SLS-IV (FE) Prevention Developing Sample	2SLS-IV (FE) Protection Developing Sample
Constant	-6.756 (18.18)	14.16 (19.59)	14.51 (10.43)	-13.69 (16.51)	10.02 (11.03)	8.928 (9.963)
Protocol (t-2)	-1.213** (0.527)	-1.353** (0.577)	-1.132** (0.508)	-1.057** (0.499)	-1.470*** (0.571)	-1.281** (0.511)
Per capita GDP (log)	-0.497 (0.474)	-0.538 (0.507)	-1.248*** (0.455)	-0.189 (0.488)	-0.371 (0.543)	-1.094** (0.496)
Population (log)	0.506 (1.158)	-0.242 (1.268)	0.170 (1.114)	0.709 (1.070)	-0.402 (1.211)	0.643 (1.091)
Female Labor Force	0.146** (0.0685)	-0.0930 (0.0734)	-0.00516 (0.0661)	0.180** (0.0740)	-0.0981 (0.0824)	0.0239 (0.0758)
Women MPs in Parliament	0.000808 (0.00837)	0.0115 (0.00900)	-0.0150* (0.00810)	0.00396 (0.00889)	0.0141 (0.00994)	-0.0183** (0.00912)
Democracy Polity IV	0.0356 (0.0218)	-0.0318 (0.0232)	-0.0620*** (0.0209)	0.0366* (0.0217)	-0.0325 (0.0241)	-0.0613*** (0.0221)
ICGR Law and Order	0.111 (0.115)	0.0884 (0.122)	0.0272 (0.110)	0.181 (0.123)	0.180 (0.136)	-0.0116 (0.125)
ICGR Corruption	-0.119 (0.0885)	-0.192** (0.0947)	-0.0245 (0.0851)	-0.133 (0.0927)	-0.247** (0.103)	-0.0524 (0.0944)
UNGA Voting	0.746* (0.397)	-0.204 (0.426)	0.203 (0.382)	0.829* (0.427)	-0.191 (0.478)	0.0617 (0.435)
EU Membership dummy	-0.439* (0.246)	-0.512** (0.252)	-0.137 (0.228)	-0.543* (0.301)	-0.607* (0.314)	-0.0140 (0.288)
Sub-Saharan Africa dummy	2.152 (3.643)	-1.568 (8.525)	-4.085 (2.634)	2.664 (5.846)	1.587 (4.872)	-9.144** (4.459)
OECD Membership dummy	3.937 (3.447)	0.800 (4.765)	-2.345 (5.021)			
Adjusted R-Squared	0.611	0.547	0.641	0.485	0.457	0.523
First-stage F-statistic	19.51***	18.49***	19.49***	22.13***	20.82***	22.04***
Anderson Canon LR Statistic	23.37***	22.17***	23.36***	26.57***	25.03***	26.46***
Sargan Statistic (p-value)	1	1	1	1	1	1
Time Dummies	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Country Dummies	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
No. of countries	117	117	117	95	95	95
No. of Observations	746	746	745	599	599	599

Notes: Standard errors clustered at country level in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1