Facilitating Worker Mobility: A Randomized Information Intervention among Migrant Workers in Singapore

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Abstract

International migrant workers often face high job search costs and imperfect information on their legal rights to change employers. Such information constraints can undermine the economic benefits from international migration by tying migrant workers to their current employers, leading them to accept less favorable employment terms. We ran a randomized experiment on the impact of facilitating worker mobility via an information intervention among Filipino maids in Singapore. The treatment led to improvements in knowledge of legal rights related to changing jobs, as well as in job conditions (e.g., improved hours and other conditions of work). Treatment effects are concentrated among workers who at baseline (prior to treatment) had low knowledge of their legal rights, as well as those with poor baseline job conditions. Workers with poor baseline job conditions also became more likely to change employers in response to treatment. The results reveal the empirical relevance of imperfect information in the the labor market for migrant workers, particularly information facilitating job-to-job transitions.

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Worker mobility is an important determinant of employment terms and conditions in the labor market (Scully, 1973; Raimondo, 1983; Naidu, 2010; Naidu and Yuchtman, 2013). Foreign migrant workers, in particular, often have limited job-to-job mobility in their countries of employment due to imperfect information (Huang and Yeoh, 1996; Kossoudiji and Cobb-Clark, 2002; Munshi, 2003; Beaman, 2012). Incomplete information can tie migrant workers to their current employers and lead them to accept less favorable terms of employment. In this paper, we examine whether relaxing information constraints related to job-to-job transitions can improve employment outcomes of foreign workers.

82 million individuals from developing countries were residing in developed countries in 2013, mostly for the purpose of employment.¹ Labor migration leads to large income gains (Clemens et al., 2009; Clemens, 2013), some of which are shared with their family members through remittances (Yang, 2008; McKenzie et al., 2010). Remittances sent to developing countries reached \$551 billion in 2013, and have a range of positive impacts on recipient households (Yang, 2011; Gibson and McKenzie, forthcoming).

At the same time, there is a growing sense among policy-makers and nongovernment organizations (in both sending and receiving countries) that migrant workers face potentially important barriers to improving their conditions of work overseas. In particular, information constraints could undermine the economic benefits from international migration by decreasing migrants' incomes or their ability to obtain better work conditions.² In a standard job-search model, workers use information about market conditions to determine their outside options (Burdett and Vishwanath, 1988; Gonzalez and Shi, 2010). Migrant workers, however, face multiple information constraints in their foreign country of employment. Restricted

¹South-North migration accounted for 35 percent of total international migrants in 2013 (United Nations, 2013). In the last two decades, South-North migration has been the main driver of global migration, growing more than twice as fast as the global total.

²Poor working conditions for migrants are a frequent international news item, such as reports of high death rates among migrants in dangerous jobs. For example, in Qatar, a major Middle Eastern destination for migrants from South Asia, 241 Indian and 185 Nepali construction workers died in 2013 (Gibson, 2014). For detailed summary of research on the effectiveness of policies that enhance benefits and reduce risks from migration at all three stages of the migration process (pre-departure, during migration, and return migration), see McKenzie and Yang (2014).

information on vacant jobs, partly due to limited local social networks, increases costs of searching for new employment. In addition, lack of knowledge about legal rights and regulations regarding changing employers can further restrict labor mobility and create monopsony power for employers (Ashenfelter at al., 2010; Staiger et al., 2010; Manning, 2011; Matsudaira, 2014).³ Both factors could reduce migrant reservation wages, restrict their choice of employment, reduce workers' bargaining power relative to current employers, and make it difficult to leave jobs with poor employment conditions.

We implemented a randomized controlled trial examining the impact of providing information aimed at facilitating worker mobility. Our study population was composed of Filipino maids in Singapore. Filipinos make up the largest share of foreign domestic workers (FDWs) in Singapore. FDWs are mostly female and work in private homes performing household chores. The informal nature of the job imposes constraints on effective monitoring of FDWs' working conditions, and surveys of FDWs indicate poor knowledge of their legal rights to change employers. This provides an ideal setting to test the role of incomplete information in influencing work conditions and worker mobility.

FDWs assigned to the treatment group received verbal and written information on Singaporean labor laws about changing employers. Treated FDWs were also handed a list of current job vacancies for domestic work in Singapore, and they were informed of a free online job portal where they could get more up-to-date information on FDW job openings. Several months later, we re-interviewed study participants to determine the impacts of the treatment.

The treatment led, first of all, to substantial improvements in worker knowledge about their legal rights, in particular that they could find and change employers without the use of an agent or middleman. In addition, the treatment led to improvement in an index of self-reported employment conditions. Among the com-

 $^{^{3}}$ Legal restrictions that tie migrants to their employers or make it difficult to change employers are commonplace, particularly in countries with larger migrant workforces (Ruhs, 2013). This is clearly a separate issue from imperfect information about migrant worker's legal rights to change jobs.

ponents of the index, the treatment had positive impacts on work hours as well as "other conditions," but not on salaries. These overall impacts are statistically significant at conventional levels.

Subsample analyses help shed light on the mechanisms and provide additional insight. The treatment effects on knowledge and work conditions are concentrated among workers who, at baseline (i.e., prior to treatment), had poor knowledge about their legal rights related to job mobility. This finding is suggestive that improvements in knowledge were the channel through which the treatment effects operated. Positive impacts on knowledge and work conditions were also larger in magnitude among "vulnerable" FDWs (those who reported at baseline to have poor work conditions on several dimensions.) This vulnerable sub-population also became more likely to find a new employer as a result of treatment.⁴

To our knowledge, this paper is the first empirical study of the impact of improving information related to migrant worker job mobility. This paper contributes to a growing literature on the effects of information imperfections in markets for migrant work, and in labor markets more generally. Information imperfections have been shown in some cases (but not others) to affect the migration decision itself (McKenzie et al., 2013; Beam, 2014; Bryan et al., 2014; Beam et al., forthcoming). Asymmetric information within transnational households (between migrants and their family members back home) have been shown to influence remittances and savings rates (Ambler, 2015; Ashraf et al., 2015). In addition, many public policies aimed at promoting employment among native workers focus on improving access to information (Heckman et al., 1999).

