You can't take it with you ... but can it benefit your children?

Portability between countries and transmissibility across generations of immigrants' human capital

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April 4, 2018

Motivation

- Literature on the economic assimilation of immigrants (1G)
  - Achievements of immigrants in **host country** v natives Card (2005); Algan et al. (2010)
  - Differences between cohort of arrivals in **host country** Card (2005); Borjas (1995, 2015)
- Literature on the intergenerational mobility of immigrants (1G and 2G) Borjas (1993); Aydemir et al. (2009)
  - Correlate fathers and sons' earnings in **host country**

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  - Correlate fathers and sons' earnings in **host country**
- Everything starts in the **host country**
  - If mismatches between status in origin and host countries
  - Story of the engineer who becomes a taxi driver

This paper

- Incorporates pre-migration information
- Documents facts on migration

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

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

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

- Puzzle why the 2G, and not just the 1G, "catches up"?
- Builds a model where portability HK $\neq$ transmissibility HK
- Test empirically predictions of the model
- What the paper is NOT about? self-selection of immigrants
- What the paper does NOT claim? causal inference

Contribution

- The economic assimilation of immigrants Caponi (2011); Friedberg (2000); Eckstein and Weiss (2004); Borjas (2015)

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  - Add a dimension of heterogeneity
  - Similar economic conditions but different parental background
- Builds on a stylized fact already studied in sociology Ichou (2014)

Preview of the results

How does the long term picture of immigrants' assimilation change?

- A large fraction of 1G are "downgraded"
- 'Resurgence' is strong, 2G catch up with pre-migration
- Points towards low long-term mobility

Why catching up does not fully happen with the 1G?

- "Shock" of migration is substantial
- Low rate of accumulation of host country HC for 1G
- Higher rate of accumulation of host country HC for 2G

Plan of the talk

- Presentation of the data
- Descriptive Evidence
- Model
- Testing predictions of the model

Description of the Data - TeO

"Trajectoires et Origines", (TeO) by INED/INSEE in 2008/2009

- Designed specifically for immigrants. Relevant information
  - Level of French when arrived
  - Level of French now
  - Was origin country degree recognized?
  - ...
- Sampled to be representative of 2nd generation.
- Contains information on the social status prior to migration.
  - Education (level and type) in home country
  - Occupation before migration
  - Education and Occupation of their parents (the 0G)

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- Who can be followed?

		Part of the Survey		
		Personal History	Current Situation	Children
Sampled as	first	grandparents 0G parents pre mig 1st G	parents France 1st G	children France 2nd G
	second	parents pre mig 1st G	parents France 1st G children France 2nd G	grandchildren France 3rd G

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- What is known?

		Part of the Survey		
		Personal History	Current Situation	Children
Sampled as	first	occupation, education occupation, education	occupation, wage, transition on L market	education employment
	second	education	occupation education, occupation, wage	education employment

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- Same information appear twice $\Longrightarrow$ Out of sample robustness
- A sample of natives

Notation and Definition - I

- Notation
  - S stands for status
  - Subscripts P and C stand for parents and children.
  - For parents three observations, $S_{P,0},\ S_{P,1},\ S_{P,2}$ for $t = 0, 1, 2$
  - Children are observed only once $S_{C,2}$.
  - Status can take two values H or L (for high and low).
- Sample restriction
  - Sample first, 1G acquired HK in origin
  - Sample first, 2G born in France or arrived <10
  - Sample second, 1G arrived after 18
  - Restrict to both parents immigrants

Notation and Definition - II

- Definition of status in France
  - H is defined according to occupation
    - father is "supervisory occupations"
    - or father is "high managerial"
  - L is 1-H
- Definition of status in origin country
  - In sample first
    - *parents' definition:* "high" occupation before migration or finihsed secondary school
    - *grandparents' definition:* "high" occupation before migration or finihsed secondary school for grandfather
  - In sample second, father finished secondary school
- Robustness checks:
  - compare samples with same information
  - use different outcomes for children
  - use different definitions of $S_{P,0} = H$ for parents

