Voted In, Standing Out: Public Response to Immigrants’ Political Accession

Guy Grossman*  Stephanie Zonszein†

January 12, 2022

Abstract

In a context of nativism and poor representation of immigrant-origin ethnic minorities, what is the reaction of the host society when immigrants succeed at integration in political institutions? Building on threat theory—which links minorities’ political power to hostility against minoritized groups—we argue that when they win political office, immigrants pose a threat to natives’ dominant position. This in turn triggers a hostile reaction from a violent-prone fringe, the mass public and the elites. We test these dynamics across the last four UK general elections, using hate crime police records, public opinion data, and text data from over 500,000 news articles from 350 national and local newspapers. We identify the public’s hostile reactions with a regression discontinuity design that leverages close election results between minority-immigrant and dominant group candidates. Our findings suggest a public backlash against ethnic minority immigrants’ integration into majority settings.

Key words: Immigrant Integration, Representation of Immigrant-Origin Ethnic Minorities, Hate Crime, Exclusionary Attitudes, Media Portrayals of Immigrants

JEL Codes: J11, J15, Z13

*Professor, University of Pennsylvania. Email: ggros@upenn.edu.
†PDRI Postdoctoral Fellow, University of Pennsylvania. Email: szon@sas.upenn.edu.

Corresponding author.

We thank Jacob Denenberg for excellent assistance collecting data of candidate’s ethnic backgrounds, and Jennifer van Heerde-Hudson for kindly sharing the Parliamentary Candidates UK project data. We also thank Fernanda Márquez-Padilla, Rahsaan Maxwell and Kevin Munger for helpful advice, and participants at the ITAM Alumni Conference 2021, PolMeth XXXVIII, Online Political Economy Seminar Series 2021, the Development Economics Seminar at Hitotsubashi University, and the Political Economy Seminar at Hebrew University.
1 Introduction

From headscarf bans to Brexit, nativism is on the rise in Western democracies. At the same time, integrating ethnic minority immigrants into their host country’s political life has become a challenge for these societies.\(^1\) In the UK, immigrant-origin ethnic minorities are less likely to be included on the electoral register—25% of first-generation and 20% of the second generation who are eligible to register to vote do not do so, compared to 10% of the white British population (Heath et al., 2013). They are also descriptively underrepresented: while ethnic minorities constitute 15% of the total population, only 10% of Members of Parliament are from an ethnic minority background (Uberoi and Johnston, 2019). In such a context of nativism and low representation of immigrant-origin ethnic minorities, what is the response of the dominant-group natives to ethnic minorities’ success at integration in political institutions?\(^2\)

It has long been argued that the political and/or economic ascendance of a minority group can trigger a hostile, and at times violent, backlash from members of the majority group concerned by a real (Bobo, 1983) or perceived (Blumer, 1958) threat to the status quo. Hostility against minority groups can occur in response to structural social changes like population shifts (Blau, 1977) and economic restructuring (Dancygier and Donnelly, 2013), as well as the increasing political power of previously disenfranchised groups (Van Dyke and Soule, 2002). Such hostility, expressed as violence or exclusionary attitudes, is in part reactionary and can be a means of reasserting social control (King and Brustein, 2006).

The successful integration of immigrant-origin ethnic minorities in political institutions, in particular, is expected to be perceived as posing a challenge to the existing power of the dominant-group

\(^1\)We acknowledge that inclusionary attitudes and immigrant political integration have been increasing in the last decade in Western European democracies. Despite these improvements, the current mainstreaming of nativist ideologies is reinforcing barriers to immigrants’ full participation in their host societies.

\(^2\)We use the term \textit{immigrant} to refer to both first- and later-generation immigrants. We use it interchangeably with the term \textit{ethnic minority}, as many of the numerically sizable minority groups in Western democracies have recent immigrant origins.
natives (Wilson, 1978; Dancygier, 2010). Using parliamentary elections in the UK, in this paper we explore the response of majority group members to ethnic minority immigrants winning political power through the ballot box. Our paper is motivated by two limitations of existing studies that contend that when marginalized groups gain political power, the dominant group responds with greater hostility.

First, past work has had a hard time establishing a causal relationship between minorities’ political power gains and majority group backlash. Proxy measures commonly used in the extant literature such as the size of the minority group (Blalock, 1967; Quillian, 1995; Green, Strolovitch and Wong, 1998) do not necessarily capture the group’s political power, even as they indirectly measure competition for scarce resources. Studies that do capture minorities’ political power with measures such as the ratio of minority-to-majority votes in recent elections (D’Alessio, Stolzenberg and Eitle, 2002), the share of legislatures that are members of the minority group (Van Dyke and Soule, 2002), the success of parties supporting minorities (King and Brustein, 2006), and whether a minority holds political office (Jacobs and Wood, 1999) are vulnerable to identification concerns. Particularly, from omitted variable bias—by failing to account for unobserved relevant characteristics that determine both minority political power and anti-immigrant attitudes and behavior—and from problems of reverse causality. We address these concerns by using a regression discontinuity design of close parliamentary elections, comparing constituencies where a minority MP candidate barely wins versus constituencies where a minority candidate barely loses.³

The second limitation of existing work is its ambiguity with respect to which members of the majority group respond negatively to gains in minority political power. Much of the literature focuses on violent backlash in the form of hate crimes (Dugan and Chenoweth, 2020), lynching (Hovland and Sears, 1940; Olzak, 1990), and inter-racial killings (D’Alessio, Stolzenberg and Eitle, 2002). However, such heinous crimes are usually perpetrated by the more extreme members of society, and thus a focus on extreme (and relatively rare) forms of violence leaves open the question of whether such negative behavior and attitudes are more widely shared among majority group members. And

³Relatedly, Kuipers, Nellis and Weaver (2021) identify the effect of extremist parties winning power, rather than the effects of electing minorities, on exclusionary attitudes.
while admittedly some studies have established a correlation between minority political power gains and mass public opinion (e.g., Quillian, 1996; Fossett and Kiecolt, 1989), it is unclear whether the conditions that trigger violent responses are ones that also trigger less extreme responses.

We address this concern by exploring—within the context of a single event—outcomes at three different societal levels. Specifically, we focus on: (a) hate crimes (which is a behavior at the tail of the societal distribution); (b) attitudes toward migrants (which captures mass public opinion), and (c) media tone towards migrant groups (which reflects the attitudes and behavior of elites). We study the reaction of these three societal segments to the same event (the election of a minority candidate in close elections) separately from each other, as they may not necessarily respond in the same direction.

We argue that three mechanisms explain a hostile response to minority electoral victories. First, elections trigger intergroup competition by activating a process of social comparison between dominant and ethnic minority groups (Tajfel and Turner, 1979). To the extent that minority victories are conceived as posing a threat to the dominant group’s status, they may result in conflict. Second, close elections intensify such a dynamic as they heighten ethnic identification, and strong ethnic identities are accompanied by ethnocentrism, which is frequently expressed as hostility against outgroups (LeVine and Campbell, 1972). Third, ethnic minority victories may also operate as an informational cue about the relative power of the ethnic minority group and its mobilization capacity, triggering, in turn, status concerns (related to competition for resources), and the subsequent hostile response (Craig, Rucker and Richeson, 2018).

Leveraging close election results between minority-immigrant and dominant group candidates, we find that the accession of members of ethnic minority immigrant groups to political office across the last four UK general elections triggered a backlash against their communities. In constituencies where a minority candidate barely wins, compared to where the minority candidate barely loses, the subsequent hate crime rate is significantly higher. Three months after the election we identify an effect of 0.88 standard deviations, which corresponds to a 68% increase in hate crime relative to the average hate crime rate in constituencies where minority candidates barely lose. Similarly, we find that narrowly winning a parliamentary seat affected mass attitudes toward immigrants, significantly increasing the share of survey respondents who state that too many immigrants have
been let into the UK. The size of the effect corresponds to a 66% decrease in inclusionary attitudes (or 0.65 standard deviations). Finally, we assess elites’ response by analyzing text from over 500,000 newspaper articles that have been matched to the specific ethnic background of the candidates and their constituencies, which allows us to compute a measure of negative speech about the candidate’s ethnic group. Three months after the election, we find a difference of 20 percentage points (or 0.66 standard deviations) between the proportion of negative mentions about the barely winners’ and the barely losers’ ethnic group.

This paper contributes to the large literature on intergroup conflict that is rooted in Blalock’s 1967 original conceptualization of power threat theory. While the correlation between gains to minority political power and majority group backlash is well established, our study provides instead causal estimates of such a potential backlash. In addition, we show within the same case that the backlash against political gains by a minority group is not limited to a violent-prone fringe (recall—hate crimes are relatively rare events) but is also observed among the mass public and the elites. Moreover, subgroup analyses suggest that the election of minority candidates triggers responses rooted mostly in subjective concerns over status, with objective (or material) concerns likely playing a more auxiliary role.

We also contribute to a growing literature on the determinants of hate crimes that target minoritized groups. Specifically, we enrich work on situational trigger events, which hitherto focused on reactions to unexpected shocks (Dipoppa, Grossman and Zonszein, 2021), and to minorities perpetrating terror attacks (Deloughery, King and Asal, 2012) and serious felonies (Jäckle and König, 2018). We show that minority candidates winning close parliamentary elections can similarly trigger a violent response, arguably because political ascendance of minorities, heightens among members of the dominant group, a sense of threat to the hierarchical status quo.

Only a handful of studies assess variation in immigration media coverage explained by immigrant-related events. Those that do are mostly concerned with large-scale terrorist attacks perpetrated by members of minority groups, and focus on coverage by the national media (Vliegenthart, Boomgaarden and Boumans, 2011; Bleich, Nisar and Abdelhamid, 2016). To the best of our knowledge, this is the first article to assess whether and how the successful integration of migrant groups to

See Green and Spry (2014) and Dancygier and Laitin (2014) for useful reviews.
their host political institutions affects the media coverage of migrants. In so doing, we contribute to the political communication literature by showing that the electoral success of a migrant group changes the local media coverage of that group in terms of both attention and valence.

2 Minority political power and intergroup hostility

A central tenet of classic minority-group threat theories is that real or perceived intergroup competition for scarce resources provokes hostility. Group conflict involves not only objective conditions of competition between members of different groups but also the subjective perception that outgroup members pose a threat to (objective) valued resources or preferred social stratification (Bobo, 1983).

According to social identity theory, individuals form their self-identity and define their interests based on group membership, and they evaluate their own group by comparing its attributes to those of other groups (Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Shayo, 2009). When such a comparison is unsatisfactory, individuals attempt to make their group more positively distinct (Tajfel and Turner, 1979). The goal of such a strive for differentiation is to maintain or achieve social superiority, and by extension, a positive self-worth. As such, the process of group differentiation is essentially competitive, and intergroup competition is set by social comparison. Insofar as social differentiation rests on comparisons related to the distribution of scarce resources, social competition is expected to be linked to intergroup conflict (Sambanis and Shayo, 2013), as individuals exert effort to change their group’s social position.

Importantly for the context we study here, an outgroup becomes a target of comparison when circumstances, like competitive elections, make that outgroup more salient. Accordingly, an election may trigger intergroup competition by activating a process of social comparison that rests on social status. In particular, the accession of ethnic minorities to political office, which signals a clear challenge to the status quo, can drive dominant groups to experience social identity insecurity. High-status groups react to insecure social identity by searching for enhanced group distinctiveness, which in turn may trigger a discriminatory response, especially when their dominant status is perceived as legitimate (Blumer, 1958).
Contextual conditions and threat

Minority-group threat theory provided the theoretical foundation for a long-standing body of research on inter-racial relations. Here, minorities occupying spaces traditionally dominated by an ethnic majority group are perceived to pose a threat to the majority’s social, political, and economic status. Empirically, this body of work consistently finds a positive relationship between the relative size of a minority population and hostility against that minoritized group. As the relative size of the minority population increases, the threat increases as well by, for example, heightening interethnic competition for scarce resources like jobs, housing, education, and health care (an economic and social threat), or by increasing the potential for minority political mobilization (a political threat) (Blalock, 1967).

As status threat increases, the willingness of (some) dominant group members to allow minorities in their life spaces decreases, and derogation of minorities increases. Evidence of such a dynamic has been provided by relating the relative size (change, or rank) of a minority population in a county or metropolitan area to racial inequality in education, occupation and income (Wilcox and Roof, 1978), hate crimes against minorities (Green, Strolovitch and Wong, 1998; Cikara, Fouka and Tabellini, 2021) and asylum-seekers (Marbach and Ropers, 2018), white’s attitudes toward racial segregation (Wilson, 1978), and anti-immigrant prejudicial attitudes (Quillian, 1995).

More recent work provides nuance to the link between relative size of a minority group and threat. One such argument is that dominant group members are more likely to respond to changing demographic context with exclusionary attitudes, when primed by external stimuli that reinforces the threat, such as negative rhetoric about immigrants that becomes nationally salient (Hopkins, 2010). Consistently, empirical studies find that providing dominant ethnic group members information about the changing ethnic demographics of a nation (or an individual’s local context) triggers multiple concerns about their status, standing, and potential vulnerabilities, which, in turn, promote derogation of ethnic minorities (Craig, Rucker and Richeson, 2018). As such, we contend that beyond the direct threat on the dominant group’s political status, a close election won by an ethnic minority candidate may operate as the external stimulus (or communication device about the size, mobilization capacity and growth of the ethnic minority population) that connects the dominant group changing demographic context with their behavior and attitudes toward minorities. Such a
stimulus or information triggers a hostile response.

Distinct from minority-group threat theories based on competition for scarce resources, the hostile response to changing ethnic demographics has also been explained as a reaction to a cultural identity threat. Groups perceived to threaten a nation’s distinctive cultural identity are likely to elicit hostility, as the nation is an object of strong alliances (Sides and Citrin, 2007). In contexts like a general election in which national identity is the basis of self-identity and emotional attachment, immigrants are by definition outsiders (Huddy, 2001). As such, considerations of national identity evoke exclusionary reactions to minority immigrants (Sniderman, Hagendoorn and Prior, 2004).