Our paper is also connected to a smaller body of work on the impact of labor market restrictions or distortions on migrant work. Naidu et al. (2014) show that a legal reform in the UAE that loosened restricitons on migrant workers' ability to change jobs led to higher migrant earnings. McKenzie et al. (2014) show patterns in Filipino migration responses to overseas economics shocks that are consistent

 $^{^{4}}$ The non-vulnerable subgroup, on the other hand, does not become more likely to change employers as a result of treatment, but in this group we do find a positive treatment effect on stated *intentions* to seek to improve work conditions in the future.

with binding minimum wages for migrant work. We contribute to this emerging literature by examining impacts of improving information on migrant legal rights to change jobs.

This paper also relates to the role of labor mobility and easier online search options in determining labor market outcomes (Kuhn and Skuterund, 2004; Stevenson, 2009; Kroft and Pope, 2014). Mobility restrictions have been shown to affect wages and welfare among native workers in developed (Naidu, 2010) and developing countries (Lilienfeld-Toal and Mookherjee, 2010).

The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 describes the foreign domestic worker labor market in Singapore. Section 2 outlines the research design and the empirical strategy. Section 3 presents estimates of the causal impact of information intervention on labor market outcomes. Section 4 concludes.

1 Background

Foreign domestic workers (FDWs) are common in Asian economies like Singapore, Hong Kong, and South Korea, Middle Eastern countries like Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Israel; and in the Western countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada (albeit at a much smaller scale).⁵ Domestic work is also the most important sector of employment among female migrants from several developing countries. More than 85 percent of all female migration from Sri Lanka and 40 percent from the Philippines consisted of domestic workers. In some countries, FDWs even outnumbered male migrants.⁶ This demand for FDWs is fueled by the growing participation of women in industrialized nations in formal labor markets; and their consequent reliance on migrant labor for their household production needs. An aging population in developed countries further adds to this demand (Kremer and Watt, 2009; Yeoh and Huang, 2010).

⁵In Hong Kong, close to 60 percent of educated women with young children employ a FDW (Cortes and Pan, 2013); in the United States, Cortes and Tessada (2011) estimate that immigrants represented 25 percent of the workers employed in private household consumption.

 $^{^6 {\}rm Domestic}$ workers accounted for 66 percent of those departing for foreign employment in Indonesia and 42 percent in Sri Lanka.

Since 1978, when Singapore first granted work permits to foreign domestic workers, the number of FDWs working in Singapore has increased from 40,000 in 1988 to 200,000 in 2009 (Yeoh et al., 1999). Currently, one in every five Singaporean households employs a foreign maid. Approximately, three-quarters of FDWs come from the Philippines, one-fifth come from Indonesia, and the rest come from other government-approved countries.⁷ They make up close to 20 percent of its foreign workforce (Ministry of Manpower, 2014a).

The recruitment and employment of FDWs in Singapore is governed by the Employment of Foreign Manpower Act. Under this Act, households with sufficient income and domestic needs are allowed to hire a female FDW. She must be between the age of 23 and 50, and have completed a minimum of 8 years of education. In turn, employers are required to pay a one-time security bond of SGD5,000;⁸ the deposit would be refunded when FDW returns safely to her home country after the contract expires. In addition, employers also have to pay a monthly levy of SGD265 to the government and purchase personal accident and medical insurance policies for each FDW they hire. They are required to pay FDWs monthly and no later than 7 days after the last day of the salary period, to allow for weekly rest days, and to provide them with a safe work environment.⁹

Employers can hire FDWs directly or through an employment agency, of which there are over 1,000 operating in Singapore. These agencies recruit potential workers through brokers in their home country and match them with employers in Singapore.¹⁰ The FDW work visa is tied to the employer, and only allows her to

 $^{^{7}}$ This list includes Thailand, Sri Lanka, Philippines, Bangladesh, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Macau, Malaysia, Myanmar, South Korea, and Taiwan. The first three countries were approved for recruitment since the beginning in 1978, while the others were added later over time.

⁸The average exchange rate from June-October, 2013 was USD1 = SGD1.24.

⁹Safe work environment is defined as "sufficient ventilation, safety, privacy, space, and protection from the elements like rain and sun." In addition, FDWs must undergo a medical check-up every six months and attend the Settling-in Program within three working days of arriving in Singapore. They are not allowed to bring with them any family members to Singapore, marry Singaporeans, or become pregnant during their stay in the country. Employers must complete the Employer's Orientation Program. More detailed information on regulations and requirements is available in Employment of Foreign Manpower Act, Chapter 91A, Schedule 1 and Schedule 4. It can be downloaded at: http://www.mom.gov.sg/legislation.

 $^{^{10}}$ 90 percent of households hired a FDW through an employment agency. 74 percent of employers used FDW bio-data provided by the agency to choose their preferred maid, but only half of them went on to also interview the FDWs (Ministry of Manpower, 2010).

work on household chores at the location stated in her contract. It also requires her to reside (or "live-in") with her employer. The length of the contract is two years, but can be renewed for six more years. Renewals after eight years of employment are considered on a case-by-case basis.

The Employment of Foreign Manpower Act allows FDWs to change employers at any time, as long as they continue to work as domestic workers. This law guarantees the right to transfer without the FDW having to leave Singapore, using an employment agent, or paying any fines. Workers do require approval from their current employer in order to transfer. To initiate a transfer, the new employer must file an application for a new work permit on behalf of the FDW. Almost half of FDWs remain employed with the same employer for over a year, and fewer than 3 percent of FDWs have changed more than two employers (Ministry of Manpower, 2014b).¹¹

FDWs are not protected by the Employment Act, which regulates work hours, wages, and other benefits of workers in Singapore. The Singapore government maintains that such controls are impractical due to the unstructured nature of household chores, and therefore, leaves employment conditions to the discretion of the employer and the employee. Human Rights Watch (2005) found that more than 80 percent of domestic workers in Singapore complained of having a heavy workload with not enough time to rest.¹² More than two-thirds of FDWs complained about limited access to information and external communication.

2 Experimental Design

Our sample consists of Filipino migrants working in Singapore as domestic workers. The research team visited a centrally-located shopping mall popular with Filipino

¹¹The transfer rates across employment agencies vary from zero to twenty percent, while the retention rates vary from zero to one hundred percent. Both measures are used as an indicator of the employment agency's quality and performance (Ministry of Manpower, 2014b).