Descriptive Statistics - Status in the origin country

Table: Sample first - *Parents' definition*

Country of origin	$S_{P,0} = L$	$S_{P,0} = H$	Nb of Observations
Algeria	57.4	42.6	61
Germany	23.7	76.3	38
Central America	38.9	61.1	18
North America	7.7	92.3	13
South America	20.0	80.0	30
Africa (Other)	37.5	62.5	40
Europe (Other)	41.5	58.5	53
Belgium	23.5	76.5	51
Cambodia	72.2	27.8	36
Cameroon	75.0	25.0	24
Congo B	50.0	50.0	16
Ivory Cost	45.5	54.5	11
Spain	71.4	28.6	14
Italy	70.4	29.6	27
Laos	54.3	45.7	35
Mali	81.0	19.0	21
Morocco	79.3	20.7	82
Middle East	6.1	93.9	33
Poland	31.6	68.4	19
Portugal	95.2	4.8	166
RDC	19.4	80.6	36
Senegal	75.9	24.1	29
Tunisia	77.8	22.2	36
Turkey	82.5	17.5	80
UK	15.7	84.3	51
Vietnam	43.1	56.9	58
Asia (Other)	23.1	76.9	52

More

Before migration to 1st job - Sample first

Table: Transition matrix - *Parents' definition*

	Absolute Numbers			Percentages		
	$S_{P,1} = L$	$S_{P,1} = H$	Total	$S_{P,1} = L$	$S_{P,1} = H$	Total
$S_{P,0} = L$	654	15	669	97.76	2.24	54.26
$S_{P,0} = H$	408	156	564	72.34	27.66	45.74
Total	1,062	171	1,233	86.13	13.87	

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- Robust to
  - using *Grandparents' definition*
  - breaking down by decades of arrivals
  - region of origin

From arrival to current job - Sample first

Table: Transition matrix - *Parents' definition* - All sample

	Absolute Numbers			Percentages		
	$S_{P,2} = L$	$S_{P,2} = H$	Total	$S_{P,2} = L$	$S_{P,2} = H$	Total
$S_{P,1} = L$	870	192	1,062	81.92	18.08	86.13
$S_{P,1} = H$	34	137	171	19.88	80.12	13.87
Total	904	329	1,233	73.32	26.68	

From arrival to current job - Sample first

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Table: Transition matrix - *Parents' definition* - Previously high

	Absolute Numbers			Percentages		
	$S_{P,2} = L$	$S_{P,2} = H$	Total	$S_{P,2} = L$	$S_{P,2} = H$	Total
$S_{P,1} = L$	264	144	408	64.71	35.29	72.34
$S_{P,1} = H$	30	126	156	19.23	80.77	27.66
Total	294	270	564	52.13	47.87	

Resurgence wiht 2nd generation - Sample first

- Outcome: educational achievements (obtained the baccalauréat)
- Objective:
  - Fix the family situation in France
  - Vary the pre-migration status
- Controls are gender, age (of the children) and country of origin

	No interaction				Interactions	
	Current Job	First Job	$ Resources		Current Job	First Job
Pre-mig	0.13	0.15	0.16	Low & High	0.00	-0.05
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)		(0.07)	(0.09)
Current	0.14	0.13	0.00	High & Low	0.10	0.14
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.00)		(0.04)	(0.03)
				High & High	0.30	0.29
					(0.04)	(0.04)
Mean	0.61	0.61	0.61		0.61	0.61
N	2,142	2,142	1,570		2,142	2,142
N high	832	832	580		832	832

- Standard errors are clustered at the household level
- Robust to inclusion of: number of siblings, year of birth, year of arrival (of the parent), ethnic enclave (ZUS), mean education achievement before migration
- Similar picture with *Grandparents' definition*

Resurgence wiht 2nd generation - Sample second

- Same regressions as before
- With more outcomes: not dropping out, higher education degree, wage and having a "high" occupation

	No interaction						Interactions				
	D-O	BAC	H-E	ln Wage	Job		D-O	BAC	H-E	ln Wage	Job
Pre-mig	0.08	0.17	0.26	0.14	0.21	Low & High	0.04	0.17	0.15	0.24	0.26
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.11)	(0.08)		(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.09)
Current	0.03	0.13	0.13	0.16	0.20	High & Low	0.08	0.19	0.29	0.27	0.29
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.08)		(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.15)	(0.10)
						High & High	0.10	0.28	0.35	0.17	0.34
							(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Mean	0.86	0.53	0.32	7.40	0.37		0.86	0.53	0.32	7.40	0.37
N	3,339	3,339	1,933	667	859		3,339	3,339	1,933	667	859
N high	397	397	143	46	63		397	397	143	46	63

- Robust to inclusion of: number of siblings, year of birth, year of arrival (of the parent), ethnic enclave (ZUS), mean education achievement before migration

Why Model?