In addition to the relative size of a minority group, other threat-triggering conditions have been discussed in the literature. Blalock (1967)’s central link between intergroup conflict and competition for scarce resources has naturally been extended to the link between intergroup conflict and economic conditions. In particular, worsening of economic circumstances among dominant group members has been shown to trigger hostility against minorities (Sharma, 2015). Such a hostile response is not exclusive to those directly in competition with minorities and immigrants, as dominant group members respond to the perception that they will lose their economic advantages over the subordinate group (Quillian, 1995). Accordingly, empirical studies find, for example, a negative relation between minority-to-majority unemployment and majority-on-minority crime (D’Alessio, Stolzenberg and Eitle, 2002), a positive association between job loss and patriot/militia organization (Van Dyke and Soule, 2002), and a positive link between unemployment and anti-immigrant attitudes (Fetzer, 2000) as well as support for anti-immigrant political parties (Jackman and Volpert, 1996).

A handful of studies addresses minority-group threat theory specifically from its political threat component. Rather than looking at the size of a minority, D’Alessio, Stolzenberg and Eitle (2002) use the ratio of black-to-white votes cast in the South Carolina general election to measure threat to the dominant group’s political status. Jacobs and Wood (1999) use instead the racial identity of mayors, finding a significant relation between the presence of black mayors and white killings of blacks. In his discussion of ethnic conflict, Hardin (1995) conceptualizes public office as a positional good which is fundamental in the allocation of distributional goods like welfare benefits. State-managed distributional goods matter more when there are fewer private opportunities, and
therefore public office is particularly consequential for ethnic conflict during hard economic times. Relatedly, Dancygier (2010) explains immigrant-native conflict as arising from immigrants’ costly material demands to which political parties are responsive. Natives attack immigrant-origin minorities when their presence reduces natives’ material welfare. Dancygier (2010) tests her argument by operationalizing immigrant political power as the share of minorities in local councils, finding a positive association with conflict only under conditions of economic scarcity.

In sum, building on minority-group threat theory and the empirical evidence that derives from it, we argue that elections between the dominant group and immigrant-origin ethnic minority candidates trigger intergroup competition. By differentiating winners from losers, elections are inherently a social comparison process. Social comparisons do not necessarily provoke intergroup conflict, but conflict is more likely when intergroup competition rests on a real or perceived threat to the dominant group’s political, economic, or cultural status.

A hostile response to the accession of ethnic minorities to political office is perhaps more likely under competitive elections, which are the focus of our empirical strategy. First, competitive elections between ethnically distinct groups have been shown to heighten ethnic identification (Eifert, Miguel and Posner, 2010) and ethnocentrism, frequently expressed as hostility against outgroups (LeVine and Campbell, 1972). Second, an ethnic minority victory poses a threat to the dominant group’s status—which is based on objective conditions regarding competition for scarce resources or the subjective perception about reconfiguration of the hierarchical social structure. Third, an ethnic minority victory likely operates as an informational cue about the relative size of the ethnic minority population, and its mobilization capacity. Combined, ethnocentrism, objective and subjective status concern and informational cues regarding the relative political power of groups are expected to trigger, in turn, a hostile response.
3 Ethnic minority candidates and Members of Parliament in the UK

We test the above argument using the case of minority candidates in close parliamentary elections in the UK. The number of ethnic minority candidates has been increasing over time, particularly propelled by a 2010 agreement between the three biggest parties to set internal targets for the improvement of minorities' representation. As a result, the number of ethnic minority Members of Parliament (MPs) almost doubled between 2005 and 2010 (Sobolewska, 2013). Since the 2010 general election, ethnic minority candidates have competed in 58% of all parliamentary constituencies in England and Wales and have won in 21%.

MPs in the UK are constituency oriented, and the personal relationship they cultivate with their constituents make them highly visible. The turn towards a focus on constituency services was set in motion by the post-war welfare state, which increased citizens’ interactions with the state as they navigated a complex set of rules and eligibility criteria. More recently, reforms in Parliament—like the foundation of the Backbench Business Committee, which selects business based on constituency relevance—have further reinforced the centrality of constituency concerns (McKay, 2020). Although the ability of individual MPs to engage in redistribution is restricted by parliamentary institutions (e.g., voting in accord to the party whip), there is evidence that MPs often trade off their time to participate in government-opposition debate (one of their most fundamental resources) for constituency representation (Crewe, 2015). Moreover, MPs are frequently involved in local casework, even when matters are legally a responsibility of local government, like housing or pensions (Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina, 1984).

Considering that MPs in the UK serve their constituents, evidence from candidate and MP surveys suggest that ethnic minority MPs are more eager to represent their fellow minorities than their white counterparts. Minority MPs are also more likely to believe that racism held back

5About 66% of British constituents can spontaneously recall the name of their MP; twice the recall level of US Member of Congress (McKay, 2020). An eighth of British respondents claimed to have met their MP personally (Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina, 1984).
British minorities, and as such, it is their duty to address long-standing inequalities by prioritizing minority concerns. However, this is less true of Conservative ethnic minority candidates and MPs (Sobolewska, McKee and Campbell, 2018). On the demand side for politicians, immigrants believe that coethnic politicians better understand the interests of their communities and take these interests to heart (Bloemraad, 2006).

In this context, control over political office by a member of an ethnic minority group can be viewed as a significant threat to the privileged position of the dominant group. Such a threat may be more salient in a competitive context that enhances status threat, and when the increased political representation of ethnic minorities is backed by institutional efforts to achieve their representation (King and Brustein, 2006), such as the 2010 multi-party agreement mentioned above. The threat may be based on objective conditions of competition: ethnic minority politicians articulate more redistributive policies, benefiting their fellow minorities, and via constituency service they redirect attention to marginalized groups. However, threats can also be based on the subjective perception that ethnic minority members pose a threat to the hierarchical social order. As such, the presence of ethnic minority politicians in Parliament may signal the demise of a ‘white political elite’ (Clark, 1994). Minority politicians heighten minorities’ sense of political efficacy, enhancing minority’s future political participation (Bobo and Gilliam, 1990), and therefore the prospects of electing minority group representatives, given that minority group mobilization is a key resource for electing coethnic representatives (Maxwell, 2012). In sum, ethnic minority political victories pose a combination of objective and subjective threats for dominant group members that may find their expression in hateful behavior and exclusionary attitudes.

4 Data, outcomes and treatment measures

We measure the possibility of a violent backlash with police recorded monthly hate crime counts. Because hate crime offenders are not representative of the broader public—the majority of offenders in the UK are white, male and under 25 (Roberts et al., 2013)—we measure mass public response with publicly available public opinion data. Particularly, we measure attitudes towards immigrants and ethnic minorities from post-election surveys. Finally, we assess the reactions from elites with
the valence of newspaper articles about the candidates’ ethnic group. Unlike hate crimes for which we do not know the victim’s identity, and public opinion data where questions are broadly about immigrants and minorities, the newspaper data allows us to measure responses specifically targeting the ethnic group of a candidate. We collect these data for the longest period available covering the general elections from 2010 to 2019. In Table A.1 we present summary statistics for our main outcome, treatment and predetermined variables, and below we describe them with detail.

4.1 Hate crimes

Data Following a FOI request, the Home Office provided us with monthly hate crime counts in England and Wales as recorded by the police, desegregated by Community Safety Partnership (CSP) and Local Authority District (LAD) from April 2014 to September 2020. We requested such data by offense sub-code for racially or religiously aggravated offenses (e.g. racially or religiously aggravated assault with injury) and for the non-aggravated equivalent offenses (e.g. assault with injury). Overall, the data contains 327,840 hate crimes.

Outcomes The main variable measuring violence against ethnic minority immigrants is the monthly number of hate crimes per 1,000 residents in a given constituency. We focus on every month after the general election, from the first month, which includes the election date, up to nine months later, corresponding to the maximum period of available crime data after the 2019 election. As a placebo outcome, we use the monthly constituency crime rate of equivalent offenses that are not motivated by racial or religious animus. Appendix B describes the process we follow to assign hate crimes from LADs into parliamentary constituencies, including a validation exercise.

We do not have information from 30 CSPs that do not use offense sub-codes to report hate crime. Additionally, we do not have information about victims’ identity, as not every CSP records such information, and those that do, started to record it only in 2016. 9% of the religiously motivated hate crimes are anti-Christian (Home Office, 2020).
4.2 Mass public opinion

Data Public opinion data are from the 2010, 2015, 2017 and 2019 British Election Study, which are face-to-face post-election surveys fielded immediately after a general election, and representative of UK eligible voters. We focus on white respondents and, for comparability, subset the data to England and Wales—the two countries for which we have hate crime data. Pooling together the data of these four election surveys, we have a sample of 2,200 respondents and at least one respondent in 45% of the constituency-elections where minority candidates run for a seat in parliament.\textsuperscript{7}

Outcomes The main variable measuring inclusionary attitudes towards immigrants is computed with an item that asks respondents across the last three election surveys whether too many immigrants have been let into the UK. To assess the robustness of our results beyond this item, we compute two additional outcomes that use all other available survey items on attitudes towards immigration and ethnic minorities. These items are either included in all survey years, but the wording of questions and answers (and their range) changes or are not included across the four elections. We use an index of left–right views on topics unrelated to immigration as a placebo outcome. Appendix C describes with more detail the survey items and the computation of the outcome variables (including harmonization across years).

4.3 Media tone toward migrant groups

Data We use data from over 500,000 articles from 350 national, regional and local UK newspapers, covering the general elections from 2010–2019.\textsuperscript{8} This data is from Common Crawl, which is an open repository of web crawl data. We assume that an article refers to a candidate’s ethnic group when

\textsuperscript{7}Each constituency-election has between 1 and 16 respondents, with a median of 8. Since the data is not representative of constituencies, we analyze it at the individual level.

\textsuperscript{8}The data includes opinion articles, news stories and possibly letters to the editor. Therefore, the articles may be capturing a mixture of elite and broader societal behavior rather than uniquely reflecting elite behavior. Yet, we contend that the content mostly reflects elite behavior, given that it is curated by the editors and their staff.
three conditions are met: 1) the publication date is on election day and up to 10 months after each
general election\(^9\), 2) the article contains mentions of terms referring to the candidate’s country or
nationality of origin, which are extracted with the named entity annotator of CoreNLP and 3) such
mentions co-occur in the article with a mention referring to the candidate’s constituency. The
constituency is extracted by tokenizing the article with CoreNLP and looking for tokens which
match place names in the Index of Place Names in Great Britain, and mapping to the corresponding
constituency. Overall, this data includes almost 150,000 mentions from 156 newspapers that meet
these three conditions about the candidates’ group.

**Outcomes** Using CoreNLP’s five-category sentiment annotator, we compute a measure of tone
in elite speech about the candidate’s ethnic group. Particularly, we extract from the relevant articles
the sentiment of the sentences mentioning the candidate’s country and nationality terms. CoreNLP’s
sentiment annotator improves upon bag of words sentiment classifiers that ignore the order of words
and assign positive points for positive words and negative points for negative words and then sum
up these points (e.g., Young and Soroka, 2012). Instead CoreNLP uses a model that builds up a
representation of whole sentences based on their grammatical structure. As such, it computes the
sentiment based on how words compose the meaning of longer phrases, without losing important
information, like sentiment change and scope of negation (Socher et al., 2013). In addition, this
annotator is particularly useful in capturing the sentiment of sentences, which is the task at hand,
as it is trained on a large corpus of (more than 200,000) human labeled phrases, as opposed to
labeled documents or chunks.

Using the sentiment classification of each of the mentions of a candidate’s ethnic group, we
compute our main outcome measuring an elite response by taking the monthly ratio between the
negative valence mentions and the total number of mentions about the candidate’s ethnic group.
We focus on such a ratio rather than on the number of negative mentions, because the result of
the election may increase the salience of the winning candidate’s ethnic group. When this is the
case, our interest is on evaluating whether such an increase in salience is of speech with specific

\(^9\)Ten months correspond with the maximum number of months between the 2019 election
and the most recent article.
valence (i.e. proportionally more negative or positive). For this reason, we also compute the proportion of positive- and neutral-valence mentions about the candidate’s ethnic group, which we use in additional analyses assessing a generalized increase in salience. To increase confidence that our main measure of proportion of negative mentions is indeed capturing the valence towards the candidate’s ethnic group, as opposed to characterizing the constituency, we compute a placebo measure which includes mentions about countries and nationalities in North America, Western Europe, and Australia and New Zealand in the candidate’s constituency, which should not be affected by the identity of a winning candidate. Appendix D describes with greater detail the process to gathering the newspaper data and to computing the outcome measures. It also discusses validity of the named entity and sentiment annotators.

4.4 Election results and ethnic background of candidates

Data The data on general election results from 2010 to 2019 are from the Electoral Commission. We construct a database of the ethnic background of candidates by relying on previous classifications of a parliamentary candidate’s ethnicity as white or Black, Asian, and minority ethnic (BAME). We build on these previous classifications by identifying the ethnic origin of BAME candidates based on their country of birth, and their parents and grandparents’ countries of birth.

Collecting data on candidates is a difficult task as there is no single source of candidate data, either from the Electoral Commission, or from the political parties themselves. We rely on a range of sources including the 2010 British General Election Constituency Results, which contains the ethnicity of candidates running with the biggest three political parties: Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat. 76% of ethnic minority candidates stand in elections with one of these three parties.\textsuperscript{10} For the 2015 and 2017 general elections we rely on the Parliamentary Candidates UK project, which collected the ethnicity of every candidate standing in these elections with an established party,\textsuperscript{11} and on independent candidates if they are one of the top two finishers in a

\textsuperscript{10}Based on data from the 2015 general election, which is the next closest election for which we have data on every candidate.

\textsuperscript{11}Labour, Conservative, Liberal Democrat, Scottish National, Plaid Cymru, UKIP, Green
constituency. For the 2019 election we labelled whether a candidate is BAME by searching the profile of the more than 3,300 candidates and using information of candidates who have run before for a seat in parliament or who are sitting MPs. For candidates in this election, and to identify a candidate’s country of origin for all election years, we rely on various sources including crowdsourced information by the Democracy Club, which collects candidates social media accounts (Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn), campaign websites and their pictures.