 $^{^{12}}$ Human Rights Watch (2005) estimates that the Indonesian Embassy in Singapore receives fifty complaints per day, mostly from domestic workers. The Philippines Embassy and the Sri Lankan High Commissions each receive forty to eighty complaints from FDWs per month.

workers, Lucky Plaza Mall, every Sunday from June 2013 to October 2013. Filipino FDWs commonly visit the mall on their rest day (typically Sunday) to meet other FDWs and send money home via the many remittance companies located there. 33.4 percent of FDWs whom we approached for an interview agreed to participate in the study. FDWs who agreed to participate were administered a baseline survey on the spot. Half of respondents were assigned to the treatment group based on a randomly selected sealed envelope that was opened by the surveyor immediately after completing the survey, and revealed the treatment status. FDWs selected into the treatment group received the treatment soon thereafter. All participants were then contacted via phone seven to eight months after the initial visit for a follow-up survey.

The baseline sample consisted of 303 FDWs, out of which 153 FDWs were randomly assigned to the treatment group. Table 1, Columns 1 and 2 report means of baseline variables in the control and treatment groups, respectively, while Column 3 reports the difference in means. Across all the reported demographic and employment variables, we cannot reject that means are equal across treatment and control groups at conventional levels of statistical significance. As indicated by the F-test statistic at the bottom of Column 3, we also cannot reject the joint equality of means between the two groups across the full set of variables shown.

FDWs in our study are on average 37 years old, slightly more than two-fifths are married, and roughly three-fifths have completed college. The average duration of employment is 4 years, and more than 80 percent of FDWs have been working for the same employer for the past one year. Across the sample, we find that labor laws that are designed to protect FDWs are not always adhered to. 30 percent of FDWs report earning less than the minimum wage set by the Philippines government for its overseas domestic workers, USD400.¹³ While Singapore laws leave many aspects of domestic work unregulated, they mandate FDWs to be paid within the week after the last day of their salary period, guarantee one rest day per week, and require

¹³The Philippines Overseas Employment Administration regulates the recruitment and employment of Filipinos for work abroad, including setting their minimum wage standards. For detailed discussion on the minimum wage standards for Filipino FDWs, see McKenzie et al. (2014).

provision of a safe workspace. However, more than 20 percent of FDWs report not having at least one of these conditions fulfilled by their current employer. We categorize them as "vulnerable" FDWs for later analysis. When they were tested on Singapore labor laws related to FDW transfer, only 10 percent of FDWs could correctly answer all four questions, and 65 percent answered half of the questions incorrectly.

2.1 Information intervention

The treatment consisted of verbal and written information about the labor market for domestic help in Singapore. We provided two types of information. Treated FDWs were first handed a flyer on Singapore labor laws about changing employers for FDWs. It included information about their legal rights guaranteed in Singapore, and provided detailed instructions on how to request transfers, including where they could obtain application forms.

The second set of information focused on employment opportunities currently available to them in Singapore. They were informed about a new, free online job portal with job postings from employers seeking to hire FDWs. DWjobs.org was setup in 2012 as a non-profit enterprise, and the website and its mobile application serve as a job-matching platform for FDWs seeking to transfer, by allowing prospective employers to post advertisements and FDWs to download them for free.¹⁴ In addition to this information, treated FDWs were also given a print-out of the ten most recent job postings from the website. Each job posting came with a brief job description and the employer's contact information. We updated this print-out weekly.

Our survey staff provided a verbal summary of the key information from the written material before handing it over to treated respondents. Appendix 1 repro-

¹⁴The website's goal is to create a more equitable job marketplace for FDWs. Both employers and FDWs can use the internet-based service for free and avoid paying employment transfer fees to middlemen (e.g., employment agencies) that can range from SGD400 to SGD600. The website also provides a forum for discussions of issues faced by employers and workers, along with the list of basic skills training resources available to FDWs in Singapore. More information about the organization and its online job-matching service can be found at dwjobs.org.

duces the FDW legal rights flyer and an example of a job postings print-out used in the intervention.

We would expect that this information could increase job mobility, as well as increasing employees' bargaining power by improving their outside options. If FDWs were information constrained, this information intervention should decrease their job search costs.

2.2 Sample attrition

Out of 303 FDWs interviewed in the baseline, we successfully followed up with 178 FDWs via phone.¹⁵ The attrition rate is almost identical and not statistically different between treatment and control groups (see bottom of Column 3, Table 1), suggesting that attrition bias is not a prominent concern. Columns 4-6 in Table 1 present means of baseline variables in the treatment and control groups and their differences for this restricted sample. Means in the full and restricted samples are similar. In the restricted sample, three (out of 18) differences between treatment and control groups (age, indicator for working over eight hours per day, and indicator for having been injured at work) are statistically significant at the 10 percent level, which is about what would be expected to occur by chance. The F-test in Column 6 does not reject the joint equality of means between the two groups at conventional levels of statistical significance.

¹⁵This follow-up success rate of 60 percent is consistent with other migrant studies such as Ambler et al. (2015) and Ashraf et al. (2015). The latter study successfully tracked 57 percent of migrants from El Salvador living in Washington, D.C. from the baseline. The follow-up rate in Ambler et al. (2015) is 73 percent. FDWs who we could not contact in the follow-up might have left the country, changed their phone number, or not want to be re-interviewed. If we could not contact an FDW after calling her for more than 10 times, we sent a short text message to the same number, informing our intention to contact for the follow-up survey. After the text, we tried calling 10 more times.

2.3 Empirical specification

We estimate intention-to-treat effects of our information intervention by estimating OLS with the following specification:

$$Y_i = c + \gamma \, Treatment_i + X'_i \, \delta + \epsilon_i \tag{1}$$

where Y_i is the outcome measure for individual *i*, $Treatment_i$ is a binary indicator for treatment assignment of individual *i*, and X_i is a vector of individual-level covariates. The covariates are included to improve estimation precision and to account for any chance differences between treatment and control groups in their baseline characteristics. Because we randomized at the individual-level, the variable $Treatment_i$ should be uncorrelated with the individual-specific error term, ϵ_i .

The coefficient of interest in the regression is γ , the causal impact of treatment on FDW outcomes, Y_i .