- Strong empirical evidence, unsatisfactory to leave unexplained
- Formalize some intuition
- Not estimate the structural parameters (as in Caponi (2011))
- But develop a story to explain the facts
- See if the data "agrees" with the story
- Test predictions of the model

Setting of the model

- Based on the model by Borjas (2015)

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- 2 periods

- First period
  - parents arrive and cannot transfer their entire HC, δ
  - parents decide on inv to adapt their HC, π
  - parents decide on inv to develop HC of their children, θ

- Second period
  - parents and children on the labor market
  - accumulate extra HC at rate g and m

- Parents discount the future with a factor of ρ
- Parents are benevolent
- Parents transmit b of their own HC
- The cost of investment is that it "eats" part of your own capital

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  - Collect returns on portable HC

Assumptions of the model

- Example of the engineer becoming taxi
- K is him being engineer, $(1-\delta)K$ being taxi
- Rate of HC accumulation for the parents : $g(1-\delta)K = (\pi K)^{\alpha} K^{\beta}$
  - Invest on entire HC If studies for an exam, study as engineer
  - Collect returns on portable HC Accumulates over being a taxi driver
- Rate of HC accumulation for the children: $mK = (\theta K)^{\xi} K^{\lambda}$ Raises his children as engineer not taxi
  - Not discounted by the loss of HC of their parents
- α and ξ, transformation of investment into future HC
- β and λ, how much initial HC matters for accumulation
- No crowding out between π and θ
- The maximization program is

$$\max_{\pi,\theta}(1-\delta)(1-\pi)K - \theta K + \rho\left[(1+g)(1-\delta)K + b(1+m)K\right]$$

Solution of the model

- The solutions are

$$\pi^* = (\frac{1}{1-\delta})^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} (\alpha\rho)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} K^{\frac{\alpha+\beta-1}{1-\alpha}}$$

$$\theta^* = (\xi\rho)^{\frac{1}{1-\xi}} K^{\frac{\xi+\lambda-1}{1-\xi}}$$

- Mobility of the parents

$$\rho(1-\delta)(1+g^*)K - (1-\pi^*)(1-\delta)K$$

$$\rho(1-\delta)(1+g^*)K - (1-(\alpha\rho)\, g^*)(1-\delta)K$$

- Mobility of the children

$$\rho b(1+m^*)K - \rho(1+g^*)(1-\delta)K$$

- Drving elements to build a "story"
  - Stock of HC
  - Capacity of investment to transform into local HC

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- Do the basic assumptions make sense empirically?
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- Are the predictions of the model met in the data?
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  - On parents' inv to adapt their HK, $\frac{\partial \pi}{\partial K}$, $\frac{\partial \pi}{\partial \delta}$ More
  - On parents' inv in their children, $\frac{\partial \theta}{\partial K}$ More
- Can it help us build a story?
  - Consistent with the descriptive evidence
  - That can be tested
- Let's suppose for simplicity that $b = \rho = 1$
- Story
  - If capacity to adapt HC is low for parents (g^* small) => no full catch-up
  - If capacity to transmit HC to children is higher ($g^* < m^*$) => pre-mig background matters

Empirical relevance of the assumptions - Sample first

- If K transmission $\neq$ K portability
  - portability should affect parents directly
  - not affect children directly
  - a good measure is degree recognition
- Mincer equation for parent's wage with dummy for degree recognition
- Educ achievements for children
  - with the same variables
  - and a dummy for father occupation

	Parents		Children	
	No Country FE	Country FE	No Country FE	Country FE
Recognition	0.21	0.16	0.03	0.06
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Nb of Observations	323	323	875	875

Testing the "story" - accumulation for parents - Sample first

- Accumulation measured with returns to experience in FR
- Accumulation measured with returns to taking French classes
- Outcome is wages

	Experience in France				Returns to French Classes	
	No Country FE	Country FE	Natives		No Country FE	Country FE
Nb of years	-0.01	-0.01	0.04	Courses	0.02	-0.03
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)		(0.04)	(0.05)
Nb of years - Squared	0.00	0.00	-0.00			
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)			
Nb of observations	1,054	1,054	642		750	750
Nb of high - def parents					188	188
Nb of high - def grandparents					341	341

- Almost no return to learning French
- Much smaller returns to experience than native French (although imprecise estimates)

Testing the "story" - accumulation for children - Sample second

- Accumulation measured with returns to parents' investment
  - Schooling strategy, send a school outside the district
  - Help their children with homework
  - Provide children with room on their own to study
  - Pay for private classes
- Benchmark is return for natives (H_0 coefficient is the same)
- Below results for homework investment, similar picture with others