We also cull information from party websites, regional and local newspapers, and especially from ethnic newspapers (e.g., Asian Voice), which usually include a list of co-ethnic candidates in an election special issue. We classify a candidate’s ethnic origin only when the candidate self-identifies as ethnic minority on their social media profile, personal website, their party’s website, or if more than one information source confirms the candidate’s origin. We do not include national and ethno-linguistic minorities (e.g, Welsh), as these communities are not classified as minorities in the data we are relying on.

Across the last four general elections 923 ethnic minority candidates from 334 constituencies (58% of all constituencies) stood for parliament in England and Wales, with increasing numbers over time (Figure E.1a). Because our estimation strategy involves the strongest minority candidate in each constituency, our sample is of 662 candidates with 29% winners. Perhaps contrary to conventional wisdom, these candidates are fairly split across the biggest parties and across geographical areas (Figure E.1b and E.1c).

Treatment The independent variable of interest indicates whether an ethnic minority candidate wins the election.

4.5 Constituency characteristics

We use data from the 2001 and 2011 Census (accessed via nomis, Office of National Statistics) to compute predetermined variables of characteristics of a constituency that may determine both an ethnic minority win and our outcomes: hate crime, exclusionary attitudes towards immigrants and minorities, and negative media tone about migrant groups. For example, the constituency vote and Northern Ireland parties.
share for UKIP and BNP in the previous election, constituency population share that is foreign
born, ethnic or religious minority, unemployed, the share of households with high deprivation, and
population density.

5 Estimation method

We test whether the accession of members of ethnic minority immigrant groups to political office
triggers a backlash against their communities by comparing our key outcome measures (monthly
hate crime rate, exclusionary mass attitudes, monthly proportion of negative mentions about a
candidate’s ethnic group in the media) across constituencies with minority candidate winners and
constituencies with minority candidate losers. Specifically, we use an RD design that leverages close
election results. The focus on close elections follows our theoretical framework but is also important
from an estimation perspective because constituencies with and without standing minority candi-
dates differ from one another in many ways. In contrast, constituencies where a minority candidate
barely wins or barely loses a close race to a dominant group candidate are, on average, otherwise
identical.

Specifically, we estimate the following linear equation:

\[ Y_{eit} = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{VictoryMargin}_{eit} + \tau \text{EthnicMinorityVictory}_{eit} + \]

\[ \beta_2 (\text{EthnicMinorityVictory}_{eit} \cdot \text{VictoryMargin}_{eit}) + \epsilon_{eit}, \]

where \( Y_{eit} \) is one of our outcome variables measured for ethnic group \( e \) in constituency \( i \) at
time \( t \).\(^{12}\) \( \text{VictoryMargin}_{eit} \) is the running variable, which is defined as the difference between the
vote share obtained by the strongest ethnic minority candidate in a constituency and the vote share
obtained by its strongest dominant group opponent. This variable controls for the minority’s vote-
share winning margin. \( \text{EthnicMinorityVictory}_{eit} \) is an indicator variable for whether the ethnic

\(^{12}\)Hate crime rate is measured for constituency \( i \) at time \( t \) and the public opinion variables
are measured for individual \( j \), in constituency \( i \) at time \( t \), and therefore the outcome and
error term are indexed by \( it, jit \), respectively.
minority candidate wins a seat in Parliament. The quantity of interest is thus \( \tau \), which reflects the RD estimate of the effect of an ethnic minority victory.

We estimate \( \tau \) by fitting Equation 1 to a sample that includes only ethnic group-constituency-election triplets whose vote-share winning margins are within the symmetric mean squared error (MSE) optimal bandwidth around the victory margin threshold.\(^{13}\) We compute the MSE-optimal bandwidth using Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014)’s adaptive bandwidth selection algorithm, and we estimate the standard error of \( \tau \) in the conventional way and with the author’s robust bias-correction in order to compute \( p \)-values and 95% confidence intervals with such a correction.\(^{14}\)

For efficiency gains, we control for predetermined characteristics of the candidates (e.g. incumbency), constituencies (listed in Section 4.5), and survey respondents (for public opinion outcomes) that may determine both our outcomes and a minority win. We cluster the standard errors \( \epsilon_{\text{constituency-election}} \) by constituency-election to account for dependence of hate crimes and media tone within a constituency across months, and for dependence of respondents’ attitudes within a constituency and election year.

6 Results

6.1 Hate crimes

In Figure 1a we present the main effect of minority candidates’ victory in close parliamentary races on hate crime, three months after the general elections. To the right of the victory threshold, the line (with 95% confidence intervals) shows for different values of the victory margin, the average monthly hate crime rate in constituencies where minority candidates win. To the left of the threshold, the

\(^{13}\)The interaction between the two variables in Equation 1 allows us to estimate \( \tau \) by fitting local-linear polynomials with different slopes on each side of the victory margin threshold.

\(^{14}\)The robust bias-correction accounts for the bias introduced by the local approximation of the linear polynomial around the victory margin threshold, and for the variance in the estimation of that bias. The robust bias-corrected standard error is larger than the conventional one, which implies that our estimates are conservative.
line shows the average monthly hate crime rate in constituencies where minority candidates lose. As these lines show, there appears to be a jump at the victory threshold; when a minority candidate goes from barely losing to barely winning a seat in Parliament, hate crimes in the candidate’s constituency increase by 7 per 100,000 residents (or 0.07 per 1,000 residents as shown in the plot by the vertical distance between the two points where the lines touch the threshold).\textsuperscript{15} This effect is equivalent to 0.88 standard deviations, and corresponds to a 68% increase in hate crime relative to the average hate crime rate in constituencies where minority candidates barely loose.

In Figure 1b we present our estimates of the effect on hate crimes by month since the general election. While we find some suggestive evidence that the effects decay over time, we note also that across months effects are not statistically distinguishable from each other. In appendix Table F.1, we present these effect estimates, including estimates of their inference, size of the MSE-optimal bandwidth, and effective sample (i.e. number of observations within the MSE-optimal bandwidth) and sample sizes. The table reports in addition estimates from a specification that does not include predetermined covariates. Across specifications the effects have the same direction and similar magnitude, though they are statistically significant only when we control for predetermined covariates.

\subsection*{6.1.1 Validity tests and robustness checks}

Placebo tests further suggest that the accession of ethnic minorities to political office is what incites the observed (relative) increase in hate crimes. First, we find no discontinuity in the rate of equivalent crimes that are not motivated by racial or religious animus at the threshold where minorities win a seat in Parliament (Figure F.1). Second, we find no discontinuities at the victory threshold in the rate of hate crimes before the general election (Figure F.2). These results suggest that the effects of a minority win on hate crimes are not explained by other dynamics in the constituencies where minorities win, like the intensity of crime.

For the RD results to be valid, and not confounded by unobserved differences in the potential

\textsuperscript{15}The average size of a UK constituency is slightly over 70,000 eligible voters. Therefore, a minority win results in additional 4.9 hate crimes in the average constituency.
Figure 1: Ethnic minority victory effects on hate crime

Notes: In (a) lines represent the average monthly hate crime rate (with 95% confidence intervals) from local linear regression with covariate adjustment fitted to the sample of units whose vote-share winning margin is within the MSE-optimal bandwidth of +/- 22 percentage points around the victory threshold. Points are the average monthly hate crime rate for equally spaced mimicking-variance bins. In (b) points are RD estimates of the effect of an ethnic minority victory and lines 95% robust bias-corrected confidence intervals.

outcomes of the constituencies that elect ethnic minorities versus those that elect members of the dominant group, it must be the case that candidates cannot sort around the winning threshold. First, the tests in Appendix F.3 show that there is no manipulation of the election results; the density of candidates is continuous at the threshold where minorities win political office. Secondly, the tests in Appendix F.4 show that the constituencies (and candidates) where candidates barely win do not differ in observable ways from the constituencies (and candidates) where candidates barely lose. These results validate the identifying assumption of the RD design.

Supporting further the robustness of the results, we find no discontinuities in the hate crime rate at any point other than the threshold where minorities win political office, and the effect is robust to the choice of bandwidth (Appendix F.5). Moreover, we confirm that hate crimes increase when minorities win a seat in Parliament with estimates from a difference-in-differences approach (Appendix F.7). Finally, we provide evidence that strongly suggests that our findings represent an increase in hate crime incidence and not merely an increase in hate crime reporting (Appendix F.8).
6.1.2 Subgroup analysis

We assess whether the accession of ethnic minorities to political office interacts with other local conditions that have been long identified to provoke hostility against immigrant-origin minorities. We present below results of theoretically driven subgroup analysis, and discuss their implications for theory in the discussion section. Consistent with Green, Strolovitch and Wong (1998), we find that the RD estimate of the effect of a minority win on hate crimes in constituencies with high influx of migrants over the last decade before the election is larger and statistically distinguishable from the estimate of the effect in constituencies with a low influx of migrants.\(^{16}\) However, contrary to previous finding that immigrants’ political power provoke immigrant-native conflict only in economically deprived places (Dancygier, 2010), we do not find that the effect of a minority win in constituencies with a high increase in unemployment over the last decade before the election is distinguishable from the effect in constituencies with a low increase (or even decrease) in unemployment (Figure G.1a).\(^{17}\)

We also find that the violent response to ethnic minorities winning political office concentrates in constituencies where those candidates hail from left-leaning parties (Figure G.1b). The Conservatives strategy to increase minorities’ representation assigns ethnic minority candidates to ’white’ safe seats, where the ethnic minority population represents less than 20%, or even 10% (Byrne et al., 2020).\(^{18}\) It is possible that the violent response is muted when candidates stand with right-leaning parties because they are assigned to more homogeneous constituencies with less inter-group interactions. A complementary explanation is that the political ideology of minorities standing with right-leaning parties is appealing to the voters more likely to negatively respond to minorities winning office (Karpowitz et al., 2021), in turn muting the violent response.

Finally, if a minority candidate winning political power changes threat perceptions for members of the majority dominant group, then a violent response should be more likely in constituencies that elect a minority for the first time (Newman, 2013). We assess this expectation by controlling for a

\(^{16}\)The test statistic of the difference in coefficients is \(t = 2.14\).

\(^{17}\)The test statistic of the difference in coefficients is \(t = 0.69\).

\(^{18}\)In the 2010 election more than a third of the ethnic minority MPs were seating in constituencies with less than 10% of a minority population.
variable that indicates whether a constituency has had a standing ethnic minority MP at least once before each of the elections in our sample. We find that at least during the first five months after the general election the RD estimate of the effect of a minority win shrinks and is not statistically significant when we control for such a variable (Figure G.1c). This suggests that the violent response to minorities winning political office mostly happens in constituencies that elect minorities for the first time.

6.2 Mass public opinion

In Figure 2 we present the main effect of minority candidates’ victory on mass attitudes towards immigrants after the general election. To the right of the victory threshold, the line (with 95% confidence intervals) shows the average proportion of white respondents who do not think that "too many immigrants have been let into the country" in constituencies where minority candidates have won. To the left of the threshold, the line shows the proportion of white respondents with such an opinion in constituencies where minority candidates lost. As these lines show, there is a drop at the victory threshold; when a minority candidate goes from barely losing to barely winning a seat in Parliament, the proportion of white respondents who hold inclusionary attitudes towards immigrants in the candidate’s constituency decrease by 30 percentage points. This effect is equivalent to 0.65 standard deviations, and corresponds to a 66% decrease in inclusionary attitudes relative to the average attitude in constituencies where minority candidates barely loose.

In Appendix Table H.1 we present the effect estimates and all the other relevant statistics for different model specifications. The RD estimates are consistent and statistically significant across specifications.

6.2.1 Validity tests and robustness checks

A placebo test further strengthens the validity of the results on mass attitudes. We find no discontinuity in respondents left–right ideology at the threshold where minorities win a seat in Parliament (Appendix H.1). This suggests that the effects of a minority win on mass attitudes towards immigrants are not confounded by other dynamics shaping respondents' ideological views in constituencies where minority candidates win.
Figure 2: Ethnic minority victory effects on inclusionary attitudes towards immigrants

Notes: Lines represent the average proportion of respondents who do not think that "too many immigrants have been let into the country" (with 95% confidence intervals) from local linear regression with covariate adjustment fitted to the sample of units whose vote-share winning margin is within the MSE-optimal bandwidth of +/- 14.3 percentage points around the victory threshold. Points are the average proportion of respondents who do not think that "too many immigrants have been let into the country" for equally spaced mimicking-variance bins.

Furthermore, we do not find evidence of sorting around the winning threshold. First, the tests in Appendix H.2 show that there is no manipulation of the election results; the density of survey respondents is continuous at the threshold where minorities win political office. Secondly, the tests in Appendix H.3 show that the constituencies, candidates and survey respondents where candidates barely win do not differ in observable ways from the constituencies, candidates, and respondents where candidates barely lose. These two results validate the identifying assumption of the RD design. In addition, in Appendix H.4 we confirm that the results are not sensitive to the choice of bandwidth.

Finally, in Table H.2 we present the effect estimates on two additional attitudinal outcomes discussed in Appendix C. Across outcome measures and model specifications the effects have the same direction: inclusionary attitudes towards immigrants decrease in constituencies barely win by minority candidates. However, the somewhat smaller effect size on an index measure including stereotypical beliefs and attitudes towards diversity accommodation is not statistically significant,
likely because the sample size is much smaller (as it only includes the 60% of respondents who were asked an additional survey component in 2017 and 2019).

6.3 Media tone towards migrant groups

We present our main finding on the media tone towards migrant groups in Figure 3a. The line (with 95% confidence intervals) to the right of the victory threshold shows the average monthly proportion of negative mentions about the winning candidate’s ethnic group three months from the general election, and to the left the average monthly proportion of negative mentions about the losing candidate’s ethnic group. As these lines show, at the threshold, where a constituency goes from barely electing a dominant group candidate to barely electing an ethnic minority candidate to Parliament, there is a jump in the proportion of negative mentions about the candidate’s ethnic group. The estimated magnitude of such an increase in negative media coverage is about 20 percentage points (or 0.67 standard deviations), and is equivalent to an increase of 110% compared to the average proportion of negative mentions about the ethnic groups of the barely losing candidates.