3 Results

We estimate the effect of the treatment on four types of outcomes: knowledge about labor laws related to job mobility, employment outcomes, intentions related to employment, and job search outcomes. Results for different sets of outcome variables are in Tables 2, 3, 4, and 5. For each set of outcome variables, we show treatment effects in the full sample in Panel A, and treatment effects for subsamples of the data (partitioned by baseline knowledge and by work conditions) in Panels B and C.

3.1 Treatment effects in the full sample

We first discuss treatment effects in the full sample, in Panel A of Tables 2-5.

Table 2 examines whether FDWs who received treatment had better knowledge of Singaporean labor laws related to job mobility at the time of the follow-up survey. We measured knowledge measured via true-or-false answers to the following four statements questions: According to Singapore law, FDWs are allowed a) to work in Singapore only via an agent; b) to change employers without using an agent; c) to change employers but have to leave Singapore first; and d) to change employers but need an approval from the current employer. The correct answers are "False" for the first and third questions, and "True" for the second and fourth.

The results in Table 2 indicate that the treatment had a positive impact on respondents' knowledge of labor regulations related to FDW job transfers. We find large and positive treatment effects on correct answers for the first two questions, which are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Impacts for questions 3 and 4 are small and not statistically significant at conventional levels.

To account for the problem of multiple inference, we construct summary indices that aggregate information over multiple treatment estimates, as in Kling et al. (2007). The knowledge index in Table 2, Column 5 is calculated by taking an equally weighted average across the four knowledge outcome indicator variables (equivalent to the share of the four questions answered correctly). The impact on the knowledge index is positive and significant at the 1 percent level. The impact of 0.156 on the knowledge index is large, amounting to 22.6 percent of the mean in the control group (0.691).

Impacts on employment outcomes are presented in Table 3. FDWs were asked during the follow-up survey whether their employment conditions had changed since the baseline. The results suggest that FDWs who received treatment are 9.3 percentage points more likely to reduce their work hours, and 10.7 percentage points more likely to improve other work conditions (excluding salary and work hours), compared to those who did not receive treatment. Both effects are statistically significant at the 5 percent level. On the other hand, treatment has no large or statistically significant impact on the likelihood of changing employers or of increasing one's salary.

The effect on an employment index (the average of the dependent variables in columns 1-4) is positive and statistically significant at the 10 percent level. The point estimate indicates an increase in the index of 0.055, which is not trivial in

magnitude compared to the mean in the control group (0.581).

Table 4 estimates the effect on FDWs' intentions to seek better employment conditions with employers. The dummy variables indicate whether respondents chose the maximum value in a 10-point scale (10 being extremely likely) to express their intentions to search for new employment, ask for higher salary, ask for better work hours and seek more rest days in the near future. The treatment increased the likelihood that FDWs reported they would seek better work hours and more rest days by 13.6 and 8.3 percentage points, respectively. The two estimates are statistically significant at the 5 percent level, and are large with respect to the means in the control group (4.5 percent and 2.3 percent, respectively.) Column 5 reports the impact on an index of intentions (the average of the dependent variables in Columns 1-4), and indicates that the treatment had a positive and statistically significant impact (at the 5 percent significance level) on FDWs' intentions to seek better work conditions. The effect on the intentions index, 0.079, is very large in magnitude, roughly doubling the mean in the control group (0.073).

Table 5 reports impacts on job-search behaviors. Columns 1-3, respectively, report impacts on indicator variables for looking for a new employer, searching for multiple employers, and using alternate channels to search besides an employment agency. The fourth job-search outcome is an indicator for the respondent reporting that job search was an easy process. The information intervention had no effect on any of the search variables or on an index of job search (the average of the dependent variables in columns 1-4).

3.2 Treatment effects in subsamples

To shed light on possible mechanisms and provide further insights, we now turn to analyses of impacts in subsamples. We first consider subsamples divided by initial knowledge of labor laws, and then turn to subsamples according to initial work conditions.

3.2.1 Subsamples by initial knowledge

Examining treatment effects by initial knowledge can suggest whether the treatment operates via changes in respondents' knowledge. The fact that the treatment has large impacts on respondents' knowledge of labor laws related to FDW job transfers, shown in Panel A of Table 2, is consistent with knowledge being the operative channel.

Additional evidence in favor of knowledge being the operative channel would be findings that effects on the various outcomes were concentrated among respondents who had low knowledge at baseline (prior to treatment.) We define "high knowledge" as in Table 1: an indicator for respondents answering correctly all four questions about labor laws. Panel B of Tables 2-5 estimates regressions where we add an indicator for Treatment interacted with the indicator for "high knowledge" (the main effect for high knowledge remains included in the regression as a control variable.) The coefficient on treatment then represents the treatment effect for those with low knowledge. The coefficient on the interaction term represents the difference in the treatment effect for those with high knowledge (compared with those with low knowledge). We also report the p-value of the F-test that the treatment effect for those with high knowledge (the sum of the coefficient on the treatment main effect and the coefficient on the interaction term) is statistically significantly different from zero.

We first highlight heterogeneity in the treatment effect on knowledge outcomes, in Table 2. As in Panel A, in Panel B the treatment effect is large and positive for respondents with baseline low knowledge. The coefficient on the treatment main effect for the first two outcomes and for the knowledge index are all statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The Treatment * High knowledge interaction term is negative in sign for these three variables, although not statistically significantly different from zero at conventional levels. F-test cannot reject at conventional levels that the treatment effects for initially high-knowledge respondents are zero.

Results in Panel B of Table 3 indicate that impacts on employment outcomes are larger among the initially low knowledge. For the dependent variables where there are large average effects in Panel A (columns 3 to 5), the main effect (impact of treatment for the initially low knowledge) is positive and statistically significant, while the interaction term coefficients in Panel B are all negative and relatively large in magnitude. For the employment index outcome variable (column 5), we can reject at conventional statistical significance levels that the treatment effect is the same in the low- and high-knowledge subsamples: the interaction term is negative and statistically significant at the 10% level. The F-tests cannot reject that treatment effects among the high-knowledge are zero.