	Dropping Out	BAC	Higher Education	High Job	(Log) wage
Effect Imm	0.016	0.026	0.071	0.042	0.031
	(0.011)	(0.018)	(0.024)	(0.038)	(0.034)
Effect natives	-0.036	0.014	-0.050	0.007	-0.070
	(0.020)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.038)	(0.035)
Nb of observations	7,193	7,193	5,702	4,079	3,230
Nb of Immigrants	3,550	3,550	2,059	922	729
p-value H_0 equality	0.010	0.673	0.000	0.437	0.020

- Not very different than natives
- Different when returns is higher for immigrant children

Conclusion

- Look at economic assimilation of immigrants
- Extend the time bonds
  - Before : pre-migration
  - After : link 1G and 2G of same families
- Document initial loss in 1G and catching up over generations
- Build a model with portability $\neq$ transmissibility
- Motivates a story with different rates of accumulation by generations
- Confirmation in the data

Descriptive Statistics - Status in the origin country

Table: Sample first - *Grandparents' definition*

Country of origin	$S_{P,0} = L$	$S_{P,0} = H$	Nb of Observations
Algeria	69.0	31.0	168
Germany	15.0	85.0	40
Central America	55.2	44.8	29
North America	6.2	93.8	16
South America	15.2	84.8	33
Africa (Other)	25.4	74.6	63
Europe (Other)	32.9	67.1	70
Belgium	26.4	73.6	53
Cambodia	67.1	32.9	73
Cameroon	35.1	64.9	37
Congo B	31.2	68.8	32
Ivory Cost	50.0	50.0	26
Spain	61.1	38.9	36
Italy	65.9	34.1	44
Laos	56.0	44.0	75
Mali	68.9	31.1	45
Morocco	79.2	20.8	231
Middle East	12.5	87.5	48
Poland	39.1	60.9	23
Portugal	81.0	19.0	237
RDC	23.5	76.5	51
Senegal	70.4	29.6	71
Tunisia	72.8	27.2	92
Turkey	71.8	28.2	177
UK	11.1	88.9	54
Vietnam	37.9	62.1	95
Asia (Other)	23.3	76.7	73

Back

Predictions of the model - Parents

- Investment in adapting their HK measured with language courses
  - $\frac{\partial \pi K}{\partial \delta} > 0$, the harder you fall, the more you will invest
  - $\frac{\partial \pi K}{\partial \delta} > 0 \Rightarrow \alpha < 1$
  - I regress language course **on the subset of low status at migration**
  - Control for age and gender (both columns), level of French at arrival in 2nd column
  - Include a dummy for pre-mig status
  - Include dummies for highest educational level and test for H_0 equality of coeff

	Education Level			Pre-mig status	
Primary School	-0.062	-0.062	Pre-mig	0.182	0.200
	(0.030)	(0.030)		(0.036)	(0.037)
Secondary School	0.149	0.159			
	(0.044)	(0.043)			
Higher Education	0.127	0.136			
	(0.049)	(0.049)			
Nb observations	1,293	1,293		838	838
p-value H_0 equality	0.000	0.000			

Predictions of the model - Parents

- Investment in adapting their HK measured with language courses
  - $\frac{\partial \pi K}{\partial K} > 0$, the higher HC, the higher is investment
  - $\frac{\partial \pi K}{\partial K} > 0 \Rightarrow \beta > 0$
  - I regress language course **on the subset of low status at migration**
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	Education Level			Pre-mig status	
Primary School	-0.053	-0.062	Pre-Mig	0.178	0.195
	(0.030)	(0.030)		(0.033)	0(.033)
Secondary School	0.157	0.159			
	(0.041)	(0.043)			
Higher Education	0.126	0.136			
	(0.040)	(0.049)			
Nb observations	1,423	1,293		935	935
p-value H_0 equality	0.000	0.000			

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Predictions of the model - Children

- $\frac{\partial \theta K}{\partial K} > 0$, the higher HC, the higher is investment
- $\frac{\partial \theta K}{\partial K} > 0 \Rightarrow \xi > 1$ and $\lambda > 0$
- I regress parental investment on pre-mig and post-mig status
- Control for age and gender (of children), country of origin FE
- Include a dummy for pre-mig status

	No interaction					Interaction			
	School	Homework	Room	Private Classes		School	Homework	Room	Private Classes
Pre-mig	0.05	0.31	0.11	0.13	Low & High	0.05	0.12	0.08	0.07
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)		(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Current	0.04	0.13	0.07	0.13	High & Low	0.06	0.30	0.12	0.10
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)		(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)
					High & High	0.08	0.44	0.18	0.29
						(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Mean	0.18	0.33	0.67	0.14		0.18	0.33	0.67	0.14
N	3,312	3,273	3,339	3,339		3,312	3,273	3,339	3,339
N high	385	397	397	397		385	397	397	397

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