In Figure 3b we present estimates of the minority victory effects on media tone across time. We find suggestive evidence that the effects decay over time after the general election. The RD estimates of the effects of a minority win decrease in size around the seventh month after the election, however the monthly effects are not statistically distinguishable from each other. In Appendix Table I.1 we present these effect estimates and all other relevant quantities for different model specifications. Across specifications the effects have the same direction and similar magnitude, although for most of the analyzed months they are statistically significant only when we control for predetermined covariates.

6.3.1 Validity tests and robustness checks

In order to make sure that our measure of negative mentions is capturing the valence towards a candidate’s ethnic group, as opposed to specific dynamics of the media covering a candidate’s constituency, we assess whether a minority win affects a placebo measure that includes mentions about countries and nationalities in North America, Western Europe, Australia and New Zealand in the candidate’s constituency. We do not find a discontinuity in the proportion of negative mentions
Figure 3: Ethnic minority victory effects on media tone

Notes: In (a) lines represent the average monthly proportion of negative mentions about a candidate’s ethnic group (with 95% confidence intervals) from local linear regression with covariate adjustment fitted to the sample of units whose vote-share winning margin is within the MSE-optimal bandwidth of +/- 12 percentage points around the victory threshold. Points are the average monthly proportion of negative mentions about a candidate’s ethnic group for equally spaced mimicking-variance bins. In (b) points are RD estimates of the effect of an ethnic minority victory and lines 95% robust bias-corrected confidence intervals.

about these placebo groups at the threshold where minorities go from barely losing to barely winning a seat in Parliament (Appendix I.1). The results of this placebo test further validate our findings on media tone towards politically salient migrant groups. In addition to this placebo test, we assess whether the proportion of negative mentions about a candidate’s ethnic group is discontinuous at the minority victory threshold before the general election (Appendix Figure I.2). We find no discontinuities—the estimates of the effect of a minority win on negative media tone before election are centered around zero (and are not statistically significant)—except for two months before the election; when there is a jump at the threshold in the proportion of negative mentions about the winner’s ethnic group. Such an increase, however, is only statistically distinguishable from zero one month prior to the election. The campaigns officially begin with the dissolution of Parliament, which is about one month and a half prior to the election. Given this, it is possible that the estimate of a minority win one month before election is an anticipatory reaction from the media to minorities winning a seat in Parliament, as the media is more informed than the public. It is also
possible that, with the objective of affecting the election results, the media responds to minority candidates that are more likely to win with a more negative coverage of their ethnic communities. This placebo test increases our confidence about the robustness of our results. It suggests that the estimates of a minority win on media tone are explained by the election and not by other dynamics in constituencies where minorities win.

We validate the identifying assumptions of the RD design by finding no sorting at the threshold where minorities win political office. First, the tests in Appendix I.3 show that the density of candidates is continuous at the victory threshold. Secondly, the tests in Appendix I.4 show that the constituencies and candidates where candidates barely win do not differ in observable ways from the constituencies and candidates where they barely lose. In addition, in Appendix I.5 we show that with the exception of two instances with opposite effects, there is no other discontinuities away from the victory threshold. We also confirm that the results are not sensitive to the choice of bandwidth. Overall, these tests strengthen the validity of our results on media tone.

6.3.2 Additional analysis of media tone and salience

A minority win in competitive elections may bring more media attention to a winning candidate’s migrant ethnic group. An increased salience in this context is of particular importance: more attention to ethnic minority communities promotes their civic visibility among local politicians, organizations and larger society, enabling communities to introduce claims (Bloemraad, de Graauw and Hamlin, 2015). However, a salient rhetoric with a negative tone about migrants can influence mass public exclusionary attitudes (Hopkins, 2011). We assess whether there is more mentions about barely winners’ than about barely losers’ ethnic communities in Figure 4a. The RD estimates of the effects of a minority win on the monthly number of mentions about a candidate’s ethnic group suggest that in general there is more speech about the barely winner’s ethnic group. Three months after the election, there is 20 more mentions about barely winners than losers, and such a difference is statistically significant at the 10% level. However, such an increase in media attention is concentrated on speech with specific valence. We find statistically significant increases in the proportion of negative and positive mentions (equivalent to 0.66 and 0.47 standard deviations, respectively three months after the election), but not in neutral mentions (of 0.09 standard deviations
and not statistically significant, Figure 4b). Furthermore, at least during the first four months from the election, the increase in attention is predominantly negative; although the effect estimates are only statistically distinguishable when we compare the share of negative to neutral mentions (Appendix Table J.1).

Figure 4: Ethnic minority victory effects on media attention and tone

Notes: Points are RD estimates of the effect of an ethnic minority victory and lines 95% robust bias-corrected confidence intervals.

Overall, we find a backlash from the news media to minority immigrants winning a seat in Parliament. Such backlash can further affect public attitudes and behavior in the constituencies that elect minorities. However, similarly to studies assessing the media coverage of minorities after salient events (Bleich, Nisar and Abdelhamid, 2016), we also find a counter-backlash —the proportion of positive mentions about barely winners’ ethnic communities also increase— that may counteract the force of a salient negative rhetoric. Perhaps surprisingly, while we find that newspapers that are not ideologically aligned with the candidate’s party drive the negative mentions, we also find that these newspapers contribute with the positive mentions. However, we also find that left-wing newspapers and large papers (those with a circulation of more than 25,000 copies) contribute the most to the observed increase in positive mentions. In contrast, the increase in negative mentions is mostly driven by right-wing newspapers and papers of smaller circulation (Appendix J). This suggests that some of the journalists who are most exposed to the production of a negative rhetoric
about migrants are those counteracting its negative force, but that such a corrective behavior comes mostly from left-wing journalists working for bigger papers.

7 Discussion and conclusions

Using a regression discontinuity design of close parliamentary elections in the UK, we identify the effects of immigrant-origin minority candidates winning political office on the attitudes and behavior of dominant-group natives. We find that such victories result in a dramatic increase in hate crimes, in exclusionary attitudes towards immigrants as captured by mass public opinion, and in negative tone in the coverage of a winning candidate’s ethnic group in both local and national newspapers. The effects we document are statistically significant and substantively large.

An ethnic minority candidate winning a seat in the national parliament triggers a hostile reaction because it poses a threat to the position of dominant group members. The backlash we identify in response to an election outcome is especially concerning because it is so widespread, encompassing not only a violent-prone fringe, but also the mass public as well as elites. This finding contributes to the intergroup conflict literature, which has been somewhat ambiguous with respect to the identity of those among the majority group most likely to respond to heightened outgroup threat. In addition, our study’s findings raise important questions regarding both the role of competitive elections in intergroup threat theory and the nature of threat that causes a hostile response. While the structure of our data cannot answer these questions conclusively, they do point to important avenues for future work.

Although our results point to a backlash from the mass public and elites, exploring the patterns of influence between the media and the public in response to a minority win is outside the scope of this study. It has long been established that in choosing and displaying news, the media shape the public’s political attitudes (e.g. McCombs and Shaw, 1972; Munger et al., 2020). On the other hand, due to market pressures, media outlets are incentivized to cover issues that resonate with their audiences’ priorities. In addition, public sentiment is often reflected by newsworthy political events in themselves, like election results (Todd, 1980). Our study is not designed to contribute to the enduring discussion in the political communication literature of whether the elites through the
media influence or reflect mass public opinion. Nevertheless, the magnitude of the RD estimates of the effect of a minority win suggests no clear pattern of influence of one societal sector on the other, as they are both about the same size (0.65 sd). It is left to future work, based on a different research design, to assess possible co-influence patterns.

Our study sharpens a debate about why elections with a viable minority candidate may trigger a hostile response. One possibility is that independent of their parliamentary and constituency work, minority winning candidates increase the salience of minority groups, reminding voters of their changing ethnic demographic landscape. Craig, Rucker and Richeson (2018) argue that such priming in and of itself can trigger among members of the dominant group concerns about their social standing. As such, a minority win plays a role of an information shock that redirects the native-born attention to threatening contextual conditions, triggering in turn a hostile reaction. Such a hostile reaction is expected to be stronger where the information confirms changes people observe in their environment (e.g., a large migrant influx), when the information is novel (e.g. when a minority wins a constituency for the first time), and when the information is recent (readily after the election). Our findings point towards this possibility.

Our study also raises questions about the dimensions of threat that are most relevant to cases of hostile responses to the political success of a minority group. The first is objective material threat: members of the majority group may rationally fear that minority politicians will favor members of their group in distributing finite resources or that they would support redistributive or compensatory policies, such as affirmative action. The second is a subjective threat to the hierarchical social structure: majority group members may be concerned that a minority victory threatens the higher status of their group. While dominant group status has a material element (e.g., preferential job hiring), its importance is mostly symbolic-psychological, as it affects an individual’s positive sense of self. Past studies generally do not discuss explicitly which dimension of threat—objective or subjective—is more meaningful for majority group backlash against minority groups that are gaining political power.

It is notoriously hard to separate subjective from objective considerations (Manekin, Grossman and Mitts, 2019). However, our findings do allow making some suggestive head ways. Specifically, recall that we find that (a) the backlash attenuates over time; (b) that it is concentrated in
constituencies with no prior experience of a minority victory, and (c) that economic conditions do not moderate the effects of minority victories. Combined, these findings point to the primacy of the symbolic-psychological dimension of group threat, at least in our setting. To be clear, this is not to say that material considerations are not important, but only that our findings are more consistent with non-material considerations. Future work should help clarify which dimension of group threat—subjective threat to group status or objective-material threat—is most consequential in this and other incidences of minority’s political power.

Most of the scholarly work on the political integration of immigrants and minorities centers on avenues to improve their participation and representation (e.g., Givens and Maxwell, 2012; Hainmueller, Hangartner and Pietrantuono, 2015). Less attention has been paid to the possible backlash against successful political integration through elected office. While our study contributes to reducing such a research gap, it also leaves open the question of whether, on balance, the positive outcomes from getting immigrant-origin minorities elected outweigh the negative effects of the backlash dynamics. Future research should address such a question, as well as the policies that can counteract the hostile response to immigrants’ successful integration.

---

19 This is reminiscent of the argument that the white nationalist backlash that followed president Obama’s victory (and which was instrumental in the rise of president Trump) was to the most part a response to a symbolic threat to the dominant status of white people, as opposed to material concerns over specific policies Obama may have championed as president (Sides, Tesler and Vavreck, 2019; Hopkins, 2021).
References


Cikara, Mina, Vasiliki Fouka and Marco Tabellini. 2021. “Hate crime increases with minoritized


Western Europe. Lynne Rienner Publishers Boulder, CO.


Jackman, Robert W and Karin Volpert. 1996. “Conditions favouring parties of the extreme right in


Marbach, Moritz and Guido Ropers. 2018. “Not in My Backyard: Do Increases in Immigration Cause Political Violence?”


Appendices

A Table of summary statistics

In Table A.1 we present summary statistics for our main outcomes, treatment, and predetermined covariates, including characteristics of the candidates and constituencies.

B Assignment of hate crimes from LADs into parliamentary constituencies

Local Authority Districts are a level of subnational division used for the purposes of local government. As such, district boundaries may include more than one parliamentary constituency, and constituencies may cross district boundaries. On average, districts contain 2 constituencies (78% include more than one) and about 30% of the constituencies cross district boundaries.

In order to compute hate crime rates at the constituency level we assign the LAD crime rate per 1,000 population to each constituency within a LAD, and for constituencies which cross LAD borders, we assign the average LAD crime rate weighted by population overlap, using the wards’ population within a constituency and district to compute the weight. When a ward crosses constituency boundaries (251 wards out of 8297), we split the population ward proportionally by the constituency size.

B.1 Validation of assignment of hate crimes from LADs

To validate the measure of hate crime at the constituency level, we use the assignment rule described above to infer the share of the ethnic minority population at the constituency level and we compare it with the observed share. Figure B.1 shows that the inferred and observed shares are strongly correlated, rendering validity to the assignment rule of hate crimes from districts into constituencies.

Figure B.1: Validity of hate crime assignment from LAD to constituency

(a) Ethnic minority population

(b) Population with a non-dominant religion

Pearson correlation = 0.93

Pearson correlation = 0.9
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>variable</th>
<th>mean</th>
<th>sd</th>
<th>min</th>
<th>max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% negative mentions</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% neutral mentions</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% positive mentions</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>inclusionary attitudes</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hate crime rate</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>victory margin</td>
<td>-20.04</td>
<td>37.91</td>
<td>-82.05</td>
<td>70.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>winner</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>incumbent candidate</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>female candidate</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>left party candidate</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% ethnic minority</td>
<td>23.66</td>
<td>20.18</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>76.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% non-dominant religion</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>population density</td>
<td>35.51</td>
<td>34.09</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>146.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% young</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% single</td>
<td>37.66</td>
<td>9.68</td>
<td>23.10</td>
<td>65.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% deprivation level 1</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% deprivation level 2</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% deprivation level 3</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% deprivation level 4</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% social grade ab</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% social grade a1</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% social grade c2</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% social grade d</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% level 1 qualifications</td>
<td>12.76</td>
<td>2.72</td>
<td>5.70</td>
<td>19.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% level 2 qualifications</td>
<td>14.22</td>
<td>2.73</td>
<td>7.30</td>
<td>18.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% level 3 qualifications</td>
<td>12.02</td>
<td>2.65</td>
<td>8.30</td>
<td>27.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% level 4+ qualifications</td>
<td>29.30</td>
<td>9.91</td>
<td>12.10</td>
<td>57.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% economically inactive</td>
<td>30.05</td>
<td>4.33</td>
<td>19.20</td>
<td>43.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% economically active: students</td>
<td>3.79</td>
<td>1.73</td>
<td>1.90</td>
<td>12.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% economically active: employed</td>
<td>61.37</td>
<td>6.30</td>
<td>42.00</td>
<td>74.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% economically active: unemployed</td>
<td>4.79</td>
<td>1.55</td>
<td>2.20</td>
<td>9.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% tenure: rent free</td>
<td>1.35</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>4.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% tenure: owned</td>
<td>58.84</td>
<td>14.26</td>
<td>20.50</td>
<td>85.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% tenure: private rented</td>
<td>19.10</td>
<td>7.77</td>
<td>7.30</td>
<td>42.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% tenure: social rented</td>
<td>19.81</td>
<td>8.83</td>
<td>5.30</td>
<td>50.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% English main language: none</td>
<td>7.20</td>
<td>6.52</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>26.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% English main language: one &gt; 16</td>
<td>6.15</td>
<td>4.97</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>20.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% English main language: one &lt; 16</td>
<td>1.39</td>
<td>1.36</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>6.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% immigrants: EU</td>
<td>4.90</td>
<td>3.55</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>16.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% immigrants: non-EU</td>
<td>14.39</td>
<td>11.55</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>47.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% immigrant arrival &lt; 1960</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% immigrant arrival 1960-1990</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% immigrant arrival 1990-2011</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% vote far-right</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
C Survey items used in measurement of public opinion

Main outcome:

Inclusionary attitudes towards immigrants. Measured with the item Do you think that too many immigrants have been let into this country, or not? on a binary scale with categories Yes, too many, and No, not too many. This item is available and with a fixed wording in the last three post-election surveys.