This pattern of heterogeneity in treatment effects reveals itself in respondents' intentions (Table 4) as well. Treatment effects for the initially low knowledge are large in magnitude and statistically significant, while those for the high knowledge are smaller in magnitude (although not statistically significantly so among these outcomes) and are not statistically significantly different from zero.¹⁶

Overall, we view these results as highly suggestive that the treatment effect operates, at least in part, by improving respondents' knowledge. Across Tables 2, 3, and 4, impacts on the summary indices in each set of outcomes (column 5 of each table) for the initially low knowledge are large, positive, and statistically significantly different from zero at the 1 percent or 5 percent level. By contrast, the point estimates of impacts for the high knowledge on the summary indices are in each case less positive, and none are statistically significantly different from zero. For the employment index (Table 3), the impact for high knowledge respondents is statistically significantly different (at the 10 percent level) from the effect among low knowledge respondents.

3.2.2 Subsamples by initial work conditions

It is natural to suppose that workers with initially worse working conditions would be more responsive to the treatment, as they would likely have higher potential gains from changing jobs or from negotiating with their current employers for better

¹⁶In Table 5, there are no statistically significant patterns of treatment effect heterogeneity in Panel B, just as there were no impacts in Panel A's estimation of effects in the full sample.

conditions. We therefore now turn to exploring heterogeneity in treatment effects according to baseline work conditions. As discussed previously, Singaporean labor law requires employers to pay FDWs on time, allow one rest day a week, and provide a safe working environment to work. We categorized FDWs as "vulnerable" if they reported in the baseline that at least one of these conditions was not fulfilled by their current employer. These vulnerable FDWs comprise of slightly more than 20 percent of our sample. Results are in Panel C of Tables 2-5.

Results for employment outcomes, in Table 3, indicate that treatment effects are larger for vulnerable respondents. Coefficients on the Treatment * Vulnerable FDW interaction term are positive in each regression, and statistically significantly different from zero for four of the five outcome variables (the exception is the regression for salary). For each outcome variable in the table (again with the exception of the salary regression), the treatment effect for vulnerable FDWs is statistically significant at conventional levels, while the treatment effect for those not vulnerable (the coefficient on the main treatment effect) is not statistically significantly different from zero for any outcome. The employment index regression provides the most dramatic evidence of this pattern: the treatment effect for the non-vulnerable is 0.024 (not statistically significant), while that for the vulnerable (the sum of the treatment main effect and interaction term coefficients) is 0.164and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. It is also striking that, unlike the results for the full sample in Panel A, Panel C's results reveal that the treatment leads vulnerable FDWs to be more likely to change employers (column 1). The treatment effect on the "new employer" outcome for vulnerable FDWs amounts to 17.4 percentage points, with a p-value of 0.066.

Table 4, Panel C examines the differential effect on respondent intentions. The treatment had a positive impact on the intentions of non-vulnerable FDWs, who report higher propensity to seek better work hours and more rest days. On the other hand, the treatment had no statistically significant effect on intentions of vulnerable FDWs. Results for the intention index in Column 5 indicate that the effect on FDWs' intentions is positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent

level among non-vulnerable FDWs. For vulnerable FDWs, however, the effect is close to zero and is not statistically insignificant at conventional levels. (That said, for no outcome is the difference in the treatment effect between the two groups statistically significant at conventional levels.)

Taken together with the heterogeneous treatment effect estimates from Panel C of Table 3, the results suggest differences in the timing of action between that vulnerable and non-vulnerable FDWs in response to treatment. Treatment led to an immediate response on switching to a new employer and improving their employment conditions by vulnerable FDWs. Non-vulnerable FDWs who received treatment raise their reported intentions to improve their conditions in the future, but do not report having done so yet at the time of the follow-up survey. This result is also sensible, in that vulnerable FDWs would presumably feel greater urgency to improve their situations compared to non-vulnerable FDWs.

4 Conclusion

In a sample of Filipino migrant workers working as domestics (maids) in Singapore, we conducted a randomized controlled trial testing the impacts of providing information related to job mobility. The treatment provided information on workers' legal rights to change employers, and access to actual job listings. We found positive impacts on knowledge about legal rights related to job mobility, employment conditions, and intentions to improve employment conditions in the future. Subsample analyses reveal magnified effects in migrants with initially (pre-treatment) low knowledge of their legal rights, and who were "vulnerable" in these sense of having experienced poor working conditions at baseline. The subpopulation of vulnerable workers also became more likely to change employers in response to the treatment. These results reveal the empirical relevance of imperfect information as a market failure influencing employment outcomes in a labor market for migrant workers.

From a policy standpoint, there is substantial concern on the part of govern-

ments in migrant-origin countries and concerned non-government organizations that migrant legal rights are poorly protected. Ruhs (2013) emphasizes that national interests of migrant-destination countries often undermine an expansion of migrant rights. Our findings identify a simple intervention (simply providing information) that could improve employment outcomes of migrant workers even when it is not possible to alter the legal status quo related to migrant job transitions. That said, our findings apply most directly to labor markets (such as Singapore) where migrant job mobility is relatively unrestricted, but where this may not be completely known by migrants.

Our results also reveal that labor mobility more generally has an important effect on employment conditions of migrant workers. Many migrant-dominated occupations in developed countries, including domestic work, are characterised by fixed-length contracts and work permits that tie them to their employers. While rapid expansion of these sectors has allowed large numbers of workers from developing countries to seek lucrative employment opportunities, our results are suggestive (and consistent with the findings of Naidu et al. (2014)) that reforming labor laws that govern work contracts and conditions could further increase migrants' benefits from such employment.

There are important aspects of information constraints that are not explored in this paper, in particular the role of social networks. In our endline survey, more than 70 percent of treated FDWs reported sharing information on legal rights and job openings with friends. We view more detailed examination of the nature and extent of such information flows within social networks as an important area for future research, which we intend to explore.

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	Full sample			Restricted sample		
	Control	Treatment	Diff	Control	Treatment	Diff
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Demographic Characteristics						
Age (years)	36.60	37.37	0.772	36.88	38.65	1.775^{*}
Married	0.418	0.427	0.008	0.438	0.449	0.011
College graduate	0.562	0.607	0.045	0.607	0.618	0.011
Employment Characteristics						
Duration in Singapore (years)	8.059	8.200	0.141	8.404	9.404	1.000
Duration of current employment (years)	4.185	4.154	-0.031	4.235	4.673	0.438
Work more than 8 hr/day^a	0.954	0.973	0.019	0.944	0.989	0.045^{*}
Paid less than minimum wage ^{b}	0.366	0.300	-0.066	0.326	0.236	-0.090
Vulnerable FDW	0.209	0.247	0.038	0.202	0.236	0.034
Ever paid late	0.046	0.047	0.001	0.056	0.045	-0.011
Ever worked on rest days	0.137	0.167	0.029	0.135	0.169	0.034
Ever injured at work	0.039	0.080	0.041	0.023	0.079	0.056^{*}
Sends remittances	0.954	0.927	-0.028	0.955	0.899	-0.056
Social network	0.778	0.773	-0.004	0.843	0.764	-0.079
Knowledge about labor laws						
High knowledge	0.072	0.127	0.055	0.079	0.146	0.067
Work w/o agent	0.255	0.287	0.032	0.225	0.270	0.045
Change w/o agent	0.261	0.300	0.039	0.303	0.337	0.034
Change w/o leaving	0.739	0.780	0.041	0.719	0.809	0.090
Need approval	0.935	0.967	0.032	0.955	0.966	0.011
Observations	153	150		89	89	
Months between baseline and follow-up				7.556	7.927	0.371
Attrition between baseline and follow-up	0.418	0.407	-0.01			
F-test statistics			0.734			1.254
P-value			0.705			0.242

Table 1: Summary statistics and balance tests

Notes: **Vulnerable FDW** is a dummy variable that equals one if a FDW reports being paid late, working on rest days, or getting injured at work. **High knowledge** is a dummy variable that equals one if a FDW correctly answers all the questions on transfer laws. The robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. ^a The Employment Act requires that workers in Singapore not work more than 8 hours

per day. FDWs, however, are not protected by the Act. ^bThe Philippines Overseas Employment Administration sets a minimum wage for Filipino

FDWs. The minimum wage is USD400 (or SGD500, based on the average exchange rate from June-October, 2013).

	Work w/o agent (1)	Change w/o agent (2)	Change w/o leaving (3)	Need approval (4)	Knowledge index (5)
Panel A: average treatment effect					
Treatment	$\begin{array}{c} 0.312^{***} \\ (0.0715) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.308^{***} \\ (0.0675) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.030 \\ (0.0586) \end{array}$	-0.025 (0.0235)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.156^{***} \\ (0.0381) \end{array}$
Panel B: by knowledge					
Treatment	0.318^{***} (0.0762)	0.328^{***} (0.0721)	0.025 (0.0627)	-0.019 (0.0250)	0.163^{***} (0.0407)
Treatment x High knowledge	-0.061 (0.2310)	-0.164 (0.2190)	0.051 (0.1900)	-0.051 (0.0760)	-0.056 (0.1240)
High knowledge	$0.248 \\ (0.1850)$	0.387^{**} (0.1750)	$0.078 \\ (0.1520)$	$0.009 \\ (0.0608)$	0.180^{*} (0.0989)
P-value of F-test:					
Treat + Treat x High knowledge	0.235	0.424	0.672	0.328	0.356
Panel C: by work conditions					
Treatment	0.345^{***} (0.0805)	0.310^{***} (0.0763)	0.115^{*} (0.0646)	-0.005 (0.0263)	0.191^{***} (0.0426)
Treatment x Vulnerable FDW	-0.152 (0.1700)	-0.007 (0.1610)	-0.391^{***} (0.1360)	-0.090 (0.0553)	-0.160 (0.0897)
Vulnerable FDW	-0.009 (0.1280)	-0.135 (0.1220)	0.105 (0.1030)	0.022 (0.0419)	-0.004 (0.0679)
P-value of F-test: Treat +Treat x Vulnerable FDW	0.203	0.035	0.024	0.055	0.697
Observations Mean dep. var., control group	$178 \\ 0.449$	$178 \\ 0.506$	$178 \\ 0.820$	$178 \\ 0.989$	$178 \\ 0.691$

Table 2:	Impact	of	treatment	on	knowledge	outcomes
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Notes: The specifications control for FDW's demographic, employment, and knowledge characteristics. Work w/o agent is a dummy variable which equals one if a FDW correctly answered that FDWs can work in Singapore without using an agent. Change w/o agent is a dummy variable which equals one if a FDW correctly answered that FDWs can change employers without using an agent. Change w/o leaving is a dummy variable which equals one if a FDW correctly answered that FDWs can change employers without using an agent. Change w/o leaving is a dummy variable which equals one if a FDW correctly answered that FDWs can change employers without leaving Singapore. Need approval is a dummy variable which equals one if a FDW correctly answered that FDWs need an approval from their current employer to transfer. Knowledge index is an equally weighted average of the four knowledge outcome dummy variables. The robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.

	New	Salary	Work	Other	Employment
	employer (1)	(2)	(3)	conditions (4)	(5)
Panel A: average treatment effect					
Treatment	0.028	-0.008	0.093**	0.107***	0.055^{*}
	(0.0448)	(0.0781)	(0.0413)	(0.0409)	(0.0294)
Panel B: by knowledge					
Treatment	0.025	0.025	0.114***	0.131***	0.074**
	(0.0487)	(0.0833)	(0.0440)	(0.0433)	(0.0311)
Treatment x High knowledge	0.052	-0.300	-0.183	-0.212	-0.161*
	(0.1480)	(0.2530)	(0.1340)	(0.1320)	(0.0945)
High knowledge	-0.103	0.221	0.157	0.154	0.107
	(0.1180)	(0.2030)	(0.1070)	(0.1050)	(0.0757)
P-value of F-test:					
Treat + Treat x High knowledge	0.582	0.246	0.579	0.513	0.324
Panel C: by work conditions					
Treatment	-0.012	-0.017	0.057	0.070	0.024
	(0.0502)	(0.0882)	(0.0462)	(0.0457)	(0.0328)
Treatment x Vulnerable FDW	0.186^{*}	0.039	0.167^{*}	0.169^{*}	0.140^{**}
	(0.1060)	(0.1860)	(0.0973)	(0.0963)	(0.0691)
Vulnerable FDW	-0.065	-0.045	-0.189^{***}	-0.126*	-0.106**
	(0.0800)	(0.1410)	(0.0737)	(0.0729)	(0.0523)
P-value of F-test:					
Treat + Treat x Vulnerable FDW	0.066	0.892	0.011	0.006	0.008
Observations	178	178	178	178	178
Mean dep. var., control group	0.079	0.483	0.888	0.876	0.581

Notes: The specifications control for FDW's demographic, employment, and knowledge characteristics. New employer is a dummy variable which equals one if a FDW reports that she changed employer since the baseline. Salary is a dummy variable which equals one if a FDW reports that her wages increased since the baseline. Work hours is a dummy variable which equals one if a FDW reports that her wages increased since the baseline. Work hours did not increase since the baseline. Other conditions is a dummy variable which equals one if a FDW reports that other aspects of her work did not worsen since the baseline. Employment index is an equally weighted average of the four employment outcome dummy variables. The robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.