Additional outcomes:

Attitudes towards immigrants/immigration regarding the economy. Measured in 2010 with the item Immigrants generally are good for Britain’s economy. on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from Strongly disagree to Strongly agree. In the other three election years, the framing of this question is about immigration as opposed to immigrants. The wording of the answers and their range is also different. Nevertheless, we pool the answers to these two questions, as we consider that they are close enough in meaning. We do so to have at least one attitudinal item about immigrants spanning the four election years. The question is: Do you think immigration is good or bad for Britain’s economy? on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from Bad for economy to Good for economy. To have all answers on a 5-point scale, we collapse the answer categories 2, 3 and 5, 6.

Index of stereotypical beliefs about migrants and attitudes towards diversity accommodation. Computed by summing the responses to the following items: Now thinking about minorities in Britain. To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?

1 Minorities should adapt to customs and traditions of Britain
2 Will of the majority should prevail, even over the rights of minorities
3 Immigrants are generally good for Britain’s economy
4 Britain’s culture is generally harmed by immigrants
5 Immigrants increase crime rates in Britain

Responses are on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from Strongly agree to Strongly disagree. The order of item 3 is reversed to compute the index. All items are positively correlated with a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.83. These items are only available for the 2017, 2019 post-election surveys, and only for respondents who self-completed an additional module (about 60% of all respondents).

Placebo outcomes:

Index of left–right views. Computed via simple sum of these 8 items: How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

1 Ordinary working people get their fair share of the nation’s wealth.
2 There is one law for the rich and one for the poor.
3 There is no need for strong trade unions to protect employees’ working conditions and wages.
4 Private enterprise is the best way to solve Britain’s economic problems.
5 Major public services and industries ought to be in state ownership.
6 It is the government’s responsibility to provide a job for everyone who wants one.
7 People should be allowed to organise public meetings to protest against the government.
8 People in Britain should be more tolerant of those who lead unconventional lives.

Responses are on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from Strongly disagree to Strongly agree. The order of items 2, 5, 6, 7 and 8 are reversed to compute the left–right index. This index has a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.62, and all items are positively correlated.

D Newspaper data, computation of media tone measures and validation of key elements

Newspaper data  We construct the dataset of newspaper articles using the following steps. To determine a comprehensive list of UK newspapers, we first identified a list of seed categories on Wikipedia (WP) (e.g. 'Category:Newspapers_published_in_England'), we took the recursive items of those categories (e.g. 'Category:Newspapers_published_in_England' > 'Category:Newspapers_published_in_London'), we used WP article properties to filter out articles about non-newspapers (e.g. people, books), and we extracted the newspaper URLs from the WP Infobox using the Python package wptools. With this process we identified a list of UK newspapers URLs containing 337 newspapers in total.

Then, to obtain the articles published by each of these newspapers, we looked up the URLs in Common Crawl (an open repository of web crawl data containing a snapshot of every web page at the moment of the crawl). Particularly in the Index for 2020-16 crawl, the most recent crawl at that moment. We retrieved the WARC (Web ARChive format) records for each crawled page from the newspaper, and extracted the pages’ HTML. From the HTML, we extracted the text, title, and byline using the Python package readabiliPy; the publication date using the Python library htmldate; the location by tokenizing the article with CoreNLP, and looking for tokens which match place names in the Index of Place Names in Great Britain, and mapping to the corresponding constituency. Figure D.1 presents the geographical coverage of all extracted articles across constituencies.

Figure D.1: Coverage of all extracted articles
In order to select the subset of articles that reference a candidate’s ethnic group, we extracted mentions of terms referring to nationalities and countries using the CoreNLP named entity annotator, as well as the sentiment of the sentences mentioning those terms, using CoreNLP’s five-category sentiment classifier, in order to define the tone of speech about a candidate’s ethnic group. This sentiment classifier addresses compositionality in semantic vector spaces allowing to detect intricacies of sentiment and to capture complex linguistic phenomena, like sentiment change and scope of negation (Socher et al., 2013). The classifier provides highly accurate sentiment predictions at the sentence level. We focus on the sentiment of each sentence containing a mention of relevant country or nationality terms. Therefore, an article may provide more than one instance of speech (or mention) about a candidate’s ethnic group. The median article contains 2 mentions of the same term. We focus on the collection of all of these instances of speech for each candidate.

Validation of named entities and their sentiment classification  A human judge annotated a sample of 102 articles containing 563 mentions of country/nationality terms in order to validate them and their sentiment classification. Specifically, the human judge first annotated whether the terms refer to a country/nationality or not for each mention in the article. Only 7% of the mentions refer to something else (e.g. the name of a person, a telephone pole as opposed to a Polish person, or were used in URLs referred in the articles). In other words, for this task the named entity annotator of CoreNLP had 93% accuracy.

Second, the human judge annotated the sentiment of each article’s sentence mentioning a country/nationality term in the five-category classification scale. Comparing the human annotations to the classification of the model for the positive (including ‘very positive’ and ‘positive’) and negative (‘very negative’ and ‘negative’) categories, and defining the positive class as the negative sentiment category, we have that the CoreNLP’s sentiment annotator has an accuracy of 78%, precision of 63%, recall (or true positive rate) of 89%, specificity (or true negative rate) of 72%, and F1-score (or harmonic mean of precision and recall) of 74%. These are reasonable statistics for sentiment classification (Socher et al., 2013). Although the model overpredicts the negative mentions as compared to the human annotations (the precision is 63%), it gives us a reasonable, if imperfect, measure of negative speech about a candidate’s ethnic group in the newspaper articles. Moreover, the effect estimates are not expected to be affected by the imprecision of the sentiment classification model (although the variance estimates may be affected), given that the model overpredicts negative mentions equally across articles speaking about the ethnic group of a barely winner and articles speaking of the ethnic group of a barely loser.

Measure of media tone about migrant groups  We match the country/nationality mentions’ sentiment to candidates based on date, location, and country/nationality. Specifically, we follow this process: 1) we map the candidate’s origin characteristics (their country/nationality of origin, and their parents’ and grandparents’ countries/nationalities) to a sub-region, 2) we map the articles’ country/nationality mentions to a sub-region and 3) we match candidates and articles based on sub-region, constituency and date of publication (using only the subset of articles published on election day and up to 10 months after the election, which corresponds with the maximum number of months between the 2019 election and the most recent news article. This mapping process implies that for say a candidate of Indian origin, the measure of speech about her ethnic group accounts for mentions in her constituency of all countries/nationalities within Southern Asia.

In general, we account for all known countries/nationalities of origin of a candidate. For instance,
for a Ugandan-Indian candidate, we include all articles which mention the terms Uganda/Ugandans and India/Indians. In this case, given our mapping process the measure of speech about her ethnic group includes all mentions of Southern Asia and Eastern African. Overall, only 11 candidates are assigned to more than one sub-region, but not to more than two. Furthermore, this process excludes a) candidates for whom we do not have origin information below their continent of origin for example, Asia, Africa, Caribbean and b) articles with mentions of terms like ‘asian’, ‘african’. The proportion of excluded candidates represents 30% of all strongest minority candidates (winners and first minority losers). While it is a large proportion, their exclusion may be positive in two ways: 1) the salience or online presence of included candidates is kept constant across candidates, given that we are excluding candidates for whom we cannot find information online about their background and 2) the mapping process treats every candidate the same without making assumptions about their origin. Out of all the strongest minority candidates across the four general elections for whom we have specific information about their background, we have at least one mention during the first ten months after election for 438 candidates in England and Wales. The median candidate has 71 mentions.

Following this matching process, we then compute the ratio between the number of negative mentions (adding together the ‘very negative’ and ‘negative’ sentiment categories) and the total number of mentions about the candidates’ sub-region of origin in their constituency, at every month after the general election. We compute the analogous ratios for positive (summing the ‘very positive and ‘positive’ categories) and neutral mentions. Figure D.2 presents the frequency of sub-region mentions for all matched candidates across the last four general elections (left panel) and the distribution of mentions about the candidate’s sub-region by sentiment categories (right panel).

E Ethnic minority candidates across time, parties, and geography

F Minority victory effects on hate crimes

In this section we report a set of placebo and falsification tests that establish the validity of the RD design (sections F.1–F.5), the main RD results in tabular form (section F.6), and the robustness of the RD to an alternative, difference-in-differences specification (section F.7).

F.1 Continuity of placebo outcomes

We use as a placebo outcome the constituency crime rate for equivalent crimes that are not motivated by racial or religious animus. We test whether this placebo outcome is discontinuous at the margin of victory cutoff. The rationale for this test is the same as the rationale for a test assessing discontinuities in predetermined covariates: when a placebo outcome that correlates strongly with the outcome of interest is discontinuous at the cutoff, then the continuity of the potential outcome functions is unlikely to hold, questioning the validity of the RD design under the continuity-based approach.

20These cases are mostly Ugandan-born candidates with Indian parents who migrated to the UK during the onset of Idi Amin’s coup in the 70s.
Notes: In (a) the orange numbers indicate the number of candidates from each sub-region. In (b) the dashed vertical lines indicate the median candidate’s number of mentions. The histogram excludes the top quartile of candidates with the most mentions for visualization purposes.

Figure D.2: Distribution of mentions

Notes: (b) Includes only the strongest minority candidate by constituency-election.

Figure E.1: Description of ethnic minority candidates

Figure F.1 shows that this placebo outcome is not discontinuous at the threshold where an ethnic minority candidate wins a seat in Parliament. The effects are not statistically significant, have the opposite direction to the effects on hate crime and are comparably smaller (Figure F.1c). This increases our confidence that the validity of the design holds, and that the estimates of the minority victory effects on hate crime are not explained by a generalized higher level of crime in constituencies where minorities win.
Notes: In (a) lines represent the average monthly crime rate (with 95% confidence intervals) from local linear regression with covariate adjustment fitted to the sample of units whose vote-share winning margin is within the MSE-optimal bandwidth of +/- 14.5 percentage points around the victory threshold. Points are the average monthly crime rate for equally spaced mimicking-variance bins. In (b) and (c) points are RD estimates of the effect of an ethnic minority victory and lines 95% robust bias-corrected confidence intervals.

Figure F.1: Ethnic minority victory effects on equivalent crimes

F.2 Continuity of main outcome before general election

We test whether the hate crime rate is discontinuous at the margin of victory cutoff before the general election. Figure F.2 shows that the hate crime rate is not discontinuous at the threshold where an ethnic minority candidate wins a seat in Parliament. The effects are not statistically significant and are comparably smaller to the effects after the election. This increases our confidence about the robustness of our results, as it suggests that the estimates of the minority victory effects on hate crime are not explained by other dynamics in constituencies where minorities win.

F.3 Density of the running variable

Following (Cattaneo, Jansson and Ma, 2020), we test (using the rddensity R package) the continuity assumption of the density functions of the running variable with local polynomial density estimators. Figure F.3 reveals no evidence of sorting around the cutoff. Even though there is a jump in the density functions for losing and winning candidates at the cutoff, the confidence intervals of these functions completely overlap and the p-value of the continuity test indicates that we cannot reject the null of continuity of the density functions. The results of this test indicate no manipulation of the election results.

F.4 Continuity of predetermined variables

Following (Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiumik, 2014), we also test (using the rdrobust package in R) the continuity assumption for predetermined variables with local linear regression within an MSE-optimal bandwidth. Given that we have a large number of covariates, we show in Figure F.4a the threshold for the p-values of the tests of discontinuity (the dashed vertical line), when controlling...
Notes: Points are RD estimates of the effect of an ethnic minority victory and lines 95% robust bias-corrected confidence intervals.

Figure F.2: Ethnic minority victory effects on hate crimes before and after the election

Notes: Tests for manipulation of the election results by assessing continuity of the candidate density functions at the cutoff with local polynomial density estimators and robust bias-corrected inference.

Figure F.3: Continuity in the density of candidates around the cutoff

the false discovery rate with the Benjamini–Hochberg procedure. In this case, 3 of a total of 37 covariates show statistically significant discontinuities after controlling the FDR.

However, some of the covariates we include are not independent of each other (as BH correction would assume); in particular some of the covariates (such as the proportions of immigrant arrivals in different decades) are linear combinations of an underlying variable. To account for this dependence, we test the continuity assumption with a permutation test for continuity in the distribution of observations around the cutoff (which is a stronger requirement than continuity of means) as

\[ 21 \text{See (De la Cuesta and Imai, 2016) for an example of controlling the false discovery rate with the Benjamini–Hochberg procedure when testing for multiple discontinuities in predetermined variables in RD contexts of close elections.} \]
described in (Canay and Kamat, 2018) and as implemented by the \texttt{RATest} R package. Here we find that only 4 of the 37 predetermined variables are discontinuous at the cutoff (Figure F.4b). This number of discontinuous covariates is equivalent to two more than the average number of false rejections (which is 2). Furthermore, when controlling for the FDR with the Benjamini-Hochberg procedure, we do not find any discontinuous variables.