	Job	Salary	Work	Rest	Intentions
	search		hours	days	index
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Panel A: average treatment effect					
Treatment	$\begin{array}{c} 0.044 \\ (0.0486) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.053 \\ (0.0395) \end{array}$	0.136^{**} (0.0621)	0.083^{**} (0.0371)	0.079^{**} (0.0309)
Panel B: by knowledge					
Treatment	0.019 (0.0518)	0.059 (0.0424)	0.174^{***} (0.0664)	0.098^{**} (0.0397)	0.087^{***} (0.0334)
Treatment x High knowledge	0.227 (0.1570)	-0.040 (0.1290)	-0.302 (0.2020)	-0.115 (0.1210)	-0.057 (0.1010)
High knowledge	-0.132 (0.1260)	-0.077 (0.1030)	$0.208 \\ (0.1610)$	$0.000 \\ (0.0967)$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.000 \\ (0.0812) \end{array}$
P-value of F-test:					
Treat + Treat x High knowledge	0.097	0.875	0.497	0.880	0.753
Panel C: by work conditions					
Treatment	0.060 (0.0548)	0.070 (0.0446)	0.163^{**} (0.0700)	0.084^{**} (0.0419)	0.094^{***} (0.0348)
Treatment x Vulnerable FDW	-0.072 (0.1150)	-0.076 (0.0938)	-0.122 (0.1470)	-0.001 (0.0882)	-0.068 (0.0732)
Vulnerable FDW	0.080 (0.0873)	0.015 (0.0711)	(0.057) (0.1120)	-0.002 (0.0668)	(0.009) (0.0554)
P-value of F-test: Treat + Treat x Vulnerable FDW	0.907	0.941	0.755	0.296	0.687
Observations Mean den var control group	178	178	178	178	178
mean dep. var., control group	0.030	0.130	0.040	0.025	0.013

Table 4: Impact of treatment on intention outcomes

Notes: The specifications control for FDW's demographic, employment, and knowledge characteristics. Job search is a dummy variable which equals one if a FDW reports that she is very likely to search for a new employer in the next six months. Salary is a dummy variable which equals one if a FDW reports that she is very likely to ask for higher salary in the next three months. Work hours is a dummy variable which equals one if a FDW reports that she is very likely to ask for higher salary in the next three months. Work hours is a dummy variable which equals one if a FDW reports that she is very likely to ask for better working hours in the next six months. Rest days is a dummy variable which equals one if a FDW reports that she is very likely to ask for more rest days in the next three months. Intentions index is an equally weighted average of the four intention outcome dummy variables. The robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.

	New employer (1)	Multiple employers (2)	Channel besides agent (3)	Easy process (4)	Search index (5)
Panel A: average treatment effect					
Treatment	$0.005 \\ (0.0557)$	$0.014 \\ (0.0471)$	0.028 (0.0346)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.018 \\ (0.0380) \end{array}$	$0.016 \\ (0.0365)$
Panel B: by knowledge					
Treatment	-0.013 (0.0602)	-0.002 (0.0505)	0.021 (0.0371)	0.014 (0.0408)	0.005 (0.0394)
Treatment x High knowledge	0.175 (0.1830)	0.152 (0.1530)	0.066 (0.1130)	0.046 (0.1240)	0.110 (0.1200)
High knowledge	-0.209 (0.1460)	-0.108 (0.1230)	-0.069 (0.0902)	-0.031 (0.0991)	-0.104 (0.0957)
P-value of F-test:					
Treat + Treat x High knowledge	0.343	0.298	0.410	0.610	0.307
Panel C: by work conditions					
Treatment	-0.028 (0.0626)	-0.006 (0.0531)	0.012 (0.0389)	-0.016 (0.0425)	-0.010 (0.0410)
Treatment x Vulnerable FDW	0.148 (0.1320)	0.091 (0.1120)	0.074 (0.0820)	0.155^{*} (0.0895)	0.117 (0.0862)
Vulnerable FDW	0.033 (0.0999)	-0.050 (0.0846)	-0.028 (0.0621)	-0.065 (0.0678)	-0.027 (0.0653)
P-value of F-test:					
Treat + Treat x Vulnerable FDW	0.304	0.394	0.244	0.083	0.162
Observations	178	178	178	178	178
Mean dep. var., control group	0.146	0.090	0.034	0.056	0.082

Table 5: Impact of treatment on search outcomes

Notes: The specifications control for FDW's demographic, employment, and knowledge characteristics. New employer is a dummy variable which equals one if a FDW reports that she searched for a new employer since the baseline. Multiple employers is a dummy variable which equals one if a FDW reports that searched for more than one employer since the baseline. Channel besides agent is a dummy variable which equals one if a FDW reports that searched using channels other than her employment agency. Easy process is a dummy variable which equals one if a FDW reports that her search experience was very easy. Search index is an equally weighted average of the four search outcome dummy variables. The robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.

DOMESTIC WORKERS: KNOW YOUR RIGHTS

FDWs can work in Singapore WITHOUT using an agent

FDWs can change employer WITHOUT using an agent

FDWs can change employer WITHOUT leaving Singapore

> FDWs can change employer with NO fee

For more information, visit:

http://www.mom.gov.sg/Documents/servicesforms/passes/WPSPassConditions.pdf

To report any violation, visit:

http://www.mom.gov.sg/contactus/Pages/report-to-us.aspxthe

WHAT DOES THE LAW SAY?

The Ministry of Manpower gives you the legal right to request for transfer to any new employer of your choice, if:

- Your current Work Permit is still valid for 30 days or more
- Your passport is valid for at least 7 months
- Your current employer approves your transfer to a new employer

You can find more information at the Ministry of Manpower website:

www.mom.gov.sg/foreign-manpower/passesvisas/work-permit-fdw/inform-mom/

WHAT DO YOU NEED TO DO?