Given the results from both the permutation test for continuity of distribution around the cutoff and the FDR-corrected local linear regression test, the distribution of p-values is consistent with the uniform distribution that we would expect for balance checks in a randomized experiment. This indicates that there were no systematic discontinuities at the threshold where minorities become MPs, and that therefore the continuity assumption of the potential outcome functions is likely to hold.

Notes: Test for continuity of candidate and constituency predetermined background characteristics in (a) using a local linear regression with a symmetric MSE-optimal bandwidth as implemented by the \texttt{rdrobust} R package and in (b) using an asymptotic permutation test comparing the distribution of observation near the cutoff as implemented by the \texttt{RATest} R package. The vertical line in (a) indicates a $p$-value = 0.004, which is the threshold for the $p$-values when controlling the false discovery rate with the Benjamini–Hochberg procedure, and in (b) a $p$-value = 0.05. Here the threshold for $p$-values when controlling the FDR with BH procedure is approximately 0.

Figure F.4: Continuity of predetermined variables around the victory threshold

F.5 Discontinuities away from the victory threshold and sensitivity to the choice of bandwidth

In Figure F.5a we test for discontinuities at points other than the threshold where minorities win political office. We do not find evidence of statistically significant discontinuities away from the treatment threshold. Figure F.5b tests for sensitivity of the results to the choice of bandwidth, using CER- and MSE-optimal bandwidths, half and one and a half times their size. We find that
the results are broadly consistent with the findings obtained with the optimal MSE bandwidth.

Notes: (a) tests for discontinuities away from the margin of victory cutoff with placebo cutoffs that incrementally decrease or increase by 15 percentage points away from the cutoff, and (b) tests for sensitivity to the choice of bandwidth. MSE stands for mean squared error optimal bandwidth and CER refers to a bandwidth that minimizes the coverage error from the robust biased corrected confidence intervals obtained with the MSE-optimal bandwidth. The values next to the 'CER', 'MSE' labels indicate the bandwidth size.

Figure F.5: Falsification tests
### F.6 Main RD results in tabular form

Table F.1: Ethnic minority victory effects on hate crimes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RD estimate</th>
<th>se</th>
<th>p-value</th>
<th>95% CI</th>
<th>mean control</th>
<th>sd effect</th>
<th>MSE-opt bw</th>
<th>eff. N</th>
<th>N controls</th>
<th>month</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.076</td>
<td>0.066</td>
<td>0.212</td>
<td>[−0.054, 0.244]</td>
<td>0.107</td>
<td>0.911</td>
<td>20.59</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>1040</td>
<td>no 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.070</td>
<td>0.045</td>
<td>0.700</td>
<td>[−0.007, 0.189]</td>
<td>0.107</td>
<td>0.853</td>
<td>21.23</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>1040</td>
<td>yes 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.076</td>
<td>0.059</td>
<td>0.162</td>
<td>[−0.038, 0.228]</td>
<td>0.108</td>
<td>1.012</td>
<td>18.98</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>1560</td>
<td>no 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.070</td>
<td>0.039</td>
<td>0.043</td>
<td>[0.003, 0.174]</td>
<td>0.110</td>
<td>0.868</td>
<td>20.41</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>1560</td>
<td>yes 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.076</td>
<td>0.054</td>
<td>0.135</td>
<td>[−0.029, 0.217]</td>
<td>0.104</td>
<td>1.010</td>
<td>19.14</td>
<td>364</td>
<td>2080</td>
<td>no 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.070</td>
<td>0.037</td>
<td>0.038</td>
<td>[0.005, 0.165]</td>
<td>0.103</td>
<td>0.882</td>
<td>22.29</td>
<td>416</td>
<td>2080</td>
<td>yes 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.083</td>
<td>0.057</td>
<td>0.122</td>
<td>[−0.027, 0.231]</td>
<td>0.098</td>
<td>1.135</td>
<td>18.69</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>2600</td>
<td>no 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.076</td>
<td>0.038</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td>[0.011, 0.176]</td>
<td>0.100</td>
<td>0.966</td>
<td>20.73</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>2600</td>
<td>yes 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.076</td>
<td>0.053</td>
<td>0.136</td>
<td>[−0.029, 0.214]</td>
<td>0.099</td>
<td>1.053</td>
<td>18.81</td>
<td>546</td>
<td>3120</td>
<td>no 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.068</td>
<td>0.035</td>
<td>0.034</td>
<td>[0.006, 0.161]</td>
<td>0.099</td>
<td>0.884</td>
<td>21.90</td>
<td>618</td>
<td>3120</td>
<td>yes 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.071</td>
<td>0.051</td>
<td>0.140</td>
<td>[−0.029, 0.203]</td>
<td>0.102</td>
<td>0.963</td>
<td>19.32</td>
<td>644</td>
<td>3640</td>
<td>no 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.035</td>
<td>0.030</td>
<td>0.238</td>
<td>[−0.029, 0.118]</td>
<td>0.104</td>
<td>0.484</td>
<td>31.87</td>
<td>1113</td>
<td>3640</td>
<td>yes 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.068</td>
<td>0.050</td>
<td>0.151</td>
<td>[−0.031, 0.199]</td>
<td>0.105</td>
<td>0.878</td>
<td>19.26</td>
<td>736</td>
<td>4160</td>
<td>no 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.033</td>
<td>0.030</td>
<td>0.254</td>
<td>[−0.031, 0.116]</td>
<td>0.108</td>
<td>0.443</td>
<td>31.81</td>
<td>1272</td>
<td>4160</td>
<td>yes 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.067</td>
<td>0.049</td>
<td>0.142</td>
<td>[−0.028, 0.193]</td>
<td>0.104</td>
<td>0.857</td>
<td>19.24</td>
<td>828</td>
<td>4680</td>
<td>no 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.034</td>
<td>0.029</td>
<td>0.230</td>
<td>[−0.027, 0.114]</td>
<td>0.108</td>
<td>0.455</td>
<td>31.52</td>
<td>1413</td>
<td>4680</td>
<td>yes 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.062</td>
<td>0.046</td>
<td>0.149</td>
<td>[−0.028, 0.182]</td>
<td>0.105</td>
<td>0.801</td>
<td>19.79</td>
<td>930</td>
<td>5200</td>
<td>no 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.062</td>
<td>0.031</td>
<td>0.027</td>
<td>[0.008, 0.144]</td>
<td>0.104</td>
<td>0.750</td>
<td>21.21</td>
<td>990</td>
<td>5200</td>
<td>yes 9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The dependent variable is monthly hate crimes per 1000 residents in a constituency. RD estimate is computed with local-linear regression within a symmetric MSE-optimal bandwidth. se is the conventional standard error, p-value and 95% CI are robust bias-corrected. mean control indicates the average monthly hate crime rate in constituencies where ethnic minorities barely lose, sd effect presents the RD estimate in standard deviations, MSE-opt bw is the MSE-optimal bandwidth of vote-share winning margin around the victory threshold, eff. N is the sample size within the MSE-optimal bandwidth and N is the sample size. controls include an indicator of whether the candidate is the incumbent, constituency vote share for UKIP and BNP in the previous election, constituency share that is ethnic minority, young population, single, with social grade DE, unemployed, population density, and share of households with 3 or more deprivations, and in social tenure. Standard errors are clustered by constituency-election. Hate crime data are from Home Office, ethnic background of candidates is constructed by the authors, and constituency characteristics from 2011 UK Decennial Census.

### F.7 Difference-in-differences

As an additional check for the estimated effects on hate crime, we use a difference-in-differences (DiD) approach that compares the hate crime rate across constituencies that elect ethnic minority candidates and constituencies that do not, before and up to nine months after the election when a minority candidate is elected for the first time in a constituency.
With this estimation design, a constituency is in the treatment condition during the months following a general election in which an ethnic minority candidate is elected, and in the control condition, otherwise. 69 out of 520 constituencies have an ethnic minority MP during at least one month between April 2014 and September 2020, 23 constituencies have a minority MP during this whole period, and 4 constituencies go in and out of the treatment condition. We focus on the first nine months after the election—the maximum number of months which are observable for constituencies electing an ethnic minority candidate for the first time in 2019.

We estimate the DiD estimator with the generalized synthetic control method based on interactive fixed effects models as described in (Xu, 2017) and implemented by the gsynth R package. We use this approach as opposed to a standard two-way fixed effects regression because even after controlling for relevant predetermined covariates that determine both minority victories and hate crimes, we reject the null hypothesis of common trends for all pre-minority victory periods and all groups of constituencies that elect a minority candidate for the first time at a particular election. The Cramer von Mises test statistic and p-value of (Callaway, Sant’Anna et al., 2018)’s integrated moments test for the conditional parallel trends assumption holding in all pre-treatment time periods for all groups are 0.886 and 0.0, respectively.

Given this, we instead impute a counterfactual for each treated constituency that resembles the pre-minority victory hate crime trends of treated constituencies. Furthermore, we prefer the generalized synthetic control method over the most recently developed approaches for DiD with multiple time periods and variation in treatment timing (e.g. (Callaway, Sant’Anna et al., 2018)), given that the number of constituencies electing a minority candidate for the first time at each of the three observed elections is small: 14, 9, 20, respectively. This produces group-time average treatment effects that are rather noisy.

Figure F.6 presents the estimated effects of electing an ethnic minority candidate to Parliament on monthly hate crimes per 1000 residents. It shows a positive and significant effect in the first month after the election that is won by a minority candidate. After that month, each monthly effect is relatively smaller, and is not statistically significant. However, on average the effect remains positive and larger than the average effect before minority candidates win an election. Consistent with parallel trends (and with the method computing an adequate counterfactual), we do not see any pre-minority MP significant effects, and the effects are very close to zero throughout the 12 month period before an ethnic minority candidate wins the election.
Notes: The line represents the ATT, and the ribbon 95% confidence intervals.

Figure F.6: Ethnic minority victory effects on hate crime

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ATT.avg</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
<th>Cl.lower</th>
<th>Cl.upper</th>
<th>p.value</th>
<th>months</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.0153</td>
<td>0.0051</td>
<td>0.0045</td>
<td>0.0242</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.0088</td>
<td>0.0041</td>
<td>-0.0003</td>
<td>0.0160</td>
<td>0.058</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.0071</td>
<td>0.0038</td>
<td>-0.0010</td>
<td>0.0139</td>
<td>0.078</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.0046</td>
<td>0.0035</td>
<td>-0.0029</td>
<td>0.0106</td>
<td>0.268</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.0054</td>
<td>0.0035</td>
<td>-0.0025</td>
<td>0.0110</td>
<td>0.199</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.0048</td>
<td>0.0034</td>
<td>-0.0032</td>
<td>0.0104</td>
<td>0.287</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.0046</td>
<td>0.0034</td>
<td>-0.0035</td>
<td>0.0100</td>
<td>0.350</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.0060</td>
<td>0.0036</td>
<td>-0.0026</td>
<td>0.0112</td>
<td>0.199</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.0065</td>
<td>0.0036</td>
<td>-0.0026</td>
<td>0.0114</td>
<td>0.207</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The dependent variable is monthly hate crimes (racially/religiously aggravated offenses) per 1,000 residents. Inference is conducted via bootstrapping. Standard errors are clustered by constituency.

Table F.2: Average ethnic minority victory effects on hate crime (averaging across months after victory)

Table F.2 presents the average effects across the first nine months after a minority victory. In general, the average effects during this period are positive, statistically significant in the first three months, and decrease with time. Again, these patterns suggest a violent but rather short-lived reaction to ethnic minorities accession to political office.

While the effect at one month after a victory is equivalent to an increase of 1.5 hate crimes per 100,000 residents (and statistically significant at the 1% level), the average effect after three months of victory almost halves to 0.7 hate crimes per 100,000 residents (statistically significant at the 10% level). These effect is ten times smaller than the effect estimated with the RD design. However,
these effects are not directly comparable as these two different estimation methods target different quantities of interest. The quantity of interest in the RD design is the local average treatment effect (LATE), while in the DiD approach is the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT). Moreover, the effective samples across the two different approaches are different: the DiD ATT includes the group of constituencies won by large margins and that on average have a smaller post-minority victory hate crime rate (of 0.10 per 1,000 people in constituencies won by more than 15 pp compared to 0.14 in constituencies won by less than 15 pp), while the RD LATE does not include such group of constituencies. Relatedly, the comparison group in the DiD includes constituencies where minority candidates lose by large margins or do not even run for Parliament, and that have on average higher post-election hate crime rates than constituencies where minority candidates run and lose by small margins. Furthermore, the local nature of the RD design may help control for unobserved confounders that are not completely accounted for with the synthetic controls that may be contributing to bias downward the estimated ATT.

F.8 Testing for possible hate crime reporting bias

It is possible that the observed increase in hate crime is not only explained by the reaction of the dominant group to ethnic minorities winning elections, but also by an increase in hate crime reporting. Specifically, members of the ethnic group of the winning candidate may feel more empowered to report crime. While this is feasible, we contend that it is unlikely, as the definition of hate crime and the process to report it in the UK is designed to prevent under-reporting. Crimes are identified and flagged as a hate crime by the police and the Crown Prosecution Service when the criminal offense is perceived by the victim or any other person to be motivated by hostility or prejudice towards someone based on a personal characteristic like race or ethnicity, religion or beliefs, without further prove.22

To further assess such an endogeneity concern we estimate minority win effects on hate crime within the category of ‘violence against the person’, and particularly ‘violence with injury’. Because of the seriousness of the offense, such a category of hate crime is expected to be consistently reported regardless of whether people are empowered or discouraged to report crime. Accordingly, the RD estimates of the effects of a minority win should not suffer from such a reporting bias. Despite the small number of crimes within this category (5% of total hate crimes), the estimates presented in Table F.3 are broadly consistent with our main findings on total hate crime: crimes jump at the minority victory threshold.