The transfer process is EASY and FREE.

- Your new employer will submit a new Work Permit application on your behalf to the Ministry of Manpower
- Your current employer must complete Part 5 of the Work Permit application to give his/her consent for the transfer
- Once your application is approved, you can collect your new Work Permit by visiting the Work Pass Service Center located at Tanjong Pagar Complex, 7 Keppel Road #02-27/29

The application form can be downloaded at:

http://www.mom.gov.sg/Documents/servicesforms/passes/WP_AppIn_Form_for_FDW.pdf

WHERE TO FIND NEW EMPLOYERS?

dwjobs.org is a FREE website with:

- Daily information on the large number of employers in Singapore seeking to hire domestic workers
- Detailed job descriptions including wages and contact numbers for you to call

You can also access all these ads on DWjobs Facebook page: www.facebook.com/dwjobs

Figure A2: Sample of a Job Posting Flyer

JOB POSTING 1: Contact Number: Salary: Property Type: Area: Skills Required: Description: Good & total housek every week, own roor	Domesic Helper on Transfer Wanted Immediately 55.550 Landed Cooking, Housekeeping eeping and some cooking for family of 4 adults. Prefer English speaking, honest, committed, clean and hardworking. off-day plus bathroom.	JOB POSTING 6: Contact Number: Salary: Property Type: Area: Skills Required: Description: We are looking for a can be end July or e with the following inf	Looking for Helper Who Enjoys Taking Care of Young Children S5 505 - 600 Other Child Care, Pet Care, Housekeeping, Cooking helper who enjoys looking after young children. We are family with 2 active children aged 1 & 2.5 and a cute toy dog. Start date safy August 2013; Prefers helper with reference from current/former employer, 1 day off per veak. Please ens me at the option of you an interference to meet up for an interference King Cooking. The safe of the option of the option of the option of the option. Thanks!
JOB POSTING 2: Contact Number: Salary: Property Type: Area: Skills Required: Description: Able to communicate	Filipino Halper Needed \$ 520 Landed Markeling, Cocking, Housekeeping in English, Independent, and Honest.	JOB POSTING 7: Contact Number: Salary: Property Type: Area: Skills Required: Description: Small family looking (3) Organised and H	Family Looking for Suitable Helper \$\$ 500 - 550 Condo Child Care, Housekeeping, Cooking, Marketing for helper with the following citretia: (1) Able to handle and care for children (8 yr and 12 yr); (2) Responsible and Independent: for helper with the following citretian: (1) Able to handle and care for children (8 yr and 12 yr); (2) Responsible and Independent: for helper with the following citretian: (1) Able to handle and care for children (8 yr and 12 yr); (2) Responsible and Independent: for helper with the following citretian: (1) Able to handle and care for children (8 yr and 12 yr); (2) Responsible and Independent: for helper help
JOB POSTING 3: Contact Number: Salary: Property Type: Area: Skills Required: Description: A local family of six a mainly the household honest and hardwork	Looking for a Transfer Helper \$5:500 ++ Landed Elder Care, Marketing, Cooking duda staying in 3 storey landed house around chores and preferably able to cook well. Ability to speak a little mandarin will be an added advantage. Willing to pay to a good, ng helperf Interested please cail Raymond Hp	JOB POSTING 8: Contact Number: Salary: Property Type: Area: Skills Required: Description: We are a friendly Sin below who can belo	a part specificate. Thanks Looking for Trustworthy Helper \$5 500 - 600 Infant Care, Housekeeping, Marketing, Cooking Infant Care, Housekeeping, Marketing, Cooking Infant Care, Housekeeping, Marketing, Cooking
JOB POSTING 4: Contact Number: Salary: Property Type: Area: Skills Required: Description: I'm locking for a help	Looking for a Helper Who Has Got Good Cooking Skills Negotable Contro Cooking Cooking and helking call me if you are thank you	experience in Singa organized; (3) quic current/previous em also flexible with sta family. Please msg a JOB POSTING 9:	pope and possess the following qualifies: (1) experience with newborn; (2) good in general household chore, very dean & kamare & filenoider, (4) good houghermakeling skill and able to cock; (5) reference and recommendation latter from poper will be a plus Weekly sunday off and salay will commensurate with experience. We prefer the helper to start ASAP but, if date f you it can equivements. If you posess the above qualifies, we would hou to meet and welcome you to be a part of our a short intro of yourself to me at the prefer to start of our a start of our a start from the direct. Thank you.
JOB POSTING 5: Contact Number: Salary: Property Type: Area: Skills Required: Skills Required:	Australian Expat Family Looking for Help SS 550 - 650 Landed Child Care, Housekeeping, Infant Care	Contact Number: Salary: Property Type: Area: Skills Required: Description: At least 2 years work	S\$ 500 Other Housekeeping, Cooking, Marketing, Elder Care king experience in SG. Able to communicate in English. Independent
Ve are an Australiar bedroom landed prop 18 month old son; Ho infant and child care with Expat familes); family for the foresee contact me via the fo Phone:	family new to Singapore with a set dog, an 18 month old boy and a baby doe in August. We have seenthy moved into a 5 erd on the diverse of the following date: Information of the following date: Information of our usakesping (including inomig), Marketing and cooking. We are locking of a begin with: Is as the set to bey Child care of our substance of the the following date: Information of the following date: Information of the theorem with a multi, is good with dogs: Has a hagve mathem and loses filters. Speaks angular well; kas at least the years experimence with a multi, is good with dogs: Has a hagve mathem and loses filters. Speaks angular well; kas at least they years experimence (some is in her 30's or early 40's and has the energy to look after a 18 month old boy; Is genuinely interested in being a part of our adde future. All soundways and out filterwise amployer references are required. If you are interested please lowing with your name and transfer date and we will contact you soon regarding an interview: email: Text	JOB POSTING 10: Contact Number: Salary: Property Type: Area: Skills Required: Description: Looking for good an cook and of indepen	Seeking Transfer Maid \$5.40 HBD Elder Carre, Housekeeping, Cooking, Marketing Elder Carre, Housekeeping, Cooking, Marketing trustwordty maid to do general housework and look after aged lady. Must be hardworking, honest, tidy and willing to learn to dent disposition.

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Note: The personal contact information in the above figure has been blacked out for privacy reasons. This information was visible to the participants of the study.

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