22Race for the UK criminal justice system agencies means any group defined by race, color, nationality or ethnic or national origin.

Table F.3: Ethnic minority victory effects on violent hate crimes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RD estimate</th>
<th>se</th>
<th>p-value</th>
<th>95% CI</th>
<th>mean control</th>
<th>sd effect</th>
<th>MSE-opt bw</th>
<th>eff. N</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>month</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-0.0003</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.909</td>
<td>[−0.002, 0.003]</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>-0.045</td>
<td>20.56</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>1040</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.0010</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.160</td>
<td>[−0.001, 0.004]</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.154</td>
<td>21.76</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>1560</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.0026</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>[0.001, 0.005]</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.439</td>
<td>18.66</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>2080</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.0011</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.105</td>
<td>[−0.000, 0.003]</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.185</td>
<td>23.95</td>
<td>540</td>
<td>2600</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.0009</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.128</td>
<td>[−0.000, 0.003]</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.141</td>
<td>18.62</td>
<td>540</td>
<td>3120</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.0017</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>[0.000, 0.005]</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.242</td>
<td>15.10</td>
<td>490</td>
<td>3640</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.0020</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>[0.001, 0.005]</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.280</td>
<td>14.58</td>
<td>544</td>
<td>4160</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.0027</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>[0.001, 0.005]</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.376</td>
<td>13.63</td>
<td>558</td>
<td>4680</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.0026</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>[0.001, 0.005]</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.349</td>
<td>13.04</td>
<td>580</td>
<td>5200</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The dependent variable is monthly hate crimes within the category of ‘violence against the person with injury’ per 1000 residents in a constituency. RD estimate is computed with local-linear regression within a symmetric MSE-optimal bandwidth. se is the conventional standard error, p-value and 95% CI are robust bias-corrected. mean control indicates the average monthly hate crime rate in constituencies where ethnic minorities barely lose, sd effect presents the RD estimate in standard deviations, MSE-opt bw is the MSE-optimal bandwidth of vote-share winning margin around the victory threshold, eff. N is the sample size within the MSE-optimal bandwidth and N is the sample size. The model specification includes controls: an indicator of whether the candidate is the incumbent, constituency vote share for UKIP and BNP in the previous election, constituency share that is ethnic minority, young population, single, with social grade DE, unemployed, population density, and share of households with 3 or more deprivations, and in social tenure. Standard errors are clustered by constituency-election. Hate crime data are from Home Office, ethnic background of candidates is constructed by the authors, and constituency characteristics from 2011 UK Decennial Census.
G Subgroup effects on hate crime

We conduct three subgroup analyses. First, in Figure G.1a (right side) we show that the effect of a minority candidate victory in close parliamentary elections on hate crime is concentrated in constituencies that experience a larger than median increase in the number of migrants in the decade preceding the elections. In contrast, while we find that the effect on hate crimes is larger in constituencies that have experience larger than median increase in their unemployment rate in the decade preceding the election versus those experiencing relatively low unemployment rate, the difference between those two coefficients is not statistically significant (Figure G.1a, left side).

Second, in Figure G.1b we show that minority migrant victory only has a positive effect on hate crime incidence when the candidate hails from a left- but not a right-wing party. Finally in Figure G.1c we demonstrate that when controlling for whether the constituency was represented in the past by a minority candidate, the size of the effect shrinks quite a bit in the first 5 post-election months.

Notes: Points are RD estimates of the effect of an ethnic minority victory on hate crimes per 1000 residents and lines 95% robust bias-corrected confidence intervals.

Figure G.1: Subgroup effects on hate crime

H Minority victory effects on mass public attitudes

Moving to mass public opinion, we report below a set of placebo and falsification tests that establish the validity of the RD design (sections H.1–H.4). We further report the main RD results in tabular form and the robustness of those results to alternative survey questions in section H.5.

H.1 Continuity of placebo outcomes

We test whether an index of left–right views is discontinuous at the threshold where constituencies go from electing a dominant group candidate to electing a minority candidate. The rationale for using ideology as a placebo outcome is that it is expected to be strongly correlated with attitudes towards immigrants and ethnic minorities, but as ideology is sticky is not expected to be affected by the ethnic identity of the winning candidate. Figure H.1 reveals no discontinuity in ideology at the threshold where minority candidates win a seat in Parliament. These tests suggest that the validity of the design holds.
Notes: In (a) lines represent respondents’ average left–right view (with 95% confidence intervals) from local linear regression with covariate adjustment fitted to the sample of units whose vote-share winning margin is within the MSE-optimal bandwidth of +/- 15.7 percentage points around the victory threshold. Points are the average left–right view for equally spaced mimicking-variance bins. In (b) points are RD estimates of the effect of an ethnic minority victory and lines 95% robust bias-corrected confidence intervals.

Figure H.1: Ethnic minority victory effects on ideology (placebo outcome)

H.2 Density of the running variable

Figure H.2 reveals no evidence of sorting around the cutoff. Even though there appears to be a jump in the density functions of respondents at the threshold in which constituencies go from electing a dominant group candidate to electing a minority candidate, the confidence intervals of these density functions completely overlap and the p-value of the continuity test indicates that we cannot reject the null of continuity of the density functions. The results of these tests indicate no manipulation of the election results.

Notes: Tests for manipulation of the election results by assessing continuity of the density functions at the cutoff with local polynomial density estimators and robust bias-corrected inference.

Figure H.2: Continuity in the density of survey respondents around the cutoff
### H.3 Continuity of predetermined variables

In Figure H.3 we present results for the tests on the continuity of predetermined variables around the threshold where minority candidates win a seat in Parliament. We find that 2 of a total of 36 covariates show statistically significant discontinuities in means with the test employing local linear regression within an MSE-optimal bandwidth controlling for the FDR with the Benjamini–Hochberg procedure (Figure H.3a). This number of discontinuous covariates is equivalent to the average number of false rejections (which is 1.8). Furthermore, with the permutation test for continuity in the *distribution* of observations around the cutoff, we find that only 1 of the 35 predetermined variables are discontinuous at the cutoff (Figure H.3b). The results from both tests suggest that there were no systematic discontinuities in the covariates at the threshold where minorities win political office, and that therefore the continuity assumption of the potential outcome functions is likely to hold.

Notes: Test for continuity of candidate and constituency predetermined background characteristics in (a) using a local linear regression with a symmetric MSE-optimal bandwidth as implemented by the *rdrobust* R package and in (b) using an asymptotic permutation test comparing the distribution of observation near the cutoff as implemented by the *RATest* R package. The vertical line in (a) indicates a *p*-value = 0.0012, which is the threshold for the *p*-values when controlling the false discovery rate with the Benjamini–Hochberg procedure, and in (b) *p*-value = 0.008.

Figure H.3: Continuity of predetermined variables around the cutoff

### H.4 Sensitivity to the choice of bandwidth

The results on mass public opinion are not sensitive to the choice of bandwidth. In Figure H.4 we present the minority victory effects on the main attitudinal outcome for different values of the bandwidth. We fit our linear model to the sample of observations within the CER- and MSE-optimal bandwidths, half and twice their size. We find that the results are broadly consistent with the findings obtained with the optimal MSE bandwidth.
Notes: Points are RD estimates of the effect of an ethnic minority victory on inclusionary attitudes towards immigrants and lines 95% robust bias-corrected confidence intervals. MSE stands for mean squared error optimal bandwidth and CER refers to a bandwidth that minimizes the coverage error from the robust biased corrected confidence intervals obtained with the MSE-optimal bandwidth. The values next to the ‘CER’, ‘MSE’ labels indicate the bandwidth size.

Figure H.4: Sensitivity to the choice of bandwidth

H.5 Additional attitudinal outcomes

To validate the robustness of our results beyond our main attitudinal outcome (provided in tabular form in Table H.1), we compute two additional outcomes that use all other available survey items on attitudes towards immigration and ethnic minorities. The first outcome, economy, is an item that asks survey respondents whether immigrants are good for Britain’s economy. This item is included in all survey years, but the wording of questions and answers (and their range) changes across time. The second outcome is an index that includes stereotypical beliefs about immigrants and attitudes towards accommodating diversity. However, this items are only included for a subsample of 60% of those who answered the 2017, 2019 surveys. In Table H.2 we present the effect estimates on these two additional attitudinal outcomes discussed further in Appendix C. We include as well the estimates on our main outcome as benchmark.
Table H.1: Ethnic minority victory effects on mass inclusionary attitudes towards immigrants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RD estimate</th>
<th>se</th>
<th>p-value</th>
<th>95% CI</th>
<th>mean control</th>
<th>sd effect</th>
<th>MSE-opt bw</th>
<th>eff. N</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>cov</th>
<th>smpl</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-0.255</td>
<td>0.065</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>[-0.426, -0.150]</td>
<td>0.434</td>
<td>-0.562</td>
<td>14.42</td>
<td>291</td>
<td>1924</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>f</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-0.258</td>
<td>0.065</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>[-0.425, -0.150]</td>
<td>0.440</td>
<td>-0.560</td>
<td>15.14</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>1876</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-0.295</td>
<td>0.052</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>[-0.428, -0.210]</td>
<td>0.445</td>
<td>-0.646</td>
<td>14.33</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>1876</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>c</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy indicating whether a survey respondent do not thinks that "too many immigrants have been let into the country". RD estimate is computed with local-linear regression within a symmetric MSE-optimal bandwidth. se is the conventional standard error, p-value and 95% CI are robust bias-corrected. mean control indicates the average proportion of respondents who do not think that "too many immigrants have been let into the country" in constituencies where ethnic minorities barely lose. sd effect presents the RD estimate in standard deviations, MSE-opt bw is the MSE-optimal bandwidth of vote-share winning margin around the victory threshold, eff. N is the sample size within the MSE-optimal bandwidth and N is the sample size. cov is a vector of controls including an indicator of whether the candidate is the incumbent, whether the survey respondent is male, young, single, employed, owns a house, and the constituency vote share for UKIP and BNP in the previous election, share that is foreign born, and share of households with 3 or more deprivations. smpl is the used sample: f stands for full sample and c for a complete cases sample with no missing values for respondent’s predetermined variables. Standard errors are clustered by constituency-election. Survey data are from the British Election Study, ethnic background of candidates is constructed by the authors, and constituency characteristics from 2001 and 2011 UK Decennial Census.
Table H.2: Ethnic minority victory effects on mass attitudes towards immigrants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>estimate</th>
<th>se</th>
<th>p-value</th>
<th>95% CI</th>
<th>mean control</th>
<th>sd effect</th>
<th>MSE-opt bw</th>
<th>eff. N</th>
<th>out</th>
<th>cov</th>
<th>smpl</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-0.332</td>
<td>0.118</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>[-0.640, -0.134]</td>
<td>3.438</td>
<td>-0.252</td>
<td>11.69</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>2111</td>
<td>economy</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-0.371</td>
<td>0.120</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>[-0.678, -0.167]</td>
<td>3.468</td>
<td>-0.284</td>
<td>11.39</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>2058</td>
<td>economy</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-0.479</td>
<td>0.063</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>[-0.645, -0.380]</td>
<td>3.336</td>
<td>-0.367</td>
<td>8.05</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>2058</td>
<td>economy</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-0.255</td>
<td>0.065</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>[-0.426, -0.150]</td>
<td>0.434</td>
<td>-0.562</td>
<td>14.42</td>
<td>291</td>
<td>1924</td>
<td>entry</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-0.258</td>
<td>0.065</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>[-0.425, -0.150]</td>
<td>0.440</td>
<td>-0.560</td>
<td>15.14</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>1876</td>
<td>entry</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-0.295</td>
<td>0.052</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>[-0.428, -0.210]</td>
<td>0.445</td>
<td>-0.646</td>
<td>14.33</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>1876</td>
<td>entry</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-0.145</td>
<td>0.201</td>
<td>0.510</td>
<td>[-0.582, 0.289]</td>
<td>2.225</td>
<td>-0.157</td>
<td>18.83</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>899</td>
<td>index</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-0.187</td>
<td>0.203</td>
<td>0.408</td>
<td>[-0.624, 0.253]</td>
<td>2.263</td>
<td>-0.202</td>
<td>18.70</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>865</td>
<td>index</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-0.092</td>
<td>0.186</td>
<td>0.754</td>
<td>[-0.453, 0.329]</td>
<td>2.274</td>
<td>-0.099</td>
<td>15.66</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>865</td>
<td>index</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The dependent variable is indicated by out: economy is respondent’s agreement with the statement "immigration is good for Britain’s economy" on a 5-point Likert scale, entry, which is our main outcome of interest and is included here as benchmark, is a dummy indicating whether a survey respondent do not thinks that "too many immigrants have been let into the country", and index aggregates agreement with five statements about immigrants and ethnic minorities; higher values indicate more inclusionary attitudes. RD estimate is computed with local-linear regression within a symmetric MSE-optimal bandwidth. se is the conventional standard error, p-value and 95% CI are robust bias-corrected. mean control indicates the average proportion of respondents who do not think that "too many immigrants have been let into the country" in constituencies where ethnic minorities barely lose. sd effect presents the RD estimate in standard deviations, MSE-opt bw is the MSE-optimal bandwidth of vote-share winning margin around the victory threshold, eff. N is the sample size within the MSE-optimal bandwidth and N is the sample size. cov is a vector of controls including an indicator of whether the candidate is the incumbent, whether the survey respondent is male, young, single, employed, owns a house, and the constituency vote share for UKIP and BNP in the previous election, share that is foreign born, and share of households with 3 or more deprivations. smpl is the used sample: f stands for full sample and c for a complete cases sample with no missing values for respondent’s predetermined variables. Standard errors are clustered by constituency-election. Survey data are from the British Election Study, ethnic background of candidates is constructed by the authors, and constituency characteristics from 2001 and 2011 UK Decennial Census.
I Media tone towards migrant groups

We report placebo and falsification tests that establish the validity of the RD design and the robustness of our results (sections I.1–I.5), and the main RD results in tabular form (section I.6).

I.1 Continuity of placebo outcomes

We use as a placebo measure the tone of news article mentions about countries and nationalities from North America, Western Europe, Australia and New Zealand that co-occur with mentions about the candidate’s constituency. The placebo outcome is thus the monthly ratio of negative mentions to total mentions about these countries and nationalities in the candidate’s constituency. In Figure I.1a we illustrate the RD estimates of the effect of a minority win on this placebo outcome three months from the election, and in Figure I.1b we present the estimates across months after the election, and we compare them to the estimates of the effects on media tone about the candidate’s ethnic group (our main outcome variable). Both figures show no discontinuity in the tone of mentions about countries and nationalities from North America, Western Europe, Australia and New Zealand at the threshold where minorities win political office, suggesting that the validity of the design holds.

Notes: In (a) lines represent monthly proportion of negative mentions about countries and nationalities from North America, Western Europe, Australia and New Zealand in the candidate’s constituency (with 95% confidence intervals) from local linear regression with covariate adjustment fitted to the sample of units whose vote-share winning margin is within the MSE-optimal bandwidth of +/- 12.1 percentage points around the victory threshold. Points are the average monthly proportion of negative mentions about countries and nationalities from North America, Western Europe, Australia and New Zealand in the candidate’s constituency for equally spaced mimicking-variance bins. In (b) points are RD estimates of the effect of an ethnic minority victory and lines 95% robust bias-corrected confidence intervals.

Figure I.1: Ethnic minority victory effects on media tone of placebo groups
I.2 Continuity of main outcome before general election

We test whether the proportion of negative mentions about a candidate’s ethnic group is discontinuous at the minority victory threshold before the general election. We find no discontinuities at the threshold before the election—the estimates of the effect of a minority win are centered around zero (and are not statistically significant)—except for two months before the election; when there is a jump at the threshold in the proportion of negative mentions about the winner’s ethnic group. Such an increase however, is only distinguishable from zero one month prior to the election (Figure I.2). Campaigns officially begin with the dissolution of Parliament, which is about one month and a half prior to the election. It is possible that there is an anticipatory reaction from the media to minorities winning a seat in Parliament, as the media is more informed than the general public. It is also possible that the media responds to minority candidacies with a more negative coverage of candidates who are more likely to win, with the objective of affecting the election results. Overall, this placebo test increases our confidence about the robustness of our results. It suggests that the estimates of the minority victory effects on media tone about a candidate’s ethnic group are explained by the election and not by other dynamics in constituencies where minorities win.

![Figure I.2: Ethnic minority victory effects on media tone before and after the election](image)

Notes: Points are RD estimates of the effect of an ethnic minority victory and lines 95% robust bias-corrected confidence intervals.

Figure I.2: Ethnic minority victory effects on media tone before and after the election

I.3 Density of the running variable

Figure I.3 reveals no evidence of sorting around the cutoff. Even though there appears to be a jump in the density functions of candidates at the threshold in which constituencies go from electing a dominant group candidate to electing a minority candidate, the confidence intervals of these density functions completely overlap and the p-value of the continuity test indicates that we cannot reject the null of continuity of the density functions. In addition, the p-value for the (McCrary, 2008) sorting test is 0.82, indicating that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of continuity of the density of candidates at the threshold. The results of these tests indicate no manipulation of the election results.
Notes: Tests for manipulation of the election results by assessing continuity of the density functions at the cutoff with local polynomial density estimators and robust bias-corrected inference.

Figure I.3: Continuity in the density of candidates around the cutoff

I.4 Continuity of predetermined variables

In Figure we present results for the tests on the continuity of predetermined variables around the threshold where minority candidates win a seat in Parliament. We find that 2 of a total of 32 covariates show statistically significant discontinuities in means with the test employing local linear regression within an MSE-optimal bandwidth (Figure I.4a). Furthermore, controlling for the FDR with the Benjamini–Hochberg procedure we do not find discontinuous variables. Moreover, with the permutation test for continuity in the distribution of observations around the cutoff, we find that only 1 of the 31 predetermined variables are discontinuous at the cutoff, and zero when we control the FDR with the Benjamini–Hochberg procedure (Figure I.4b). This number of discontinuous covariates is equivalent to the average number of false rejections (which is 1.55). The results from both tests suggest that there were no systematic discontinuities in the covariates at the threshold where minorities win political office, and that therefore the continuity assumption of the potential outcome functions is likely to hold.
I.5 Discontinuities away from the victory threshold and sensitivity to the choice of bandwidth

In Figure I.5a we test for discontinuities at points other than the threshold where minorities win political office. We find that with the exception of two instances which show the opposite effect (a decrease in negative media tone), there is no evidence of statistically significant discontinuities away from the treatment threshold. In Figure I.5b we test for sensitivity of the results to the choice of bandwidth, using CER- and MSE-optimal bandwidths, half and twice their size. We find that the results are consistent with the findings obtained with the optimal MSE bandwidth —there is an increase in the proportion of negative mentions about a candidate’s ethnic group at the victory threshold. These two results strengthen the validity of our findings on media tone.

Notes: Test for continuity of candidate and constituency predetermined background characteristics in (a) using a local linear regression with a symmetric MSE-optimal bandwidth as implemented by the \texttt{rdrobust} R package and in (b) using an asymptotic permutation test comparing the distribution of observation near the cutoff as implemented by the \texttt{RATest} R package. The vertical line indicates $p$-value $= 0.05$. The threshold for the $p$-values when controlling the false discovery rate with the Benjamini–Hochberg procedure is zero.

Figure I.4: Continuity of predetermined variables around the cutoff
Notes: (a) tests for discontinuities away from the threshold where minorities win a seat in Parliament with placebo cutoffs that incrementally decrease or increase by 10 percentage points away from the cutoff, and (b) tests for sensitivity to the choice of bandwidth. MSE stands for mean squared error optimal bandwidth and CER refers to a bandwidth that minimizes the coverage error from the robust biased corrected confidence intervals obtained with the MSE-optimal bandwidth. The values next to the 'CER', 'MSE' labels indicate the bandwidth size.

Figure I.5: Falsification tests

I.6 Main RD results in tabular form

Table I.1 displays all statistics of interest related to the estimates of the effect of a minority win on media tone.

J Explaining effects on media attention and tone

We assess whether there is an association between the political alignment of newspapers and the increase in speech about migrant groups with a specific valence (negative and positive). To do so, we classify the newspapers into right-wing or not right-wing using Wordscores (Laver, Benoit and Garry, 2003) (as implemented by the R package quanteda) with 2017 party manifestos as reference texts and expert surveys as exogenous scores. The party manifestos are from Burst et al. (2020) and the expert surveys from Norris (2020). The party scores are the average value of experts’ party placements on economic and social issues. We consider that all newspapers with computed scores to the right of the most left-leaning self-identified right-wing newspaper are right-wing. This classification has an accuracy of 73%, measured against newspaper self-identification, which we extract from Wikipedia infoboxes, and is available for 22/156 newspapers.

In Figure J.1a we present the RD estimates of the effects of a minority win on valence of migrant groups for newspapers that support a candidate’s party (based on political alignment) and non-supportive papers. These estimates suggest that the negative mentions are indeed driven by newspapers that do not support the parties—the minority victory effects on the proportion of negative
Table I.1: Ethnic minority victory effects on media tone about migrant groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RD estimate</th>
<th>se</th>
<th>p-value</th>
<th>95% CI</th>
<th>mean control</th>
<th>sd effect</th>
<th>MSE-opt bw</th>
<th>eff. N</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>cov</th>
<th>month</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.080</td>
<td>0.106</td>
<td>0.331</td>
<td>[-0.104, 0.309]</td>
<td>0.189</td>
<td>0.269</td>
<td>24.77</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>438</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.228</td>
<td>0.098</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>[0.069, 0.454]</td>
<td>0.115</td>
<td>0.998</td>
<td>14.37</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>438</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.123</td>
<td>0.097</td>
<td>0.078</td>
<td>[-0.019, 0.362]</td>
<td>0.135</td>
<td>0.417</td>
<td>14.34</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>876</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.297</td>
<td>0.087</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>[0.171, 0.512]</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>1.088</td>
<td>10.53</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>876</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.102</td>
<td>0.101</td>
<td>0.165</td>
<td>[-0.058, 0.339]</td>
<td>0.217</td>
<td>0.321</td>
<td>16.44</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>1314</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.210</td>
<td>0.094</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>[0.062, 0.432]</td>
<td>0.193</td>
<td>0.674</td>
<td>12.13</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>1314</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.121</td>
<td>0.072</td>
<td>0.030</td>
<td>[0.015, 0.297]</td>
<td>0.210</td>
<td>0.393</td>
<td>14.57</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>1752</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.216</td>
<td>0.075</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>[0.103, 0.397]</td>
<td>0.183</td>
<td>0.724</td>
<td>11.65</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>1752</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.144</td>
<td>0.075</td>
<td>0.016</td>
<td>[0.033, 0.329]</td>
<td>0.176</td>
<td>0.474</td>
<td>13.42</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>2190</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.234</td>
<td>0.074</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>[0.126, 0.417]</td>
<td>0.159</td>
<td>0.781</td>
<td>10.69</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>2190</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.124</td>
<td>0.076</td>
<td>0.040</td>
<td>[0.007, 0.305]</td>
<td>0.169</td>
<td>0.419</td>
<td>14.59</td>
<td>432</td>
<td>2628</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.203</td>
<td>0.069</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>[0.105, 0.377]</td>
<td>0.163</td>
<td>0.699</td>
<td>11.89</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>2628</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.065</td>
<td>0.067</td>
<td>0.195</td>
<td>[-0.045, 0.219]</td>
<td>0.189</td>
<td>0.223</td>
<td>16.51</td>
<td>567</td>
<td>3066</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.125</td>
<td>0.062</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>[0.026, 0.267]</td>
<td>0.180</td>
<td>0.428</td>
<td>14.53</td>
<td>497</td>
<td>3066</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.043</td>
<td>0.056</td>
<td>0.258</td>
<td>[-0.046, 0.173]</td>
<td>0.196</td>
<td>0.145</td>
<td>16.45</td>
<td>648</td>
<td>3504</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.076</td>
<td>0.050</td>
<td>0.070</td>
<td>[-0.007, 0.190]</td>
<td>0.197</td>
<td>0.255</td>
<td>16.60</td>
<td>656</td>
<td>3504</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.068</td>
<td>0.057</td>
<td>0.111</td>
<td>[-0.021, 0.201]</td>
<td>0.177</td>
<td>0.227</td>
<td>15.41</td>
<td>693</td>
<td>3942</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.137</td>
<td>0.047</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>[0.073, 0.259]</td>
<td>0.169</td>
<td>0.463</td>
<td>14.23</td>
<td>612</td>
<td>3942</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.042</td>
<td>0.054</td>
<td>0.267</td>
<td>[-0.046, 0.167]</td>
<td>0.193</td>
<td>0.140</td>
<td>16.79</td>
<td>830</td>
<td>4380</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.096</td>
<td>0.047</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>[0.024, 0.207]</td>
<td>0.186</td>
<td>0.318</td>
<td>15.61</td>
<td>770</td>
<td>4380</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The dependent variable is the monthly proportion of negative mentions in news articles about a candidate’s ethnic group. *RD estimate* is computed with local-linear regression within a symmetric MSE-optimal bandwidth. *se* is the conventional standard error, *p-value* and *95% CI* are robust bias-corrected. *mean control* indicates the average proportion of negative news article mentions about the barely losing candidate’s ethnic group. *sd effect* presents the RD estimate in standard deviations, *MSE-opt bw* is the MSE-optimal bandwidth of vote-share winning margin around the victory threshold, *eff. N* is the sample size within the MSE-optimal bandwidth and *N* is the sample size. *cov* is a vector of controls including whether the candidate is the incumbent, from a left-leaning party, a woman, a first-generation immigrant, the constituency vote share for UKIP and BNP in the previous election, constituency share that shares the candidate’s ethnic background, shares of foreign born, with a minority religion, young population, single, with level 1 qualifications, with social grade DE, unemployed, and share of households with 4 or more deprivations, and in social tenure. Standard errors are clustered by constituency-election. News articles were extracted from Common Crawl, ethnic background of candidates is constructed by the authors, and constituency characteristics from 2001 and 2011 UK Decennial Census.

mentions are bigger for mentions from non-supportive newspapers than supportive newspapers—but the coefficients also suggest that non-supportive newspapers contribute with the positive mentions. Furthermore, when we compute the minority win effects for right- and left-wing newspapers (Figure J.1b), we find evidence that the increase in negative mentions is mostly driven by right-wing
newspapers, and that at least for the first quarter after the election, left-wing newspapers contribute the most to the increase in positive mentions about a candidate’s ethnic group. Moreover, the estimates of the RD effects of a minority win on the tone of newspapers by their circulation (above or below 25,000 copies), suggest that during the first months after the election the positive mentions about a winning candidate’s ethnic group are contributed by papers with a circulation of more than 25,000 copies, while smaller papers drive the negative mentions (Figure J.1c).

Notes: Points are RD estimates of the effect of an ethnic minority victory and lines 95% robust bias-corrected confidence intervals.

Figure J.1: Ethnic minority victory effects on media tone by newspaper-party political alignment, paper ideology, and circulation

Table J.1: Minority victory effects across media valence categories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>month</th>
<th>(negative - positive)</th>
<th>(negative - neutral)</th>
<th>(positive - neutral)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>1.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.90</td>
<td>2.83</td>
<td>0.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>1.68</td>
<td>1.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>2.11</td>
<td>1.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>1.88</td>
<td>1.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>1.41</td>
<td>0.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>-0.33</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>1.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>-1.05</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>0.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>-0.14</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.87</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Values indicate the $t$-statistic of the difference between the RD estimates of the effects of a minority win on the proportion of negative, positive, and neutral mentions about a candidate’s ethnic group in the media. Values larger than the critical value of 1.96 are statistically significant.
References for Appendix


